Movement for Democratic Change treasurer Roy Bennett said the South African government was very close to the Arthur Mutambara faction of the MDC and suggested that it provided funds to the faction.
The United States embassy in Pretoria, however, said it had not confirmed the report.
Bennett told an embassy official that the South African government was suspicious of the MDC. It also viewed the United States government as being sympathetic to the MDC.
Bennett said Welshman Ncube, one of the MDC negotiators and secretary general of the Mutambara faction at the time, had also complained to South African government officials about US meddling in the internal politics of the MDC
Ncube is now the leader of the faction.
Bennett said the South African government was closer to the Mutambara faction, especially to Ncube, because of the historical links between the African National Congress and the Zimbabwe African People’s Union.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 07PRETORIA1447, PROSPECTS FOR MBEKI FACILITATION IN ZIMBABWE
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Reference ID |
Created |
Classification |
Origin |
VZCZCXRO5259
RR RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHSA #1447/01 1141450
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 241450Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9385
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0966
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 2054
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0481
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 1071
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0505
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 1259
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 1729
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1170
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 6376
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0455
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1059
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 1184
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0064
RUEHTN/AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN 4225
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1191
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0392
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 PRETORIA 001447
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF/S D. MOZENA, S. HILL, M. TABLER-STONE, DRL J.
KRILLA
NSC FOR AF SENIOR DIRECTOR B. PITTMAN
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E. LOKEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/2017
SUBJECT: PROSPECTS FOR MBEKI FACILITATION IN ZIMBABWE
REF: A. 06 PRETORIA 0582
¶B. 05 PRETORIA 4522
¶C. CAPE TOWN 0060
¶D. HARARE 0326
¶E. PRETORIA 1054
¶F. TRENKLE-DELL EMAIL OF 03/29/2007
Classified By: Ambassador Eric Bost. Reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION. As recently-appointed SADC
“facilitator” for Zimbabwe, President Mbeki is off to the
races but may not make it to the finish line. Mbeki has
taken on Mugabe in the past and failed, and we should not
underestimate Mugabe’s ability to outfox him again.
Nevertheless, we recommend giving Mbeki space to pursue his
ultimate goal of facilitating Mugabe’s retirement. Mbeki
wants Mugabe replaced by a ZANU-PF-led “government of
national unity,” which he believes will reform the economy
and open political space. At this stage, we suggest
maintaining a restrained public posture on the initiative,
while privately stressing the need for free and fair
elections, noting our skepticism about Mugabe’s intentions,
and asking about “plan B” if the SADC-Mbeki initiative does
not succeed. It also may be useful to encourage regional
allies to engage Mbeki regularly and to support efforts by
South African civil society organizations, the press, and
Zimbabwean exile groups to keep the Mbeki facilitation on
track.
¶2. (C) This message and its recommendations draws on the
conversations with Pretoria-based diplomats, South African
analysts, Zimbabwean exile leaders and businessmen, and civil
society organizations. Ambassador hosted a lunch April 19
with the High Commissioners from Australia, the United
Kingdom, New Zealand, and Canada to discuss Mbeki-SADC
initiative. The envoys agreed with Post’s assessment that
the Mbeki initiative faces an uphill battle and were
skeptical that he would succeed. Despite their concerns,
they concurred that the Mbeki effort is the “only game in
town,” and deserves space and quiet support, at least for the
time being. END SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION.
————————————–
SADC Appoints South Africa as Mediator
————————————–
¶3. (C) The March 28-29 Extra-Ordinary Southern African
Development Community (SADC) Summit “mandated” South African
President Mbeki to “continue to facilitate dialogue between
the opposition and the government” in Zimbabwe. The SADC
appointment is the first time that South Africa has been
formally designated by the regional organization to deal with
the crisis in Zimbabwe, although the SAG has tried a number
of bilateral initiatives over the years, including
negotiating a compromise constitution (ref A) and offering a
conditional loan (ref B). The SADC blessing is important to
the South Africans and may make them more aggressive than
they otherwise would be. Mbeki strongly prefers to act under
a multilateral mandate, even if it’s largely a figleaf for
SAG bilateral interests.
