Movement for Democratic Change Secretary for Legal Affairs David Coltart said the Zimbabwe African National Union- Patriotic Front’s intolerance of the opposition was deeply ingrained and went far beyond President Robert Mugabe.
He said that ZANU-PF would swallow the MDC in a government of national unity even if Mugabe were gone.
ZANU-PF successor aspirants would likely stick together after Mugabe in spite of their occasionally divergent personal interests and views.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 03HARARE1711, TALKS ON TALKS: MOMENTUM TOWARD ZIMBABWE POLITICAL
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 HARARE 001711
SIPDIS
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR J. FRAZER
LONDON FOR C. GURNEY
PARIS FOR C. NEARY
NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/22/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ZI MDC ZANU PF
SUBJECT: TALKS ON TALKS: MOMENTUM TOWARD ZIMBABWE POLITICAL
DIALOGUE REMAINS ELUSIVE
REF: (A) HARARE 1600 (B) HARARE 1599 AND PREVIOUS
Classified By: POLITICAL OFFICER WIN DAYTON; REASON – SECTION 1.5 (B) (
D)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: A series of meetings between political
players here and HIRC Africa Subcommittee staffer Malik Chaka
illuminated the tentative state of play of various efforts to
get ZANU-PF/MDC talks resumed. ZANU-PF Chairman John Nkomo
highlighted improvements in the political atmosphere and
emphasized the ruling party’s willingness to undertake
dialogue with the opposition — after a few obstacles were
removed. For its part, the MDC leadership conceded that
ZANU-PF had made some positive moves but indicated that
Mugabe’s party still appeared unwilling to consider
meaningful change. These and other meetings, including one
with members of the bishops troika, indicate that the
bishops’ initiative most likely is dead as a potential formal
mediating mechanism, although the parties continue to talk
quietly in other channels about getting dialogue going —
directly and through the South African Government. Although
ZANU-PF appears to be dragging its feet for now, it may yet
agree to commencement of some form of talks before the end of
the year — presumably strategically timed for maximum
domestic and international public relations benefit. The
cordial tone and relatively open access extended by the
government to Chaka may signal government interest in a less
hostile relationship with the USG. END SUMMARY.
Nkomo Underscores ZANU-PF Interest in Talks
——————————————-
¶2. (C) ZANU-PF Chairman John Nkomo warmly welcomed Chaka and
Ambassador Sullivan to his office for an hour-plus meeting
August 20. Nkomo asserted that the worst was over in
Zimbabwe and that all parties recognized the need to
collaborate in addressing the country’s difficulties.
ZANU-PF was not “anti-opposition,” he explained; aside from a
few issues such as land redistribution, the parties were
separated only by a difference in focus that was magnified by
rhetoric. This generated unnecessary tension that already
had absorbed too much time and resources.
¶3. (C) Nkomo emphasized that ZANU-PF and MDC representatives
were talking on an individual basis. Negotiating teams
already were in place, although “structure was still
preliminary” and commencing formal talks now would be
premature. Litigation initiated by each side hampered
efforts at constructive engagement. Nkomo maintained that
resolution of the legitimacy issue needed to precede talks —
“on what basis can we relate if we are not recognized?”
Nonetheless, both parties were contributing to improving
atmospherics that would eventually support commencement of
dialogue. The opposition’s appearance in parliament was an
example of such measures and evidenced that the parties were
talking. “To the outside, we appear enemies; when we meet,
we are not enemies.” Nkomo dismissed the sometimes shrill
voices on both sides that opposed dialogue as a misinformed,
irrelevant minority. Mugabe himself wanted to see the
impasse resolved. Contradicting his own earlier assertion
that talks were premature, he said talks could restart any
time.
¶4. (C) Turning to the bishops’ initiative to jump start
political dialogue, Nkomo essentially confirmed the bishops’
chronology of exchanges between the party and the bishops
(ref B). As to their substantive role, however, ZANU-PF saw
the bishops only as facilitators of dialogue; they were
welcomed “between the parties” but not as formal mediators.
