Zimbabwe withdrew its request for assistance with the 2005 elections from the United Nations Development Programme, according to the United States embassy, but the embassy construed this to mean that it was setting the stage for a considerably reduced international presence in the run-up to and during the March 2005 parliamentary elections.
But that was not all; the country also announced that it was not going to ask for any food assistance. President Robert Mugabe instead ordered the government and the Grain Marketing Board to import 800 000 tonnes of food.
The UNDP is currently funding the constitutional making process which has hit several snags because the drafters are reported to have totally ignored the views of the people gathered during the constitutional team’s outreach programme.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 04HARARE461, GOZ SEALING COUNTRY AHEAD OF ELECTIONS?
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
171108Z Mar 04
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000461
SIPDIS
SECRET NOFORN
SIPDIS
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR J. FRAZER, TEITELBAUM
LONDON FOR C. GURNEY
PARIS FOR C. NEARY
NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2014
SUBJECT: GOZ SEALING COUNTRY AHEAD OF ELECTIONS?
REF: A. HARARE 456
¶B. HARARE 350
¶C. HARARE 349
Classified By: POLITICAL OFFICER KIMBERLY JEMISON FOR REASONS 1.5 B/D
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Government of Zimbabwe appears to be
setting the stage for a considerably reduced international
presence in Zimbabwe in the run-up to and during the March
2005 parliamentary elections. Withdrawing its request for
UNDP elections assistance (Ref B) and suggesting it does not
plan to request food relief (Ref C) evince GOZ intent to
reduce foreign access to the country and to maximize ruling
party control of key electoral levers. The crackdown on the
independent press and harassment of NGOs also play into this
effort to close off the electoral process to outsiders. END
SUMMARY.
——————————————— —————-
FOOD “SELF-SUFFICIENCY” INCREASES RISK OF FOOD POLITICIZATION
——————————————— —————-
¶2. (SBU) Maize distribution could be solely in the hands of
the GOZ during an important election period if Zimbabwe
significantly reduces or even eliminates its appeal for food
aid this year. In the past, ZANU-PF has used food as a
political tool and a Grain Marketing Board (GMB) monopoly on
maize distribution would work to the party’s advantage. As
suggested in ref B and confirmed at a UN/donor meeting on
March 15, the GOZ requested that this year’s Consolidated
Appeal include no reference to food assistance beyond June
¶2004.
¶3. (U) The December 2003/2004 FOSENET food security
monitoring report noted an increase in allegations of
political bias in accessing GMB food stocks over the last few
months, particularly in Mashonaland East. The report
identified the following districts as having problems with
political bias in food access: Chikomba, Marondera rural and
urban, Mudzi, Hwedza, Bindura rural, Guruve, Mazowe, Chegutu
urban, Norton, Zvimba, Bikita, Chiredzi, and Chivi. Of these
districts, Marondera, Bindura, Chegutu, Bikita, and Chiredzi
had constituencies almost evenly split between the MDC and
ZANU-PF during the 2000 elections.
¶4. (SBU) Prior to many parliamentary and urban/rural council
elections over the last two years, ZANU-PF candidates and
officials were accused of bribing voters with food.
Typically, the ZANU-PF district office received bags of maize
which only card-carrying ZANU-PF members were able to
purchase. In some places, showing cards was not enough and
prospective buyers had to produce letters from community
leaders or local party officials attesting to long-standing
party loyalty and activity. Throughout the food crisis,
FOSENET, a coalition of 54 local NGOs that monitors the food
situation in Zimbabwe, has reported that ZANU-PF party
members were favored in GMB food sales and international food
relief distributions, although the latter allegations were
infrequent and swiftly dealt with by international NGOs. For
its part, the GOZ has ignored such complaints and counter
claimed that some NGOs were selectively distributing to
opposition elements.
—————————–
IS SELF-SUFFICIENCY POSSIBLE?
—————————–
¶5. (U) A GOZ claim that Zimbabwe will be self-sufficient in
maize depends on the country’s final production and ability
to secure the foreign exchange to import the remainder of its
need. Fueling prospects for maize production are improved
rainfall–although for crops planted in February the rains
must continue through April–and increased hectarage planted
to maize(Ref C). PolOff spoke with the Famine Early Warning
System (FEWS) on February 26 about likely production. FEWS
said preliminary Agricultural Research and Extension Services
(AREX) maize estimates based on likely area planted and yield
suggest production in 2004 of between 780,000 and 1,170,000
MT (area at 1.3 million hectares and yields between .6 and .9
MT/ha). These estimates are based primarily on communal area
planting, as data about the resettled areas is generally
unavailable. According to FEWS, AREX estimates are generally
within 20 percent of the final Central Statistical Office
statistics. Other estimates for the 2004 season range from
600,000 MT to 1.2 million MT, with total maize consumption
needs at approximately 1.8 million MT.
