Pretoria was so desperate to get analytical information on Zimbabwe that Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad asked Idasa analyst Sydney Masamvu to give him a five-page analysis about the situation in Zimbabwe in 10 days.
But Masamvu reported his entire conversation to United States embassy officials in Pretoria two days later and even asked them what to incorporate in his paper to Pahad.
Masamvu met senior Pretoria government officials over two days on 24 and 25 April 2007, according to a cable released by Wikileaks. The officials included Pahad, Department of Foreign Affairs Director General Ayanda Ntsaluba, Minister of Intelligence Ronnie Kasrils, head of the National Intelligence Coordinating Committee Barry Gilder, and African National Congress secretary-general Kgalema Motlanthe.
Embassy officials said it was highly unusual for senior South African government and ANC officials to spend so much time speaking with an NGO analyst like Masamvu, “no matter how well informed he is”, and to be so open and frank.
This outreach indicates that the Pretoria lacked sophisticated information about the situation in Zimbabwe and was reaching out to multiple sources for policy ideas.
The embassy asked Washington and the embassy in Harare to give feedback on what information to pass on to Masamvu so that he could incorporate it in his report to Pahad.
It also asked Washington to think about Masamvu’s suggestion that sanctions be lifted among some ZANU-PF members so as to create distrust within the party.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 07PRETORIA1495, C) ZIMBABWE: SENIOR SAG OFFICIALS OUTLINE VIEWS
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|
Reference ID |
Created |
Released |
Classification |
Origin |
VZCZCXRO1243
OO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHSA #1495/01 1201412
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 301412Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9465
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1177
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1065
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 1077
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 2060
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA PRIORITY 0972
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0070
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0511
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0461
RUEHTN/AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN PRIORITY 4243
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PRETORIA 001495
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR P, AF, AF/S
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2017
SUBJECT: (C) ZIMBABWE: SENIOR SAG OFFICIALS OUTLINE VIEWS
TO NGO CONTACT
REF: A. PRETORIA 1447
¶B. PRETORIA 0957
Classified By: Charge d’Affaires Donald Teitelbaum. Reasons 1.4(b) and
(d).
(U) This is an action request — see para 15.
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. In a series of meeting with IDASA analyst
Sydney Masamvu on April 24-25, senior South African officials
questioned Masamvu in detail about the situation in Zimbabwe.
DepForMin Pahad made clear he held MDC leader Tsvangirai in
low regard, but had a much higher opinion of MDC
Secretary-General Biti. At Pahad’s request, Masamvu listed
SIPDIS
three “neutral” Zimbabwean leaders who would be acceptable to
ZANU-PF and the MDC: Simba Makoni, Gideon Gono, and Strive
Masiyiwa. DFA DG Ntsaluba said the MDC was heavily
infiltrated by the GOZ, and that Tsvangirai should lobby
other African states, not Washington and London. Ntsaluba
said Mugabe only acts when under pressure. Intelligence
Minister Kasrils and his deputy Gilder discussed Mugabe’s
“pressure points” with Masamvu, noting that dissent within
ZANU-PF should be “nurtured” and the MDC strengthened. ANC
Secretary-General Motlanthe told Masamvu he is urging Mbeki
SIPDIS
to lobby SADC on free and fair elections in Zimbabwe now,
before it is too late. It is unusual for these senior SAG
officials to spend so much time with an NGO analyst like
Masamvu. This suggests that the SAG lacks solid information
about the dynamic in Zimbabwe and is still developing policy
options. The tenor of the questioning indicates that the SAG
remains committed to easing Mugabe out of power, but appears
focused on installing in his place a Pretoria-manipulated
government of national unity, regardless of the electoral
wishes of the Zimbabwean people. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad and Department of
Foreign Affairs (DFA) Director General Ayanda Ntsaluba met at
length with Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA)
analyst and close Embassy contact Sydney Masamvu (strictly
protect) on April 24. Pahad requested the meeting with
Masamvu after reading the March 05 International Crisis Group
(ICG) report “Zimbabwe: An End to the Stalemate?”, and asking
who had researched the report. Following this initial
conversation, Pahad set up individual meetings the same day
for Masamvu with Minister of Intelligence Ronnie Kasrils and
with head of the National Intelligence Coordinating Committee
(NICOC) Barry Gilder. Masamvu also met ANC Secretary-General
Kgalema Motlanthe on April 25, his second meeting with
Motlanthe in recent months (Ref B). Pahad tried to
facilitate a meeting between Masamvu and President Mbeki on
April 25, but was not successful because of scheduling
complications. A visibly exhausted Masamvu provided PolOff a
readout of these marathon meetings on April 26.
