President Robert Mugabe and the leader of the smaller faction of the Movement for Democratic Change Arthur Mutambara were the biggest winners in the Global Political Agreement signed on 15 September 2008.
Mugabe who was beaten by the leader of the larger faction of the MDC Morgan Tsvangirai in the 29 March elections, though Tsvangirai’s victory was not an outright win, came out tops retaining most of the powers he had before the agreement.
Under the agreement, the President has the following notable authorities:
- Chairs the Cabinet;
- Chairs the National Security Council (comprised of the
- military, Central Intelligence Organization, and police);
- Appoints the two Vice Presidents;
- Appoints 15 of the 31 members of Cabinet (who also serve as Ministers and sit on the Council of Ministers);
- Appoints 8 non-constituency Senators to the Senate (Senate will now consist of 102 Senators; 9 new Senate positions were created and split evenly among the three parties. Mugabe already had the authority to appoint 5 Senators and 10 Provincial Governors to the Senate);
- Can declare war and make peace (subject to any new constitutional limits);
- Can proclaim and terminate martial law (also subject to any new constitutional limits); and can dissolve Parliament (in consultation with the Prime Minister).
But Mutambara was by far the biggest winner. Despite garnering only 10 parliamentary seats out of 210 -and demonstrating little control of those 10- Mutambara negotiated a position as Deputy Prime Minister.
MDC-M also picked up three ministries, one appointed MP and three
Senators.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 08HARARE842, FLAWED DEAL PRESERVES ZANU-PF PRIMACY;
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Reference ID |
Created |
Released |
Classification |
Origin |
VZCZCXRO4929
OO RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHSB #0842/01 2611554
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 171554Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3451
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 2302
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 2421
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0936
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1698
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 2054
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 2475
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 4907
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1570
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000842
SIPDIS
AF/S FOR G. GARLAND
DRL FOR N. WILETT
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E. LOKEN AND L. DOBBINS
STATE PASS TO NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B. PITTMAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2018
SUBJECT: FLAWED DEAL PRESERVES ZANU-PF PRIMACY;
TSVANGIRAI’S ROLE UNCERTAIN
REF: HARARE 819
Classified By: Ambassador James D. McGee for reason 1.4 (d)
——-
SUMMARY
——-
¶1. (C) President Mugabe came away from Monday’s signing of a
power-sharing agreement with many of his previous executive
authorities intact. He appears to retain control of the
military, and potentially other security elements, as well as
primacy within the policy-determining Cabinet. Prime
Minister Tsvangirai’s role is less clearly defined and will
become evident through implementation, but executive
oversight is a foremost responsibility. Arthur Mutambara’s
MDC-M formation came out a clear winner, as his faction
expanded its executive representation well beyond their
parliamentary presence. Additionally, a 19 month timetable
for a new constitution was agreed upon, as well as committees
to spur economic recovery and evaluate compliance. END
SUMMARY.
—————————————
The Presidency Wields the Biggest Stick
—————————————
¶2. (SBU) The political resolution signed September 15 between
ZANU-PF and the two MDC factions maintains the supremacy of
the role of President in Zimbabwe’s new government. The
President is clearly the Head of State and also appears to be
the Head of Government. While the coming implementation of
the agreement and the still undisclosed distribution of
ministries between the rival parties will largely determine
the extent of Mugabe’s executive branch authorities, this
document does little to constrain his executive power.
¶3. (U) Under the agreement, the President has the following
notable authorities:
— Chairs the Cabinet;
— Chairs the National Security Council (comprised of the
military, Central Intelligence Organization, and police);
— Appoints the two Vice Presidents;
— Appoints 15 of the 31 members of Cabinet (who also serve
as Ministers and sit on the Council of Ministers);
— Appoints 8 non-constituency Senators to the Senate (Senate
will now consist of 102 Senators; 9 new Senate positions were
created and split evenly among the three parties. Mugabe
already had the authority to appoint 5 Senators and 10
Provincial Governors to the Senate);
— Can declare war and make peace (subject to any new
constitutional limits);
— Can proclaim and terminate martial law (also subject to
any new constitutional limits); and
— Can dissolve Parliament (in consultation with the Prime
Minister).
¶4. (SBU) The distribution of ministries will be paramount in
determining the extent of Mugabe’s and Tsvangirai’s shared
executive authorities. Independent of that, this agreement
appears to preserve Mugabe’s control of the state security
apparatus, as well as allow him to wield the most influence
over a powerful Cabinet that has been charged with
“evaluating and adopting all government policies.”
