The two Movement for Democratic Change negotiators, Tendai Biti for the Morgan Tsvangirai faction and Welshman Ncube for the Arthur Mutambara faction, disagreed on sanctions on the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front with Biti urging more pressure while Ncube encouraged an easing of the sanctions.
The two, both secretary generals of the factions, expressed these views in separate meetings with United States embassy officials on 15 and 16 October 2007.
Biti urged continued pressure, including a possible expansion of the sanctions, on ZANU-PF while Ncube supported maintaining current sanctions.
Ncube any new sanctions would be cynically welcomed by ZANU-PF which could say to the Southern African Development Community we told you that the Western agenda was regime change.
New sanctions would also be viewed by South African President Thabo Mbeki, who was the chief mediator, and SADC as a slap at their mediation efforts.
Ncube suggested that if ZANU-PF improved the electoral environment, the West should respond by easing travel sanctions on some individuals.
Biti and Ncube, however, agreed that elections would be held in September or October 2008.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 07HARARE934, BITI AND NCUBE ON SADC NEGOTIATIONS
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
|
Reference ID |
Created |
Released |
Classification |
Origin |
VZCZCXRO0783
RR RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHSB #0934/01 2891531
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 161531Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2012
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 1727
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 1602
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 1731
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0368
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1011
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 1360
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 1788
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 4217
RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0852
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000934
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
AF/S FOR S.HILL
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E.LOKEN AND L.DOBBINS
STATE PASS TO NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B.PITTMAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2012
SUBJECT: BITI AND NCUBE ON SADC NEGOTIATIONS
REF: HARARE 882
Classified By: Pol/Econ Chief Glenn Warren under 1.4 b/d
——-
Summary
——-
¶1. (C) MDC negotiators Tendai Biti and Welshman Ncube expect
SADC-sponsored negotiations to end in November with an
agreement that includes a new constitution. Elections will
likely take place in September or October 2008. The MDC
remains skeptical that ZANU-PF will permit an environment
conducive to fair elections. On sanctions, Biti recommends
the West maintain, or if possible, increase sanctions. Ncube
supports a gradual easing of sanctions commensurate with an
improvement of the political environment. Both MDC leaders
believe it is a foregone conclusion that President Mugabe
will be endorsed by the ZANU-PF Congress in December and
stand as the party’s candidate for president. End Summary.
¶2. (SBU) Polecon chief met with Biti and Ncube separately on
October 15 and October 16.
————————————-
Status of Negotiations and Next Steps
————————————-
¶3. (C) Biti and Ncube said that agreement had been reached
on a new constitution. The negotiators were now meeting in
Harare to discuss reform of the Public Order and Security Act
(POSA), the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy
Act (AIPPA), and the Broadcasting Act. They planned to
return to South Africa for talks with the South African
mediators on October 30, October 31, and November 1, to
finalize agreement on these “security issues.” They then
expected to begin discussions on “political issues.” For the
MDC, these issues included violence and intimidation directed
at their members; the militarization of governmental
structures in the provinces, including the manipulation of
food aid and other coercion of voters; and achievement of
civil dialogue on the issues facing Zimbabwe. For ZANU-PF,
political issues to be discussed included respect for
national sovereignty, sanctions, off-shore radio broadcasts,
and attendance by the opposition at Zimbabwe national days
(presumably implying recognition of the government).
¶4. (C) While the MDC expected an agreement, Biti noted that
the issue of Diaspora voting was a potential deal breaker.
The MDC wanted any Zimbabwean outside the country to be able
to vote. Realizing it would not achieve this, the party was
aiming at a minimum for the right of Zimbabweans living in
SADC countries to vote. Biti explained that since many of
these individuals no longer had residency in Zimbabwe–and
therefore would not be attached to a constituency–they might
not be able to vote for parliamentarians but would be limited
to voting for president. This would be acceptable.
¶5. (C) Following a SADC agreement, the MDC negotiators
anticipated that Parliament would submit the draft
constitution for several months of public comment. Biti said
he expected little to be changed from what was already
agreed; nevertheless, after objections from civil society
that it was not included in the discussion of Amendment 18 it
was important that the public have input into the
constitution.
¶6. (C) The new constitution and agreed-upon legislation
(Electoral law, reformed POSA, reformed AIPPA) would be
passed by Parliament after public comment on the
constitution. Elections would take place under the new
constitution. ZANU-PF wanted the elections as soon as
HARARE 00000934 002 OF 003
possible, but both Biti and Ncube emphasized the importance
of a “cooling off” period of at least six months to enable
the MDC to campaign with the advantage of the new
constitution and legislative changes. They believed the
earliest elections could take place would be September or
October. Ncube commented that the South Africans wanted
early elections, but also wanted the elections to be viewed
as legitimate. Therefore it was likely they would facilitate
a postponement in line with the MDC’s wishes.
