The United States remained convinced that there would be no real change until there was an election that would bring a reform government to power.
That was its assessment of the inclusive government after its first year in office but two more years have passed since then.
The Movement for Democratic Change which it always considered as the junior partner in the government, though it won the 2008 elections, however, insisted that the West should not look at benchmarks or single events as signs of progress but at the continuing process of change.
But the United States embassy insisted: “Fundamental, institutional change, however, will be dependent on two things: new elections that result in a government dedicated to reform — the earliest that could happen would be 2011, but it is likely elections will not take place until 2012 or 2013 — and the development of enduring institutional structures that are the true underpinnings of a representative democratic society.”
Full cable:
Viewing cable 10HARARE107, Zimbabwe: Measuring Progress
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Reference ID |
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VZCZCXRO7491
RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHSB #0107/01 0500842
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 190842Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0063
INFO SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMCSUU/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0029
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0029
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0029
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 08 HARARE 000107
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/19
SUBJECT: Zimbabwe: Measuring Progress
CLASSIFIED BY: Charles Ray, Ambassador, State, EXO; REASON: 1.4(D)
——————-
INTRODUCTION
——————-
¶1. (C) The coalition government is now one year old. As the U.S.
examines further engagement with Zimbabwe, post would like to
suggest the Hague Principles agreed to in late 2007 as benchmarks
for examining progress, and we offer our evaluation of progress
from that time until the present. The Hague principles are: 1)
Full and equal access to humanitarian assistance; 2) Commitment to
macroeconomic stabilization in accordance with guidance from
relevant international agencies; 3) Restoration of the rule of law,
including enforcement of contracts, an independent judiciary, and
respect for property rights; 4) Commitment to the democratic
process and respect for human rights, including a commitment to
freedom of expression, freedom of print and broadcast media,
freedom of assembly, and freedom of association; 5) A commitment to
timely elections held in accordance with international standards,
and in the presence of international election observers. It would
be misleading, however, to look strictly at static benchmarks. As
Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai and his party continue to tell us,
what counts is the continued process to open democratic space in
Zimbabwe, not day-to-day headlines that mask seemingly sustainable
achievements. Finally, given significant gridlock in government
resulting from the inconvenient marriage between ZANU-PF and MDC-T
(MDC-M’s role is increasingly insignificant), real change is
impossible until there is an election that brings a reform
government to power. END INTRODUCTION.
—————
Background
————–
¶2. (SBU) A group of bilateral donors and international agencies
met in the Hague on October 2, 2007 and agreed on a
principles-based approach to reengagement with the government of
Zimbabwe. At that time, SADC was facilitating talks between the
parties regarding the holding of elections. President Robert
Mugabe pushed for elections in 2010. An agreement was ultimately
reached to hold elections in March 2008. The run up to the
elections was mostly free of the violence and intimidation that had
characterized earlier elections. With some exceptions, the MDC
factions were allowed to campaign throughout the country and hold
rallies. Repressive laws, such as the Public Order and Security
Act (POSA), were not used for the most part to stifle freedom of
assembly. Zimbabweans were allowed access to humanitarian
assistance during this period. ZANU-PF, confident of victory,
permitted a relatively fair election, and the result was that the
MDC factions gained a majority in parliament, Morgan Tsvangirai won
an official plurality of the presidential vote (ZANU-PF fraud
likely prevented him from winning a majority) and a run off
presidential election was set for June. From April until the June
27 election, ZANU-PF unleashed its repressive machinery. Over 200
people were killed, thousands were beaten, and political space was
completely closed. In June, to make its point, the government
suspended NGO operations, curtailing the ability of many to provide
humanitarian assistance.
¶3. (SBU) Mugabe was declared the winner of the June election which
took place even though Tsvangirai pulled out when it became evident
a couple of weeks before that many of his supporters were afraid to
vote. In July 2008, SADC-sponsored negotiations between the
parties began. Mugabe was forced to the negotiating table for two
reasons: He lacked legitimacy, as even his SADC friends refused
to recognize his victory; and the economic situation, marked by an
inflation rate then in the billions, was unsustainable. The Global
Political Agreement (GPA) was reached in September, but
ZANU-PF-sponsored violence continued during negotiations, and in
October security forces began a series of abductions of MDC-T
HARARE 00000107 002 OF 008
officials and civil society activists, including Jestina Mukoko. A
number of these individuals were in custody even after the new
government was formed in February 2009.
