Movement for Democratic Change leader Morgan Tsvangirai’s chief lawyer Innocent Chagonda, and Nelson Chamisa the party spokesman at the time, were willing to share the Ministry of Home Affairs, which was one of the main outstanding issues stopping the formation of an inclusive government nearly four months after the signing of the Global Political Agreement.
MDC treasurer Roy Bennett was still adamant that the party would not share the ministry though this had been instructed by the Southern African Development Community which was brokering the peace talks in Zimbabwe.
Bennett maintained that outstanding issues included:
- equity in allocation of governors,
- equal distribution of ministerial portfolios,
- the constitution
- composition of the National Security Council and
- appointment of senior government officials.
Most of the issues remain unresolved four years after the formation of the inclusive government whose life span is about to expire.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 09PRETORIA43, MDC WILL STAY THE COURSE
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
|
Reference ID |
Created |
Classification |
Origin |
P 121452Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6914
INFO AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN PRIORITY
AMCONSUL DURBAN PRIORITY
AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG PRIORITY
DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L PRETORIA 000043
DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S J. FRAZER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2019
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL ZANU SF ZM
SUBJECT: MDC WILL STAY THE COURSE
Classified By: Ambassador Eric M. Bost. Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)
Standing Committee, consisting of 19 leaders, met near
Johannesburg, South Africa for a strategy meeting from
January 6-8, 2009. In a January 9 meeting with Ambassador
Bost, MDC President Morgan Tsvangirai said the party leaders
resolved to stick to its current position on joining a unity
government only if Zanu-PF comes to agreement on previously
stated outstanding issues. MDC expects that the parties will
not come to agreement on outstanding issues and is preparing
to implement Plan B – increasing pressure, domestically and
internationally, on the regime led by Zimbabwean President
Robert Mugabe. Although Tsvangirai sees South Africa as the
key to international pressure, he expects no change in
Zimbabwe policy under President Kgalema Motlanthe and is
uncertain whether it will change with the administration of
African National Congress (ANC) President Jacob Zuma, who is
expected to win presidential elections this year. Tsvangirai
plans to return to Zimbabwe on January 15 or 16. End summary.
———————-
SOUTH AFRICA UNHELPFUL
———————-
¶2. (C) MDC’s plan A focuses on settling outstanding issues
with Mugabe before joining a unity government. Tsvangirai
told Ambassador Bost he has not received a response to his
letter requesting Motlanthe to host a meeting between
Tsvangirai and Mugabe to resolve outstanding issues. When
pressed, he said he did not think Motlanthe would agree to
this request.
¶3. (C) Tsvangirai said South Africa is the only country that
can change the situation in Zimbabwe, but he was skeptical
that South Africa would use its power to pressure Zanu-PF.
He said the South African Government (SAG) was structurally
the same under Motlanthe as it was under former President
Thabo Mbeki, with many of the same decision-makers. He
thinks Mbeki is still driving SAG policy on Zimbabwe from
behind the scenes. According to Tsvangirai, the SAG
leadership continues to protect Mugabe because they think
Mugabe is not the problem, rather part of the solution to the
crisis in Zimbabwe. Ambassador Bost asked Tsvangirai for his
interpretation of South Africa’s motivations in regards to
Zimbabwe policy. Tsvangirai said South Africa was committed
to the solidarity of liberation movements and as a liberation
party, Zanu-PF must be given the opportunity to recreate
itself. He explained that Mbeki’s policy on Zimbabwe was
built on an anti-Western precept and the policy has not
changed under Motlanthe’s leadership.
——————————————— —–
TSVANGIRAI UNCERTAIN ABOUT ZUMA POLICY ON ZIMBABWE
——————————————— —–
¶4. (C) Ambassador Bost asked Tsvangirai whether South
Africa’s posture on Zimbabwe would change under Zuma’s
leadership. He said he engages Zuma on a regular basis, but
Zuma remains outside of the SAG’s policy-making circle.