¶5. (SBU) Interestingly, the agreement includes no discussion
of what it means to chair Cabinet. The Prime Minister’s
position, however, does describe Tsvangirai’s responsibility
to “oversee the formulation of government policies by the
HARARE 00000842 002 OF 003
Cabinet.” This would not appear to mean that Mugabe has
relinquished his authority in directing Cabinet, even if that
may be the MDC’s erstwhile wish. The legacy of Mugabe’s many
years of executive authority makes this highly unlikely, as
does Mugabe’s eventual appointment of 15 of 31 ministers and
Tsvangirai’s title of Deputy Chair of Cabinet.
————————–
Tsvangirai’s Role Evolving
————————–
¶6. (SBU) The role of Prime Minister is centered on his
position as Chair of the Council of Ministers (COM) and
Deputy Chair of the Cabinet. It is the Prime Minister’s
responsibility to oversee policy formulation. We interpret
this as meaning he will have oversight responsibilities to
make sure that policies adopted by the Cabinet are
implemented. Less clear is the extent to which he will be
able to direct the formation of those policies. While the
international media–most notably the BBC–have described
Tsvangirai’s role as being responsible for the day-to-day
running of the country, we believe that is an overly
optimistic interpretation of the document.
¶7. (U) As Prime Minister, Tsvangirai has the following
notable authorities:
— Chair of the COM and Deputy Chair of Cabinet;
— Oversees formulation of government polices by the Cabinet;
— Ensures policies are implemented;
— Serves as the leader of government business in Parliament;
— Sits on the National Security Council; and
— “Shall report regularly to the President and Parliament.”
¶8. (SBU) The newly-created COM appears to be an evaluative
body assessing the performance of Cabinet. The government is
in need of such an auditor. However, it now seems that the
COM will be a slightly smaller subset of the same ministers
who sit on Cabinet, creating an obvious conflict of interest.
Without the authority to remove Cabinet ministers, the
ZANU-PF ministers are unlikely to give much weight to
Tsvangirai’s role as Chair of the COM.
——————————
MDC-M’s Over-weighted Position
——————————
¶9. (SBU) Debatably, the biggest winner in the agreement may
well have been Arthur Mutambara’s MDC-M faction. Despite
garnering only 10 parliamentary seats out of 210–and
demonstrating little control of those 10–Mutambara
negotiaed a position as Deputy Prime Minister. MDC-M also
picked up three ministries, one appointed MP andthree
Senators. Most critically, should Mutambaa continue to show
signs of supporting Mugabe (a he did throughout the
negotiations), he could tp the balance of power in Cabinet
in Mugabe’s favor. (Septel provides the views of Tendai
Biti, oe of the agreement’s negotiators, on how this came
about.)
——————————————— –
Constitution, By-Elections, and Many Cmmittees
——————————————— —
¶10. (SBU) The agreement lays out certain steps leading to the
adoption of a new Zimbabwean constitution. Specifically, a
Select Committee of Parliament composed of party MPs will
draft a new constitution that will go through a nation-wide
referendum and then ultimately be submitted for vote in
Parliament. There is no mention of the President needing to
HARARE 00000842 003 OF 003
approve the new constitution. The timetable sets a period of
19 months from now until a final parliamentary vote.
¶11. (SBU) If any vacancies arise in Parliament during the
next 12 months, the other parties agree that they will not
contest for the seat, leaving it to the party holding the
vacant seat will to fill the vacancy. Unless independents or
other party candidates emerge, this should ensure that the
MDC-T maintains its one seat advantage over ZANU-PF in the
House of Assembly, and may mitigate intimidation and violence
in upcoming by-election campaigns for two vacant seats.
(reftel)
¶12. (SBU) The deal also creates four new entities. A
National Security Council (NSC), a National Economic Council
(NEC) and two review entities: the Joint Monitoring and
Implementation Committee (JOMIC) and an unnamed committee
composed of two representatives from each party. The
National Security Council will be run by Mugabe. The NEC is
a bipartisan committee that will advise on economic recovery.
The JOMIC is the principal entity that will periodically
review the implementation of the agreement and hear
complaints stemming from any lack of compliance.
——-
COMMENT
——-
¶13. (C) This document is clearly a framework that leaves it
to the signatories to hammer out many important details.
Unfortunately, it is the details–such as who controls which
ministries–that will determine this agreement’s ultimate
success or failure. END COMMENT
MCGEE
(38 VIEWS)