——————————————— —————
Full and Equal Access to Humanitarian Assistance
——————————————— —————
¶4. (SBU) Continuum of humanitarian access:
A) NGO field activities banned (June-August 2008)
B) NGOs permitted to operate but closely monitored and
controlled, and subject to threat (April-June 2008)
C) NGOs generally permitted to operate but some reports of
disruptions, other harassment (September 2008-present)
D) Completely unimpeded humanitarian access
¶5. (SBU) Although ZANU-PF continues to allege that NGOs and
donors are involved in politics, since the lifting of the NGO ban
in August 2008, humanitarian access to vulnerable populations has
been generally good. International and local NGOs have generally
been able to move freely and deliver services unimpeded during a
period of increased programming. (NOTE: There have been isolated
reports of discrimination against MDC-T members in the distribution
of food assistance. END NOTE.) Work permits and operational
agreements have been processed. The government has put into place
a policy and process of donor coordination that remains slow but
generally reflects international standards.
¶6. (SBU) Organizations such as the International Organization for
Migration and UN High Commissioner for Refugees continue to
encounter government sensitivities regarding populations of
displaced farm workers, and a an unknown number of undocumented
people from other countries; most notably Malawi, but in general
are able to gain access to them and provide assistance. A
significant milestone was the August 2009 Joint GOZ-Donor IDP
assessment.
¶7. (SBU) Regular crop assessments have been conducted. Food and
cash transfer programs during the hungry season have proceeded
without political interference.
¶8. (SBU) The Ministry of Health’s collaboration with the World
Health Organization and other donors to manage H1N1 in Mutare and
its swift response to suspected cholera cases in Chipinge in
September reflects an improvement in delivery and transparency.
——————————————— ———–
Commitment to Macroeconomic Stabilization
——————————————— ———–
HARARE 00000107 003 OF 008
¶9. (SBU) Continuum of macroeconomic stabilization
A) Complete lack of fiscal and monetary discipline, controls on
foreign exchange (November 1997-January 2009)
B) Fiscal and Monetary discipline, confidence in
sustainability of policy limited by political factors (February
2009-present)
C) Fiscal and monetary discipline, policy commitment
credibility
¶10. (SBU) Following hyperinflation that reached over a trillion
percent, Zimbabwe introduced a multi-currency system at the end of
January, 2009 and the Zimbabwe dollar almost immediately became a
relic of the past. The resulting end of inflation has resulted in
a significant measure of macroeconomic stability. Expectations of
inflation are minimal, there is no fiscal deficit to speak of, and
the economy is growing (though slowly) for the first time in more
than a decade.
¶11. (SBU) Macroeconomic stability is sustainable provided MDC-T
continues to control the Ministry of Finance and the Reserve Bank
of Zimbabwe is held in check and not allowed to undermine the
banking system. To move beyond stabilization to recovery and
long-term growth, Zimbabwe needs a lower risk profile (to attract
commercial credit and investment) and multilateral concessional
loans (to resolve the GOZ’s debt crisis and put the public sector
back on its feet). Neither of these things will happen until new
elections give Zimbabwe a government able to make credible policy
commitments.
