One of the two negotiators for the Tsvangirai faction of the Movement for Democratic Change, Elton Mangoma, said South African President Thabo Mbeki and other leaders of the Southern African Development Community were piling pressure on MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai because he was considered to be more malleable than President Robert Mugabe.
The MDC was, however, not going to sign a bad agreement. It was prepared to be patient and wait until the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front agreed to concede the role of head of government to Tsvangirai.
Mangoma said pressure was also coming from their sister organisation the Mutambara faction of the MDC which he said was even more aggressive than ZANU-PF in putting pressure on Tsvangirai to sign an agreement.
MDC-M secretary-general Welshman Ncube who was also one of the two negotiators for that faction argued that without a deal the MDC would have nothing.
Mangoma argued that the MDC would be finished in a government controlled by ZANU-PF and that in urging Tsvangirai to sign an agreement, Ncube and MDC-M were angling for positions in a new government controlled by ZANU-PF.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 08HARARE703, STALEMATE
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Reference ID |
Created |
Released |
Classification |
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VZCZCXRO3944
OO RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHSB #0703/01 2321423
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 191423Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3311
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 2217
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 2336
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0868
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1613
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 1971
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 2392
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 4824
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1485
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000703
SIPDIS
AF/S FOR G. GARLAND
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E. LOKEN AND L. DOBBINS
STATE PASS TO NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B. PITTMAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2018
SUBJECT: STALEMATE
REF: PRETORIA 1847
Classified By: Ambassador James D. McGee for reason 1.4 (d)
——-
SUMMARY
——-
¶1. (C) Elton Mangoma, an MDC negotiator and advisor to MDC
president Morgan Tsvangirai, told polecon chief August 19
that despite pressure from all sides the MDC would sign a
deal only if Tsvangirai became head of government. While
negotiations will continue, facilitated by South African
president Thabo Mbeki under the aegis of the SADC Troika,
Mangoma said the MDC would hold firm and would be prepared to
wait out ZANU-PF until an agreement reflective of the March
29 elections was achieved. With ZANU-PF unwilling to cede
power, he saw no prospect for an early resolution to the
Zimbabwean crisis. END SUMMARY.
——————
The MDC Holds Firm
——————
¶2. (C) Mangoma said at the SADC Summit (Ref) there had been
intense pressure from all sides to reach an agreement. Apart
from ZANU-PF, the MDC Mutambara (MDC-M) negotiators,
particularly Welshman Ncube, had been agressive–even more so
than ZANU-PF–during the tripartite negotiations in
pressuring Tsvangirai to sign an agreement. Ncube had argued
that without a deal the MDC would have nothing. Mangoma
opined to us that the MDC would be finished in a government
controlled by ZANU-PF and that in urging Tsvangirai to sign
an agreement, Ncube and MDC-M were angling for positions in a
new government controlled by ZANU-PF.
¶3. (C) SADC and Mbeki had pleaded with MDC Tsvangirai
(MDC-T) at the SADC Summit last week to sign an agreement
which left Mugabe with executive power and control of the
security forces, according to Mangoma. They had tried to
convince the MDC that whatever reservations it had about a
power-sharing agreement could be worked out in the new
government. Mangoma believed that SADC and Mbeki were not
concerned about the nature of an agreement, but just wanted
one signed. Pressure was being placed primarily on the MDC
because Tsvangirai was considered more malleable than Mugabe.
¶4. (C) Despite the pressure, Mangoma insisted–as has
Tsvangirai–that the MDC would not sign a bad agreement. It
was prepared to be patient and wait, as the shrinking economy
denied more and more ZANU-PF officials access to government
largesse, until ZANU-PF was willing to concede the role of
head of government to Tsvangirai.
¶5. (C) While Mangoma saw no early end to the impasse, he
said the MDC would continue to talk when summoned by the
mediator, Mbeki. It would also continue its outreach within
the SADC region to attempt to create more pressure on Mugabe.
————–
Mbeki and SADC
————–
¶6. (C) Mangoma said Mbeki would continue in his role as
mediator, supported by the SADC Troika (the SADC Organ on
Politics, Defence, and Security Co-operation), now comprised
of Mozambique (replacing Tanzania), Angola, and Swaziland as
chair. He expressed some suspicion of the Troika–King
Mswati of Swaziland “didn’t know what an election was,” and
Angola was a one-party state with some difficulty relating to
a two-party democracy. Nevertheless, he thought Angola had a
HARARE 00000703 002 OF 002
growing and sophisticated understanding of Zimbabwe and
Mozambique had a history of dealing with opposition politics.
¶7. (C) Mangoma added that he believed SADC was sensitive to
the concerns of the international community and urged us to
continue to work behind the scenes to encourage SADC
countries to support a fair agreement. He noted that
Tanzania, Zambia, and Botswana had shown strong support for
the MDC’s position and, based on discussions at the SADC
Summit, thought Malawi might be supportive as well.
¶8. (C) Mangoma said Tsvangirai planned to travel to Botswana
and Zambia within the next couple of days and might also
visit King Mswati in Swaziland. He would then return to
Harare before traveling to other SADC countries to enlist
support.
———————-
Parliament and the MDC
———————-
¶9. (C) There have been news that Mugabe would soon convene
Parliament, perhaps on September 1. Mangoma was uncertain if
this was true, but said the MDC would oppose it as a
violation of the Memorandum of Understanding that serves as a
basis for the negotiations. Nevertheless, if Parliament was
convened, Mangoma was confident that with a couple of
exceptions, all MDC-T parliamentarians would be present.
According to Mangoma, with the expected support of six to
eight of the MDC-M MPs, MDC-T would have a parliamentary
majority and would be able to elect the Speaker of the House
of Assembly.
——-
COMMENT
——-
¶10. (C) Tsvangirai and MDC-T face continuing and increasing
pressure from ZANU-PF, MDC-M, and SADC to sign a
power-sharing deal that would leave Mugabe with considerable
executive power. They continue to take a principled
position–in the face of spin by ZANU-PF that they are
defying SADC–and insist on an agreement that makes
Tsvangirai head of government. (The GOZ mouthpiece The
Herald carried two headlines today: “MDC-T leader lie to us
(SADC) about Zim situation,” and “‘SADC presses Tsvangirai to
sign deal”.) We should continue to make our position clear
to SADC capitals: international reengagement will be
considered only if a government is constituted, consistent
with the March 29 elections, that has Tsvangirai as its head.
MCGEE
(23 VIEWS)