¶4. (C) Mbeki and his core Zimbabwe advisors — Minister of
Provincial and Local Government Sydney Mufamadi, Director
General in the Presidency Frank Chikane, Presidential Legal
PRETORIA 00001447 002 OF 006
Advisor Mojanku Gumbi, and Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad
— are devoting significant time and attention to Zimbabwe.
The combination of the continuing economic collapse in
Zimbabwe, Mugabe’s brutal and public attacks on opposition
leaders, the flood of millions of Zimbabweans into South
Africa, and the specter of the upcoming (and potentially
violent) elections in Zimbabwe have reenergized SAG
diplomatic efforts. DefMin Lekota told Ambassador February
22 that the SAG was so concerned about unpredictable
situation in Zimbabwe that they were keeping troops in
reserve capable of responding to the situation (ref C). We
also believe that South Africa wants Zimbabwe “solved” before
it hosts the soccer World Cup in 2010.
————————-
Persuade Mugabe to Retire
————————-
¶5. (C) While South Africa’s tactics as mediator in Zimbabwe
remain murky, the SAG appears to be pursuing its strategy
along two main tracks. First, we believe the SAG and ANC are
intensifying behind-the-scenes efforts to persuade Mugabe to
step aside before the upcoming 2008 elections. Mbeki knows
that it will be difficult for Zimbabwe to hold free and fair
elections — or for the GOZ to undertake any real economic
and political reform — with Mugabe as the president and
ZANU-PF candidate. Mbeki is reportedly playing with several
formulas to give Mugabe a “soft landing,” such as convincing
him to accept a position as ceremonial president or to retain
the party presidency. Other reports of the SAG’s efforts to
facilitate Mugabe’s retirement include:
— During the March Extra-Ordinary Summit, SADC quietly
tasked Tanzanian President Kikwete to put together a package
to deal with Mugabe’s financial and physical security,
according to IDASA analyst Sydney Masamvu. This package
would deal with prosecution for crimes against humanity,
retirement location, and financial guarantees for Mugabe and
his family.
— Masamvu also learned that following a meeting with former
President Nelson Mandela, senior ANC leader Tokyo Sexwale
called GOZ Reserve Bank Governor Gideon Gono on April 6
indicating that the feeling within the ANC as a party was
that Mugabe should retire now (ref D).
— We understand from several sources that the ANC is staying
in close touch with the Mujuru and Mnangagwa factions of
ZANU-PF — both of whom reportedly want Mugabe gone —
looking for opportunities to influence internal ZANU-PF
dynamics.
—————————————–
Promote Political Dialogue Leading to GNU
—————————————–
¶6. (C) The second track is promoting dialogue between the GOZ
and opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), centered
around creating conditions for free and fair elections in
¶2008. We believe Mbeki views the elections not as an end in
themselves, but rather as a tool to facilitate dialogue
between the government and opposition, to end the country’s
economic and political crisis, and to bring Zimbabwe out of
its international isolation. Our sources suggest that
PRETORIA 00001447 003 OF 006
Mbeki’s preferred scenario is the creation of a ZANU-PF-led
government of national unity (GNU), preferably before the
elections, with the MDC (or at least elements thereof)
working with ZANU-PF to deal with the economic crisis and to
open political space before the elections. Mbeki might even
recommend delaying the elections if he believes the GNU
scenario is going to pan out.
¶7. (C) This formula draws heavily on South Africa’s own
transition experience, as well as SAG mediations in the DRC,
Burundi, and Cote d’Ivoire. Mbeki’s team has met the two MDC
Secretaries General, Tendai Biti and Welshman Ncube, twice in
SIPDIS
recent weeks to tease out their negotiating positions (ref
E). MDC Treasurer Roy Bennett told PolOff April 19 that the
South Africans gave the two officials a six-page letter from
Mbeki, which Bennett characterized as a “long-winded” request
for MDC views on the conditions for elections and soliciting
their commitment to dialogue. (NOTE: Bennett understands
that Mbeki sent Mugabe a similar letter. END NOTE.) In
return, the MDC factions, largely working together on this
initiative, agreed to dialogue and provided South Africa with
a “Roadmap” demanding six reforms before the MDC will agree
to participate in elections:
— a new constitution;
— repeal of repressive laws;
— new voter’s roll;
— establishment of an independent electoral commission which
is answerable to parliament and constituted in a way that
“shows the diversity of Zimbabwean politics”;
— demilitarization of state institutions; and,
— international supervision of elections.
