United States Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Johnnie Carson expressed concern about President Robert Mugabe’s possible successors and seemed to be only comfortable with Vice-President Joice Mujuru.
Carson said Mugabe had rejected all approaches about “his” Global Political Agreement insisting that his “favourable legacy” in the history books had already been established.
While noting that Mugabe was still healthy and vigorous, he said Mugabe’s successor generation contained some “bad apples”, but there were some, like Joice Mujuru, who recognised the need for change in Zimbabwe.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 09STOCKHOLM515, A/S CARSON’S SWEDEN VISIT AND U.S.-EU TROIKA
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Reference ID |
Created |
Released |
Classification |
Origin |
VZCZCXRO5441
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHSM #0515/01 2301518
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 181518Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4630
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 STOCKHOLM 000515
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2019
TAGS: EAID ETTC EUN MARR PREL SW
SUBJECT: A/S CARSON’S SWEDEN VISIT AND U.S.-EU TROIKA
MEETING ON AFRICA JULY 14
Classified By: CDA Robert Silverman for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1.(SBU) Summary: Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
Johnnie Carson represented the U.S. at the EU troika meeting
on Africa issues held July 14 in Stockholm. The agenda
included the Horn of Africa (Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea),
Sudan, Zimbabwe, Kenya, unconstitutional changes of
government (Madagascar, Mauritania, Guinea, and Niger), and
the Sahel. In addition to the agenda items, A/S Carson
raised the issues of piracy and drug trafficking in Africa.
The troika meeting provided the context for a good exchange
of views on many issues, on which the U.S. and the EU
generally agree. A/S Carson and Head of the Africa
Department at the Swedish MFA Ambassador Anders Hagelberg
declared the meeting a great success. Hagelberg said the EU
and the U.S. are &more like-minded than ever before,8
adding that he looked forward to a close cooperation during
the Swedish EU Presidency.
¶2. (C) A/S Carson and the CDA had a pull-aside on July 14
with Swedish MFA State Secretary Frank Belfrage to discuss
the intense public pressure on the Swedish government to get
Eritrea to release imprisoned Swedish-Eritrean journalist
Isaak Dawit. Belfrage asked if the U.S. had insights on
approaches to Eritrea. End Summary.
Overview
——–
¶3. (U) Head of the Swedish MFA Africa Department Ambassador
Anders Hagelberg, chairing for the EU, opened the meeting by
praising President Obama’s July 12 speech in Accra, Ghana,
saying he saw it as “re-shaping” U.S. Africa engagement in
offering the platform that will open new opportunities for
U.S.-EU cooperation on the continent. A/S Carson explained
that the U.S. will focus on placing “Africa in the hands of
Africans.” The U.S. will be a partner in four key areas:
democracy and governance; economic challenges; public health;
and conflict mitigation. We also share the EU’s focus on
climate change in the Africa context and on the effects of
the global economic crisis in Africa.
Somalia
——-
¶4. (C) Somalia was the meeting,s top priority, and the
troika spent the majority of the morning discussing it. A/S
Carson led the discussion by explaining U.S. support for the
Djibouti Process under the Intergovernmental Authority for
Development (IGAD), Sheik Sharif and the Transitional Federal
Government (TFG), and the African Union Mission in Somalia
(AMISOM). He outlined Somalia,s problems, calling these
issues a &festering sore that impacts the entire region.8
The U.S. and the EU agreed that they need to address the
following issues: Somali refugee flows to neighboring
countries; spillover effects of Ethiopian and Eritrean hot
and cold war tensions; movement of smuggled goods; piracy;
the arrival of foreign fighters and their relation to
Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda; and continued efforts to find the
individuals responsible for the bombing of U.S. embassies in
Africa in 1998. A/S Carson emphasized the importance of a
comprehensive political solution that does not simply treat
the symptoms, but also treats the root causes of the internal
conflict in Somalia. He expressed deep concern for the
refugee problem, citing figures of nearly 270,000 refugees
currently in camps in northern Kenya and an additional
5-6,000 refugees entering Kenya each month.