Tsvangirai said he and Zuma are “equally frustrated” with the
SAG’s Zimbabwe policy. Under Zuma’s administration,
Tsvangirai expects a greater push for resolution of the
Zimbabwe crisis. However, he said, “I haven’t picked out
what Zuma thinks is the solution.”
——————————————— ——–
——————————————— ——–
FORGET THE LEADERSHIP, GO TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN PEOPLE
——————————————— ——–
¶5. (C) Tsvangirai signaled a tactical change for winning
South Africa’s support. He said, “Perhaps we are making a
mistake by talking to the leadership.” MDC plans to reach
out to civil society, including the Congress of South African
Trade Unions and the South African Communist Party, in an
effort to intensify South African public pressure on its own
government. When Ambassador Bost asked him whether MDC would
engage the ANC’s rival party, the Congress of the People
(COPE), Tsvangirai said he was doubtful COPE could help, but
would “have to” meet with them because they are part of civil
society. Tsvangirai said the SAG would be more responsive to
the South African people than to MDC.
——————————————-
MUGABE NOT EXPECTED TO AGREE TO MDC DEMANDS
——————————————-
¶6. (C) On January 8, MDC Treasurer Roy Bennett, who attended
the strategy meeting, told poloff although MDC does not
expect Zanu-PF to agree to its demands, the party does not
want to be perceived as the “spoiler” of the GPA by walking
away from negotiations. That line of thinking is consistent
with Tsvangirai’s comments regarding unaccounted-for
abductees. He told Ambassador Bost he thought it was
significant that the public now knows the state is
responsible for abductions of MDC supporters and other civil
society members. He indicated no intention of following
through on his threat to suspend negotiations and contact
with Zanu-PF if all abductees were not released or charged by
January 1, 2009.
¶7. (C) Bennett reiterated to poloff some of MDC’s outstanding
issues: equity in allocation of governors, equal distribution
of ministerial portfolios, the constitution and composition
of the National Security Council and appointment of senior
government officials. (Note: Outstanding issues Bennett did
not mention are a sunset clause on any Government of National
Unity and rescission of Mugabe’s appointment of Johannes
Tomana as attorney general and reappointment of Gideon Gono
as central bank governor.) Bennett said MDC would not share
the Ministry of Home Affairs as instructed by the Southern
African Development Community (SADC) following its November 9
summit. (Note: MDC spokesman Nelson Chamisa and Tsvangirai’s
chief lawyer Innocent Chagonda have expressed to Embassy
Harare a willingness to share Home Affairs.)
——————————————— ——–
MDC VAGUE ON STRATEGY TO INCREASE PRESSURE ON ZANU-PF
——————————————— ——–
¶8. (C) In light of Mugabe’s publicly-stated intention to form
a government unilaterally by the end of February, the MDC is
gearing up to increase pressure on Zanu-PF to give up power
as per plan B, according to Bennett. Tsvangirai told
Ambassador Bost they would pressure Mugabe until he changes
his “paradigm.” He said, “We are reaching a tipping point
where Mugabe has no option but to settle the crisis or the
country will plunge into the unknown.” Tsvangirai believes
the collapse of the local currency and subsequent
dollarization of the economy will force the regime to concede
power as it does not have the capacity to cover the
government payroll using U.S. dollars. Tsvangirai
acknowledged the resilience of Mugabe and Zanu-PF. He said
during the 1998-2000 timeframe, “(MDC leaders) were so naive.
We thought we were just going to vote Mugabe out. We
underestimated the depth and determination of this group.”
Tsvangirai said former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo
told him in a recent meeting that he thinks Mugabe wants to
die in office.
¶9. (C) In spite of Ambassador Bost’s efforts to elicit a
specific plan of action, Tsvangirai was vague about how MDC
would increase pressure on the Mugabe regime, saying only
that fighting a dictatorship using democratic means is
difficult, like “fighting with your bare hands.” Bennett
said MDC would enact a 90 day plan, culminating at the end of
March in mass demonstrations in every province to coincide
with the celebration of the party’s 10th anniversary. He
said MDC would conduct an internal party audit to determine
Qsaid MDC would conduct an internal party audit to determine
and fill gaps in the party structure created by loss of party
leaders at the provincial, district, and ward levels.
