Many supporters of the Morgan Tsvangirai faction of the Movement for Democratic Change had become disenchanted by the splits within the party- the Mutambara breakaway in 2005 and the dismissal of Lucia Matibenga in 2007.
This was the view of the United States embassy as the country headed for the 2008 elections when former Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front politburo member Simba Makoni announced his candidacy for presidency.
This was a clear indication that the United States, and the West in general, did not give Tsvangirai a chance in the elections and were probably behind Makoni, who was seen as a reformist and had the backing of former army commander Solomon Mujuru.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 08HARARE130, THE SIMBA MAKONI FACTOR
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|
Reference ID |
Created |
Classification |
Origin |
VZCZCXRO8381
RR RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHSB #0130/01 0451528
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 141528Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2481
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 1768
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 1894
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0479
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1171
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 1528
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 1950
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 4379
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1021
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HARARE 000130
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
AF/S FOR S. HILL,
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E. LOKEN AND L. DOBBINS
STATE PASS TO NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B. PITTMAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2018
SUBJECT: THE SIMBA MAKONI FACTOR
Classified By: Amb. James D. McGee for reason 1.4 (d)
——-
Summary
——-
¶1. (C) Simba Makoni’s candidacy, first announced on February
5, has shaken up President Robert Mugabe and ZANU-PF. The
secrecy surrounding his decision to become a candidate
produced surprise; it has also made it difficult for analysts
to judge the strength of his support. Most of his presumed
backers have not publicly announced their support, and Makoni
at separate press and diplomatic briefings on February 13
said he would welcome support from all Zimbabweans, but
declined to identify supporters. He stated he would run as
an independent candidate.
¶2. (C) Makoni and his advisers have had conversations with
Arthur Mutambara and his MDC faction, but a deal for an
alliance has not yet been struck. Most political observers
believe that a Makoni-Morgan Tsvangirai alliance would
present formidable opposition to Mugabe. There have been
overtures between the two camps, but each belittles the
strength of the other, and an accord does not at this point
appear likely. End Summary.
————————
Confusion Within ZANU-PF
————————
¶3. (C) The mastermind behind Makoni’s candidacy is Ibbo
Mandaza, an academic, publisher, and ZANU-PF critic of
Mugabe. Mandaza told us at the end of last year that he was
attempting–he thought successfully–to persuade Makoni to
become a candidate. Although Mandaza insisted he was on
course, his plans appeared dashed when newspapers and Embassy
contacts reported that Makoni had seen Mugabe on January 22
and pledged loyalty to him and the party. In retrospect,
this appeared to have been a clever strategy to keep Mugabe
in the dark. From January 22 until Makoni announced his
candidacy on February 5, local media, which operates as a
comprehensive rumor mill, did not speculate about a Makoni
candidacy. The media vitriol which spewed toward Makoni
after his announcement corroborated reports from Embassy
contacts that Mugabe and his inner circle had been surprised
by Mandaza and Makoni.
¶4. (C) Apart from the media, and a few Mugabe insiders such
as Emmerson Mnangagwa and Political Commissar Elliot Manyika,
there has been little public criticism of Makoni. One
notable exception was war veteran Joseph Chinotimba who
called Makoni a “taitor” and said he would be dealt with.
The relatively muted ZANU-PF reaction to Makoni is evidently
a result of confusion within the party and uncertainty about
how to deal with his challenge. Party spokesman Nathan
Shamuyarira, without saying more, announced on February 12
that Makoni’s decision to stand as an independent had
resulted in his automatic expulsion from the party, and that
the Polituburo had affirmed this in a meeting the previous
day.
