ZANU-PF politburo member Didymus Mutasa, who was Minister for State Security at the time, “proudly” told a United States delegation that he was among those principally responsible for Operation Restore Order (Murambatsvina) and showed no remorse for the suffering the operation had caused.
He said the operation was necessitated by illegal activities such as money-changing, prostitution and robbery stemming from areas of illegal construction and asserted that the operation had been successful in stemming the national crime rate.
He dismissed reports that hundreds of thousands had been displaced and claimed “only 40 000” had lost their homes.
When told that Murambatsvina had set back prospects for improved bilateral relations with the United Sates, Mutasa said he was not interested in engaging with the US or in soliciting any bilateral assistance.
He said that the US consistently applied a double standard to Zimbabwe that was evidence of its intent to effect regime change.
Mutasa said Zimbabwe only wanted two things from the US: more honest public statements about the country and to be left alone.
“Why did the USG speak out about dead babies in Zimbabwe and not about the ‘tens of thousands of babies’ it had ‘murdered’ in Iraq?” he asked.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 05HARARE976, STAFFDEL SIMPKINS ENGAGES ON RESTORE ORDER
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HARARE 000976
SIPDIS
AF FOR DAS T. WOODS
AF/S FOR D. MOZENA, B. NEULING
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2010
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR ECON EFIN SOCI ZI VIP
SUBJECT: STAFFDEL SIMPKINS ENGAGES ON RESTORE ORDER
REF: (A) HARARE 928 (B) HARARE 760
Classified By: Charge d’affaires a.i., Eric T. Schultz under Section 1.
4 b/d
——–
Summary
——–
¶1. (C) On a visit to assess and discuss the effects of
Operation Restore Order, Majority Staffer Gregory Simpkins
and Minority Staffer Pearl-Alice Marsh from the House of
Representatives International Relations Committee (HIRC)
traveled to Harare and Bulawayo, July 2-6. The staffdel saw
first hand the devastation in former settlements and
high-density suburbs. In meetings with government officials,
they expressed outrage over the human rights violations
surrounding Restore Order. In his meeting with them,
Minister for State Security Didymus Mutasa took credit for
the operation, expressed no remorse at the plight of its
victims, and showed no interest in reengagement with the U.S.
Reserve Bank (RBZ) Governor Gideon Gono said the operation
had been carried out without proper consultation but had his
support. He desired engagement from the West in restoring
Zimbabwe,s economy.
¶2. (C) In meetings with opposition and civil society, the
staffdel expressed the warmly welcomed message that the
United States was aware of their struggle and continued to
support their efforts. MDC officials emphasized the need for
continued U.S. support, including encouraging Nigeria and
South Africa to increase pressure on Mugabe. They said that
Operation Restore Order had created unrest within ZANU-PF but
that the time might not be right for Zimbabweans to rise up
in peaceful protest. However, the MDC was taking steps to
ready the people for that moment. Bishops Trevor Manhanga
and Patrick Mutume said that the churches were trying not to
be political but that all deplored Operation Restore Order
and were speaking out about it. The staffdel suggested to
the Bishops, the MDC and others in the opposition that it was
important to engage with U.S. religious leaders, especially
African-Americans. They added that Congressman Payne might
consider a trip to Zimbabwe in the near future. End Summary.
—————
Staffdel Agenda
—————
¶2. (C) In Harare, the staffdel met with Government officials
Didymus Mutasa and Gideon Gono and several MDC officials.
They spoke with Jonathan Moyo (septel). They met with
Catholic Bishop Patrick Mutume and Evangelical Bishop Trevor
Manhanga. They spoke with UN special envoy Anna Tibaijuka
and other UN officials (ref A). The staffdel also attended a
number of other meetings and events. They attended a church
service the Fountain of Hope Church, an evangelical church,
and met with congregants afterwards to discuss with citizens
the U.S. interest in Zimbabwe. They visited Porta Farm, a
settlement area on the outskirts of Harare that had been
destroyed by Operation Restore Order. They spoke with
businesswomen in Harare and University of Zimbabwe Economics
professor Tony Hawkins about the effects of Operation Restore
Order on the economy. They attended a roundtable discussion
with human rights and HIV/AIDS NGOs about the human effects
of Restore Order. They also spoke with reporters from the
Daily Mirror, the Standard, and ZimOnline.
¶3. (C) In Bulawayo (septel), the Staff Delegation met with
activists from Women of Zimbabwe Arise! (WOZA) and MDC MP
David Coltart. They also visited a church providing
assistance to the displaced and one of the destroyed
settlements, escorted by officials from World Vision.