The churchmen had exceeded their brief in soliciting agendas,
according to Nkomo. For now, ZANU-PF would continue to talk
to them and hoped they would foster a positive atmosphere for
talks.
¶5. (C) Nkomo acknowledged a constructive role for South
Africa in moving toward dialogue. He had met with Thabo
Mbeki three weeks before and knew the SAG had received
delegations from both sides. For his part, he had assured
Mbeki that things were moving, ZANU-PF had accepted a church
role, and intra-parliamentary relations were productive.
¶6. (C) Nkomo stressed that the political environment was at
the root of Zimbabwe’s economic crisis. Policies lacked
cohesion and both domestic and international players had lost
confidence in Zimbabwe. Regulatory systems were collapsing
and businesses were paralyzed by uncertainty. Nkomo opined
that rains could yet save Zimbabwe, but that the starting
point for sustainable recovery in any event was to stem the
collapse in confidence — this had to start with progress on
the political front. Zimbabwe was part of the globalized
community and needed international assistance. The GOZ was
working discreetly at the ministerial level to inquire at the
IMF and World Bank about possible prescriptions for
re-engagement and he was confident they would return once
political progress was firmly established. Nkomo
akcnowledged the importance of NGO work in Zimbabwe and
elaborated on recently announced adjustments to humanitarian
relief distrubition channels (reported septel). In the
meantime, resource constraints stemming from economic crisis
complicated politics. After alluding to earlier U.S. and
U.K. commitments to fund land redistribution, Nkomo
acknowledged the need to review progress and mistakes in land
reform. In this regard, the Utete Commission report under
review would help guide future action.
MDC Leaders Warily Pushing for Talks
————————————
¶7. (C) Ambassador Sullivan’s lunch for Chaka on August 21
was attended by MDC President Morgan Tsvangirai, Vice
President Gibson Sibanda, Secretary General Welshman Ncube,
Deputy Secretary General Gift Chimanakire, and Director for
Presidential Affairs Gandi Mudzingwa. The MDC leadership
reported that they were seeing more openness and
communication from ZANU-PF. Justice Minister Patrick
Chinamasa had been the one to propose and work for MDC
attendance at Mugabe’s parliamentary address. Inter-party
relations had improved in parliament, where MPs were being
given some latitude in reporting views out of committee, for
example. On the campaign front, police had facilitated
Tsvangirai’s stumping efforts in Victoria Falls, and “Green
SIPDIS
Bombers” intimidating MDC activists in Gwanda had been
arrested. Nonetheless, ZANU-PF intimidation and/or
harassment continued at varying levels throughout the
country, especially in rural areas, and risked reaching a
self-sustaining level.
¶8. (C) As to the substance of inter-party contacts, Ncube
cast as “unreal” ZANU-PF’s four principal demands —
irreversability of land reform, non-interference by
international community, recognition of the role of the
liberation struggle, and “sovereignty.” ZANU-PF
interlocutors characterized issues raised by MDC (e.g.,
democratic processes, fuel crisis, inflation) as “symptoms”
and not necessarily appropriate for talks at this stage.
Ncube remarked on the consistency of ZANU-PF interlocutors on
substance, notwithstanding the ad hoc appearance of different
channels of communication. Tsvangirai asserted that
ZANU-PF’s apparent hesitancy was most likely calculated and
not reflective of significant division in its ranks.
Nonetheless, as long as succession was an open question,
mutual suspicions and divergent self-interest of ZANU-PF
principals would be a potential impediment to meaningful
dialogue. It was in the interest of each aspiring successor
to be seen as the one able to deliver Mugabe the longest stay
in power. No formal negotiating teams had been set by either
side, aside from the potential to carry over the composition
of last year’s suspended talks.
¶9. (C) Elaborating on ZANU-PF succession, Tsvangirai
observed that the possibly imminent demise of Vice President
Mudenza (reportedly on life support) could prompt a
“restructuring excercise” with implications for succession.
