Movement for Democratic Change president Morgan Tsvangirai refused to meet South African President and negotiator Thabo Mbeki and President Robert Mugabe at State House in July 2008 though his counterpart Arthur Mutambara was attending because he thought this would be misconstrued as recognition of Mugabe as president.
Tsvangirai had been invited to State House together with Mutambara, Welshman Ncube and Priscilla Misihairabwi-Mushonga but he perceived this as a staged photo opportunity to demonstrate Mugabe’s purported openness to dialogue, and Mbeki’s success as mediator.
He was also concerned that meeting Mugabe at State House would confer MDC recognition of Mugabe as president.
According to the United States embassy Tsvangirai undoubtedly made the correct decision.
It said: “What emerged from the meeting, much to the consternation of MDC-M supporters, was nothing of substance but a picture of a smiling Mutambara shaking hands with Mugabe.”
Full cable:
Viewing cable 08HARARE605, STATE OF PLAY: AWAITING NEGOTIATIONS
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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 101456Z JUL 08
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3163
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
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RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 4742
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RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
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RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1401
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HARARE 000605
SIPDIS
AF/S FOR S. HILL
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E. LOKEN AND L. DOBBINS
STATE PASS TO NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B. PITTMAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2018
SUBJECT: STATE OF PLAY: AWAITING NEGOTIATIONS
Classified By: Charge d’Affaires Katherine Dhanani for reason 1.4 (d)
——-
SUMMARY
——-
¶1. (C) The Zimbabwean political scene is quieter than it has
been for some time. Despite denials by MDC leaders of
current negotiations, preliminary talks are taking place this
week in South Africa. Harare awaits the arrival of Jean
Ping, Chairman of the African Union (AU) Commission, and
Jakaya Kikwete, head of the African Union and president of
Tanzania, who are expected to discuss an AU role alongside
SADC in negotiations between the two Zimbabwean parties.
Both sides are interested in a negotiated settlement, but on
their own terms; this may make an eventual agreement
difficult to achieve. Violence and intimidation continue,
although at an apparently lower level, at least in urban
areas, than before the June 27 election. ZANU-PF’s goal is
to assert its authority and weaken the MDC, both for
negotiations and in the new Parliament. Parliament will be
convened next week with the MDC expected to elect the Speaker
of the House of Assembly if a sufficient number of its
members attend. END SUMMARY.
——————-
Talking About Talks
——————-
¶2. (C) Despite contradictory statements from MDC leadership,
the SADC mediation process is in fact continuing. Mbeki
mediators Sydney Mufamadi and Mujanku Gumbi are meeting with
MDC Tsvangirai (MDC-T) negotiators Tendai Biti and Elton
Mangoma, MDC Mutambara (MDC-M) negotiators Welshman Ncube and
Priscilla Misihairabwi-Mushonga, and ZANU-PF negotiators
Patrick Chinamasa and Nicholas Goche this week in South
Africa. These discussions were to have begun last week, but
Biti’s passport had not yet been returned, and Mangoma wanted
assurances that the GOZ would remove him from an arrest list.
Yesterday a judge (apparently with the GOZ’s acquiescence)
ordered Biti’s passport returned and Mangoma received his
requested assurances. We understand that the South African
talks will attempt to set an agenda and possibly agreement on
a memorandum of understanding for full-fledged negotiations.
The MDC will seek an agreement that the GOZ desist from the
arrest and prosecution of MDC parliamentarians so that all
MDC parliamentarians can participate in the opening of
Parliament.
¶3. (C) Tsvangirai stands by his insistence that the MDC will
not participate in further full-fledged negotiations unless
the AU has a role in the mediation process. We understand
Kikwete and Ping were due to go directly from the G-8 Summit
in Tokyo to Harare, but Ping became ill and the trip was
delayed until later this week or the beginning of next week.
In addition to an AU role, the MDC has publicly insisted on,
as a prerequisite to negotiations, immediate cessation of
violence and intimidation, release of over 1500 MDC
detainees, and resumption of humanitarian assistance
(presumably lifting the NGO ban). Seeking to exploit
inconsistency and promote an image of MDC division, the main
headline in today’s The Herald trumpeted “Inter-party talks
resume,” and the accompanying article noted the apparent
contradiction with Tsvangirai’s public statements that there
were no ongoing talks.
