The United States viewed the bi-annual summit of the African Union of January 2009 as an opportunity to advance its interests or see them take significant steps backwards.
It seems Washington was interested in the crises in Zimbabwe, Somalia, Sudan, Mauritania, Guinea and Eastern Congo.
On Zimbabwe the United States felt that the AU was restrained because it had given the mandate to solve the crisis to the Southern African Development Community which it felt had failed to resolve the issue.
Washington was now convinced that that there could not be any credible power sharing agreement between the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front and the Movement for Democratic Change as long as Robert Mugabe remained the head of state.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 09ADDISABABA76, USAU: US INTERESTS AT STAKE AT ADDIS AU SUMMIT,
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Reference ID |
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Classification |
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VZCZCXRO6510
OO RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDS #0076/01 0141209
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 141209Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3368
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEPADJ/CJTF HOA
RUZEFAA/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 7662
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 000076
SIPDIS
STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/RSA, AF/E, AF/W, AF/C, AF/S, AF/SPG AND
NEA/MAG
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2019
SUBJECT: USAU: US INTERESTS AT STAKE AT ADDIS AU SUMMIT,
JAN. 26-FEB. 3
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN A. SIMON, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).
¶1. (SBU) Summary: The African Union Summit in Addis Ababa
from January 26 through February 3 presents an opportunity
to advance US interests Q or see them take significant
steps backward. The crises in Zimbabwe, Somalia, Sudan,
Mauritania, Guinea, and Eastern Congo will all likely be
items of discussion and backroom wheeling and dealing.
Preparation with key players at the Summit should begin
shortly. End Summary.
¶2. (U) The bi-annual summit of the African Union (AU)
begins January 26 with a two-day meeting of the Permanent
Representatives Committee (PRC), followed by a two-day
meeting of foreign ministers from January 29-30, followed
by the heads of state meeting in the Assembly of the Union
from February 1-3. The earlier meetings will develop
reports and recommendations for the meeting of the
Assembly, as well as endorse a number of protocols and
proposals developed through the previous year. The heads
of state usually accept those recommendations as presented.
¶3. (SBU) The official theme of the summit is
infrastructure. The global financial crisis will be a
major issue on the agenda and one day will be devoted to
the issues of union government (a Libyan initiative), but
the major crises on the continent are likely to be the
primary topics of discussion and attention at the Summit.
At issue will be whether the AU will take a more active
role in Zimbabwe, whether members will commit more support
to the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and how much
pressure the AU will exert to restore constitutional order
in Mauritania and Guinea. The impending International
Criminal Court decision concerning Sudanese President
Bashir, SudanQs still-unresolved Darfur crisis, and the
ongoing conflict in Eastern Congo are also likely to
generate debate.
——–
Zimbabwe
——–
¶4. (C) The AU has been restrained in its approach to the
crisis in Zimbabwe by the decision at its last Summit in
Sharm El-Sheikh to delegate mediation of the crisis to the
Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). Yet the
impotence of SADC to resolve the issue is clearly an
embarrassment to some members. In November, Deputy
Chairperson of the Commission Erastus Mwencha said that if
the crisis remained an issue by the time of the Summit, the
members Qwill tear him [Mugabe] apart.Q However, this is
not a universal view. Peace and Security Commissioner
Ramtane Lamamra has voiced frustration, apparently shared
by other members, with the MDC and its unwillingness to
accept the power sharing agreement as is. And the Algerian
Ambassador, the current chair of the Peace and Security
Council (PSC), recently dismissed the crisis as a Q
political disputeQ when asked if the PSC would address the
issue during AlgeriaQs chairmanship. QThere are political
disputes all over Africa,Q he said. QShould the AU
intervene in each one?Q (Comment: With such a wide
divergence in views, the Summit debate could just as easily
result in a reaffirmation of SADCQs role and approach as a
condemnation of Mugabe and a more active role for the AU.
On the one hand, many member states are impatient with
Zimbabwe; on the other hand, many are reticent to criticize
an elder statesman. End Comment.)
¶5. (C) On January 13, Deputy Chairperson Mwencha met with
SADC officials to discuss ways to push forward a
resolution, largely to diffuse the issue before the
Summit. The focus of these efforts appears to be on
gaining passage of Amendment 19 and a commitment of MDC
leader Morgan Tsvangirai to join the government before the
Summit. In a conversation with the Ambassador on January
14, Mwencha said the discussion had included the idea of
leaving the issue of control of the Home Affairs ministry
to be decided at a later date. Mwencha said a joint
AU-SADC team will go to Zimbabwe before the Summit to push
the process along. Ambassador cautioned that a settlement
will do little to resolve the crisis if it does not include
credible power-sharing with the MDC, and the United States,
among others, had lost confidence that such a credible
ADDIS ABAB 00000076 002 OF 003
agreement is possible if President Mugabe remains as the
head of state.
——-
Somalia
——-
¶6. (U) The AU Commission and the PSC have regularly called
for a UN Peacekeeping Operation in Somalia, with limited
effect. However, a strong statement from the assembled
heads of state of Africa may carry more weight with the
UNSC members. The AU Summit is also an opportunity to
raise the final three battalions required to bring AMISOM
to full strength. Burkina Faso and Ghana have very
recently expressed interest in contributing troops.