¶5. (C) Swedish Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa Marika
Fahlen responded, pointing out that the EU is the largest
donor to Somalia and that the EU hopes to harmonize EU-US
policies. Fahlen expressed fear that the TFG lacks a clear
vision and is now less able to articulate the Djibouti
Commitment upon which its legitimacy is based. Fahlen noted
both U.S. and EU donations to the AMISOM and questioned
AMISOM,s capability, asking whether or not the EU should
increase its mandate for AMISOM without providing more
equipment. Additionally, Fahlen stated that the EU and the
U.S. should work to stop the “financial middle man8 and
interrupt the flow of equipment to Al-Shabaab. She addressed
the symbiotic relationship between the pirates and
Al-Shabaab, an exchange of service for protection. Fahlen
also took up the role of the Somali diaspora (25,000) in
Sweden and Somali-Swedes fighting in Somalia. She expressed
that perhaps the diaspora could possibly play a constructive
role in aiding Somalia, if properly encouraged. A/S Carson
noted that the U.S. was also very concerned about the foreign
fighters in Somalia, some of whom traveled there in response
to Ethiopian engagement. Both sides expressed concern that
STOCKHOLM 00000515 002 OF 005
Sheik Sharif might call for the return of Ethiopian troops.
¶6. (C) Jose Costa Pereira of the Council Secretariat asked
about the idea of a special EU representative to the Horn of
Africa. A/S Carson emphasized that the TFG must show that
it is an effective government, not just a symbol. The U.S.
will continue to support AMISOM, but will urge the Algerians
first to provide troop transportation. A/S Carson agreed
with his EU interlocutors that Eritrea acts as a regional
spoiler in Somalia not because it loves Al-Shabaab but
because Eritrea seeks to undermine Ethiopia. Additionally,
A/S Carson suggested that the U.S. and the EU work to
energize the seven IGAD states individually coordinate
representations and joint demarches in Nairobi; and ask Kenya
not to serve as a port for foreign fighters and illegal
trade.
Ethiopia-Eritrea
—————-
¶7. (C) Both the U.S. and the EU voiced similar concerns
about Ethiopia and Eritrea. A/S Carson said he agreed with
the EU assessment that “political space” has narrowed in
Ethiopia. Amb. Hagelberg described the situation as
sensitive, but not as sensitive as it has been, stating that
the EU &shouldn,t be too shy8 about the border dispute.
The EU places elections at the center of the Ethiopian agenda
and is concerned with election observation and instability
that could result following the &wrong8 election results,
he said. A/S Carson stressed the importance of resolving the
Eritrea-Ethiopia border dispute by getting Ethiopia to live
up to its Algeria Agreement commitment, adding that the EU
might be better positioned to achieve this. A/S Carson,
noting that “we’re stymied,” asked if EU access to dialogue
with Ethiopia has actually produced influence. Delegates
admitted that the Europeans were frustrated too, and said
that the EU would reassess its Eritrea policy during the
Swedish Presidency.
Sudan
—–
¶8. (C) A/S Carson said the EU and the U.S. shared much the
same position on Sudan regarding the elections, the
north-south divide, and the situation in Darfur. He led the
discussion and emphasized that if the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA) is not concluded, efforts to end the
humanitarian crisis in Darfur will be ineffective. A/S Carson
commented that any referendum calling for the division of
Sudan should not necessarily have to result in an “immediate
split” of the country. The Council Secretariat’s Pereia
noted that the CPA ends soon and that the international
community needs to address post 2011 political, economic, and
security arrangements. Ambassador Fahlen added that Darfur
has become so politicized that it too is its own player in
the peace process, adding that dialogue should include rebel
groups. Eritrea has had a role in training Justice and
Equality Movement (JEM) rebels in Darfur, so it needs to be a
player in the peace process as well. A/S Carson stated that
the U.S. was uncertain as to how important the work of the
Mbeki Panel would be, adding that the U.S. hopes it be
consistent with other efforts. Amb. Hagelberg stated that
the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) indictment of Bashir
has handicapped Europe,s relations with Sudan.
Zimbabwe
——–
¶9. (C) Amb. Hagelberg led the discussion for the EU side,
saying that along with Somalia, Zimbabwe would be at the top
of the EU priority list during the Swedish Presidency. (It
will also feature prominently on the agenda of the October
EU-South Africa Summit.) The Commission’s Roger Moore,
Director of the Horn of Africa and Southern Africa, Indian
Ocean and Pacific (ACP III), and A/S Carson exchanged views
on meetings with Morgan Tsvangirai and his GOZ delegation
during their recent visits to the U.S. and Europe. Moore
opined that relations between Tsvangirai and Mugabe’s Zanu/PF
factions seemed both “complementary and competing,” a
description with which A/S Carson agreed. Moore said that
Zimbabwe and the EU have agreed to produce “joint roadmaps,”
with Zimbabwe doing one related to commitments under the
“global political agreement,” and the Commission addressing
the normalization of EU-Zimbabwe relations. The goal would
then be to build bridges (linkages) between the two roadmaps.
