While Zimbabwe “was soaked in its anti-imperialist rhetoric and conspiracy theories”, it had a growing list of enemies including its own neighbours according to a cable from the United States embassy in Harare.
Top of the list was Botswana, followed by Nigeria and even Libya which had bailed out the country during its fuel crisis was distancing itself.
Britain remained the perennial enemy.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 04HARARE751, ZIMBABWE’S GROWING REGIONAL ENEMIES LIST
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
050818Z May 04
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000751
SIPDIS
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR J. FRAZER, D. TEITELBAUM
LONDON FOR C. GURNEY
PARIS FOR C. NEARY
NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/03/2009
SUBJECT: ZIMBABWE’S GROWING REGIONAL ENEMIES LIST
REF: (A) HARARE 743 (B) HARARE 726 (C) GABORONE 676
Classified By: Political Officer Win Dayton under Section 1.5 b/d
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Soaked in anti-imperialist rhetoric and
conspiracy theories, Zimbabwe’s official press continues to
view other nations exclusively through the prism of the
ruling party’s “with-us-or-against-us” framework. On the
enemies list, the West has been joined by Botswana, Nigeria
and, most recently, the SADC Parliamentary Forum, with Libya
apparently next in line. A front page story May 4 warns of
coming pressure on the GOZ from selected African nations at
the behest of the United Kingdom. END SUMMARY.
Botswana Tops the List
———————-
¶2. (U) Since Gaborone distanced itself from SADC’s public
support for Zimbabwe on the margins of December’s
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM), it has
found itself Zimbabwe’s Public Enemy Number One in Africa.
Recent transgressions spotlighted in lurid front page reports
on Botswana include alleged targeting of Zimbabweans for
floggings by Botswanan authorities, labor exploitation, the
erection of border fences, and Botswanan support for VOA
broadcasts (ref C). Information Minister Jonathan Moyo’s
confrontation with the Botswanan Ambassador over such issues
was given prominent coverage and official editorials
alternately portray the GOB as seduced, bullied, or bought
out by Western interests.
Nigeria Running Second
———————-
¶3. (SBU) Nigeria has been a distant second to Botswana on
the enemies list, more prominently featured but in less
venomous terms. Election violence, opposition crackdowns,
and Abuja’s open door to Zimbabwe’s white farmer class are
favorite themes in news coverage here, and editorials since
CHOGM have pilloried Obasanjo repeatedly. Most recently, an
editorial in the Government-controlled Herald editorial on
April 16 “condemned” Obasanjo’s “grandstanding antics” in
trying to attract Zimbabwe’s white farmers, suggesting rather
implausibly that were he an “impartial broker” on Zimbabwe he
would have encouraged the farmers to remain in Zimbabwe to
farm on “permissible” sizes of land. (Note: After having
their entire farms and investments seized, the farmers were
technically eligible to apply for new plots under land
reform. End note.) A Harare-based Nigerian diplomat
confirmed that Obasanjo had been incensed by the GOZ’s
intransigent posture during the run-up to CHOGM and had since
been inclined to keep his distance from Zimbabwe’s crisis.
Suspicious of Others
——————–
¶4. (SBU) Other African diplomats report that the GOZ
monitors their governments’ statements in the media and
international fora religiously, calling in diplomats for a
dressing down if such statements are deemed critical. In
February, Mugabe blasted an unnamed “majority” of his African
counterparts for succumbing to Western influence and turning
against African revolutionary causes. The GOZ and the
official press generally have remained cautiously respectful
of the South African Government.
¶5. (U) The official press has reported Libya’s rapprochement
with the West in extremely negative terms, attributing it to
neo-colonialist British pressure and Libyan economic
desperation. The ruling party-affiliated Sunday Mirror asked
in a May 2 editorial “Has Gaddafi sold his soul to the West?”
and forecast that his relations with Mugabe “seem destined to
become difficult.” Until late last year, Mugabe counted
Gaddafi as among his most prominent allies, and the official
media trumpeted each of the frequent high level visits
between Harare and Tripoli. Harare-based diplomats in
contact with the Libyan mission here tell us that its access
to the GOZ has been reduced markedly since Gaddafi shook
hands with Tony Blair.