————————————–
Restoration of the Rule of Law
————————————-
¶12. (SBU) Continuum of Rule of Law
A) Judiciary completely compromised, political arrests
frequent, property rights not protected (2005-May 2009)
B) Judiciary compromised but occasionally rules against the
state, political arrests occasional, property rights not protected
(June 2009-present)
C) Judiciary somewhat independent, infrequent political
arrests, property rights somewhat protected
D) Independent judiciary, no political arrests, property rights
enforced
¶13. (SBU) This is perhaps the most problematic area. On the
positive side, there are no political detainees, with the possible
exception of three MDC members charged with the alleged murder of a
HARARE 00000107 004 OF 008
ZANU-PF councilor in Banket . Politically motivated prosecutions
have greatly decreased. There are occasional judicial judgments
against the State. For example, the Supreme Court recognized that
Jestina Mukoko had been tortured by state agents and ruled that her
case should be stayed, effectively dismissing it. A High Court
Judge ruled that the Zimbabwe Minerals Development Corporation and
its partners had illegally taken over claims in Chiadzwa belonging
to African Consolidated Resources. On the negative side, farm
invasions have continued to take place, some accompanied by
violence, and neither government ministers nor the police have made
sufficient efforts to stop this lawlessness. In fact, invasions
are treated as political rather than legal matters. In a similar
vein, when the SADC Tribunal ruled against the government in a case
brought by white commercial farmers, the Minister of Justice, with
typical pettifoggery, argued that Zimbabwe had not bound itself to
the Tribunal. Although prosecutions have declined, police continue
to arrest demonstrators, particularly members of Women of Zimbabwe
Arise (WOZA).
¶14. (C) The biggest obstacles to Rule of Law are institutional.
Minister of Justice Patrick Chinamasa is close to Mugabe and is a
political partisan rather than an independent lawyer. Similarly,
the Attorney General carries ZANU-PF’s water. He has been
responsible, albeit with guidance from Chinamasa and others, for
political prosecutions. He is personally prosecuting Roy Bennett
in a case where there is clearly insufficient evidence; Mugabe has
made it clear Bennett cannot be sworn in as deputy minister of
agriculture unless and until he is acquitted. The Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court is a Mugabe acolyte who replaced the former chief
justice after he was forced to resign in 2001 by war veterans who
threatened him and by Chinamasa who said he could not guarantee his
safety. Most judges are compromised by having received farms from
the government. Police independence supposedly depends on
oversight from the Ministry of Home Affairs. But this ministry,
which has ZANU-PF and MDC-T co-ministers, is heavily influenced by
the ZANU-PF minister and ZANU-PF bureaucracy, including the
permanent secretary. And the commissioner of police, who is
supposed to report to the Ministry, does not. He sits on the Joint
Operations Committee, which formulates and implements policy, with
leaders of the military who are loyal to Mugabe. The military is a
power unto itself, and is not subject to civilian control, other
than perhaps to Mugabe. The military was responsible for a rash of
killings and beatings in the Chiadzwa diamond fields in 2008 and
¶2009.
¶15. (C) Until the top officials charged with justice and law and
order responsibilities are replaced, and there is a commitment to a
credible and internationally recognized legal framework, it is
unlikely that we will see much additional progress in Rule of Law.
And it is unlikely these officials will change until there is a new
government. (COMMENT: A budgetary process that allows adequate
compensation for judges, according to Finance Minister Biti in a
conversation with a visiting CODEL, would also aid in
re-establishing the independence and credibility of the judiciary.
Currently, when lawyers are appointed to the bench, they suffer a
decline in income that makes them susceptible to bribes and
coercion. END COMMENT) The National Security Council, whose
membership includes the president, prime minister, and service
chiefs, met for only the second time this month since the formation
of the government. As noted the JOC continues to function, and
there is no evidence that transparent civilian control of the
military will occur any time soon. With respect to land reform,
nobody, including the MDC, has called for a reversal. But it is
evident that land reform has benefitted primarily high-level
ZANU-PF and military officials, and not those for whom it was
intended. The GPA calls for a land audit as a prerequisite to
eliminating multiple farm ownerships and more equitable
distribution. So far, ZANU-PF has obstructed efforts for an audit,
either on the basis that there is no money to fund it, or with the
fatuous argument, made by the Minister of Agriculture to the
Ambassador (Ref), that until sanctions are lifted land inputs are
unavailable, land cannot be developed to its potential, and it is
therefore impossible to assess its true value for purposes of an
audit.
