Former Information Minister Jonathan Moyo told United States ambassador Christopher Dell that Emmerson Mnangagwa, considered one of the front-runners to succeed President Robert Mugabe, was too loyal to Mugabe to upset the cart.
He even cited a joke that was doing the rounds in Harare that when Vice-President Joseph Msika told Mnangagwa that he and Mugabe were stepping down, Mnangagwa told him he would step down too.
“A few months ago, Moyo reported, Vice President Msika advised Mnangagwa that Mugabe and Msika were preparing to step down; Mnangagwa responded that he would step down too,” Moyo told Dell according to a diplomatic cable released by Wikileaks.
“Stressing his loyalty to Mugabe, Mnangagwa told Msika his continued presence would be a distraction to any successor and a disruption to party unity. Msika countered that Mnangagwa’s prospects to succeed Mugabe were good and convinced him to remain,” Moyo told the ambassador according to the cable dispatched on 23 March 2006.
Moyo said Mnangagwa still believed that Mugabe could still confer the presidency on him, but his prospects were doubtful.
Mnangagwa’s association with the Tsholotsho affair, the Col Dyck affair, the 1980s Gukuranhundi massacres in Matabeleland, and ruling party financial skulduggery all gave Mugabe or Mujuru tools with which to undermine Mnangagwa privately and publicly, he said.
Moyo also said although the security forces originally supported Joice Mujuru they were now doubting her ability to hold things together.
He maintained that the securocrats – together with the black middle class – viewed Mnangagwa as more capable than Mujuru of turning the economy around and of relating to the West.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 06HARARE372, MOYO ON POLITICAL LANDSCAPE, AVENUES FOR CHANGE
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Reference ID |
Created |
Released |
Classification |
Origin |
VZCZCXRO0477
PP RUEHMR
DE RUEHSB #0372/01 0831244
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 241244Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9798
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 1168
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 1003
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 1172
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0433
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 0792
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 1226
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 3576
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0997
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 1627
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC//DHO-7//
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1383
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK//DOOC/ECMO/CC/DAO/DOB/DOI//
RUEPGBA/CDR USEUCOM INTEL VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ23-CH/ECJ5M//
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HARARE 000372
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
AF/S FOR B. NEULING
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE
AFR/SA FOR E. LOKEN
COMMERCE FOR BECKY ERKUL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2011
SUBJECT: MOYO ON POLITICAL LANDSCAPE, AVENUES FOR CHANGE
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher Dell under Section 1.4 b/d
——-
Summary
——-
¶1. (C) Independent MP Jonathan Moyo told poloff March 22
that the growing proximity of Mugabe’s departure and economic
collapse were increasing a national impetus for political
change. In this uncertain environment, securocrats were the
only ones focusing on policy and stability, and they were
losing confidence in the capacity of Vice President Mujuru’s
capacity to hold the party together after Mugabe’s departure.
Moyo expressed disappointment with the timidity of Emmerson
Mnangagwa and his camp, who he said were inclined to posture
and hedge until a succession event was close. To hasten
ruling party fractures and improve Zimbabwe’s dysfunctional
political environment, according to Moyo, the MDC factions,
civil society and Mnangagwa’s camp should agitate for
harmonized presidential and parliamentary elections in 2008,
an effort he urged the West to support. End summary.
——————————————-
Lame Duck Presidency, Economy Propel Change
——————————————-
¶2. (C) On the porch of his relatively modest Borrowdale West
suburban home, Moyo acknowledged he had been out of the
limelight for months but said he was enagaging with players
from all political groups constantly. He assessed that the
country’s political horizon remained clouded but that the
next few months would see significant developments. Two
factors — Mugabe’s lame duck status and the economy —
assured that a course for change would be set by year’s end.
¶3. (C) The controversial ex-Information Minister and former
Mugabe confidant maintained that ZANU-PF was incapable of
reforming itself in the foreseeable future. Even if the
patronage pie were contracting, the threat of losing one’s
job and outside business interests for “straying” remained
decisive for all in the absence of credible alternatives.