¶6. (U) Foreign-based media, especially from South Africa,
continues to be a principal enemy of the state. The
government press has given repeated play to Information
Minister Jonathan Moyo’s recent characterization of foreign
correspondents and those who collaborated with them as
“terrorists.” A Herald editorial (often a precursor to
government policy) last week cast those who contributed to
the portrayal of Zimbabwe in a negative light as “traitors”
and urged that they be prosecuted for treason, in absentia if
necessary (ref B).
The “Un-African” SADC Parliamentary Forum
—————————————–
¶7. (U) In his weekly pseudonymous column in the Herald on
May 1, Information Minister Jonathan Moyo blasted SADC-PF
Election Norms and Standards as an “un-African, anti-African
case of ventriloqual nonsense from the West, by the West, all
to reluctant Africa.” He suggested that the norms were
forced on parliaments by “treacherous half-sons” and
emphasized that they were invalid and non-binding.
British Plot Exposed
——————–
¶8. (U) In a front page feature on May 4, The Herald reported
that the British Government was mounting a diplomatic
campaign to engineer pressure on the GOZ through a series of
high profile visits by regional leaders. According to the
article, Zambian President Mwanawasa, Malawian President
Muluzi, South African Mbeki and the Prime Minister of
Mauritius were expected to visit, while former Kenyan leader
Daniel arap Moi would come as a special envoy of Kenyan
President Kibaki. The article closed with an assertion by an
unnamed government spokesman that “there is peace and
tranquility and the economic prospects are so good today that
we do not believe any African country would want to spoil
this for the benefit of the British.”
Comment
——-
¶9. (C) Ruling party exploitation of its monopoly over the
country’s daily media has become a central feature of GOZ
foreign policy. As in so many other sectors, this means that
policy is driven as much if not more by the insidious
Information Minister than by cabinet members formally
assigned relevant portfolios. The centrality of
neo-colonialism and race to all media treatment of
international relations is designed to fuel a seige mentality
among domestic constituencies and to intimidate African
neighbors into support for ZANU-PF. The “expose” on the
alleged British plot appears intended to pre-empt any
diplomatic or public pressure by Africans and foreshadows a
shrill response — by Moyo, at least — to any such
approaches.
¶10. (C) Moyo continues to be an influential wild card in
factional struggles within the ruling party. Much of his
effort lately appear geared against the camp of Speaker of
the Parliament Emmerson Mnangagwa, who was Zimbabwe’s
signatory to the SADC-PF Electoral Norms and Standards. (For
his part, the beleaguered Mnanagagwa appears unlikely to
stand up for the SADC-PF standards; ref A.) In the
witch-hunt atmosphere engendered by Mugabe’s anti-corruption
campaign, Moyo remains one of the paralyzed party
leadership’s most confident operators. His relentless and
single-minded attack mode, which appears to suit Mugabe for
now, may come back to haunt him later, though, as he lacks a
natural constituency and continues to accumulate enemies at
home and abroad.
¶11. (C) Zimbabwe’s relations with Libya had grown more
distant even before Gaddafi’s westward shift, more for
economic than political reasons. Libya faced little prospect
of meaningful returns on its $360 million reported fuel deal
with Zimbabwe’s parastatal, to which it had cut off supplies
for non-payment. Nonetheless, political relations until
recently had remained close, at least in rhetorical terms,
and Gaddafi’s volte face presents a difficult challenge for
the GOZ’s indefatigable propaganda machine. Zimbabweans will
likely follow Gaddafi’s treatment by the West closely in two
contexts: the impact it will have on Africanist Gaddafi’s
solidarity with erstwhile close ally Mugabe and, perhaps more
significantly, as an indicator of how quickly an
international pariah can rehabilitate relations with the
West.
SULLIVAN
(3859 VIEWS)