——————————
Economic Consequences of Delay
——————————
¶7. (C) Biti recognized that the disastrous economic
situation would continue to deteriorate until there was a
change of government. Therefore, a postponement from March
until September or October boded poorly for the economy. But
there was no alternative. Delay was necessary for proper
consideration of the constitution and for adequate
campaigning.
———————————-
The Devil is in the Implementation
———————————-
¶8. (C) Biti and Ncube averred that no matter how good a deal
with ZANU-PF was on paper, the political atmosphere was
critical to a free and fair election. Biti said that
violence and intimidation were an agenda item for the talks,
but had not yet been addressed. He expressed dismay that
although the talks were in progress, ZANU-PF continued to
target the MDC. He pointed specifically to a September
abduction of several MDC youth at the alleged direction of
Tecla Mumbengegwi, wife of the GOZ finance minister. One was
killed and one (Maxwell Mazambani) was still in hospital in
critical condition. (Comment. Initial reports of the
incident indicated that it involved retribution for an
apparent theft and made no mention of politically-directed
violence. In a press release, the MDC referred to the
“continuing violent crackdown on democratic forces,” but did
not refer to this incident. The press release also claimed
that since the SADC process had begun, police had refused
permits for over 100 rallies. End Note.) Biti promised to
raise continuing ZANU-PF violence and intimidation with the
ZANU-PF negotiators, and in public. He was skeptical, in
light of ZANU-PF’s current behavior, that ZANU-PF would
implement a SADC agreement to the extent that a fair election
could take place.
¶9. (C) Ncube thought there was more democratic space since
the beginning of the SADC dialogue. He stated that with the
notable exception of two provinces, Mashonaland West and
Mashingo, the MDC recently had been able to contact potential
voters. He opined that the primary problem was subsequent
retribution, e.g., denial of food aid, against those who
associated with the MDC. Violence was always a potential
problem and could be used against the MDC. It was not just a
question of ZANU-PF leadership turning off the violence
spigot; it was now endemic and it would take years to clean
up the security forces.
¶10. (C) Given this endemic culture of violence and
intimidation, Ncube was also doubtful that an environment
could be created to permit fair elections–even if the will
existed. He believed that Mugabe would try to create an
environment sufficiently free to have legitimacy bestowed
upon elections, but sufficiently controlled to ensure a
ZANU-PF victory.
————————-
A Difference on Sanctions
HARARE 00000934 003 OF 003
————————-
¶11. (C) Biti urged continued pressure, including a possible
expansion of sanctions, on ZANU-PF. Ncube supported
maintaining current sanctions. He thought, however, that new
sanctions would be cynically welcomed by ZANU-PF. The ruling
party had long maintained that the western agenda is regime
change. New sanctions while the SADC process is ongoing, in
Ncube’s opinion, would allow Mugabe to say to SADC, “I told
you so,” and would be perceived by SADC and Mbeki as a slap
at their mediation efforts. He suggested that if ZANU-PF
improved the electoral environment (after an agreement), the
West could respond with easing of travel sanctions on some
individuals. He noted that Biti, he, and MDC faction
presidents Tsvangirai and Mutambara planned to meet to
coordinate a sanctions strategy for the talks.
—————————————
A Note on ZANU-PF and Mugabe’s Strategy
—————————————
¶12. (C) Both Biti and Ncube thought ZANU-PF’s endorsement of
Mugabe at the December Congress was a foregone conclusion;
the Mujurus were not strong enough to defeat him. More
questionable was how Mugabe would react to a failed Mujuru
challenge. Ncube thought Mugabe would be pragmatic and
welcome them back into the fold to forestall a defection and
possible alliance with the MDC.
¶13. (C) Biti stated that Mugabe’s greatest goal at this time
was securing legitimacy. He had entered into the SADC
negotiations, over the objections of some of his hard-line
supporters, as a step toward this goal. After a SADC
agreement, but before elections, he would make a
determination as to whether he could win a free and fair
election. If he believed so, he would mandate that ZANU-PF
permit such an election. If not, he would rig the election,
and after winning, would seek an alliance with Ncube’s MDC
faction as an alternative way of achieving legitimacy. We
suggested to Biti that to prevent a ZANU-PF-MDC (Mutambara
faction) alliance, his faction could enter into an electoral
coalition with the rival MDC (Mutambara) faction. He
responded that his faction was still–but quietly–pursuing
this.
——-
Comment
——-
¶14. (C) After some early bumps, the SADC talks appear to be
reaching a conclusion. As the MDC continually notes,
implementation is key. Continuing ZANU-PF violence and
intimidation do not augur well. That party’s response in
weeks ahead to MDC complaints about the political environment
should be a clue to its good faith, or lack thereof.
DHANANI
(47 VIEWS)