Although most recognized the need for international
assistance and wanted better relations with the West, there
was absolutely no consideration underway of reforms necessary
to secure international assistance. Succession dynamics
meant that nobody would take on Mugabe over policy. On the
economic front, the cabinet lacked the human resources to
even understand, much less debate policy alternatives, even
if Mugabe were not an obstacle.
¶4. (C) Moyo said both ruling party factions recognized that
the economy could not weather the political status quo much
longer and wanted Mugabe to step down. Moyo said Mugabe
stood no chance of winning another election were he to run.
The Mujuru faction banked on having Vice President Mujuru
succeed Mugabe in 2008, giving the party time to turn around
the economy sufficiently to win an election in a presidential
election postponed until 2010 by constitutional amendment.
This assumed that the international community would re-engage
with Zimbabwe upon Mugabe’s stepping down.
¶5. (C) Mujuru did not command sufficient support to assume
the presidency, according to Moyo. Only four of ten
provincial party structures supported her. Moreover, any
plan to delay a presidential election until 2010 would
provoke a backlash from the public, particularly among the
most numerous Karanga ethnic group. Mujuru’s effort to rally
Karanga behind the clique’s “man in Masvingo”, Obert Mpofu,
was doomed. (N.B. He did not mention other more popular
HARARE 00000372 002 OF 004
Mujuru allies in Masvingo, such as Eddie Zvobgo, Jr., and
Dzikamayi Mavhaire.) If the Mujuru faction agreed to a
national election in 2008, Mnangagwa’s group would either
prevail over her in an intra-party ZANU-PF race or bolt the
party.
¶6. (C) As for Mnangagwa’s faction, Moyo lamented their
continued low profile and unwillingness to break with or even
challenge the ZANU-PF Old Guard so far. The stakes of
patronage and succession made them hang on to their moribund
party even though they were emotionally ready to leave.
Their strategy was consciously geared to a “sprint” while
Moyo had embarked on a “marathon.” He explained that few
could afford economically or politically to break from the
party for more than a couple of months. Given ZANU-PF’s
unchallenged authority, they would wait until within months
of an election event to break from the party – if they
assessed that a new entity would overwhelm ZANU-PF’s remants.
Moyo opined, however, that delay until too late by Mnangagwa
himself could cost him politically as a sign of leadership
failure.
—————————-
Mnangagwa Preserving Options
—————————-
¶7. (C) Moyo said that the Mnangagwa faction was further
constrained by Mnangagwa’s continued strong personal loyalty
to Mugabe. He assessed that Mnangagwa did not intend to
overtly or implicitly challenge Mugabe as long as Mugabe
remained in office, and that Mnangagwa believed that Mugabe
could yet confer the presidency to him. The former heir
apparent continued to have the President’s ear. Moreover,
Mugabe wanted to keep Mnangagwa in the game, as evidenced by
his personal intervention to keep Mnangagwa from being
arrested on at least one occasion. In the same vein, Moyo
reported that Mugabe had approached Mnangagwa at the December
party conference to amend the party’s recent constitutional
requirement that a woman be included in the top three
positions, a provision that had triggered Mujuru’s
supplanting Mnangagwa as that heir apparent. Mnangagwa
declined because it would be too overtly self-serving, and
Mugabe agreed to have the amendment of the amendment advanced
later by the politburo.
¶8. (C) Moyo further corroborated another Mnangagwa anecdote
floating around Harare of late. A few months ago, Moyo
reported, Vice President Msika advised Mnangagwa that Mugabe
and Msika were preparing to step down; Mnangagwa responded
that he would step down too. Stressing his loyalty to
Mugabe, Mnangagwa told Msika his continued presence would be
a distraction to any successor and a disruption to party
unity. Msika countered that Mnangagwa’s prospects to succeed
Mugabe were good and convinced him to remain.
