Zambian President Levy Mwanawasa who was chair of the Southern African Development Community at the time of Zimbabwe’s disputed 2008 elections said the SADC mediator, South African President Thabo Mbeki, was counterproductive and insincere.
Mwanawasa said Mbeki’s quiet diplomacy had been ineffective but Mbeki hit back by accusing Mwanawasa of being manipulated by British diplomats.
The disagreement between the heads of state had resulted in a watered down communiqué on the Zimbabwe crisis with Botswana and Tanzania supporting Mwanawasa while Malawi, Angola, and Democratic Republic of Congo backed Mbeki.
Mwanawasa, however, still hailed the SADC summit saying it was a signal to Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe that SADC would not support him unconditionally.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 08LUSAKA448, SCENESETTER FOR A/S FRAZER’S VISIT TO LUSAKA
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|
Reference ID |
Created |
Released |
Classification |
Origin |
VZCZCXRO3321
OO RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHLS #0448/01 1121205
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 211205Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5725
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LUSAKA 000448
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF/FO AND AF/S
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2013
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR A/S FRAZER’S VISIT TO LUSAKA
REF: A. LUSAKA 429
¶B. LUSAKA 427
¶C. LUSAKA 423
¶D. LUSAKA 421
¶E. 06 LUSAKA 963
¶F. 06 LUSAKA 945
Classified By: Ambassador Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
¶1. (C) Your visit to Zambia is well-timed, in the aftermath
of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Summit
on Zimbabwe. Within the confines of SADC meetings, Mwanawasa
has shown a willingness to address problems in Zimbabwe and
confront Zimbabwe President Mugabe and South African
President Mbeki. Although Mwanawasa will step down from the
SADC Chair later this year, he can continue to play a
constructive role by forming a coalition with other
like-minded SADC Heads of State. There may also be a part
for former President Kenneth Kaunda to play, as a respected
senior statesman and possible envoy to Zimbabwe. During your
meetings, you may also wish to raise the progress of the
African Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA),
Zambia’s participation in regional peacekeeping operations,
and anti-corruption issues. Mwanawasa has just returned from
a SADC Summit on poverty in Mauritius, where he met with
Mbeki, the Swazi King, and other SADC leaders.
¶2. (C) Although President Mwanawasa has shown leadership by
placing Zimbabwe onto the SADC agenda, his public reticence
suggests that he still prefers to do so only privately. It
seems unlikely that, despite his differences with Mugabe, he
will take a stronger stand or openly criticize Mugabe. In
light of his sensitivity to criticism that he has been doing
the bidding of the West, it will be important to carefully
consider how to engage Mwanawasa in such a way that
legimitimizes and supports his leadership. Mwanawasa
reinforced this in a recent discussion with the Ambassador,
during which he thanked the USG for “its discretion.” In the
event that SADC leaders appoint former President Kenneth
Kaunda to be a special envoy to Zimbabwe (see para 9), we may
want to direct some of our attention, and much of our
message, to him.
———————
Overview/Introduction
———————
¶3. (U) Zambia is rich in mineral, agricultural, and water
resources and enjoys a history of peace and stability in a
sub-region marked by conflict and instability. In 2006, the
country conducted its fourth multi-party democratic elections
since 1991. Democratic institutions are still developing,
the Presidency retains a great deal of power, and
administrative corruption continues to be rampant. The
economy has experienced almost a decade of steady growth, but
not enough to generate significant new job opportunities.
About two-thirds of Zambia’s 11.9 million people live below
the poverty line, and under-five child survival rates and
maternal mortality rates are among the worst in the world.
The quality of teachers and the availability of teaching
materials are poor. The HIV/AIDS pandemic cuts across all
social and economic sectors. About 17 percent of the adult
population is HIV-positive.
——————-
USG Goals in Zambia
——————-
¶4. (SBU) The Mission’s strategic focus concentrates on
creating a more positive environment for private sector
expansion through trade and investment, addressing enormous
health and education challenges, and improving HIV/AIDS and
malaria prevention, care, and treatment through the
President’s initiatives. In addition, reducing corruption
and improving government accountability and capabilities will
assist in attaining our top strategic objectives.
———————
U.S.-Zambia Relations
———————
¶5. (C) Although the Government of Zambia often follows the AU
or SADC consensus in UN and other international settings,
occasionally a motivated and courageous GRZ official takes a
stand on issues of interest to the U.S. Government, for
example, to criticize Sudan’s human rights record in Darfur.
USG relations with the Government of Zambia are generally
positive and cordial, but GRZ follow-through on joint
activities and projects is often slow, not thorough, and
heavy on formality. GRZ delays or failure to act sometimes
stems from a lack of interest or commitment–Zambians are
LUSAKA 00000448 002 OF 003
courteous and often too polite to say “no” outright–but
other times is due to poor internal coordination and lack of
capacity.
