The rift within the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front caused by President Robert Mugabe’s failure in 2006 to secure a postponement of the presidential elections from 2008 to 2010 resulted in a number of theories being floated about Mugabe’s future.
The opposition was led within the party by former army commander Solomon Mujuru and Mashonaland East province and was supported by Harare province.
National Constitutional Assembly leader Lovemore Madhuku said the rift would seriously weaken ZANU-PF regardless of whether the elections were held in 2008 or 2010.
Political scientist Eldred Masunungure said that all provinces with the exception of Masvingo, Mashonaland West, and Mashonaland Central had rallied to Mujuru and wanted Mugabe out in 2008.
Arthur Mutambara, leader of the smaller faction of the Movement for Democratic Change, however said Mugabe would be the presidential candidate for ZANU-PF in 2008.
United States ambassador Christopher Dell said the ground had shifted under Mugabe, perhaps decisively.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 07HARARE107, OPPOSITION TO MUGABE,S 2010 EXTENSION WIDESPREAD
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
|
Reference ID |
Created |
Classification |
Origin |
VZCZCXRO2003
RR RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHSB #0107/01 0391508
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 081508Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1113
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 1464
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 1320
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 1468
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0163
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0729
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 1094
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 1522
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 3918
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1291
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 1947
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1685
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000107
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
AF/S FOR S.HILL
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E.LOKEN
STATE PASS TO NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B.PITTMAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2016
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION TO MUGABE,S 2010 EXTENSION WIDESPREAD
REF: A) HARARE 00079 B) HARARE 00092
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher Dell under Section 1.4 b/d
——-
Summary
——-
¶1. (SBU) According to Embassy interlocutors from a broad
spectrum of Zimbabwe’s political elite, President Robert
Mugabe and his inner circle have encountered stronger than
expected resistance in their attempts to extend his term to
2010, including from within Mugabe’s own party. Our
interlocutors, from ZANU-PF, the MDC, civil society, and
academia predicted that as a result the extension was
unlikely to go forward and that there would be an election or
some other form of political transition in 2008. One likely
scenario that several individuals mentioned involved Mugabe
assuming a ceremonial presidency and the creation of a new
prime minister position to head the executive branch. Others
believe it is possible Mugabe will try to force ZANU-PF to
back him in 2008 as its candidate for another full term in
office. End Summary
———————–
The View From Inside ZANU
———————–
¶2. (C) Eddison Zvogbo, Jr., a ZANU-PF insider whose late
father one of Mugabe’s vice-presidents and a major figure in
the party, in a January 31 meeting said that after the
ZANU-PF conference in December he had initially believed
Mugabe would be able to impose his will and extend his term
until 2010. However, Zvobgo said the extension had created
far more anxiety and turmoil within the party than he had
originally expected. Many ZANU-PF members believed economic
conditions and the need for international engagement mandated
a need for change at the top. Zvogbo said it was now clear
to him that Mugabe would not last beyond 2008 and that the
discussion was shifting to the modalities of transition.
¶3. (C) Zvogbo said it was unclear what kind of transition
ZANU-PF decision makers, including Mugabe, favored. Various
options were probably being considered. That said, he
thought the most likely scenario would be a 2008 presidential
election with Joice Mujuru as the ZANU-PF candidate. This
would be consistent with earlier indications that Mugabe had
anointed her as his successor. Moreover, she could be
counted on to protect Mugabe from prosecution, something
Mugabe would likely insist on in return for ceding power.
This arrangement would obviously be satisfactory to Solomon
Mujuru. What was less clear, admitted Zvogbo, was whether
Mujuru could win a fair election. He argued, however, that
the MDC was now weak and that ZANU-PF, with its electoral
machinery ready, would be in a strong position to win in 2008
even with Joice Mujuru as its candidate.
¶4. (C) David Butau, the ZANU-PF chair of the Parliamentary
Standing Committee on Budget, Finance, and Economic
Development confirmed that opposition in the party to the
extension was widespread. He told us January 18 there was no
question that the overwhelming majority of ZANU-PF members
wanted to see Mugabe out as president in 2008. Butau hoped
that there would be a ZANU-PF-led transition and that the new
leadership would engage the international community.