Moore admitted that there was probably little chance of a
successful outcome to this endeavor, but it was all that was
going at the moment. The Europeans listened eagerly to A/S
Carson’s detailed recounting of the GOZ visit to both the
White House and the State Department, and of A/S Carson’s
STOCKHOLM 00000515 003 OF 005
recent meeting with Mugabe at Sirte. (Mugabe rejected all
approaches about “his” GPA and insisted that his “favorable
legacy” in the history books has already been established.)
A/S Carson also expressed concerns about Mugabe’s possible
successor(s), while noting that the leader is still healthy
and vigorous. The successor generation contains some “bad
apples,” but there are also some, for example Vice President
Joyce Mujuru, who do recognize the need for change in
Zimbabwe.
Kenya
—–
¶10. (C) A/S Carson stated that he is deeply concerned about
the turn of events in Kenya. The coalition is fragile and
the process is not moving forward, he opined. All
delegations expressed approval of the agreement brokered by
Kofi Annan and fear that Kenya,s fragile coalition could
falter. A/S Carson noted the failure of the Kenyan government
to prosecute corruption, human rights violations and
extra-judicial killings and only “patchwork” progress on
reform. The EC called the situation in Kenya depressing but
still recognized its potential in regard to its thriving
private sector, independent media, and strong civil society.
Hagelberg said that the U.S. and the EU share many of the
same concerns and should keep up the pressure on the reform
agenda.
Madagascar
———-
¶11. (C) Both sides expressed the need for involvement
regarding the problem of unconstitutional governments. A/S
Carson emphasized the need to nurture and support democracy.
He noted that the African Union embraces democracy as a
principle and must support and reward progress. In regard to
Madagascar in particular, A/S Carson expressed hope for
further AU partnership and a need to break the “cycle of
elite entitlement” in the country. All, or else none of the
current presidential candidates should have the ability run,
and the U.S. prefers that no current government members run
in the next election. Carmen de la Pena , representing the
incoming Spanish Presidency of the EU, stated that the
international community needs to send Madagascar a common
message and might get more strongly behind the SADC mediation
efforts of former Mozambican President Chissano.
Mauritania
———-
¶12. (C) All delegations acknowledged the risks associated
with the upcoming elections. A/S Carson emphasized that the
international community should stay engaged after the
elections, honor the results, and make sure that if the
current government loses that it does not seek revenge. De
la Pena expressed fear of a post-election coup and called
Mauritania a &situation waiting for a crisis.8
Guinea
——
¶13. (C) Conversation on Guinea-Conakry was short. A/S
Carson raised the topics of elections and the increasing
concern about narcotraffickers operating in the country. The
EU delegates commented that leadership in the country is
isolated and difficult to influence. They expressed fears
that the government will not live up to promises of elections
and noted their concerns about drug trafficking.
Sahel
—–
¶14. (C) The EU has committed to a series of fact-finding
missions in the region. The first has been Mali, and in
September it will focus on Mauritania and Niger. De la Pena
shared her delegation’s findings with the group, and
emphasized the need for Europe not to solve the region,s
problems but to provide help and support. A/S Carson added
that Mali and Algeria must work together to counter the
terrorist threat in the region, but the international
community should not confuse the historical, political, and
social problems related to Tuareg insurgents with the growing
Al-Qaeda presence in the region. The EC’s Moore stated that
threats in the region “feed off of one another,” and added
that security forces in the region must be strengthened.
U.S. Requests
————-
¶15. (C) A/S Carson requested that that the EU member states
STOCKHOLM 00000515 004 OF 005
consider a proposal to prosecute and imprison pirates who
attack their respective flagged vessels. The Council’s
Pereira explained that this issue would not fall under EU
compentency, but is up to member states, stressing that
piracy is not a crime under the criminal codes in these
countries as well. A further complication would be that in
some Member States, captured pirates might even be able to
apply for assylum. Nevertheless, the EU side took note of
A/S Carson’s request.
