The pre-election environment for the 2005 parliamentary elections was improved considerably over the run-ups to the parliamentary elections of 2000 or the presidential election of 2002, according to a cable by the United States embassy that has been released by Wikileaks.
The opposition Movement for Democratic Change was even given airtime on the state controlled radio and television stations.
The cable said: “State broadcast and print media have significantly lowered the level of vitriol directed against the opposition in its news and editorial policy since the eclipse of Information Minister Jonathan Moyo over the past few months.”
MDC spokesperson Paul Themba-Nyathi said that the party had bought 91 minutes of radio time and 91 minutes of TV time.
Moyo was fired from the cabinet and from the ruling party after he decided to stand as an independent candidate in Tsholotsho. The Zimbabwe African national Union-Patriotic Front had reserved the seat for a woman to fix Moyo.
The embassy also issued what it termed a report card on how the government was implementing the Southern African Development Community guidelines on elections.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 05HARARE345, ZIMBABWE’S INTERIM REPORT CARD ON IMPLEMENTATION
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 HARARE 000345
SIPDIS
AF/S FOR BNEULING
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2010
SUBJECT: ZIMBABWE’S INTERIM REPORT CARD ON IMPLEMENTATION
OF SADC ELECTION GUIDELINES
REF: (A) HARARE 318 (B) 2004 HARARE 2003 (C) 2004
HARARE 1790
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell under Section 1.4 b/d
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: With just over four weeks to go before the
nation’s parliamentary elections, the GOZ continues to
implement measures to further its case that it is complying
with SADC election principles and guidelines. Many of the
measures have been superficial or incompletely implemented.
That said, most observers here agree that the pre-election
environment has improved considerably over the run-ups to the
parliamentary election of 2000 or the presidential election
of 2002. This cable provides a brief status report on
measures taken or being taken under each of the principal
SADC guidelines. END SUMMARY.
—–
Full Participation of Citizens in Political Process (Sections
2.1.1 and 7.4)
—–
¶2. (SBU) The new electoral law (refs B and C) has not led to
improvements in this area. It imposes greater restrictions
on the posting of campaign material and several MDC activists
reportedly have been arrested (and quickly released) in
connection with posting activities. The opposition also
reported at least three incidents in February in which ruling
party supporters assaulted MDC activists for posting or
distributing MDC campaign material; police have not taken
action in any of the instances. Local ZANU-PF elements in
some areas are reportedly disrupting MDC door-to-door
canvassing activities, as well. The Public Order and
Security Act (POSA) proscribes public criticism of the
President and at least four individuals reportedly have been
arrested during the past six months under this provision.
All were quickly released, in some cases after payment of a
nominal fine. The opposition reportedly is not permitted to
hold meetings or campaign in military or police installations
while the ruling party is afforded easy access to such
facilities.
¶3. (SBU) In spite of legal and police restrictions, in
practice there appears to be more room for political
participation than during previous national elections.
Opposition and civil society contacts have told us that the
conspicuous presence and activities of pro-ZANU-PF youth
militia that pervaded the countryside in 2000 and 2002 so far
are lacking. An NGO representative advised that even in
remote areas, “pungwes” (long political indoctrination
sessions, complete with beatings, which many local
communities were forced to attend – sometimes for days) that
were common in the run-up to past elections are completely
absent. Political persuasion efforts now revolved more
around promise of benefits than threats, although residual
fear of violence remained considerable in many areas.
Opposition supporters were wearing MDC t-shirts in areas
where they previously could not do so without risking assault
by ruling party supporters.
—–
Freedom of Association (Sections 2.1.2 and 7.4)
—–
¶4. (SBU) Most opposition contacts report that MDC members
nationwide generally enjoy more latitude to assemble than in
past elections. Police have been more liberal in their
application of POSA and have permitted campaign rallies and
activities in all ten provinces, in contrast to a much more
restrictive environment during the past two national
elections. Police still selectively apply POSA, which
requires notification of meetings to the police, strictly
against the MDC, whereas ZANU-PF in practice can conduct
meetings without regard to POSA requirements. MDC meetings
generally are monitored by police and closed down if they go
outside the terms of the POSA notification/approval. (Note:
By its terms, POSA only requires that authorities be given
prior notification of meetings, but in practice, the police
assert authority to ban, reschedule, or relocate meetings.
End note.) Some local opposition activists allege that
certain local areas remain “no-go” areas by virtue of
selective police use of POSA or intimidation by local ruling
party supporters.
