Movement for Democratic Change advisors who met a United States congressional delegation on 3 July 2008, a week after Zimbabwe African National Union- Patriotic Front leader Robert Mugabe had been sworn in as President, insisted that a transitional authority, and not a government of national unity, was the way forward.
The advisors who met at Strive Masiyiwa’s house in Dainfern, Johannesburg, included: Masiyiwa himself, MDC vice-President Thokozani Khupe, MDC treasurer Roy Bennett, George Sibotshiwe a senior aide and campaign manager to Morgan Tsvangirai, and businessman Wellington Chadehumbe.
The congressional delegation was led by House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Howard Berman.
The MDC team said the transition would only be for six months but they would accept 12 to 18 months to level the playing field for new elections. They wanted Tsvangirai to lead the transitional authority but wanted Mugabe out.
The advisors did not trust South African President Thabo Mbeki, the Southern African Development Community appointed mediator, and did not believe South Africa would help the transitional government.
Bennett and Masiyiwa directly pitched the delegation for funding of the MDC and Berman offered to push for a $5 million supplemental appropriation for promoting democracy in Zimbabwe.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 08PRETORIA1832, CODEL BERMAN MEETS ZIMBABWEAN OPPOSITION IN SOUTH
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VZCZCXRO2988
OO RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHSA #1832/01 2311342
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 181342Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5443
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHTN/AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN IMMEDIATE 5935
RUEHDU/AMCONSUL DURBAN IMMEDIATE 0094
RUEHSA/AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG IMMEDIATE 8300
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRETORIA 001832
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF/S (MARBURG), AF/RSA, H (AMACDERMOTT)
DEPT PLEASE PASS TO HILL STAFFERS RKING, P-AMARSH, DBERAKA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM OVIP ZA SF ZI
SUBJECT: CODEL BERMAN MEETS ZIMBABWEAN OPPOSITION IN SOUTH
AFRICA
REF: A. CODEL AND PAHAD
¶B. CODEL WRAP-UP
PRETORIA 00001832 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: A/DCM Donald Schenck for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
This is the third of three cables reporting on CODEL Berman’s
July 1-6, 2008 visit to South Africa.
¶1. (C) Summary: CODEL Berman met in Johannesburg on July 3
exile members of the Zimbabwean opposition Movement for
Democratic Change. They were told that: the June 27 run off
was a farce; Mugabe’s presidential claim was illegitimate;
and a Transitional Authority — not a Government of National
Unity — was needed to prepare the way out of the crisis via
new elections within the next 18 months. They decried the
“political culture” in Africa which allowed a loser who was
prone to violence to negotiate a power-sharing arrangement.
They expressed a complete lack of faith in South Africa’s
mediation effort, and the AU and the Southern African
Development Community to solve this crisis. They invested a
modest hope that the UN Security Council could do more.
“What we need,” one said, is “pressure from the USA and the
international community” to insist that the outcome of new
elections in Zimbabwe “reflects the will of the people.” End
Summary.
——————————————— —
Masiyiwa Hosts CODEL and Opposition MDC Insiders
——————————————— —
¶2. (C) CODEL Berman was hosted on July 3 in the upscale
Johannesburg gated suburb of Dainfern by Strive Masiyiwa, a
wealthy Zimbabwean businessman who has lived in South Africa
for years, and who has been a major player in opposition
initiatives against President Robert Mugabe’s ruling ZANU-PF
party. Masiyiwa invited members of the opposition Movement
for Democratic Change (MDC) to engage the CODEL and discuss
the post-June 27 runoff election crisis environment. The
participants included among the Zimbabweans: Masiyiwa
(Advisor to MDC President Morgan Tsvangirai) M. Thokozani
Khupe (MDC Vice President), Roy Bennett (MDC Treasurer once
elected to Parliament and later jailed by the GOZ), George
Sibotshiwe (Senior Aide and Campaign Manager to Tsvangirai),
and Wellington Chadehumbe (Zimbabwean businessman and MDC
Policy Advisor). U.S. participants included: House Foreign
Affairs Committee Chairman Howard Berman (D-CA), George
Miller (D-CA), Ed Royce (R-CA), Thomas Davis (R-VA), Jim
Costa (D-CA), Donald Payne (D-NJ), Linda Sanchez (D-CA);
their staff, PolCouns (Note Taker), and EconCouns (Control
Officer). This meeting took place following a briefing by
the SAG DepForMin Aziz Pahad (septel) who conveyed to the
CODEL the SAG’s official policy and characterization of the
situation in Zimbabwe.