—————-
Makoni’s Support
—————-
¶5. (C) At the announcement of his candidacy on February 5,
and at separate press and diplomatic briefings on February
12, Makoni and Mandaza declined to identify backers. This
secrecy has made it difficult to gauge the breadth and depth
of Makoni’s support. Mandaza told us there was significant
support in Mashonaland as evidenced by a substantial up-tick
in registration after Makoni’s announcement, but in the
HARARE 00000130 002 OF 004
absence of rallies or public figures endorsing Makoni’s
candidacy, actual following is difficult to confirm. The
Zimbabwe Independent reported that Makoni enjoyed the support
of vice-presidents Joseph Msika and Joice Mujuru, speaker of
parliament John Nkomo, defense minister Sydney Sekeramayi,
women affairs’ minister Oppah Muchinguri, youth minister
Saviour Kasukuwere, Solomon Mujuru, retired general Vitalis
Zvinavashe, and Mashonaland East governor Ray Kakunde, but to
date none of these individuals has gone public.
¶6. (C) A business partner and political advisor of Solomon
Mujuru, Tiranvhu Mudariki, told us that Mujuru and others
were beginning to suffer in Zimbabwe’s parlous business
environment and were convinced they could thrive economically
only with a change of leadership. He said Mujuru supported
Makoni, but would not take an active role in his campaign.
He would consider covert financial support.
¶7. (C) While numerous ZANU-PF heavyweights in addition to
Mujuru would undoubtedly like to see Mugabe go, they are
afraid to challenge him openly. First, they continue to
enjoy ZANU-PF patronage, and a challenge to Mugabe would
result in an immediate end to their benefits. Secondly,
many, including Mujuru, are corrupt, and they know Mugabe has
dossiers on them documenting their illegal activities. A
challenge to Mugabe could result in their arrest and
prosecution. Therefore, these individuals are hoping to ease
Mugabe out without a direct challenge. Mudariki noted how
difficult this was. The Mujuru faction had tried to
challenge Mugabe using party structures last year, and had
hoped that a challenger to Mugabe would be nominated at the
ZANU-PF Extraordinary Congress in December. He admitted the
Mujurus and their allies had been outmaneuvered and had been
on the defensive since.
———-
Next Steps
———-
¶8. (C) According to Mandaza, his and Makoni’s original plan
was for Makoni to present himself as a ZANU-PF candidate in
the party structures, and to try to force Mugabe to step
down. The backup plan, if Makoni and his supporters failed
to force Mugabe out, was for Makoni to run as an independent.
And if he failed to develop sufficient support as an
independent, Mandaza said the Makoni team would seek to form
a united front with other opposition groups.
¶9. (C) With Makoni’s expulsion from ZANU-PF, he is now
running as an independent. The next step for him and his
supporters will be to gauge strength and determine whether
they should explore a united opposition.
¶10. (C) At Makoni’s press and diplomatic briefings on
February 13, he noted that Zimbabwe was full of fear and
polarized, with people suffering from disease and extreme
poverty. He said he was offering renewal, and that the
symbol of his candidacy would be a rising sun to represent a
new dawn. He hoped that others would contest independently
under this banner, and that he would accept support from
anyone. February 15 is nomination day when candidates must
be registered. We will know at that time whether
parliamentary candidates will ally with him under his banner.
——————————————— —–
The Electoral Playing Field and Possible Alliances
——————————————— —–
¶11. (C) In the wake of the collapse of the MDC
reconciliation talks (Reftel), the MDC Mutambara faction will
in all probability support Makoni. Mandaza and Mutambara
HARARE 00000130 003 OF 004
have told us they are engaged in talks. Mutambara and the
faction itself have little strength, but individual
legislators within the faction have support within their
constituencies. The faction currently has 20 members of
parliament (compared with 21 for the Tsvangirai faction),
almost all in Matabeleland. Most of these would support
Makoni.
¶12. (C) Tsvangirai’s strength is in the urban areas,
particularly Harare. He also has substantial support in
Matabeleland, although this will be diluted by Mutambara
faction MPs who support Makoni. He has little support in
Mashonaland, the traditional heartland of ZANU-PF.
Tsvangirai’s traditional support has weakened. Many
SIPDIS
supporters have become disenchanted by the MDC splits–the
Mutambara break away in 2005 and the dismissal last year of
Lucia Matibenga as president of the MDC women’s wing–and
there is considerable apathy.
