Movement for Democratic Change secretary-general Tendai Biti said the Global Political Agreement was dead, just a month after its signing, adding that the only question was when to pronounce it dead.
Biti who was briefing United States embassy officials on a regular basis said even if a government was formed, the agreement would collapse because it would prove unworkable.
He said President Robert Mugabe and his Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front were not ready for the inclusive government so it would be better for the MDC to let the negotiations collapse so that genuine dialogue could take place when ZANU-PF was ready to work with the MDC.
At the same time he said that ZANU-PF’s inflexibility was meant to frustrate the MDC to abandon negotiations, but the party would not fall for this trap.
“This thing is dead”, Biti said. The only question was when to pronounce it dead.
He said Ian Smith had not been ready to make necessary concessions in 1978, and Mugabe and ZANU-PF were not ready now.
The parties were locked up over four ministries -Home Affairs, Finance, Local Government and Foreign Affairs.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 08HARARE959, BITI: AGREEMENT IS DOOMED
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Reference ID |
Created |
Released |
Classification |
Origin |
VZCZCXRO2328
OO RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHSB #0959/01 2971207
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 231207Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3606
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 2371
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 2491
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0997
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1767
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 2122
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 2547
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 4975
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1640
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000959
SIPDIS
AF/S FOR B.WALCH
DRL FOR N. WILETT
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E. LOKEN AND L. DOBBINS
STATE PASS TO NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B. PITTMAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/2018
SUBJECT: BITI: AGREEMENT IS DOOMED
Classified By: Ambassador James D. McGee for reason 1.4 (d)
——-
SUMMARY
——-
¶1. (C) The MDC will attend the SADC Troika meeting on
October 27 in Harare, according to MDC secretary-general and
negotiator Tendai Biti. Because the MDC believes mediator
Thabo Mbeki has sided with ZANU-PF on critical issues, it
will push for full SADC and AU involvement, and ultimately UN
assistance. Regardless, Biti believes a ZANU-PF–MDC
agreement is doomed to failure; either the parties will fail
to conclude the allocation of positions or, if an agreement
is concluded, it will prove unworkable. END SUMMARY.
———————————-
MDC Questions Mbeki’s Impartiality
———————————-
¶2. (C) In an October 22 conversation with pol/econ chief and
visiting INR analyst, Biti questioned Mbeki’s impartiality
and ability to continue to function as a mediator. He
referred to a document prepared by Mbeki and presented to the
parties on October 17 which, he averred, adopted the ZANU-PF
position on the allocation of ministries. This document,
leaked to the media and now available on the Internet, awards
finance to the MDC and splits home affairs between the two
parties. It is silent as to defense, information, and
justice, but in general “commends the current allocation of
Ministerial Posts.” Biti told us that Mbeki in the document
had accepted ZANU-PF’s position that it should head these key
ministries.
¶3. (C) Biti provided us a copy of a document he had prepared
on behalf of the MDC, and in response to the Mbeki document,
to be given to SADC. In his document, Biti criticizes Mbeki
for adopting ZANU-PF’s position in the allocation of
ministries, for siding with ZANU-PF in negotiations on the
relative powers of the president and prime minister, and for
failing to stop or condemn Mugabe’s appointment of senators
and governors in violation of the September 15 agreement. He
concludes: “With the greatest respect to the Facilitator,
his role and thinking, as reflected in his document clearly
show that he is not ready to assist in resolving the crisis
in Zimbabwe. Quite clearly, this issue is now beyond the
Facilitator. The guarantors and underwriters of this
agreement, SADC and the AU, must be vested with this matter
as a matter of urgency.”
¶4. (C) Biti concluded his attack on Mbeki by telling us he
thought Mbeki had been totally discredited. The MDC would
seek full SADC involvement, through a SADC Extraordinary
Congress, and AU involvement. Biti was pessimistic, however,
that either of these organizations would be effective and he
hoped that ultimately the UN would focus on Zimbabwe.