——————————————— –
Pahad and Ntsaluba Looking for “Neutral Faces”
——————————————— –
¶3. (C) Pahad and Ntsaluba asked Masamvu pointed questions
about the strengths and weaknesses of the opposition Movement
for Democratic Change (MDC), its leadership personalities,
and the role of the Zimbabwean military. Pahad made clear
that he held Tsvangirai in “low esteem,” but said that
MDC-Tsvangarai Secretary-General Tendai Biti was
“well-meaning” with a “vision for the future — unlike his
boss.” Ntsaluba commented that Tsvangirai spends too much
time lobbying London and Washington, and not enough time in
the region. “We want to hear from Morgan in Dar and in
Gaborone,” Ntsaluba urged. The MDC is “heavily infiltrated,”
Ntsaluba commented, saying that ZANU-PF provides them with
copies of MDC letters to Mbeki before the MDC letter arrives
in Pretoria. “ZANU-PF is always one step ahead,” Ntsaluba
observed. Masamvu said he told Pahad and Ntsaluba that the
MDC-Tsvangirai faction did not view South Africa as neutral
since SAG officials meet with Arthur Mutambara and Welshman
PRETORIA 00001495 002 OF 004
Ncube regularly, while refusing to see Morgan Tsvangirai.
¶4. (C) Pahad asked Masamvu which leaders were “neutral faces”
in Zimbabwe, acceptable to both ZANU-PF and the opposition.
Masamvu identified three:
— Former SADC Secretary General Simba Makoni: He remains a
member of the ZANU-PF politburo, but is viewed by the
opposition as a “unifier.” Masamvu noted, for example, that
Tsvangirai attended the funeral of Makoni’s son;
SIPDIS
— GOZ Reserve Bank Governor Gideon Gono: He knows the
ZANU-PF system and patronized the military, but Tsvangirai
can talk to him. Masamvu called Gono “pliable,” someone with
whom the international community could work; and,
— Exiled Zimbabwean businessman Strive Masiyiwa: He is not
tainted. He is respected by the international community, and
has ties both to ZANU-PF (his uncle is Vice President Msika)
and to MDC (he has quietly supported the party).
Pahad told Masamvu that these were the “same types of
individuals” that the he and President Mbeki had identified
as potential leaders.
¶5. (C) Ntsaluba suggested that Mugabe is only compliant when
he is under pressure. It was only following the March 11
beating of opposition leaders that South Africa was able to
garner enough support for SADC to put Zimbabwe on the agenda.
Ntsaluba noted that South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, and
sometimes Zambia and Tanzania were largely isolated in
wanting to pressure Mugabe. Namibia, Angola, and Malawi
remained close to Mugabe.
¶6. (C) Pahad asked Masamvu to prepare a five-page paper for
him by May 04 outlining his core recommendations for Zimbabwe
policy. Pahad also told Masamvu that he would like to meet,
together with one or two other “neutral” Zimbabwe analysts,
on a weekly basis. (COMMENT: Masamvu is open to suggestions
on what to emphasize in his paper. END COMMENT.)
—————————————–
Kasrils/Gilder Focus on Pressuring Mugabe
—————————————–
¶7. (C) Masamvu told PolOff that he found Intelligence
Minister Kasrils and NICOC head Gilder to be the most
pragmatic and focused of the SAG officials with whom he met.
Kasrils stressed that the international community must keep
the pressure on Mugabe, finding ways to “isolate him from
within his own party.” (NOTE: Masamvu suggested to PolOff
that the USG and EU consider making the smart sanctions more
“sophisticated” by lifting them on certain ZANU-PF officials
to create mistrust within the party. Properly crafted, this
strategy could further isolate Mugabe, Masamvu argued. END
NOTE.)
¶8. (C) No one should take Mugabe’s word that he will step
down, Kasrils said. Mugabe had “strung” the SAG along during
the 2004 constitutional talks. Kasrils said that the SAG
knows his game. South Africa is looking at the December
ZANU-PF annual congress as another opportunity to “rock the
boat.” If the SADC facilitation should fail, the SAG may
look to the annual congress as a “fallback” event to pressure
Mugabe to step down either by choice or through a
non-military “palace coup.” Masamvu said that Kasrils hinted
strongly that the SAG supported the Mujuru faction in
ZANU-PF, without explicitly stating that position.