Mugabe’s appointment could indicate his chosen successor, but
such a forced choice would only be accepted by the party
until the next election. Tsvangirai identified potential
successors as Parliamentary Speaker Emmerson Mnangagwa,
Solomon Majuro, former Finance Minister Simba Makoni, with
Defense Minister Sidney Sikeremayi as a possible compromise
candidate; he dismissed John Nkomo as lacking any important
constituency. In any event, he predicted ZANU-PF would rally
around a compromise candidate if one were named.
¶10. (C) Speculating about South Africa’s intentions,
Tsvangirai asserted that Mbeki “knew that time was flying.”
SIPDIS
Most SAG efforts appeared geared to getting progress underway
before the Commonwealth heads of government December meeting
(CHOGM) in Abuja, presumably with a view to having Zimbabwe’s
suspension lifted. Support continued to be strong within the
Commonwealth for Zimbabwe’s continued suspension but the
South Africans already were preparing to have the suspension
on the CHOGM agenda. The South Africans were becoming
frustrated as “promises were not being kept,” however, and
perhaps it was time for Mbeki to assert himself personally.
Tsvangirai said he thought that SAG direct pressure on Mugabe
SIPDIS
could be decisive in getting ZANU-PF to the table, but the
MDC leadership present was uncertain how far the SAG intended
to push in that regard. Like others, the South Africans were
constrained by ZANU-PF succession issues — “the transition
within a transition.” Ncube concluded that the suspension
would continue if the CHOGM consultations were private, but
that public positions could prove problematic. He counted
Ghana, Botswana, and Kenya in the camp for continued
suspension, and suggested that Nigeria’s decision on whether
to invite Mugabe to the meeting could indicate which way the
wind was blowing.
¶11. (C) The leadership noted a tension between its sense
that the public was not ripe for renewed mass action and
rank-and-file pressure to forego negotiation for a more
provocative posture. The cash crisis could spark unrest in
rural areas, where most people lacked any other medium of
commerce. In any event, concerted mass action would likely
alienate South Africa at a particularly inopportune time.
The leadership said they quietly hoped that the Zimbabwe
Confederation of Trade Unions (ZCTU) would decide in upcoming
meetings to take some form of overt action that would press
the government (and the South Africans) without the MDC
having to serve as lightning rod.
¶12. (C) The leadership detailed its strategy for the
election petition, scheduled to go to court on November 3.
The presiding judge had yet to be named but would certainly
be controlled by the government; thus, a final decision
against the petitioners was certain. The best the leadership
could hope for was that its compelling case would be openly
aired and that the court would find for petitioners on some
potentially high-profile pre-decisional procedural motions.
Media management would be important, and the party would
undertake to get coverage through South Africa even if the
international press were excluded from local proceedings.
Facing the threat of a contempt order for allegedly trying to
influence the court’s decision, MDC would be very sensitive
and cautious in its media strategy. Tsvangirai predicted
that ZANU-PF, anticipating potentially embarrassing
developments at the hearing, could be expected to generate
positive publicity in late October, perhaps with a push to
get some kind of talks going. The case could drag on for
months as part of ZANU-PF’s strategy of bleeding the MDC
through legal fees (the MDC’s biggest budget line item).
Makoni Optimistic About ZANU-PF Reform
————————————–
¶13. (C) In a meeting on August 21 with Chaka and Ambassador
Sullivan, former Finance Minister Simba Makoni sounded upbeat
on the prospect for political progress in Zimbabwe. Echoing
Nkomo, he asserted that the root cause of Zimbabwe’s crisis
was “the way we have done our politics.” Economic problems
were symptoms of “political malaise.” According to Makoni,
ZANU-PF membership was nearly united in support for change
but lacked a clear scenario through which to effect such
change. He concluded that a Gorbachev-style opening directed
from the top seemed unlikely. More likely, ZANU-PF would
choose Mugabe’s successor, who would effect a more
constructive economic and political agenda. Makoni said that
inter-party dialogue may yet succeed, but that ZANU-PF
succession was most likely to be the key to national
reconciliation and recovery. Makoni devoted most of the
remainder of his comments to the economy (reported septel).