MDC’s Bennett also said that he believed Tsvangirai would ask
for a second mediator to be added to the mix, perhaps
UN-appointed, to “keep Mbeki honest.” Bennett mentioned
someone like former UNSYG Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who is not
seen as pro-Western.
¶8. (C) The South Africans will take the MDC demands to GOZ
leaders, likely Justice Minister Patrick Chinamasa and
perhaps to Mugabe directly. South Africa will then attempt
to find middle ground between the MDC and ZANU-PF, and secure
MDC’s participation in the election.
—————–
Suspicious of MDC
—————–
¶9. (C) While the SAG has little choice but to engage the MDC,
the SAG does not respect or trust the opposition party —
particularly the Morgan Tsvangirai-led faction — and doubts
they could govern Zimbabwe. Elements of the ANC also believe
that liberation movements like ZANU-PF have an inherent right
to rule. South African commentators, such as Moeletsi Mbeki,
brother of the president, argue that South Africa does not
want a party with labor union roots emerging as a governing
party in southern Africa, since the trade union federation
COSATU is one of the few threats to ANC political dominance
in South Africa.
¶10. (C) The USG is viewed in South Africa as sympathetic to
the MDC, particularly the Tsvangirai faction. The release of
the 2007 Promoting Democracy Human Rights report, which
PRETORIA 00001447 004 OF 006
described USG support for “the efforts of the political
opposition,” received prominent coverage on the front pages
of the April 08 Sunday Times (“Americans are backing
Zimbabwe’s dissident groups”) and April 07 Business Day
Weekender (“Revelations of US meddling in Zimbabwe hurts
Mbeki plan”). These reports reinforced mistaken perceptions
in South Africa that the MDC is a tool of Western interests.
We also understand from MDC Treasurer Bennett that Welshman
Ncube complained about USG “meddling” in the internal
politics of the MDC in his meeting with SAG officials (ref
F). Bennett suspects that South Africa does not want close
MDC-USG engagement, believing the USG might counterbalance or
even undermine SAG efforts to pressure the MDC to accept
compromises. (NOTE: Bennett and other sources believe that
the SAG is much closer to the Mutambara MDC faction,
particularly Welshman Ncube (based in part on historical
links during the liberation struggle between the ANC and
ZAPU), and consults them regularly. Bennett has even
suggested that the SAG provides funds to the Mutambara
faction, a report we have not confirmed. END NOTE.)
—————–
Destined to Fail?
—————–
¶11. (C) Given the SAG’s failed attempts to resolve the
Zimbabwe crisis in the past, we share the skepticism of many
pundits about this new effort. Mugabe has outplayed Mbeki
time after time. The SAG will be reluctant to use its
economic leverage — cutting off electricity, closing the
border, or imposing sanctions on Zimbabwe — actions they
believe would further destabilize Zimbabwe.
¶12. (C) The wily Mugabe could manipulate the SADC-Mbeki
initiative in a number of ways, including for example:
— dragging out the talks by promising to meet with Mbeki and
the SAG, but never making the necessary compromises;
— making conciliatory statements while stepping up police
pressure and repression against the opposition;
— making key concessions, like repealing repressive
legislation, late in the campaign season, so late that the
opposition will not be able to take advantage of the “open”
political space; or
— promising to step down after the 2008 elections, but then
reneging after the elections have passed.
¶13. (C) Despite our overall skepticism, we note that the new
SADC-Mbeki mediation contains several new elements compared
with previous SAG initiatives:
— Mbeki believes that the SADC endorsement of South Africa’s
mediation gives him greater clout to take on Mugabe. Mbeki
himself emphasized this point in his April 1 Financial Times
interview, distinguishing the current initiative from
previous ones (“this time we are acting for the region”).