¶4. (C) In another apparent contradiction to his insistence
that there would be no negotiations absent fulfillment of the
MDC’s conditions, Tsvangirai has for some time been seeking a
meeting with Mugabe as part of the SADC negotiation process.
Tsvangirai’s goal, however, has more to do with establishing
his equal status as a leader than with actual negotiations.
HARARE 00000605 002 OF 004
Last Saturday, Mbeki flew to Harare and he and the GOZ
invited Tsvangirai to a meeting at State House with Mugabe,
as well as with Mutambara, Ncube, and Misihairabwi-Mushonga.
Tsvangirai perceived this as a staged photo opportunity to
demonstrate Mugabe’s purported openness to dialogue, and
Mbeki’s success as mediator, on the eve of the G8 Summit, in
bringing the parties together. He was also concerned that
meeting Mugabe in State House would confer MDC recognition of
Mugabe as president, something Tsvangirai has taken pains to
avoid. He therefore declined to attend. (Comment:
Tsvangirai was undoubtedly correct in his decision. What
emerged from the meeting, much to the consternation of MDC-M
supporters, was nothing of substance but a picture of a
smiling Mutambara shaking hands with Mugabe. End comment.)
————————–
What Prospect for Success?
————————–
¶5. (C) Given Zimbabwe’s recent history and the fact that
after 15 months of SADC-sponsored negotiation the parties are
still working to set an agenda and resume negotiations, there
is ample room for skepticism that negotiations will bear
fruit. Favoring optimism, each side has objectively good
reason to vigorously pursue a successful settlement. ZANU-PF
craves legitimacy and reengagement with the West in order to
regain political and economic stability. The MDC, having had
a presidential victory stolen and having witnessed ZANU-PF’s
vengeance after the March 29 election, realizes that it
cannot gain power electorally, but must do so through a
political process. However, it is not clear that either side
is ready to compromise on the critical issues. ZANU-PF wants
a government of national unity, which would be a continuation
of the current government, but with some MDC ministers.
ZANU-PF would maintain the power. The MDC wants a
transitional government, limited temporally and in terms of
powers, that would supplanted by a new government elected
under a new constitution. Tsvangirai has indicated that he
would be willing to accept Mugabe as a ceremonial president
in a transitional government, but he believes (rightly) that
he won the election and therefore should wield the power.
The mediators will seek to bridge this divide.
¶6. (C) The mediation faces an uphill battle convincing the
parties to yield. ZANU-PF’s leverage is that it holds de
facto power and continues to hold Zimbabwe in a vise of
violence and fear which continues to affect people throughout
the country. It has the power to relax this vise, and will
use this as a negotiating point. The MDC on the other hand
can simply break off negotiations, if it is unsatisfied, and
allow ZANU-PF to continue to run on its own what is becoming
an increasingly ungovernable country, particularly
economically.
¶7. (C) Some analysts believe the Mugabe team’s strategy is to
use internationally supervised negotiations as a delaying
tactic while violence and division destroy the MDC as a
future factor in Zimbabwe’s political life. These skeptics
believe Mugabe and his inner circle are seeking to repeat
their success against Nkomo and ZAPU following the
Gukurahundi massacres. They may well be right. But it is
important to remember that ZANU-PF is not monolithic. We
have heard that General Solomon Mujuru and vice-president
Joice Mujuru would support the so called Mbeki plan, a
transitional government originally proposed by Tsvangirai,
which would make Mugabe a ceremonial president, establish
Tsvangirai as an executive prime minister, and leave Joice
Mujuru as the only vice-president. From the Mujuru’s point
of view, this would sideline Mnangagwa and allow the Mujurus
to consolidate power within ZANU-PF and spearhead ZANU-PF in
elections after the transition. Mujuru still wields
influence over the military and top generals and could
HARARE 00000605 003 OF 004
attempt to secure guarantees for their futures. (NOTE:
ZANU-PF held a Politburo meeting on July 9 and agreed to
refer the Mbeki plan to the Presidium–Mugabe, Joice Mujuru,
vice-president Joseph Msika, and former House Speaker John
Nkomo. The Presidium will then make its recommendation to
the Politburo. END NOTE.)