¶9. (C) Kasrils said that the MDC needs to be strengthened to
pressure Mugabe, but that he had been consistently
disappointed by the party. Unlike Pahad, Kasrils
acknowledged that Tsvangirai was the key opposition leader
with the most support. Kasrils said that the election in
2000 was the window of opportunity for the MDC, but the party
PRETORIA 00001495 003 OF 004
missed its chance. More recently, MDC President Morgan
Tsvangirai had not seized on the March 11 events to energize
SIPDIS
the party. Instead, Tsvangirai had let the momentum
“fizzle,” raising questions about his capacity as MDC leader.
¶10. (C) In each of their meetings, Kasrils and Gilder asked
Masamvu about the role of the Zimbabwean military. When
Masamvu described the various alliances within the military
and their political and family links, both Gilder and Kasrils
took copious notes, asking a series of detailed questions.
(COMMENT: Masamvu found this surprising, since his
information was common knowledge in Zimbabwe. END COMMENT.)
Kasrils told Masamvu that 15-20 Zimbabwean soldiers are
defecting at the border every day.
¶11. (C) In their three-hour session, Gilder asked Masamvu
about the “pressure points” on Mugabe, suggesting that the
key is getting Mugabe “out of the equation.” Gilder and
Masamvu discussed five potential pressure points:
— dissent from within ZANU-PF, which should be “nurtured”;
— the deteriorating economic situation (Gilder said that
South Africa was prepared to provide economic assistance to a
“government of all forces”);
— isolation of Mugabe, both internally and internationally;
— strengthened MDC opposition; and,
— increased regional diplomatic pressure on Mugabe.
——————————————— ————
Motlanthe Urges Regional Pressure/Soft Landing for Mugabe
——————————————— ————-
¶12. (C) In their April 25 conversation, ANC Secretary General
Motlanthe told Masamvu that he feared the SADC initiative
might not deliver. He is urging Mbeki to work with his SADC
partners to deliver a message to Mugabe now — not later in
the year — stressing that SADC will not endorse the outcome
in the 2008 Zimbabwe elections unless the GOZ makes the
necessary reforms. Motlanthe said this message would be a
“bomb” for Mugabe. Motlanthe also suggested that the
international community begin to discuss a “soft landing” for
Mugabe, making it clear to him that he will not be prosecuted
in the International Criminal Court if he steps down.
Motlanthe described his vision of a new formation, a “united
front,” emerging in Zimbabwe taking in parts of ZANU-PF and
the MDC.
——-
Comment
——-
¶13. (C) It is highly unusual for senior SAG and ANC officials
to spend so much time speaking with an NGO analyst like
Masamvu, no matter how well informed he is, and to be so open
and frank. This outreach indicates that the SAG lacks
sophisticated information about the situation in Zimbabwe and
is reaching out to multiple sources for policy ideas.
Assuming that Masamvu’s interlocutors are being honest with
him — and we have no reason to expect otherwise — we are
encouraged that SAG officials have no illusions about
Mugabe’s intentions and acknowledge (at least privately) that
pressure on Mugabe must be maintained. That said, the SAG
appears focused on manipulating the various ZANU-PF and MDC
factions to piece together a government of national unity,
instead of letting voters decide the country’s leadership
through free and fair elections.
¶14. (C) We suspect that Pahad’s distrust of the
Tsvangirai-led MDC and his search for SAG-identified
SIPDIS
“compromise” leaders tracks with Mbeki’s views. Ntsaluba,
Kasrils, Gilder and Motlanthe appear more focused on Mugabe’s
PRETORIA 00001495 004 OF 004
pressure points and the importance of regional diplomacy. As
noted in Ref A, the coming weeks might be a particularly
opportune time for senior USG officials to engage the SAG on
Zimbabwe.
————–
Action Request
————–
¶15. (C) As noted in para 6, Masamvu is willing to take our
suggestions as to what he should include in his May 04
Zimbabwe paper for Pahad. We welcome Washington and Embassy
Harare guidance on what, if any, input we should provide. To
allow sufficient time for Masamvu to incorporate these
elements into his document in his own words, we require
guidance by May 2nd. We also welcome Washington and Embassy
Harare reactions to Masamvu’s para 7 suggestion that distrust
could be sown within ZANU-PF by easing sanctions on selected
individuals.
TEITELBAUM
(32 VIEWS)