——————
Mutasa on Restore Order and International Relations:
Leave Us Alone
——————
¶4. (C) Minister for State Security (and fifth-ranking
Politburo member) Didymus Mutasa proudly told the staffdel in
his office on July 5 that he was among those principally
responsible for the GOZ decision to move forward with
Operation Restore Order. He showed no remorse for the
suffering the operation had caused. Recounting familiar
purported justifications, he said the operation was
necessitated by illegal activities (money-changing,
prostitution, robbery) stemming from areas of illegal
construction and asserted that the operation had been
successful in stemming the national crime rate. He dismissed
reports of hundreds of thousands displaced and claimed “only
40,000″ had lost their homes. Questioned about court rulings
that aspects of Restore Order were illegal, he said that the
courts could do what they wanted, the government would do
what it wanted. The operation would continue and the West
was welcome to work with the GOZ on reconstruction efforts.
¶5. (C) The staffdel stressed that Restore Order had set back
prospects for improved bilateral relations in the wake of the
GOZ’s relatively peaceful administration of elections in
March. Queried about GOZ views on bilateral relations with
the United States, Mutasa said he was not interested in
engaging with the USG or in soliciting any bilateral
assistance. He asserted that the USG consistently applied a
double standard to Zimbabwe that was evidence of its intent
to effect regime change. Why did the USG speak out about
dead babies in Zimbabwe and not about the “tens of thousands
of babies” it had “murdered” in Iraq? The GOZ wanted only
two things from the USG: more honest public statements about
Zimbabwe and to be left alone. He said he would welcome the
opportunity to explain Zimbabwe to Americans but did not care
to be removed from the travel sanctions list. The GOZ
understood the USG perfectly but the USG did not understand
the GOZ; in that vein, he invited the staffdel to visit his
farm so they could learn more for themselves. He said he was
polite to them only because they were black and despite the
fact that they were tools of President Bush. The staffdel
stressed that the United States was not implacably opposed to
ZANU-PF; its concerns revolved around process, not
personalities or choosing parties.
¶6. (C) Responding to the staffdel’s questions about growing
African concern about Zimbabwe and the reported visit of an
AU envoy, Mutasa claimed that African governments
increasingly were being bought off by America and Britain,
who were out to destroy all governments that came from
liberation movements. In particular, the GOZ had “no regard”
for the Nigerians, who were largely responsible for crime in
Zimbabwe and the need for Restore Order. The regime would
listen to SADC, which remained staunchly behind the GOZ
(except perhaps Botwsana, he allowed), but not the rest of
Africa.
——————————————— ——-
Gono: Central Bank Still Seeking Re-Engagement
——————————————— ——-
¶7. (C) In a rambling presentation in his office on July 5,
Reserve Bank (RBZ) Governor Gideon Gono told the staffdel
that Restore Order had been undertaken without adequate
consultation, notice, or “communication of vision.” The GOZ,
especially the RBZ, was remedying that now as his bi-monthly
meetings with “all stake-holders” attested. For its part,
the RBZ was supportive of Restore Order, in part to steer
informal economic activity toward the formal sector and in
part because it could not be seen to condone corruption. The
staffdel reiterated Restore Order’s negative ramifications
for any prospective Zimbabwean rapprochement with the West
and urged that it be ceased.
¶8. (C) Asked by the staffdel how the country would recover
economically and at what cost, Gono recounted familiar
measures advanced in his May monetary policy statement, such
as export subsidies and concessionary loans in the
agricultural sectors (ref B), and purported
confidence-building measures (grandly named new “operations”
that are thin on details and resources) in the wake of
Restore Order. The RBZ was deploying highly-paid staff
throughout the country to work with provincial governors and
to be his “eyes and ears.” He shared a copy of his five-page
charge to them, which instructed them on comportment but said
nothing about their objectives. Gono emphasized that
restoring Zimbabwe’s economy was a mammoth task that
ultimately would require international reengagement; he
intended to build a platform to support that reengagement.
The staffdel noted that the GOZ’s execution of economic
policy seemed at odds with Gono’s often more orthodox,
market-oriented rhetoric. In response to staffdel inquiries
about his rumored attempted resignation, he stressed he would
never resign but would never refuse to be fired either.