HARARE 00000107 005 OF 008
——————————————— ———————-
—–
Commitment to the Democratic Process and Human Rights
——————————————— ———————-
—–
¶16. (SBU) Continuum of human rights
A) Ruling party holds on to power at all costs, human rights
ignored, national independent media restricted, international
journalists banned (2002-September 2008)
B) Ruling party negotiates potentially significant power
sharing, human rights ignored, national independent media
restricted, international journalists banned (September
2008-February 2009)
C) Ruling party enters into coalition government, cedes
positions but holds on to power, human rights violations continue
but become less frequent, national independent media restricted,
some international journalists permitted to return (February
2009-present)
D) Coalition government functioning with imperfect but
significant power sharing, few human rights violations, some
prosecutions of violators, new media authority authorizes
independent media (possible to achieve in short term)
E) GPA fully implemented with real power sharing, and the
potential for periodic transfer of power based on free and fair
elections, constitutional revision on track with popular
participation, no impunity for human rights violators, freedom of
print and broadcast media
¶17. (SBU) Political violence has greatly decreased since the
signing of the GPA, and in particular during the last year. There
is less political intimidation, although we continue to receive
reports from some rural areas that ZANU-PF supporters are exerting
pressure on villagers to support the party’s position in the
constitutional process. Although POSA, which has been used to
restrict freedom of assembly, has not been repealed, political
space has increased. MDC-T has held rallies around the country and
has traveled to areas it could not have a couple of years ago.
(NOTE: We have reports from several areas of MDC-T members being
arrested, and quickly released, for trying to organize in
connection with the constitutional process. They were not abused
and it is unlikely the State will prosecute them. Additionally,
efforts by a theatre group to perform a play promoting national
reconciliation were obstructed by ZANU-PF authorities in some
venues in Mashonaland. END NOTE.) An MDC-T MP has introduced a
bill in Parliament to repeal POSA. Although passage of the bill is
unlikely given Mugabe’s veto power, the fact of its introduction is
an important step.
¶18. (SBU) Weekly independent newspapers continue to publish and
international news organizations such as the BBC and Al Jazeera
have been allowed to operate openly, even after broadcasting
reports critical of ZANU-PF. A Media Commission that will inter
alia license print media has been formed but not yet officially
established. The functioning of the Commission and licensing of
independent daily papers would be important steps in establishing
freedom of expression. There is considerable criticism of ZANU-PF
in the independent Zimbabwean press, although the recent defamation
HARARE 00000107 006 OF 008
charges brought against distributors of the Zimbabwean for
allegedly falsely reporting on a meeting involving ZANU-PF
strongman Emmerson Mnangagwa demonstrate limitations on freedom of
the press.
¶19. (SBU) Parliament, which until 2008, was mostly a rubber stamp
for Mugabe, has a fragile MDC majority and has begun to operate in
an independent and sometimes bipartisan way. Co-chairs from the
three political parties head the process to draft a new
constitution. Parliamentary committees have begun to exercise
oversight functions. For example, the Portfolio Committee on Mines
and Energy, chaired by a ZANU-PF MP, has been calling witnesses to
investigate government actions in Chiadzwa.
——————————————— ———————-
————————
Commitment to Elections Held in Accordance with International
Standards
——————————————— ———————-
————————
¶22. (SBU) Continuum of commitment to elections
A) Elections stolen blatantly, including through violence and
intimidation (2002, June 2008)
B) Election results manipulated but not successfully stolen
(March 2008)
C) Independent election committee named (could be achieved
soon)
D) Voter rolls audited and cleansed
E) Unfettered voter education permitted
F) International election observers invited
G) Free and fair elections held
¶20. (SBU) According to the GPA, a new constitution was to be
drafted and submitted to a referendum within 18 months of the
formation of the government (February 2009). Although not
specified in the GPA, it was understood that elections would take
place after the adoption of the new constitution which would
presumably address the timing and process of new elections. The
constitutional process is proceeding fitfully and behind schedule,
but it is proceeding.
¶21. (SBU) More important than scheduling elections are
institutions and an environment that will permit fair elections.