— We believe Mbeki wants to “solve” the Zimbabwe issue
before he departs office in 2009, in part to enhance a legacy
battered by his lack of response to the HIV/AIDS pandemic and
inability to deal with violent crime. True, Mugabe has
PRETORIA 00001447 005 OF 006
outplayed Mbeki before, but Mbeki is a shrewd, effective
diplomat who (hopefully) has learned from his past dealings
with Mugabe. IDASA’s Masamvu even speculated that Mbeki
sought the SADC mandate because he wants to “get Bob” before
he leaves power. We doubt Mbeki would have taken on the
mediation role without some confidence that he could succeed.
— The internal dynamic in Zimbabwe is different now, with
strong elements within ZANU-PF opposed to Mugabe’s continued
rule. The SAG remains in close contact with the various
ZANU-PF camps, and thus has better information about internal
ZANU-PF developments and will seek ways to influence events.
— We believe the involvement of Minister of Provincial and
Local Government Sydney Mufamadi as Mbeki’s point person on
Zimbabwe is a positive development. Mufamadi was one of the
key players in the successful DRC peace talks. He has a
strong reputation as a pragmatic and effective negotiator.
— South Africa is under increasing internal pressure to deal
with the situation Zimbabwe. While there was initially
sympathy for Mugabe among black South Africans in the early
part of the decade, we believe this has dissipated.
Editorialists and civil society groups have been fiercely
critical of Mugabe in recent weeks, and skeptical of Mbeki’s
mediation effort. Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa
(estimated between two and three million) are increasingly
blamed for the country’s severe crime problem and the drain
on social services, adding pressure on the SAG to act.
—————————————-
Suggestions for U.S. Policy on Mediation
—————————————-
¶14. (C) Post recommends that the Department consider the
following steps related to the South African mediation in
Zimbabwe.
— Restrained Public Posture: We suggest that the USG
continue its restrained line on the Mbeki mediation, noting
that we support SADC’s and Mbeki’s call for free and fair
elections in Zimbabwe. Embracing the initiative might
undermine Mbeki by enabling Mugabe to portray Mbeki as a
lackey of the West. Keeping our powder dry also gives us
flexibility as the initiative develops. At the Ambassador’s
April 19 lunch, the High Commissioners from Australia, the
United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Canada, unanimously agreed
with this approach: giving Mbeki public space to pursue his
mediation, at least for now. All, however, agreed that GOZ
violence against the opposition must be condemned quickly and
forcefully and will not be included as part of a “restrained”
public posture.
— Active Private Consultations/Pressure: While Post
suggests maintaining a restrained public posture on the
initiative, we should privately stress to SAG officials the
importance of Zimbabwe holding legitimate elections in 2008.
Mbeki says he supports “free and fair elections in Zimbabwe,”
and we should hold him to his word. We should note our
skepticism about Mugabe’s intentions and ask SAG officials
about “plan B” if the SADC-Mbeki initiative does not succeed.
There may be times when high-level USG engagement with
President Mbeki and his key advisors may be useful, both to
emphasize our concerns and, if the facilitation develops
PRETORIA 00001447 006 OF 006
positively, to offer support.
— Engagement with Regional Allies: We believe it may be
useful to encourage SADC and African Union leaders who have
publicly expressed concern about the situation in Zimbabwe,
like Ghanaian President Kufour, Zambian President Mwanawasa
and Botswanan President Masire, to engage Mbeki and the SAG
regularly on the regional initiative. This will help keep
Mbeki “honest,” as well as provide him with support.
— Domestic Public Pressure: While the SAG likely wants the
Zimbabwe issue to fade from the headlines to allow its
“quiet” initiative to evolve, we believe that public pressure
in South Africa is critical to keeping the initiative on
track. We will continue to engage South African civil
society organizations, the press, and Zimbabwean exile
groups. We will also work with Embassy Harare on possible
quiet funding for key advocacy initiatives.
— Prepare to Respond: If the initiative evolves
successfully, it is likely that the SAG will approach the
USG, the U.K., and other Western nations to request that we
respond positively to concessions by lifting (some) targeted
sanctions and/or expressing public support for certain
actions. The SAG will be particularly interested in what USG
assistance would be available, including specific amounts and
sectors, if Mugabe leaves power and reforms begin. We should
be prepared to respond to these requests.
¶15. (U) This message was coordinated with Embassy Harare.
BOST
(21 VIEWS)
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