¶7. (C) At the Summit, the AMISOM troop contributing
countries as well as the Ethiopian hosts may raise issues
concerning the future of AMISOM. For instance, they may
question that if reinforcements are not forthcoming and if
the UN does not commit to a UNPKO operation, whether the
focus should be on removing AMISOM forces. After Ethiopian
forces depart Somalia, Ethiopian military officials stated
that AMISOM would face great difficulties if they are not
reinforced and do not have access to logistical support.
In such a scenario, the Ethiopians suggested that naval
forces, like CTF 150 or U.S. naval assets, could secure
Mogadishu to allow the safe and secure exit of AMISOM
forces, should that become necessary. Further, the status
of the TFG in the wake of YusufQs resignation and progress
on implementation of the Djibouti Accord may well be
debated, and the IGAD member states have well-defined
positions.
—–
Sudan
—–
¶8. (C) The potential ICC indictment of President Bashir may
result in the AU seeking to reiterate its strong call for
an Article 16 deferment. This had been a major issue at
the AU for some months, but our AU interlocutors now seem
to accept the unlikelihood of such a deferment. When AU
Assembly President Kikwete was at the AU in November, he
indicated in discussions with AFRICOM Commander General
Ward that Bashir had made concessions in the face of the
indictment, which the Darfur rebels had been unable to
match due to their fragmented nature. (Comment: It is
unlikely the AU “official” position on the ICC indictment
will change, and even more unlikely AU member states will
cease to see it as a threat that particularly targets
Africa. End Comment.)
¶9. (SBU) One area with regard to Sudan where the AU could
be helpful is to urge the UN to fully accept the US airlift
support required to get UNAMID equipment into Sudan as
quickly as possible. At the moment, the UN has sought to
limit use of US assets in favor of its own contractors,
which they believe are less expensive, if slower. The AU
could also issue a strong call for both sides to fulfill
their commitments to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
(CPA) and for the GOS to follow through on its own Sudan
PeopleQs Initiative commitments.
———-
Mauritania
———-
¶10. (C) Per the PSC Ministerial of December 22, the
AU-sponsored sanctions are scheduled to take effect shortly
after the Summit on February 5, Qif constitutional order is
not restored.Q In a January 8 discussion, Lamamra has
noted that while the recently concluded junta-sponsored Q
National Dialogue on DemocracyQ seemed to harm the junta by
alienating the opposition party, the fact that it set a
date for elections (May 30) could convince some AU members
to ease pressure on the junta. He suggested maintaining
the AUQs firm stance may not be easy.
¶11. (C) Another issue for the Summit regarding Mauritania
is whether legitimate President Abdallahi Sidi will be
invited to take MauritaniaQs seat in the Assembly, as the
Commission recommended to the December 22 PSC Ministerial.
ADDIS ABAB 00000076 003 OF 003
Lamamra thought the issue could be presented by the foreign
ministers to the Assembly, but it could only be decided
once the Assembly meets. While he would not hazard a guess
on how likely it would be for the Assembly to seat
President Sidi or his representative, he noted that at the
ministerial, after much discussion, SidiQs representative
was allowed to address the meeting in the name of
Mauritania. (FYI: The June AU Summit seated Zimbabwe’s
President Mugabe, while Tsvangirai was prohibited from
traveling by Mugabe. End FYI.)
——
Guinea
——
¶12. (SBU) Lamamra indicated that whatever is decided on
Mauritania is likely to impact the AUQs deliberations on
Guinea, since the AU will want to appear to have a common
approach to coups dQetat. He noted two critical
differences between the two that could come into play: 1)
Guinea does not have a living legitimate President
contesting the coup; and 2) the coup leaders in Guinea have
claimed thus far that they intend to give up power
completely. Ambassador agreed that whether the coup
leaders benefit from the illegal action they have taken
should be a major factor in determining the acceptability
of any proposed settlement.
¶13. (U) The decision by ECOWAS on January 10 to suspend
Guinea from the regional organization until the military
junta holds elections and restores constitutional order
exposed a rift among AU member states. Senegal President
Abdoulaye WadeQs expressed willingness to work with the
junta and his objection to the ECOWAS decision to suspend
Guinea could presage a lively debate over a fundamental AU
principle.
————-
Eastern Congo
————-
¶14. (U) Prior to the start of the Assembly, there will be a
Qmini-SummitQ on January 31 on the situation in the Eastern
Congo attended by the heads of state of the Great Lakes
region. UN Mediator Olusegun Obasanjo and AU Mediator
Benjamin Mkapa will report on the progress of the current
talks. Mwencha did not indicate what the expectations of
the meeting were beyond supporting the efforts of Obasanjo
and Mkapa.
——–
Comment:
——–
¶15. (C) The AU Summit will have a very important impact on
issues critical to US Africa policy. Achieving US
objectives will require vigorous diplomacy, both before and
at the Summit, including during the PRC and foreign
ministersQ meetings that occur in advance of the
Assembly. We look to Washington to provide the Q
messagingQ to be conveyed prior to and during the AU
summit. We also suggest Washington consider outreach to
key AU members, including Tanzania (the current chair of
the AU Assembly), Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, South
Africa, and other leaders of the eight AU-recognized
regional economic communities. We request copies of the
briefing papers being prepared by the appropriate Embassies
and offices on the core subjects that will be raised at the
summit Q Zimbabwe, Somalia, Sudan, Mauritania, Guinea and
Eastern Congo.
YAMAMOTO
(35 VIEWS)
