Dumiso Dabengwa, a former politburo member of the Zimbabwe African National Union- Patriotic Front who left the party to support presidential candidate Simba Makoni, was bitter that his one-time comrade-in-arms Solomon Mujuru never came out publicly in support of Makoni.
Dabengwa who left the Mavambo/Kusile/Dawn party that he had formed with Makoni to resuscitate the Zimbabwe African People’s Union, which merged with ZANU-PF in 1987, said Mujuru’s support of Makoni could have dealt ZANU-PF a devastating blow.
He dismissed the current relevance of Makoni to Zimbabwe politics arguing that Makoni would never make a clean break with ZANU-PF and was still hoping to be called upon to succeed Mugabe.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 08HARARE1131, PF ZAPU ENDS UNITY ACCORD
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Reference ID |
Created |
Released |
Classification |
Origin |
VZCZCXRO8559
OO RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHSB #1131/01 3521443
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 171443Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3837
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 2503
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 2626
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1119
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1895
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 2250
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 2675
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 5103
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1773
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 001131
SIPDIS
AF/S FOR B.WALCH
DRL FOR N. WILETT
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E. LOKEN AND L. DOBBINS
STATE PASS TO NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B. PITTMAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2018
SUBJECT: PF ZAPU ENDS UNITY ACCORD
REF: HARARE 1115
Classified By: CDA Katherine Dhanani for reason 1.4 (d)
——-
SUMMARY
——-
¶1. (C) PF ZAPU officially ended the 1987 Unity Accord with
ZANU-PF at a conference in Bulawayo on December 13 and 14.
Former ZANU-PF Home Affairs Minister and Politburo Minister
Dumiso Dabengwa was elected as interim president of the
party. PF ZAPU intends to compete in the next elections; for
now, party leaders say it will support MDC’s efforts to
achieve an equitable power-sharing government and draft a new
constitution. Dabengwa would like to become part of the SADC
process and believes his ties to South Africa, particularly
with Jacob Zuma, can help the MDC achieve credibility with
SADC and South Africa. PF ZAPU’s defection reveals another
split within ZANU-PF and denies the ruling party exclusive
possession of the liberation mantle, but the extent of its
support remains to be seen. Poleconchief met with Dabengwa
and former House of Assembly speaker Cyro Ndbeli in Bulawayo
on December 15 to discuss PF ZAPU and its plans. END SUMMARY.
—————————————
Dabengwa and the Reemergence of PF ZAPU
—————————————
¶2. (C) Dabengwa left ZANU-PF earlier this year to support
Simba Makoni’s presidential candidacy in the March elections.
He told us he had expected General Solomon Mujuru to also
break ranks, and that Mujuru’s support of Makoni could have
dealt ZANU-PF a devastating blow. Dabengwa appeared bitter
that Mujuru never publicly came out for Makoni; he said he
was still waiting for an explanation from his one-time
comrade in arms. As for Makoni, Dabengwa dismissed his
current relevance to Zimbabwean politics. He said Makoni
would never make a clean break with ZANU-PF and was still
hoping to be called upon to succeed Mugabe.
¶3. (C) According to Dabengwa and Ndebele, the two-day PF
ZAPU conference drew over 1000 people from all of Zimbabwe’s
provinces. Dabengwa was elected as interim party leader and
Canswell Nziramasanga of Mashonaland West was elected as his
deputy.
¶4. (C) Dabengwa said he had been motivated to leave ZANU-PF
because PF ZAPU and its members had become marginalized after
being forced into the 1987 Unity Agreement. Additionally, he
had become repelled by ZANU-PF violence and distressed by its
failure to tackle the humanitarian crisis.
¶5. (C) We asked Dabengwa why, in light of his
disillusionment with ZANU-PF, he had remained with the party
from 1987 until this year. Noting that he had been
imprisoned for almost five years under Mugabe, Dabengwa said
he joined with Joshua Nkomo to form the Unity government as
it was the only way at the time to stop the violence against
Ndebele, of which Gukurahundi, which killed about 20,000
people in the early 1980s, was the linchpin. After joining
ZANU-PF, Dabengwa, who served as an MP and Minister of Home
Affairs until his defeat by the MDC’s David Coltart in 2000,
said he resolved to change ZANU-PF from within.