Bennett said the party would use its majority position in
Parliament to pass bills and repeal laws in an effort to put
the regime on the defensive.
———————-
MDC REQUESTS RESOURCES
———————-
¶10. (C) Ambassador Bost asked Tsvangirai what the MDC wanted
from the USG. Tsvangirai’s only response was “resources.”
Bennett made the same appeal, emphasizing the danger of the
party becoming beholden to individuals who make large
donations that come with “conditions.” Bennett thanked the
USG for sanctions, which he said were “extremely effective”.
He offered as an example that sanctions target John
Bredencamp had approached him, proposing an exchange of
information for support to get him off the sanctions list.
Bennett said the information was regarding companies that
were being blackmailed into financing Zanu-PF. He offered to
share more concrete information with poloff in the future.
¶11. (C) Bennett said the Standing Committee used the meeting
to solve internal problems, including agreement to channel
all incoming and outgoing funds through the party treasury as
some funding had been given directly to individual MDC
members. Bennett asked whether US Embassy Pretoria could
transfer funding proposals from MDC-South Africa to USAID
Harare. He said it was safer and more secure to conduct
business in South Africa than in Zimbabwe. Poloff agreed to
raise this with Mission Harare.
——————————————— ———–
TSVANGIRAI TALKS TO EUROPEANS ABOUT MUGABE AND ELECTIONS
——————————————— ———–
¶12. (C) In a meeting on January 9 with European and
Australian diplomats, Tsvangirai said MDC would accept a
power-sharing government that included Mugabe, according to
Australian political officer Matthew Skelly. Tsvangirai also
told them that calls from the international community for
Mugabe to step down were not helpful, according to Skelly.
(Note: Some observers of the Zimbabwe crisis have criticized
Western countries for their statements calling for Mugabe to
step down. They say this provokes Mugabe to take an even
more intransigent position in the power-sharing negotiations
and plays into Mugabe’s hands by adding ammunition to his
favorite denouncement of MDC as a puppet of the West.)
Tsvangirai told them the MDC was not aiming for fresh
elections at this stage because they would end up in the same
place they are now with Mugabe refusing to cede power. In a
direct contradiction, Bennett told poloff MDC would lobby the
international community for a UN Security Council resolution,
more sanctions and using their good offices to influence the
Southern African Development Community (SADC) member
countries with the end goal of internationally-supervised
elections.
——————————-
TSVANGIRAI’S RETURN TO ZIMBABWE
——————————-
¶13. (C) Tsvangirai said he plans to return to Zimbabwe on
January 15 or 16. (Note: Tsvangirai appeared perturbed when
asked about his return to Zimbabwe, defending his decision to
stay outside by saying that leading a struggle such as this
one “has been done before” from outside the country.
According to Skelly, Tsvangirai snapped at the British
diplomat who asked about this when she pressed him for a more
specific timeframe than the vague response he gave.) Bennett
said Tsvangirai would return first to Botswana to meet with
President Seretse Khama before returning to Zimbabwe.
Tsvangirai did not mention a return to Botswana. Neither
Tsvangirai nor Bennett had definitive knowledge of Mugabe’s
location or travel plans.
¶14. (C) Comment: Tsvangirai did not articulate a strategy for
achieving MDC’s objective of pressuring Zanu-PF into giving
up power nor did he convey a sense of urgency despite
conditions on the ground in Zimbabwe. In separate meetings,
both he and Bennett said MDC leaders were tired. Tsvangirai
seemed satisfied with the strategy meeting and hopeful MDC
would win out in the end. Of concern is the fact that
Tsvangirai and Bennett provided apparently conflicting
information about MDC objectives. After three days together,
the MDC leadership is still unable to deliver a consistent
message regarding its playbook.
BOST
(31 VIEWS)