————-
SADC/Zimbabwe
————-
¶6. (C) President Mwanawasa was appointed SADC Chair at the
August 2007 SADC Summit, a position that he will hold until
August 2008. During the August 2007 meetings, Mwanawasa
expressed concerns about the speed and effectiveness of Thabo
Mbeki’s “quiet diplomacy” with Zimbabwe. According to some
reports, Mbeki and/or Mugabe accused Mwanawasa of being
manipulated by UK diplomats. This accusation, and the lack
of support from Mwanawasa’s SADC peers, extinguished the
discussion on Zimbabwe. (Refs E, F).
¶7. (C) During the Extraordinary Heads of State Summit on
April 12, Mwanawasa made a forceful opening statement that
called upon Zimbabwe’s leaders to exercise “humility” and
overlook their own personal interests in finding a solution
that reflects the will of the people (Ref C). After an
all-night session, the leaders released a weak communique
that called for the quick release of election results, but
otherwise failed to acknowledge ZANU-PF’s violence and
intimidation tactics (Ref B). The Summit pointed to an
emerging divide between SADC Heads of State who are prepared
to address problems in Zimbabwe and others who prefer not to
interfere. Press reports suggest that Botswanan and
Tanzanian leadership supported Mwanwasa, while the Presidents
of Malawi, Angola, and the Democratic Republic of Congo
backed Mbeki’s faint engagement. The diluted communique
suggests that Mbeki may have prevailed.
¶8. (C) Mwanawasa told the Ambassador, however, that the
Summit was a signal to Mugabe that SADC will not support him
unconditionally. He characterized Mbeki as counterproductive
and insincere. He observed that many SADC leaders had
changed their minds about the situation in Zimbabwe after
hearing firsthand from opposition candidates Tsvangirai and
Makoni about the electoral irregularities. MDC Secretary
General Tendai Biti called the Summit “a major improvement”
over Mbeki’s attempts at mediation. Biti said that the
communique “exposes the limitations of quiet diplomacy in
comparison to the constructive engagement, which other
countries pursued against the apartheid regime in South
Africa.”
—————————–
Mwanawasa As “Special Envoy?”
—————————–
¶9. (SBU) On April 18, Government newspapers quoted
Information Minister Mulongoti categorically rejecting
opposition candidate Tsvangirai’s call for Mwanawasa to take
over Mbeki’s mediation efforts. Mulongoti said that
Tsvangirai had discussed this with Mwanawasa during the April
SIPDIS
12 summit (and possibly during a reported half-day visit on
April 16–we cannot confirm that this meeting took place),
but Mwanawasa had no intention of taking up this assignment
without a mandate from the SADC leaders. Mulongoti added
that Zambia takes strong exception to Zimbabwe Minister of
Justice Patrick Chinamasa’s accusation that Mwanawasa’s
actions are part of a “regime change agenda.”
——————————–
Possible Role for Kenneth Kaunda
——————————–
¶10. (C) At a Ministerial meeting in August 2008, SADC leaders
discussed the possibility of scaling up South Africa’s
engagement by appointing an “eminent official” as a special
envoy to the crisis. Possible candidates included former
Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda and former Botswanan
President Ketumile Masire (Ref F). Since August, Mwanawasa
has raised this again, suggesting that Kaunda could be part
of a regional commission of senior envoys. Kaunda may have
credibility with Mugabe that some other SADC Heads of State,
who do not belong to the first generation of African
liberators, do not. Kaunda is also considered an ideal
choice inasmuch as he peacefully stepped down from office
after a twenty-seven year presidency, following strong public
pressure and his unexpected loss in national elections.
————————————
ACOTA, Peacekeeping, Anti-corruption
————————————
¶11. (C) Other items that you may wish to discuss with
Mwanawasa or the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense
LUSAKA 00000448 003 OF 003
could include:
–ACOTA training: In 2007, the first group of 560
participants successfully completed ACOTA peacekeeper
training. Despite the positive reception, the Ministry of
Defense has yet to confirm the timing of the next round of
ACOTA training. The Embassy has initiated a formal dialogue
to set a date for training in summer 2008 but has not
received a full commitment from the GRZ.
–Peacekeeping Operations: The Zambia Defense Forces (ZDF)
have been active in peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone
and, currently, Southern Sudan, although they are not
assessed as being particularly effective. The ZDF have not
responded to offers by the DATT and the Ambassador to provide
non-lethal equipment should the forces deploy to Darfur.
Regarding deployment to Somalia, the GRZ advised informally
that this is “off the table.” The Chinese are almost
certainly involved with the ZDF in the realm of training and
logistics, although we have no hard data on the extent of
their engagement.
–Anti-Corruption: The President deserves praise for his
focus on combating corruption. High-level cases have
progressed slowly, with three convictions. Post has been
pressing for a more holistic approach to corruption
prevention, that includes legislative and institutional
reforms. Some measures that require little more than
political will, have long been pending Cabinet approval,
including the establishment of an internationally compliant
anti-money laundering regime.
MARTINEZ
(52 VIEWS)