Coltart Sees Unchanging ZANU-PF
——————————-
¶14. (C) MDC MP and Shadow Secretary for Legal Affairs David
Coltart met with Chaka and emboffs on August 24 and sketched
his views of ZANU-PF in the context of recent developments.
According to Coltart, ZANU-PF’s intolerance of opposition was
deeply ingrained and went far beyond Mugabe. He predicted
that ZANU-PF would swallow the MDC in a government of
national unity even if Mugabe were gone. Notwithstanding
differences between ZAPU and MDC, ZANU-PF’s absorption of
ZAPU in 1987 remained an applicable lesson today. ZANU-PF
successor aspirants would likely stick together after Mugabe
in spite of their occasionally divergent personal interests
and views, and Vice-President Muzenda’s passing would not
trigger significant divisions within the party. In any
event, there were reasonable interlocutors, such as John
Nkomo, within the ruling party.
¶15. MDC’s prospects were better than ZAPU’s, Coltart
concluded, with the absence of cold war and apartheid and
because the economy was no longer sustainable. Furthermore,
ZANU-PF, in spite of relatively strong party discipline, was
largely reactive and capable of great “stupidity.” The
party’s resort to the treason trial and Tsvangirai’s
detention, its handling of Cricket World Cup publicity, and
attempts to control humanitarian food relief were just some
recent examples. The key to countering ZANU-PF’s intolerant
nature lay in reinforcement and construction of institutional
balances within government and civil society.
¶16. (C) As to recent evidence of a thawing in inter-party
relations, Coltart conceded that there had been superficial
improvements, including more free campaigning. Violence
levels seemed down, although areas such as his home district
Bulawayo had seen relatively violence-free elections before.
Even without violence, however, ZANU-PF continued to resort
to underhanded tactics that compromised the election’s
freeness and fairness. In Bulawayo, for example, the
election registrar only shared election rolls with the MDC
very late and after weeks of requests; one of the five rolls
remained outstanding just one week before the election.
Distribution of food and other benefits also was as
politicized as ever, with ZANU-PF cards necessary for receipt
of government-supplied maize on a widespread basis throughout
the country.
¶17. (U) Coltart reported that he intended to be in an
inter-party Zimbabwean delegation traveling to the United
States to participate in a Parliamentarians for Global Action
event, and planned to be in Washington September 15-16.
Churchmen on Fostering Atmospherics
———————————–
¶18. (C) In a meeting with Chaka and poloffs on August 23 at
the residence of President of the Evangelical Fellowship of
Zimbabwe Bishop Trevor Manhanga, Manhanga and President of
the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops Conference Bishop Patrick
Mutume detailed obstacles to resumption of political
dialogue. They said that ZANU-PF continued to engage with
them, notwithstanding the Justice Minister’s critical
outburst and Nkomo’s vacillation about their role. In
private, ZANU-PF interlocutors asserted that legitimacy, the
election contest, and the MDC’s foreign connections
constituted obstacles to commencement of talks. The bishops
dismissed ZANU-PF’s public assertions that there had been no
agreement about submission of agendas but recognized that
ZANU-PF was not now prepared to move forward on their
initiative. According to the bishops, the party was
handicapped by the dissonance of senior officials’ individual
interests and an inability to resolve its succession issue.
The economic crisis was distracting, especially with ruling
party figures striving to exploit the evolving environment at
opposition expense. Publicity and a partisan press further
hindered efforts to bridge differences. Sensationalist
coverage of Mugabe’s Heroes Day speech (ref A), for example,
ignored his markedly moderate tone and scaled back rhetoric,
and missed an opportunity to project positive atmospherics
conducive to dialogue.