——————————
A Litany of Woe and Injustice
——————————
¶3. (C) Masiyiwa introduced his guests, and set the stage by
stating the opposition’s view that: the June 27 election was
a farce; that Mugabe’s claim to executive authority was
illegitimate; and the way forward to resolve the crisis
required a Transitional Authority (TA) — not a Government of
National Unity (GNU) — with the MDC in the majority as
QNational Unity (GNU) — with the MDC in the majority as
reflected in the March 29 elections and the ZANU-PF (without
Mugabe) in the minority. This TA would have a single
purpose: to set the stage for new elections in the future
that would reflect the will of the people. He lamented the
implicit recognition of the African Union (AU) Summit in
Sharm el-Sheik that allowed Mugabe’s participation as Head of
State, and suggested that if Zambian President Mwanamasa had
not been medically evacuated with a stroke, he would have led
an anti-Mugabe initiative at that summit along with
Botswana’s President Seretse Khama (who did not attend
either). In the absence of these critical voices, and the
lack of electoral and democratic credentials of too many
other African heads of state, Mugabe was able to take
Zimbabwe’s seat, and with the help of South Africa’s
President Thabo Mbeki, was able to divert the AU from taking
a strong stand on the crisis. He told the CODEL that prior
PRETORIA 00001832 002.2 OF 003
to their arrival, he received a call from the Zimbabwean
capital reporting that 200 refugees were at that moment
appealing to the U.S. Embassy in Harare for sanctuary, while
300 asylum seekers were also at the South African Embassy.
———————–
Power, Fear and Poverty
———————–
¶4. (C) Ms. Khupe detailed the repression and violence
visited upon opponents of the ZANU-PF for the past twenty
five years. She emphasized the massacre of over 20 thousand
ZAPU supporters in the mid-1980s, the impact of the economic
crisis on the people throughout the 1990s with an
incomprehensible 2 million percent inflation rate today, the
intensity of the violent response of the ZANU-PF around
elections since 2000, and the inhumanity and desperation that
drove the most recent campaign of state-sponsored violence
prior to and beyond the June 27 “non-election election” run
off. In a climate of raw power, fear and poverty, she said,
this campaign was driven with a “heartless” determination in
a climate of “war against the Zimbabwean people.” Two
hundred thousand people were displaced, over 200 homes
destroyed, 86 people were known dead, but she feared the
total was much higher. She criticized the AU for conferring
a fig leaf of legitimacy on Mugabe and decried the “political
culture” in Africa which allowed “a negotiation for power
sharing if you lose an election and threaten violence.” She
stressed that a Transitional Authority was needed in Zimbabwe
to prepare for free and fair elections. “Mugabe must
resign,” she declared, “Tsvangirai must head the TA, and
violence must cease.”
———————-
Genesis of Catastrophe
———————-
¶5. (C) Roy Bennett — a white Zimbabwean, once coffee farmer
and former MP — said the genesis of the catastrophe that was
unfolding in Zimbabwe was a conflict of values and
principals. The ZANU-PF’s claim to a right to rule rested on
its role in the liberation struggle, and this claim was not
based on democratic principles. Mugabe and his key
supporters hungered for the power and luxury that came from
Zimbabwe’s resources and held Zimbabweans for ransom, as a
sacrifice to their avarice. He expressed a complete lack of
faith in the AU or the Southern African Development Community
(SADC) to solve this crisis and hoped the UN Security Council
could do more.