—–
Political Tolerance (Section 2.1.3)
—–
¶5. (SBU) By most measures, levels of political tolerance
have improved markedly compared to 2000 and 2002. Cases of
politically motivated murder dropped from 48 in 2001 (the
last full year before a national election) to three in in
2004, while cases of torture dropped from 2245 in 2001 to 170
during the first 11 months of 2004 (latest statistics
available). The dramatic drops — more than 90 percent in
each category — follow nearly daily calls for tolerance and
non-violence by GOZ and ruling party leaders publicly and
privately over the past few months. The publicity campaign
represents a stark contrast to ruling party campaigns during
the past two national elections, in which many leaders
publicly called for forceful suppression of opposition
activities and, in some cases, were personally involved in
violence against MDC members.
¶6. (C) Anecdotal reports of violence during the past two
weeks are on the upswing compared to previous weeks, but the
month of February was still considerably less violent than
analogous periods preceding the last two national elections.
Opposition figures report that local ruling party structures,
recognizing their vulnerability without resort to violence,
are pushing leaders to permit them greater latitude in
resorting to violence. However, these same figures believe
it is too late for the regime to affect the election’s
outcome by turning to violence at this point. For now,
though, the leadership is sticking to public and private
pleas for tolerance, and NGO contacts tell us that prominent
leaders have warned local structures about political backlash
against ruling party violence. We have heard of numerous
instances in which the police have warned local leaders of
each party that the police will take action against
perpetrators of violence, regardless of political
affiliation.
—–
Equal Access to State Media (Sections 2.1.5 and 7.4)
—–
¶7. (C) The GOZ recently promulgated regulations providing
for access by all political parties to state media. MDC
spokesperson Paul Themba-Nyathi told the Embassy on March 1
that the party had bought 91 minutes of radio time and 91
minutes of TV time and was scheduled to air its first ad the
evening of March 1. In the meantime, state TV and radio
covered the MDC campaign launch, including the airing of
several minutes of a speech by MDC President Morgan
Tsvangirai, and has covered statements by various MDC
SIPDIS
candidates. This marked much better coverage than in past
election campaigns and MDC and civil society sources claim
that it had a major effect on the electorate, galvanizing MDC
supporters who had previously been apathetic. The coverage
was still considerably less than state coverage of the ruling
party, which received hours of live coverage of the ZANU-PF
campaign launch, including a long speech by President Mugabe.
State broadcast and print media have significantly lowered
the level of vitriol directed against the opposition in its
news and editorial policy since the eclipse of Information
Minister Jonathan Moyo over the past few months.
—–
Equal Opportunity to Vote and be Voted For (Sections 2.1.6
and 7.5)
—–
¶8. (SBU) The exclusion the millions of Zimbabweans in the
diaspora from voting remains a prominent complaint from the
opposition and civil society and a serious electoral flaw.
The constitution provides for universal suffrage for citizens
but commits details to an election law. The recently enacted
election law bars absentee voting by those outside the
country except for diplomats and members of the armed
services. A citizens’ group filed an urgent application to
the Supreme Court on February 24 to compel the GOZ to
implement mechanisms to permit diaspora voting and the court
has reserved judgment. The Supreme Court found legislative
bars to diaspora voting in the last election to be
unconstitutional in February 2002, but by executive decree
under the Presidential Powers Act, the GOZ effectively kept
the diaspora from voting.
¶9. (SBU) Recent delimitation of constituencies resulted in
the elimination of three MDC seats and creation of three new
seats in areas of ruling party dominance. Although
population shifts would not seem to support this result, it
remains unclear whether the delimitation exercise, which has
been criticized bitterly by the opposition, actually violates
constitutional provisions governing delimitation.
¶10. (SBU) Non-transparency and manipulation of voter rolls
has underlain the rigging of past elections and, according to
the opposition, the state of the rolls remains a major
concern. It charges that some voters have been arbitrarily
removed from the rolls, which at the same time include names
of the deceased or of citizens who are not resident. Embassy
FSNs who examined voter rolls in their precincts reported
nothing untoward: they were afforded access on request, found
their names, and said they were relatively impressed by the
state of organization and automation at the inspection venue.
However, the rolls are only available for manual inspection,
which undermines confidence in their integrity. Withholding
electronic copies is contrary to the recommendations of the
relevant parliamentary portfolio committee on the election
law, which recommended that the Registrar General make a
national electronic copy available to the opposition,
allowing for a more systematic examination and analysis.
—–
Election Institution Impartiality and Judicial Independence
(Sections 2.1.7 and 7.3)
—–
¶11. (C) The GOZ consulted extensively with the MDC over the
appointment of the new Zimbabwe Election Commission (ZEC).
