4 Findings
4.1 Independence of the Commission
Concern was raised regarding the 'independence' of the Commission. The Commission is not an Executive Committee but will operate under the auspices of the Ministry of Lands and Rural Resettlement. Section 6 (1) of the Bill highlights that the Commission should conduct its affairs impartially and independently, but this position is compromised by section 57 (1) of the Bill that states that the Minister may give policy directions to the Commission. Furthermore, section 57 (3) implores on the Commission “to take all necessary steps to comply with any direction given to it in terms of subsection (1)”
4.2 Selection Criteria of Commissioners
The process of selecting Commissioners is shrouded in secrecy and is not stated in the Bill or the Constitution. The select Committees of Parliament were informed that the selection process was the preserve of the Minister. Nobody knows the qualifications or expertise of these Commissioners that were appointed by the President in July 2016. Section 296 (2) of the Constitution merely indicates that “members of the Zimbabwe Land Commission must be chosen for their integrity and competence in and knowledge and understanding of, the best practices in land management and administration and reflect the diversity of Zimbabwe's population, in particular its regional interests and gender balance”. The only clear position, is of the removal of the Commissioners which is based on section 237 of the Constitution, which is the same process that is applied to independent Commissions established by Chapter 12.
4.3 Land Disputes
The select Committees of Parliament observed during the public hearing that the Commission has a huge workload in resolving land disputes. Most of these disputes have been politicized and were being exacerbated by corrupt officials in the Ministry of Lands. The land disputes took various forms and include:
i. Sale of a piece of land to multiple persons, by land officers, ranging from US$3 000 to US$7 000;
ii. Double allocations and multiple farm ownership of land;
iii. Displacement, threats, violence against initial occupiers of land by influential persons;
iv. Desecration of heritage sites, sacred places, wetlands through uncoordinated land allocations.
v. Disagreements on sharing of infrastructure such as tobacco barns, farm houses and water bodies;
vi. Poor documentation or erasure of files or withdrawal of offer letters by the land officers;
vii. Resettlement of persons on grazing land leading to challenges in productivity of livestock;
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viii. Disrespect of offer letters between disputants. A holder with a 99 year lease or permit is regarded as having more rights than a holder of an offer letter.
ix. Land allocations leading to congestion instead of decongestion in some areas, due to poor pegging and monitoring by land officers.
x. Some district land committees contribute to land conflicts due to biased recommendations on land allocations;
xi. Traditional leaders were not being respected or consulted on land allocations. At times traditional leaders perpetrated land disputes through acts of nepotism and bias in land allocations.
xii. Inhabitants of an area not being given first preference in the allocation of land, but persons from other provinces were given priority.
xiii. Disinheritance of vulnerable groups such as widows and orphans.
xiii. The non-compensation of previous white farmers on improvements made on the land is leading to insecurity by new beneficiaries.
4.4. Security of Tenure
Farmers raised concerned that the Bill is silent on the issue of security of tenure. This is making it difficult for land beneficiaries to get investors or funding for agricultural activities. Furthermore, section 28 of the Bill makes it difficult for farmers to get investment in that it stipulates that “….an offer letter holder, lessee or permit holder shall not enter into a partnership for the working of his or her holding or portion of gazetted land without the consent in writing of the Minister”.
Farmers also highlighted that lack of funding and investment has led to under-utilization of land, an issue that will be investigated by the Commission in terms of section 297 (1) of the Constitution and section 21 of the Bill. Land beneficiaries expressed concern that there was high possibility of losing their land through land audits and farmers called upon the Commission to take into account all the factors leading to under-utilization of land.
4.5 Corporate Status of the Commission
Section 3 of the Bill, gives corporate status to the Commission with the capacity to sue and to be sued. However, section 58 of the Bill, seeks to protect Commissioners from legal action for the decisions taken in good faith and without gross negligence. Concern was raised that Commissioners should be held accountable for the decisions they take while in office, through legal proceedings, especially if they were prejudicial to the applicant or advantageous to Commissioners.
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