¶6. (U) President Robert Mugabe has directed his ministries
and the Reserve Bank to import 800,000 metric tons of grain
this year at a cost of USD$240 million (Ref C). Such a
procurement will challenge the GOZ’s budget given the other
urgent demands on foreign exchange such as electricity and
fuel imports, and seems to rely on unrealistic expectations
of economic turnaround. Last year, GOZ efforts to import
maize were stymied by foreign exchange shortages. Although
negative growth may slow modestly this year, most local UN,
IMF and World Bank economists expect the economy to contract
5-10 percent, which does not bode well for increased foreign
exchange earnings. Furthermore, the punitive nature of the
auction system is a disincentive for exporters and will not
stimulate export revenue (Ref A). We are estimating that
exports fell to US$1.4 billion in 2003, of which the GOZ kept
only US$350 million by withholding the mandatory 25 percent
of revenue from exporters. This year’s tobacco crop–the
major foreign exchange earner–could be as low as 45 million
kilograms. Last year, Zimbabwe exported between 80 and 103
million kilograms worth US$248 to US$318 million.
¶7. (SBU) PolOff asked a FEWS representative about the GMB,s
purported 240,000-300,000 metric tons of maize stock. The
representative had acquired a GMB spreadsheet showing GMB
sales and stock drawdowns, which showed that the GMB had sold
about 100,000 tons of the 300,000 tons it had in January.
The representative suggested that the GMB was continuing to
sell its stocks and was not hoarding the stash for future
political benefit. He also stated that the GMB would not be
able to retain grain stored now until February 2005.
—————————–
INDEPENDENT MEDIA CONTRACTING
—————————–
¶8. (U) With the apparent demise of the nation’s only
independent daily and growing regulatory constraints against
the few surviving weekly independent newspapers, independent
coverage of news events in Zimbabwe is limited. Absent
unexpected changes in the media environment, the vast
majority of Zimbabweans will receive coverage of election
candidates and issues through the prism of ZANU-PF editors at
heavily biased official media organs. The GOZ can be
expected to continue its exclusion of foreign reporters, who
for the most part have been expelled or systematically denied
visas. The ongoing saga of the Associated Newspapers of
Zimbabwe court case and the dismissal of three Herald
newspaper journalists who freelanced for Voice of America
also play into this effort to close off observation of the
electoral process to Zimbabweans and outsiders alike.
Statements by the Media and Information Commission that the
conduct of the journalists is a threat to national security
further evince GOZ intent to tighten control of all media
sources for the foreseeable future–controlling information
flow into and out of the country.
————-
NGOS TARGETED
————-
¶9. (SBU) Over the last few years, the GOZ has become
increasingly suspicious and hostile towards nongovernmental
organizations. In 2002, the GOZ tried to enforce elements of
the Private Voluntary Organizations Act that restricts the
activities of some PVOs and NGOs. As several loopholes
within the law allowed some of the GOZ’s most ardent critics
to still operate, the GOZ is threatening to limit the
remaining organizations, movements with the NGO Bill, which
is in the draft stages.
¶10. (C) More recently, the GOZ has threatened to step up
harassment of local NGOs. Within the last few weeks, an NGO
working on democracy and governance issues received three
visits from police and a call from the Central Bank warning
of increased scrutiny, and a director of one of the local
human rights NGOs recently told PolOff that the organization
had been tipped that they would be raided soon. The human
rights NGO was habitually harassed before, during, and after
the 2002 presidential elections. In addition, GOZ officials
have accused several international NGOs of being anti-state
and thus against the Zimbabwe people. Indeed, such
accusations against food-related NGOs at the recent UN-GOZ
meeting in Victoria Falls highlights the nexus between food
and politics in the GOZ’s world view. Also at the Victoria
Falls meeting, the GOZ targeted the International
Organization for Migration, which provides assistance to
displaced ex-farm workers.
¶11. (S/NF) Indications in sensitive reporting that the GOZ
intends again to embark on an effort to dismantle the NGO’s
“parallel structures” of food distribution manifest the depth
of GOZ suspicions and desire for control.
——————————————— ————–
COMMENT: ELECTORAL PROCESS TO REMAIN INSULATED AND ISOLATED
——————————————— ————–
¶12. (SBU) The GOZ seems poised to keep the electoral
environment restrictive in preparation for the March 2005
parliamentary elections. Its continued mistrust of NGOs and
priority on controlling the election environment are most
likely the principal reasons behind GOZ reluctance to accept
international assistance with the elections and to entertain
the continued need for emergency food aid. Scaling down the
international relief effort would reduce the international
presence in Zimbabwe enhancing GOZ control of food
distributions for electoral advantage and reducing the
international window to aspects of election administration.
Eliminating the independent press and firing or expelling
journalists who work with international news agencies would
advance the same purpose. That said, the GOZ is cognizant of
its need for international aid as administered by NGOs though
and will often act more gingerly than its truculent words
might suggest. Late last year, for example, the GOZ backed
down from threats to require that all food assistance go
through official channels. The extent to which it will go
beyond harassment and regulatory constraint of NGOs and the
media will hinge largely on how confident the party
leadership feels toward elections–they will do what they
feel they have to in order to come out on top. END COMMENT.
SULLIVAN
(35 VIEWS)