———————————-
Obstacles to a Workable Government
———————————-
¶5. (C) Biti said Tsvangirai and the MDC negotiators would
meet with the SADC Troika on October 27 in Harare. In
addition to allocation of ministries, other important issues
were appointment of governors and discrepancies between the
document signed on September 15 and the actual agreement.
Mugabe had unilaterally appointed the 10 provincial
governors; Biti said this should have been done in
consultation with the MDC and would have to be rectified.
The signed September 15 agreement specified that the
president would appoint 5 senators and ZANU-PF, MDC-T, and
HARARE 00000959 002 OF 003
MDC-M would each be allotted three additional senators. But
Biti said that the original agreement called for, in addition
to ZANU-PF’s 5 senators appointed by Mugabe, MDC-T to be
given 4 senators and MDC-M to be given 2 senators. ZANU-PF
would receive no additional senators. The document
discrepancies would also have to be resolved to complete an
agreement.
¶6. (C) If an agreement was concluded, the next step,
according to Biti, would be to adopt constitutional Amendment
19 to incorporate the agreement. Biti opined that agreement
on the amendment would be difficult. Amendment 19 would have
to spell out, for example, procedures for the appointments of
ambassadors and permanent secretaries. Biti noted that
according to the agreement, presidential appointments were to
be made “in consultation” with the prime minister, but the
agreement did not define “consultations,” and Amendment 19
would have to deal with this.
¶7. (C) Beyond agreement on specific issues, Biti said the
primary obstacle to a workable power-sharing government was
the lack of sincerity on the part of ZANU-PF. He pointed to
continuing public statements by ZANU-PF officials attacking
the MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai, the recent crackdown and
violence against students and Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA)
as they attempted demonstrations, ZANU-PF’s unwillingness to
compromise in negotiations to arrive at an agreement, and the
refusal to give Tsvangirai a passport. ZANU-PF could not
bring itself to accept Tsvangirai. They were suspicious of
him, and many hated him, because they believed he did not
share their liberation war values.
————–
The Road Ahead
————–
¶8. (C) Referring to the ZANU-PF–MDC agreement, Biti
concluded “this thing is dead.” The only question was when
to pronounce it dead–now or after the formation of a
government that proved unworkable. Analogizing to the
Rhodesia situation, Biti said Ian Smith had not been ready to
make necessary concessions in 1978, and Mugabe and ZANU-PF
were not ready now. It would be better, he told us, for
negotiations to collapse now so that a genuine dialogue could
take place when ZANU-PF was ready to work together with the
MDC.
¶9. (C) Biti said ZANU-PF’s inflexibility was designed to
maintain power and attempt to capture the high ground by
impelling the MDC to abandon negotiations. The MDC would not
fall into this trap and would continue to negotiate.
Recognizing the difficulty of the situation, however, the MDC
would begin to press for new, internationally supervised
elections under the auspices of the UN.
——-
COMMENT
——-
¶10. (C) The MDC appears divided on the approach to
negotiations and a power-sharing government. Tsvangirai,
while maintaining a healthy skepticism of ZANU-PF and Mugabe,
is in favor of concluding an agreement with certain minimum
preconditions that include MDC leadership of the finance and
home affairs ministries. He believes that as part of
government the MDC can begin to generate changes and take
advantage of a divided and weak ZANU-PF. Biti and others are
skeptical that, even apart from possible compromises on
ministries, ZANU-PF is willing to actually share power in a
way that would allow a new government to function. They are
therefore seeking to open up the negotiating process to go
HARARE 00000959 003 OF 003
beyond securing home affairs for the MDC as a basis of an
agreement. Also, unlike Tsvangirai, Biti does not believe
that this agreement is ultimately viable.
¶11. (C) We continue to think it likely there will be an
agreement. But given the entrenched interests of Mugabe and
ZANU-PF, we share Biti’s skepticism that it will work. END
COMMENT.
MCGEE
(35 VIEWS)