¶16. (C) A/S Carson also requested that the EU consider
prosecuting and imprisoning drug traffickers caught in Africa
that are subject to Interpol, international or European
warrants. The EC responded that the feasibility of this
would depend on the type of crime. The Europeans seemed to
think the Latin American drug trafficking problem in Africa
has decreased and that many of the drug traffickers are now
of local origin.
Other Discussions
—————–
¶17. (C) CDA Robert Silverman hosted a dinner for A/S Carson
on July 13, giving him the opportunity to meet a number of
key Swedish officials who did not attend the troika meeting.
Dinner topics included the Sudan, Eritrea and Somalia. Horn
of Africa Special Envoy Marika Fahlen mentioned that an
Al-Shabaab &spiritual8 leader and cleric recently spoke at
a Gothenburg mosque to recruit young Somali-Swedes, which
prompted major concerns from the Somalia diaspora in Sweden.
The diaspora has now invited a delegation of moderate Somalis
to speak in Sweden, Fahlen pointed out. Director-General for
Development Cooperation Jan Knutsson emphasized that although
Sweden had reduced the number of countries receiving Swedish
assistance, Africa remained a top priority, adding that four
of the top five aid recipients of Swedish aid are in Africa.
(Sweden has a long history of providing assistance to Africa,
including more than 60 years of aid to Ethiopia.) In an
interesting aside, Fahlen opined that the U.S. might be the
only actor that could &pressure8 Bashir not to run for
President in Sudan. A/S Carson,s dinner interlocutors were
extremely enthusiastic about working closely with the U.S.
during Sweden,s EU Presidency and praised President Obama,s
speech in Ghana.
¶18. (C) A/S Carson also met with Swedish State Secretary for
Foreign Affairs Frank Belfrage and Director-General for
Political Affairs Bjorn Lyrvall on July 14, prior to the
start of the troika meeting. Belfrage stated that Sweden
supports the Djibouti Process, the TFG and Sheik Sharif,
adding that &Al-Shabaab could well take over if the TNG
fails.8 A/S Carson noted that success will hinge on Sheik
Sharif,s ability to mobilize his forces, fight and begin to
act like a government. Sheik Sharif is disadvantaged against
Al-Shabaab by the fact that he is not a warlord, but an
Islamic scholar with no training in conducting warfare. A/S
Carson stressed the U.S. is moving toward a holistic view of
Somalia and the region that transcends a purely
counter-terrorism perspective.
¶19. (C) At the end of the formal meeting, Belfrage pulled
aside A/S Carson and the CDA to discuss “a sensitive matter.”
He explained that the Swedish government is under intense
pressure from its public (in the form of petitions and
continuing headlines in the press) to engage Eritrea in order
to obtain the release imprisoned Swedish-Eritrean journalist
Isaak Dawit. Belfrage reported that direct bilateral
contacts with Eritrea have not worked, and an approach via
the Foreign Minister of Qatar &backfired.8 (Eritrea,s
President Isaias Afwerki publicly condemned Sweden for asking
the Qataris to help release the journalist.) Belfrage said
another option is for Sweden to ask the Libyans for help. A
final option is to ask the EU to put aid to Eritrea on hold;
he said the EU Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian
Aid Louis Michel has warned the Eritreans, most recently at
the AU meeting in Sirte, Libya, that aid may be reexamined as
a result of human rights policies. Belfrage asked if the
U.S. had suggestions on possible approaches to Eritrea.
¶20. (C) A/S Carson replied that the USG also is attempting
to reach out to Eritrea as part of our general approach of
seeking diplomatic engagement with a number of regimes,
including Iran, Syria, and Cuba. To date, the U.S.
approaches to Eritrea have not been fruitful, and A/S Carson
detailed his unsuccessful attempts to obtain a visa to
Eritrea prior to his trip the week before to Ethiopia and
Kenya. Secretary Clinton also has attempted to call
President Isaias Afwerki unsuccessfully, he noted.
Underlining USG concern with Eritrean support for al-Shabaab
in Somalia, A/S Carson commented that our willingness to
STOCKHOLM 00000515 005 OF 005
engage with Eritrea is not an open-ended offer.
¶21. (U) This cable has been cleared by A/S Carson.
SILVERMAN
(38 VIEWS)
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