An important step would be the establishment of an independent
electoral commission to set the ground rules and ensure that NGOs
can freely participate in voter education. The leaders of the
parties have agreed on members of the Electoral Commission and
HARARE 00000107 007 OF 008
reportedly on the chair, an independent Zimbabwean judge now
working in Namibia. The Commission has not yet, however been
officially announced. Another important step would be the revision
and cleansing of the voter rolls. The long-serving Registrar of
Voters is a ZANU-PF stalwart who cannot be expected to assist in
such efforts. Finally, the presence of international election
observers, before, during, and after the election, is essential.
—————–
MDC-T’s View
—————–
¶23. (C) The U.S. and other Western countries tend to look at
benchmarks, or single events, as signs of progress. MDC-T is
concerned less with events than what it sees as a continuing
process of change. Therefore, while it believes the GPA is
deadlocked-Mugabe and ZANU-PF refuse to appoint governors and
remove Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe governor Gideon Gono and Attorney
General Johannes Tomana-MDC-T leaders in government are able to use
their positions to generate incremental change. Tsvangirai is
prime minister and, although his powers are limited, he represents
MDC-T and reform-minded Zimbabweans on the world stage. MDC-T and
MDC-M have half the ministries, including the all-important finance
ministry. Gono’s wings have been clipped and the economy
stabilized. In general MDC-T believes that the process is
irreversible-and the longer it can influence the GOZ from the
inside, the more likely democratic gains will persist (COMMENT:
While it is possible that Tsvangirai’s view that the process is
irreversible might be somewhat naC/ve, it does appear sustainable.
END COMMENT).
¶24. (C) MDC-T’s strategy is thus two-pronged. It will declare
GPA negotiations deadlocked and push for elections. Realizing this
depends on ZANU-PF taking the same position-under the current
Constitution elections would not be held until 2013-and that
elections may not take place in the near term, MDC-T will seek
additional Western assistance, and seek progress in reengagement
with international financial institutions (IFIs). Accordingly,
MDC-T Minister of Finance Tendai Biti, MDC-T Minister of
Constitutional Affairs Eric Matinenga, and MDC-M Minister of
Education David Coltart, in recent visits to the U.S. have noted
progress made under the coalition government. MDC-T believes that
Zimbabwe’s economy cannot grow significantly without Western and
IFI assistance. If the economy improves, in MDC-T’s opinion, it
will get the credit; if it does not, ZANU-PF will blame MDC-T.
——————
On the Ground
——————
¶25. (SBU) After the 2008 electoral violence and political
uncertainty, and with continuing economic instability marked by
hyper inflation, the formation of the coalition government was
widely supported by the Zimbabwean people. The large decline in
violence has been particularly welcomed, although, as noted,
ZANU-PF machinery is still in place and there is fear it could be
reactivated. In Harare and other cities, goods are once again
available in stores (although many cannot afford them), gas is
available, and there has been a noticeable increase in traffic.
Unemployment remains incredibly high and unfulfilled expectations
of higher wages by civil servants have resulted in a strike. But
there is still an energy in urban areas that was not present a year
ago, and a sense that people are better off.
¶26. (SBU) The economic buzz does not exist in rural areas.
HARARE 00000107 008 OF 008
Schools are not functioning, and there is a lack of cash to buy
whatever goods are available. There is a feeling that things are
better, however, if only because the threat of violence has greatly
diminished.
————-
COMMENT
————-
¶27. (C) The GPA continues to be a focus of attention among
Zimbabwe watchers, and Gideon Gono and Roy Bennett-and to a lesser
extent Tomana-have become familiar names, symbolic of the deadlock.
But to focus only on them would be to lose sight of the progress
that has been made on the humanitarian, economic, and political
fronts, particularly since March 2008, and in the words of Finance
Minister Biti, to divert energy from the strategic picture. And we
believe we will continue to see more, albeit slow and fitful,
change. Fundamental, institutional change, however, will be
dependent on two things: new elections that result in a government
dedicated to reform — the earliest that could happen would be
2011, but it is likely elections will not take place until 2012 or
2013 — and the development of enduring institutional structures
that are the true underpinnings of a representative democratic
society. END COMMENT.
RAY
(47 VIEWS)