The opposition publicly expressed reservations about the ZEC
Chairman but accepted all of the five Commission member,s
appointments. Privately, MDC members advise that a majority
of the Commission can be counted on to be impartial and
reliable. The Electoral Commission Law provides that a
commissioner can only be removed for cause. More problematic
than the Commission’s identity and tenure are potential
resource constraints and the Commission,s overlapping
authority with other election-related institutions. Still
lacking a functioning office and secretariat, the Commission
must coordinate with the constitutionally mandated but
largely toothless Election Supervisory Commission, and the
constitutionally mandated and historically GOZ-aligned
Registrar General. The ESC and Registrar General are staffed
largely by civil servants and retired security force
personnel whose impartiality in many cases is doubtful. The
ruling party had wanted to consolidate these overlapping
authorities before the election but, lacking the
constitutional authority to do so, created a nominally more
independent ZEC in part to address its SADC electoral
obligations. Whether the confusing array of institutions
represents an improvement over prior elections remains to be
seen.
¶12. Supreme Court Chief Justice Godfrey Chidyausiku in
February named three High Court justices to serve as an ad
hoc electoral court, a measure publicly welcomed by the
opposition. The new court is designed to deal with
election-related complaints expeditiously, within six months
at the most. Most election-related complaints associated
with the election five years ago were decided in favor of the
opposition but remain under appeal or, in some cases of final
orders, were never enforced. The new panel remains untested
so far, and it remains to be seen whether it will be capable
of administering justice more speedily or effectively.
Zimbabwean courts continue to be somewhat politicized or
disinclined to reach politically sensitive decisions,
although pockets of competence and integrity remain. For its
part, the GOZ has shown that it is prepared simply to ignore
unfavorable decisions.
—–
Voter Education (Section 2.1.8)
—–
¶13. (C) The new electoral law requires that voter education
conducted by civil society be approved by the ZEC and
conducted without foreign funds (political parties are not
constrained in their voter education efforts). We are
unaware of instances in which this provision has been
enforced, however, and civil society groups continue to
conduct voter education activities gingerly, even as ruling
party supporters have impeded some opposition party
activities involving voter education. However, NGOs involved
in voter education appear to have reduced their profiles in
recent months, probably in response to the electoral law
strictures and out of fear that the GOZ may target them under
the provisions of the as yet unsigned NGO bill. The
USAID-funded Zimbabwe Election Support Network, for example,
has put out radio, print, and billboard ads on voter
education, but has discontinued its voter education workshops
pending explicit approval from the ZEC.
—–
Prevention of Rigging/Fraud (Section 7.5)
—–
¶14. (SBU) The new electoral act incorporated several of the
measures recommended by the opposition to reduce fraud, e.g.,
use of translucent voting boxes, one-day voting,
vote-counting at the polling station. Opposition members,
however, now complain that the ruling party is manipulating
the new measures. They allege, for instance, that local
ruling party elements have tried to convince some voters that
the translucent boxes will permit government officials to
know how people voted, or that local vote-counting will
permit them to know how the individual community voted, with
attendant adverse consequences for the community. Opposition
sources have also complained that one-day may not be enough
time for all Zimbabweans to vote, especially those in urban
MDC strongholds where the number of polling places may be
deliberately insufficient.
—–
Security for Participants (Section 7.7)
—–
¶15. (C) Morgan Tsvangirai told the Ambassador last month that
the MDC had used the Police Commissioner’s national pledge to
crack down on all political violence to considerable effect
in engaging local police. The arrest of some ZANU-PF
supporters on assault-related charges and wide police
consultation with the MDC certainly mark departures from
earlier practice, but police continue to be reticent in many
cases to take action against ZANU-PF-initiated violence,
reduced as it may be.
—–
Other
—–
¶16. (SBU) It is premature to judge the GOZ’s efforts in
meeting several other SADC electoral guidelines, such as the
adequacy of logistics (Section 7.6) and transparency of the
voting process/access for party and candidate representatives
(Section 7.8). GOZ invitations for a SADC observation
mission only went out in February, in clear violation of the
90-day advance notice required under Section 7.10. The GOZ
reportedly blocked an earlier visit by a SADC technical team
of lawyers assigned to examine the legal infrastructure to
support the election.
—–
Comment
—–
¶17. (C) Dramatic reductions in violence and opposition
access to national broadcast media are significant
improvements over past elections. We believe that
international scrutiny, coupled with Mugabe’s desire to claim
renewed legitimacy based on the elections, have contributed
to the improved climate. A key issue is whether Mugabe
miscalculated and, by offering the opposition a space, has
enabled the MDC to capitalize on the more relaxed conditions
to an extent unimaginable just months ago. On the other
side, the ruling party continues to use its considerable
systemic advantages to bolster its own election prospects and
is building from a position of strength resulting from years
of intimidation and intense polarization. At this juncture,
while it is clear that the GOZ’s legal framework has created
an “un-level playing field” from the outset, the real test
will be political — a statement that would hardly have
seemed possible even three months ago.
SCHULTZ
(87 VIEWS)