¶6. (C) George Sibotshiwe, as MDC Campaign Director,
described the difficulties the opposition faced in their
campaign. He said Mugabe and the ZANU-PF were shocked and
surprised at the MDC electoral win on March and immediately
set out to make sure they did not lose the run off. The
security forces, supplemented by civilian thugs and
torturers, led the campaign of violence and intimidation.
Their campaign advance man was kidnapped, tortured and
murdered, and they were unable to organize mass rallies.
They then changed their campaign strategy from mass rallies
to a campaign caravan. Roadblocks were then established all
around the country that hindered the movement of the caravans
and undermined their ability to campaign. He explained that
Qand undermined their ability to campaign. He explained that
he and his colleagues (some of whom were tortured and others
murdered) had to flee Zimbabwe to South Africa and other
neighboring countries. He told a harrowing story about how
he escaped out the back of a house he was hiding in as GOZ
security officers were literally at the front door. He
stressed that the environment for the election was perverted
such that the MDC had to withdraw in order to save its
supporters from further harm. “What we need,” he said, is
“pressure from the USA and the international community” to
insist that the outcome of new elections in Zimbabwe
“reflects the will of the people.”
¶7. (C) Businessman Wellington Chadehumbe called for a
“strong, robust position in the UNSC” that recognizes,
promotes and supports democracy. He added that a resolution
of the crisis called for “broadening the context of
mediation” to include UN support for the AU working within
PRETORIA 00001832 003.2 OF 003
SADC enhancing South Africa’s intervention. These
“co-negotiators” would be a strategy to “weaken South
Africa’s grip” on the mediation effort. Additionally, there
was a need to “change the debate” from arguing the bogus
outcome of the June 27 farce in favor of the principle of
“the will of the people.”
————————–
The MDC’s Favored Solution
————————–
¶8. (C) The Zimbabwean opposition interlocutors reiterated
their position that a TA, not a GNU, is the way forward. The
MDC would not participate in a GNU in which they were a
“junior partner.” The TA would only need six months — but
they would accept 12 – 18 months — to level the playing
field for new elections. This strategy would be based on
“clear timelines” with “disincentives” at the end. In
response to questions from the Codel, they confirmed that
they did not trust South Africa to help them and that they
had lost confidence in President Mbeki as a mediator. They
understood that the media blitz characterizing the AU and
SADC effort as a breakthrough in negotiations for a GNU,
though false, were becoming the revealed truth as conveyed by
the international media. When asked what their plan was to
counter this trend, they emphasized their lack of access and
resources that constrained their activities. Bennett and
Masiyiwa directly pitched the Codel for funding of the MDC,
and Chairman Berman offered to push for a five million dollar
supplemental appropriation for promoting democracy in
Zimbabwe.
——————————
Comment: Leaning into the Wind
——————————
¶9. (C) The MDC is in an unenviable position and they know
it. They do not expect much help coming from SADC,
especially with South Africa acting under its mandate,
Mwanamasa incapacitated, and Swaziland’s monarchy, the DR
Congo’s chaos, and Angola’s non-elected government lacking
the credibility to call the June 27 election illegitimate.
They do not trust in the AU’s willingness and ability to come
to their aid, considering the many member states whose
governments are in power by non-democratic means. They
understand their call for an AU peacekeeping force to be
deployed to Zimbabwe in advance of new elections is unlikely.
They fear (correctly) that the UNSC will be hamstrung from
taking a strong stance as Russia and China could veto any
resolution to further pressure Mugabe. Nevertheless, they
have been in this game for many years and show no inclination
to quit now. Their request for U.S. funding is not, in our
view, a shallow effort, and any response on our part should
be handled discretely. The forces of history and the
multilateral system have not yet come to the rescue of the
Zimbabwean opposition and may not do so in the foreseeable
future. Nevertheless, they are committed to their dream of a
new Zimbabwe that has been rehabilitated from its pariah
status, and in which the skills and experience of the
Zimbabwean Diaspora can be applied to reversing the downward
trends since independence.
BOST
(37 VIEWS)