¶19. (C) The bishops said they were undeterred by ZANU-PF’s
cold shoulder and were still operating under Mugabe’s
invitation to see what they could do (ref B). They asserted
that atmospherics were improving between the parties, who
seemed to be posturing toward some re-engagement albeit with
different degrees of enthusiasm. Particularly encouraging
were recent developments in their Mutare district. The two
received a very warm welcome at a local ZANU-PF public event
conducted the night before with all senior local officials
and Justice Minister Patrick Chinamasa in attendance. (As an
aside, the bishops lamented that Chinamasa was the only
government minister from Manicaland, leaving Manicaland
essentially unrepresented in the government.) All speakers
publicly recognized the bishops’ attendance with gratitude
and Manhanga was invited to offer a closing benediction.
Chinamasa had appeared somewhat taken aback by their presence
and offered a moderate statement with only one back-handed
reference to the churches’ association with foreign
interests. Separately, the bishops had gotten all three
candidates for mayor in the August 30-31 election to agree
publicly to abide by a code of conduct, with the churches’
acting as intermediaries to help resolve complaints. The
bishops’ were taking the initiative at the local level with a
view possibly to introducing it more widely in future
elections if it proved successful.
¶20. (C) On the international front, the bishops advised that
President Mbeki was ready to meet with them but they wanted
first to have progress to show for their efforts.
Nevertheless, if nothing developed soon, they would visit him
for assistance. With a view to further inducing Mugabe to
move forward, they again (ref B) inquired what developments
would permit the international community to resume a more
normalized relationship with Zimbabwe.
Comment
——-
¶21. (C) The Chaka staffdel offered a well-timed opportunity
to engage a host of key participants privately on the status
of Zimbabwe’s talks on talks. The broad and high-level
access afforded Chaka — surprising and unmatched in the past
year — may bear testament to interest among the ZANU-PF
leadership in projecting the impression that it is serious
about political dialogue and Zimbabwe’s international
relations. At the same time, the party has yet to indicate
definitively that it will commence talks or, much less, on
what terms. Certainly, the breadth and generality of the
issues framed by the parties (e.g., “legitimacy,” “free and
fair elections”), while potentially polarizing, leave room
for finesse and resolution should both parties muster the
will to talk. Nkomo’s concession that political progress
must precede economic recovery echoes a long-standing
conclusion of many regime critics, but it is not at all clear
that the belief is shared by his boss. Indeed, Mugabe’s
personal views on succession remain a decisive but still
uncertain factor in the talks equation.
¶22. (C) Whether ZANU-PF’s temporizing is a conscious
strategy or reflective of internal indecision, the ruling
party appears so far to sit in the catbird’s seat on the
timing of talks. For its part, the MDC can be expected to
continue pressing for talks but might later seek to hold out
for concessions if it perceives ZANU-PF wants the talks badly
enough. Weakening the MDC’s hand is the reality that Mugabe
and his inner circle appear to be impervious to the suffering
associated with country’s political impasse and economic
collapse. The government’s interest in its Commonwealth
status and future re-engagement by international financial
institutions is real but not ultimately decisive. It remains
unclear how assertive South Africa is being with the regime,
or how the regime would respond to various degrees of South
African pressure.
¶23. (C) Even if ZANU-PF’s professed interest in meaningful
talks is entirely disingenuous, its nascent efforts at a more
cooperative posture are a potentially positive incremental
development. It is becoming more acceptable for long-cowed
ZANU-PF elements to be seen with and to talk with regime
critics. This opening, which may encompass diplomatic and
civil society circles as well, may subject the ZANU-PF to
greater influence from the outside and stimulate more genuine
debate within the party, although this is not a given.
Cross-party confidence-building at a personal level may begin
to take on a life of its own regardless of party leadership
intentions — an objective underlying in part the bishops’
indefatigable efforts.
¶24. (C) This weekend’s scheduled parliamentary by-elections
and mayoral and urban council elections (septel) will offer
another potential benchmark by which to measure inter-party
relations and atmospherics for talks. The government’s
response to international outcry over announced adjustments
to humanitarian food distribution procedures (septel) will
further indicate its sensitivity to international opinion and
the extent to which it is willing to exploit the politics of
suffering.
SULLIVAN
(27 VIEWS)