——————
Violence Continues
——————
¶8. (SBU) Post will report on continuing violence Septel.
There are indications that violence is increasingly targeting
individual MDC activists and prominent supporters rather than
whole communities. While there are some reports of efforts
by the authorities to rein in the youth militia they
unleashed in April, the effort is not equally evident in all
areas or successful in every case. In rural areas,
particularly in the Mashonaland provinces, many of the
“reeducation camps” remain. In addition, we have received
reports of whole communities terrorized in Gokwe in
Mashonaland West and Mudzi in Mashonaland East.
———————-
The MDC and Parliament
———————-
¶9. (SBU) As a result of the March 29 elections and three
by-elections for vacant parliamentary seats on June 27, the
composition of the House of Assembly is as follows:
–MDC-T 100
–MDC-M 10
–ZANU-PF 99
–Ind. 1 (This is Jonathan Moyo. He is expected to
align with the MDC.)
¶10. (SBU) By law, Parliament must be called into session by
July 17. Assuming the MDC factions work as a coalition, the
MDC will, in theory, have a majority and will be able to
elect the Speaker. This is a powerful position; the Speaker
controls the business of the House. Additionally, the House
of Assembly formulates the budget and is responsible for
originating legislation. An MDC majority in the House of
Assembly could frustrate ZANU-PF and Mugabe legislatively.
¶11. (C) Not coincidentally, MDC parliamentarians have been
ZANU-PF targets. According to the MDC, two have been killed,
one has disappeared, several others are in custody, and six
or seven are in South African avoiding arrest. Others are
underground in Zimbabwe. There has also been violence
directed against MDC MPs’ families.
¶12. (C) Whether or not ZANU-PF has a longer term strategy to
emasculate the MDC, there is every reason to believe the
ruling party is attempting to ensure that when Parliament is
convened, ZANU MPs present on the floor outnumber their
opponents, thereby allowing it to elect the Speaker. The MDC
(MDC-T plus MDC-M) is cautiously optimistic it will have a
majority in the House of Assembly when it is convened next
week, although there are concerns that more arrests of MDC
parliamentarians will occur immediately before Parliament
convenes. (NOTE: The other parliamentary body, the Senate,
is far less important than the House of Assembly. In the
March 27 election, MDC-T won 24 seats, MDC-M won 6 votes, and
ZANU-PF won 30. There are a remaining 33 seats apportioned
as follows: 18 to Chiefs, 10 to provincial governors, and 5
appointed by the president. Since cabinet ministers must be
members of Parliament, Mugabe can use his five appointments
for ZANU-PF heavyweights, such as Patrick Chinimasa and Oppah
Muchinguri, who lost their parliamentary seats in the March
27 elections, and reappoint them as ministers. END NOTE.)
HARARE 00000605 004 OF 004
—————-
The MDC Alliance
—————-
¶13. (C) Crucial to an MDC majority in the House of Assembly
is a continuation of the agreement reached between the two
MDC factions before the June 27 election to work together as
an alliance. ZANU-PF has made overtures to MDC-M, but MDC-M
parliamentarians, despite disenchantment with MDC-T over what
they see as MDC-T arrogance and failure to adequately consult
with them, have so far indicated to us that they will work
with MDC-T as an alliance. (NOTE: Under Zimbabwean
parliamentary rules, an individual legislator who crosses the
aisle to another party automatically loses his or her seat.
Therefore, all 10 MDC-M members of the House of Assembly must
act in unison–either to form an alliance with ZANU-PF, to
remain in an alliance with MDC-T, or to act independently.
END NOTE.) To solidify this alliance, MDC-T is prepared to
make Gibson Sibanda the Speaker. Sibanda is a former trade
unionist who was Tsvangirai’s vice-president in the Zimbabwe
Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and later became MDC vice
president after the party was formed. In 2005, he joined
Welshman Ncube and Arthur Mutambara in splitting away from
the the MDC and forming a rival faction.
Dhanani
(21 VIEWS)