¶9. (C) Moyo said he was increasingly doubtful about
Mnangagwa’s prospects. Mnangagwa’s association with the
Tsholotsho affair, the Col Dyck affair, the 1980s
SIPDIS
Gukuranhundi massacres in Matabeleland, and ruling party
financial skullduggery all gave Mugabe or Mujuru tools with
which to undermine Mnangagwa privately and publicly.
Moreover, despite his reputation for ruthlessness, Mnangagwa
was proving too confrontation-averse and vacillating in
internecine combat with the Mujuru faction. Nonetheless,
Mugabe was a bigger liability to Mujuru than to Mnangagwa,
with Mnangagwa benefiting from public attribution of economic
collapse to the political status quo.
——————————
HARARE 00000372 003 OF 004
Securocrats Pivotal, Uncertain
——————————
¶10. (C) Moyo emphasized the pivotal importance of the
security forces’ joint operations command (JOC) in the
succession game. The JOC were the only ones in power to
identify policy alternatives and weigh their consequences.
Nonetheless, they could not get sufficient purchase on policy
issues with political players given the centrality of
succession politics. Moyo suggested that the senior
securocrats had originally blessed the Mujuru succession plan
but were now doubting her ability to hold things together.
Moyo maintained that the securocrats – together with the
black middle class – viewed Mnangagwa as more capable than
Mujuru in turning the economy around and in relating to the
West. The JOC’s assessment and intentions was likely
evolving but would have to come to a head soon given their
concerns about the unsustainability of the economic crisis.
——————————
Opposition Needs Reorientation
——————————
¶11. (C) Moyo said that each ZANU-PF faction continued to
court elements of each of the inwardly absorbed MDC factions.
The security apparatus had driven and exploited the MDC
rift, and hoped eventually to draw elements of the “Welshman
faction” (N.B. perhaps tellingly, Moyo never referred to it
as the Mutambara faction) into the government to better
market the GOZ to the international community.
¶12. (C) Moyo asserted that the rift nonetheless opened
opportunities for the opposition, which could now redefine
itself and reorient itself strategically. The country was
more ready for change than it was in 2002; the opposition
needed to catch up with the people in identifying and
demanding solutions to the national crisis. Most imporantly,
the factions needed to collaborate on tactics, and join
together more definitively with business, labor, local NGOs,
the separate white and black dominated farmers unions,
churches, and disaffected elements of ZANU-PF to fuel an
atmosphere that impelled constructive change.
——————————–
Harmonized Elections a Key Wedge
——————————–
¶13. (C) Moyo maintained that the timing of the next
presidential election was a flashpoint for the ruling party’s
factional strife. A vast majority of Zimbabweans, including
within the ruling party, wanted change and saw a 2008
harmonized election as a key. Thus, the issue that was
splitting the ruling party apart could force disparate
players to join together to enhance the atmospherics and
build momentum for change. Public outcry could overcome
ZANU-PF Old Guard intransigence on the issue. Moreover,
deliberation over the constitutional amendment to authorize a
harmonized election would “open a Pandora’s Box” of potential
political reforms to remedy much of Zimbabwe’s dysfunctional
political environment. Moyo said the issue nonetheless
lacked any forceful or organizing advocate and urged the West
to work quietly with its civil society partners, with
churches perhaps coordinating public efforts, to advance it.
——-
Comment
——-
HARARE 00000372 004 OF 004
¶14. (C) Even putting aside the galling irony of courting
support from a USG he vilified for years as Information
Minister, Moyo’s comments need to be filtered for personal
ambition and his continuing (albeit perhaps weakening)
alignment with Mnangagwa. His ellipses and contradictions
reflect difficulties he has playing a weak political hand in
a shifting and uncertain succession game. In that vein, for
example, he never mentioned his United People’s Movement, a
not-so-covertly Mnangagwa-aligned vehicle that has had
problems getting purchase with civil society and the public
at large. Although Moyo may have burned too many bridges to
be an overtly influential player with any of the major
political groupings in the foreseeable future, he remains a
pot-stirrer and keen observer of the political landscape able
to proffer telling insights into the internal workings of
ZANU-PF.
DELL
(193 VIEWS)