———————–
A Former Insider,s View
HARARE 00000107 002 OF 003
———————–
¶5. (C) In a conversation with polecon chief January 26,
Jonathan Moyo, independent MP from Tshosolotsho and until
2005 Mugabe’s spokesman and a member of his inner circle,
said he believed that Mugabe and his closest allies initially
saw a 2010 synchronized election as a way to perpetuate his
presidency and also maintain ZANU-PF in power. Moyo, who
maintains close contacts within the ruling party, said the
accelerating economic collapse and the unexpected depth of
resistance in the party had led them to reconsider their
options. Solomon Mujuru and his wife Joice were the
principal sources of the resistance. According to Moyo, the
Mujurus were playing hard ball and threatening to use their
parliamentary support to scuttle a constitutional amendment
permitting the extension were one to be proposed.
¶6. (C) Moyo added that neither Mugabe and his inner circle,
nor his would-be successors, the Mujurus, would want an
election in 2008 given the state of the economy. Instead, he
thought it likely they would agree to amend the constitution
to create a ceremonial presidency for Mugabe (which would
protect him from prosecution) and to create a new prime
minister position, which would exercise most executive
authority. The Mujurus would obviously want someone from
their own camp, either Joyce Mujuru or former Finance
Minister Simba Makoni, as prime minister. Under this
scenario, elections would be delayed at least until 2010,
theoretically giving ZANU-PF time to negotiate with the
international community and begin rehabilitating the economy.
——————-
The MDC Perspective
——————-
¶7. (C) MDC anti-Senate faction leader Morgan Tsvangirai also
told the Ambassador on January 30 (Ref A) that an extension
of Mugabe’s term was proving unpopular within ZANU-PF. There
was opposition in eight out of ten provinces, as well as in
both the Mnangagwa and Mujuru factions. Given this
opposition, Tsvingirai believed Mugabe would not risk a
constitutional amendment to extend his term and the most
likely scenario was an election in 2008, with Mugabe standing
once more as the ZANU-PF candidate. However, given the state
of the economy, Tsvangirai (like Moyo) said Mugabe and the
Mujurus might agree to postpone elections by establishing a
ceremonial presidency with a prime minister heading the
executive branch.
¶8. (C) In a meeting with the Ambassador on February 1 (Ref
B), MDC pro-Senate faction leader Arthur Mutambara said he
believed Solomon Mujuru’s opposition to an extension of
Mugabe’s term and a presidential election in 2010 had
scuttled this proposal. Mutambara thought that Mugabe would
be ZANU-PF’s candidate in a 2008 election. However, Mugabe
could be beaten and it would be up to the democratic
opposition to unite around a single candidate who could
provide a strong challenge.
———————————–
Civil Society and Academia Weigh In
———————————–
¶9. (C) National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) president
Lovemore Madhuku told us January 24 that he and most of his
civil society colleagues believed that ZANU-PF was preparing
HARARE 00000107 003 OF 003
to abandon the extension of the president’s term. Madhuku
said an extension of the term and the postponement of
elections would be unpopular and would be viewed internally
and outside of Zimbabwe as a constitutional abuse. Madhuku
speculated that the ruling party’s internal divisions along
with the economic situation, would seriously weaken ZANU-PF
regardless of whether elections were held in 2008 or 2010.
¶10. (C) University of Zimbabwe political scientist Eldred
Masununguru told us that going into the December ZANU-PF
conference only Harare and Mashonaland East provinces were
against 2010 synchronization. However, since the conference,
the Mujurus has been exerting pressure on provincial
committees. Masununguru believed that all provinces with the
exceptions of Masvingo, Mashonaland West, and Mashonaland
Central have rallied to Mujuru and want Mugabe out in 2008.
——-
Comment
——-
¶11. (C) All of our interlocutors without exception agreed
that the accelerated economic deterioration and Mugabe’s
efforts to postpone scheduled 2008 presidential elections
have catalyzed opposition to an extension of his rule,
including most notably within his own party. The ground has
shifted under Mugabe, perhaps decisively, and in a septel we
will offer our analysis of what this means for the Mugabe
regime and for the country it has brought to the brink of
ruin.
DELL
(19 VIEWS)