¶13. (C) As for Makoni, apart from any support the Mutambara
faction might bring, he has no support in Matabeleland. He
will seek support from urban areas, where, as noted above,
the MDC has been historically strong, and from rural areas
outside Matabeleland, principally in Mashonaland, where he
hopes that traditional ZANU-PF voters have become disaffected
and will vote against Mugabe. The MDC is attempting to make
inroads among these voters as well.
¶14. (C) With the possibility of Makoni and the MDC splitting
the opposition vote in urban areas and Mashonaland, many
Mugabe opponents believe a Makoni-MDC alliance would provide
the best hope of defeating Mugabe, especially in light of
inevitable ZANU-PF electoral rigging. While we understand
there have been some behind-the-scenes conversations, both
sides have hyped their respective strengths and belittled the
strength of the other. Mandaza claimed to us that rural
registration had increased significantly since Makoni’s
announcement and that Tsvangirai was a has-been. Tsvangirai
and his advisors have been dismissive of Makoni–Tsvangirai
publicly has called Makoni “old wine in a new bottle”–and
his advisors have told us privately they are skeptical he has
significant support.
¶15. (C) Without accurate public opinion polls, it is
difficult to judge the relative strengths of Makoni and
Tsvangirai. It does appear that they will be chasing a lot
SIPDIS
of the same voters. In a three-way race, this would of
course benefit Mugabe, and it is therefore logical to believe
that a Tsvangirai-Makoni alliance would present the best hope
of defeating him. But self-interest has always been an
important factor in Zimbabwean politics. and there is no
reason to believe at this time that either Makoni or
Tsvangirai and their supporters would be willing to play
SIPDIS
secondary roles in favor of the other candidate in order to
achieve a united opposition.
—————–
A Note on ZANU-PF
—————–
¶16. (C) Makoni’s candidacy has exposed fissures within the
ruling party. Even if Mugabe wins the election, these
fissures are bound to grow and ultimately result in either
new leadership or in the party’s disintegration. Discontent
among ZANU-PF officials is widespread, and members of the
rank and file are beginning to understand that their
predicament is related to misguided party and government
policies. Zimbabwe is in a transition; the unanswered
questions are what the form of this transition will be and
how long it will take.
——–
HARARE 00000130 004 OF 004
Bio Note
——–
¶17. (U) Simbarashe (Simba) Makone was born on March 22,
1950, in Rusape, Manicaland. He entered the University of
Rhodesia in 1971, but was expelled for leading demonstrations
against the government. He earned a Bachelor of Science
degree in Chemistry and Zoology from the University of Leeds
in 1975 and a PhD in Medical Chemistry from Leicester
Polytechnic in the United Kingdom in 1978. He remained in
Europe until 1980 as ZANU’s chief representative.
¶18. (U) Makoni returned to Zimbabwe in 1980 and at the age
of 30 was appointed deputy minister of agriculture. In 1981,
he was promoted to the position of minister of industry and
energy development. In 1984, he became minister of youth,
sport, and culture. In late 1984, he was named executive
secretary of SADC, a position he held until 1993.
SIPDIS
¶19. (U) In 1994, Makoni was appointed as managing director
of state-controlled ZimPapers. He was fired in 1997 after
suspending an editor, a Mugabe relative, for publishing
anti-white and anti-free market articles. In 2000, he
regained favor with Mugabe and was appointed minister of
finance and economic development in what Mugabe dubbed his
“war cabinet” to deal with the continuing economic crisis.
He was asked to step down in 2002 after he advocated
devaluation of the Zimbabwean dollar.
¶20. (U) In 2005, the GOZ put Makoni forward for the
presidency of the African Development Bank. His failure to
land the position was attributed his ZANU-PF affiliation and
Zimbabwe’s political differences with the U.S. and other
Western countries.
¶21. (U) Since leaving government in 2002, Makoni has worked
as a business consultant, managed a family-owned textile
firm, and managed a commercial farm which he bought (rather
than seized).
¶22. (U) Makoni was a long-standing member of the ZANU-PF
Politburo until his expulsion this week from the party.
¶23. (U) Makoni is married and has two sons. A third son
committed suicide several years ago while a student in South
Africa.
MCGEE
(55 VIEWS)