——————————–
MDC Seeks Continued U.S. Support
——————————–
¶9. (C) On July 5, MDC MPs Welshman Ncube (also party
Secretary-General), Priscilla Misihairabwi-Mushonga (party
SIPDIS
Secretary for Foreign Affairs), Nelson Chamisa (party Youth
SIPDIS
Wing Chair), Job Sikhala, and Tendai Biti (party Secretary
for Economic Affairs), asked for continued U.S. support and
said Operation Restore Order had weakened the government.
There was rising internal unrest within the ruling ZANU-PF
party, linked to the succession struggle but also a result of
the government,s crackdown on the poor, which was unpopular
with many in the party. Misihairabwi claimed that a third
faction was forming within ZANU-PF that intended to draft
former Finance Minister Simba Makoni to challenge the Mujuru
and Mnangagwa factions for party leadership.
¶10. (C) Simpkins asked why the people of Zimbabwe were not
rising up in protest. MP Job Sikhala said he had tried to
organize peaceful resistance in his constituency of St.
Mary,s (part of the mammoth high density suburb of
Chitungwiza) but that it had failed in the face of
overwhelming Government intimidation. Misihairabwi noted
that in many countries people had put up with decades of
repression before reaching a critical moment where resistance
was possible. The MDC realized it had to build up a level of
confidence within the people for them to reach that critical
moment. The MDC was working on reshaping its approach to the
regime and was planning unspecified measures to step up
democratic resistance. The MDC continued to need external
support but Zimbabweans had to step up and take action and
learn from peaceful uprisings in other countries.
¶11. (C) Simpkins said that Operation Restore Order was
clearly systematic abuse and he did not understand why the
international community, especially Africa, did not challenge
Mugabe. The MDC MPs responded that SADC could only be
effective in pressuring Mugabe to change if South Africa,s
position on Zimbabwe changed. Ncube said there was genuine
unhappiness about Zimbabwe in other SADC countries but that
they would follow South Africa,s lead. He said that, while
he understood other strategic interests governed U.S.
relations with these countries, the U.S. should use its
influence with South Africa and Nigeria to put more pressure
on Zimbabwe. He said it was also important for the U.S. to
continue to support democratic elements in Zimbabwe. Chamisa
singled out support for Voice of America as key. The group
said that Western governments had been too timid in their
criticisms of misgovernance in Africa because leaders like
Mugabe would always play the racial card. Marsh agreed that
the twin specters of colonialism and racism had neutralized
criticism of the GOZ in the Congressional Black Caucus. She
said that the African-American community in the U.S. would be
outraged by the staffdel,s report and that there was a need
for the opposition and civil society to better engage that
community, especially African-American religious leaders.
She added that Congressman Payne was reconsidering a trip to
Zimbabwe.
——-
Bishops
——-
¶12. (C) On July 5, the staffdel met with Bishops Patrick
Mutume (Catholic) and Trevor Manhanga (Evangelical), who
spoke about Operation Restore Order and the role of religious
institutions in dealing with the country,s political
turmoil. Marsh said she had hoped that, after the flawed but
improved March elections, the GOZ would next move toward
reconciliation with civil society and the opposition and did
not understand the GOZ,s motives. The Bishops said that the
Government,s actions in Operation Restore Order were showing
people that the Government could target anyone, not just
white farmers. Mutume said the churches had tried not to be
political but that the Catholic Church had started issuing
pastoral letters protesting the operation. Manhanga said
Mugabe was not quite ready to attack the churches directly
but that it was clear he wanted to control them as evidenced
by the NGO bill, which would classify churches doing
humanitarian work as NGOs and subject them to the same
intense scrutiny as human rights NGOs. They said that Mugabe
was not easily subject to influence from outsiders but that
the churches, shuttle diplomacy might eventually work on
someone who had influence with Mugabe. The staffdel
emphasized the need for the Bishops to reengage with
religious leaders they had previously met in the United
States and offered their support in making those
reconnections.
——–
Comment
——–
¶13. (C) The staffdel,s meetings with ruling party and
opposition officials and civil society offered a window into
the activities and motives of Zimbabwe’s key political
players. Meetings with government officials underscored that
the GOZ remains apparently uninterested in reengagement with
the U.S. on political issues, despite interest by Gono and
others in the ruling party (who remain uninclined to speak
out) in rapprochement with the West. Civil society and
opposition officials enthusiastically received the
staffdel,s message that the U.S. was aware of the plight of
ordinary Zimbabweans and had not given up on them.
¶14. (U) The StaffDel did not have the opportunity to clear
this message.
SCHULTZ
(61 VIEWS)