—————
PF ZAPU’s Plans
—————
¶6. (C) Dabengwa insisted that PF ZAPU viewed itself as
opposing ZANU-PF and not the MDC. It hoped to complement the
HARARE 00001131 002 OF 003
efforts of the MDC. He objected to SADC’s position that a
GNU be formed with ZANU-PF and the MDC sharing the home
affairs ministry–the MDC was entitled to equality as a
government partner and all ministries should be discussed.
In renewed negotiations, Dabengwa said he hoped for a seat at
the table for PF ZAPU now that it was a constituted party,
along with civil society which had so far been excluded from
the process. The ultimate goal of PF ZAPU, according to
Dabengwa, was to compete in the next elections.
¶7. (C) Touting the potential of PF ZAPU, Dabengwa said that
his and other party members’ liberation war credentials would
prevent Mugabe from claiming, as he had with the MDC, that PF
ZAPU was a tool of the West. Dabengwa also said he could be
useful in helping to get South Africa to place pressure on
Mugabe and ZANU-PF. He noted that he had excellent relations
with Jacob Zuma; Zuma had invited Ndebele and him to lunch
last week. The South African leadership in general,
according to Dabengwa, was suspicious of the MDC and did not
hold MDC leader Tsvangirai in high regards; nevertheless,
Zuma in their lunch conversation had been more receptive to
MDC criticisms of ZANU-PF than he had let on in his public
statements.
¶8. (C) Dabengwa said he would be willing to collaborate with
the MDC in opposing ZANU-PF and negotiating a transitional
agreement, but had not yet talked with Tsvangirai. He
commented that he had attempted to talk with him before the
March elections to form a united opposition, but the MDC had
been arrogant–it thought it could win on its own–and his
interest had not been reciprocated.
—————
PF ZAPU Support
—————
¶9. (C) Gordon Moyo, the head of NGO Bulawayo Agenda and a
strong Tsvangirai supporter who travels frequently throughout
Matabeleland, told us on December 15 that the positive aspect
of the reemergence of PF ZAPU was that it was another chink
in the armor of ZANU-PF. On the other side of the ledger,
ZANU-PF in Matabeleland, from which PF ZAPU would have to
draw its primary support, was weak. Out of 38 Matabeleland
MPs, only 4 were ZANU-PF members. Additionally, the new
leadership of PF ZAPU was tainted by its association with
ZANU-PF and the fact that many of these leaders had engaged
in violent activity.
¶10. (C) We also met with MDC-M’s David Coltart on December
15 who agreed that the separation from ZANU-PF was harmful to
the ruling party. He was more forgiving than Moyo of the
past activities of PF ZAPU leaders; he remarked that any
leader who had been a member of ZANU-PF was likely to be
stained with violence. It remained to be seen whether PF
ZAPU could develop support in Matabeleland. Nevertheless,
Coltart, who served as one of Dabengwa’s attorneys in the
1980’s during his legal battle with ZANU-PF and the
government, was suspicious of Dabengwa. He related that in
2000 his polling agent, a political activist named Paul
Nyabanyana, was abducted and killed. Cain Nkala, a war
veteran supportive of Mugabe, was arrested about a year later
on suspicion of murder. Nkala subsequently admitted to
Nyabanyana’s murder and implicated ZANU-PF officials,
including Dabengwa. Nkala was subsequently murdered.
Coltart said there was a common belief in Bulawayo that
Dabengwa was responsible.
——-
COMMENT
——-
HARARE 00001131 003 OF 003
¶11. (C) Despite pretensions to be a national party, PF
ZAPU’s support, as at Independence in 1980, comes almost
exclusively from Matabeleland. In Matabeleland, memories of
Gukurahundi remain vivid, and as a result the MDC,
particularly the Tsvangirai faction which is viewed as
strongly anti-Mugabe and anti-ZANU-PF, has received strong
support. We are therefore skeptical that PF ZAPU can become
a major political force.
¶12. (C) The reemergence of PF ZAPU is significant, however,
in that Mugabe can no longer exclusively claim the liberation
mantle, and it represents public exposure of the ZANU-PF
cracks that are known to exist. We believe it would be wise
for Tsvangirai to reach out to Dabengwa to avail the MDC of
association with PF ZAPU’s liberation credentials, and also
for help in dealing with South Africa. Experience suggests,
however, that this will not occur.
DHANANI
(26 VIEWS)
