Movement for Democratic Change leader and Prime Minister-designate Morgan Tsvangirai told French officials that he would only participate in a government of national unity if President Robert Mugabe agreed to real power-sharing and the political agreement was accompanied by legal and constitutional changes that would give the force of law to such an arrangement.
He also said Mugabe’s ability to appoint government officials had to be regularised and put into a legal structure.
Asked whether Tsvangirai was optimistic that his conditions would be met, France’s Foreign Affairs desk officer for Zimbabwe Isabelle de Boisgelen said that Tsvangirai said he was “serene” because the MDC’s strength in the legislature ensured a certain level of power.
Boisgelen told United States embassy officials that she found this somewhat naive and perhaps even delusional because the MDC’s strength was razor thin, depended on continued cooperation with coalition partners, and could easily be overturned if Mugabe did something radical, such as dissolving the legislature.
She found Tsvangirai’s attitude difficult to understand, but he seemed to place value on what he considered the MDC’s strength in the legislature.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 08PARIS2149, FRANCE/ZIMBABWE: MORGAN TSVANGIRAI’S VISIT TO
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
|
Reference ID |
Created |
Released |
Classification |
Origin |
VZCZCXRO8119
RR RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHFR #2149/01 3291453
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 241453Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4913
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEHFRS/AMCONSUL STRASBOURG 0624
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 002149
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2018
SUBJECT: FRANCE/ZIMBABWE: MORGAN TSVANGIRAI’S VISIT TO
FRANCE
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Kathleen Allegrone, 1.4 (b/
d).
¶1. (C) MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai of Zimbabwe visited
France November 17-19, beginning in Strasbourg at
the EU meeting on development. He met with FM Kouchner in
Strasbourg and traveled in Kouchner’s plane to Paris. In
Paris on November 18, he met with Claude Gueant
(Secretary-General at the Presidency), committees at the
National Assembly and Senate, and MFA officials over lunch,
and then held a press conference with Kouchner. Tsvangirai
stressed: (1) the very dire humanitarian crisis in
Zimbabwe; (2) his appreciation for French humanitarian
assistance; and (3) his willingness to participate in a
national unity government, but only if real power sharing
were available and legally enforceable structures were in
place to ensure such power sharing. He did not believe that
what Mugabe had proposed was sufficient to permit his
participation. Tsvangirai was ambivalent about the need for
further sanctions but asked that countries like France stick
to sending strong messages about big principles, refrain from
trying to micromanage the situation in Zimbabwe, and apply
political pressure on Mugabe “discreetly” so as not to
provoke a backlash. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) Isabelle de Boisgelen, MFA desk officer for
Zimbabwe, on November 21 provided a readout on Zimbabwean
leader Morgan Tsvangirai’s visit earlier in the week to
Strasbourg and Paris. Boisgelen said that confirmation of
Tsvangirai’s visit to Strasbourg, to attend a November 17 EU
event on development, came quite late and news of his coming
to Paris even later, leaving little time to organize an
elaborate set of meetings. Tsvangirai met with FM Kouchner
in Strasbourg, as well as a number of other world leaders,
including many Africans. This provided an opportunity for
him to speak directly to interested leaders and to network.
He spent time with Kouchner in Strasbourg. Because of an Air
France strike, Kouchner offered Tsvangirai a ride to Paris on
the FM’s plane, which allowed the two to spend more time
together.
¶3. (C) Tsvangirai was accompanied at all times by an
assistant who came to France with him from Africa, and
Zimbabwe’s Ambassador to France (whom Boisgelen described as
a professional with a good perspective despite the difficult
demands of his job). Tsvangirai met on November 18 with
Claude Gueant, the Secretary-General at the French
Presidency, and then, separately, with foreign affairs
committees at the National Assembly and Senate. MFA
A/S-equivalent Jean de Gliniasty, along with DAS-equivalent
Barateau, and desk officer Boisgelen, lunched with Tsvangirai
at the MFA. Tsvangirai and Kouchner held a joint press
conference the afternoon of November 18, with Tsvangirai
leaving France the next day.
Tsvangirai’s Key Messages
————————-
¶4. (C) Boisgelen said that Tsvangirai emphasized several
points repeatedly in his talks. First, he stressed the
increasingly dire humanitarian situation in Zimbabwe, with
serious breakdowns in the public health and hygiene sectors.
He expressed appreciation for the assistance France and other
non-Africans had provided. (Boisgelen said that European
humanitarian contributions, both from the EU as an
institution and from members states, totaled 70 million euro
in 2005, 86 million euro in 2006, and 91 million euro in
2007, with, as she noted, “significant increases every year.”)
¶5. (C) Politically, Tsvangirai said that he would
participate in a national unity government if two conditions
were met: Mugabe had to agree to a “real” powersharing
arrangement and any political agreement had to be accompanied
by legal and constitutional changes that would give the force
of law to any such arrangement. These two conditions had not
yet been met, so Tsvangirai was not willing to participate in
the government. Boisgelen reported that Tsvangirai also
expressed concern that Mugabe’s ability to appoint government
officials had to be regularized and put into a legal
structure.
¶6. (C) Asked whether Tsvangirai was optimistic that his
conditions would be met, Boisgelen said that he said he was
“serene” because the MDC’s strength in the legislature
ensured a certain level of power. Boisgelen confided that
she found this somewhat naive and perhaps even delusional —
she observed that the MDC’s strength was razor thin, depended
on continued cooperation with coalition partners, and could
easily be overturned if Mugabe did something radical, such as
dissolving the legislature. She found Tsvangirai’s attitude
difficult to understand, but he seemed to place value on what
he considered the MDC’s strength in the legislature.
PARIS 00002149 002 OF 002
¶7. (C) Tsvangirai, while heaping praise on France and the
EU for their support, advised that outsiders stick to broad
principles in discussing Zimbabwe and refrain from trying to
micromanage the situation there. He suggested, moreover,
that outsiders apply pressure in Harare “discreetly,” which
Boisgelen said the French understood to mean that they should
avoid irritating Mugabe by speaking too harshly, which could
only provoke a backlash. Tsvangirai also reminded the French
that if he managed to bring about democratic change in
Zimbabwe, that would not mean that its problems were solved
and that the Europeans could go home feeling satisfied. He
said that outside assistance would be even more necessary as
Zimbabwe struggled to regain its footing and move forward.
¶8. (C) Boisgelen said that Tsvangirai, notably, was quite
ambivalent about the utility of increased sanctions. He
said, according to Boisgelen, that “the current situation in
Zimbabwe had nothing to do with sanctions,” i.e., that
Mugabe’s repression would likely have taken place in any
circumstances.
French Support
————–
¶9. (C) Boisgelen said that the French were supportive of
Tsvangirai’s efforts, the main thrust of the French message
being that the will of the Zimbabwean people, as expressed in
the first round of voting, had to be respected. They lauded
Tsvangirai’s courage and the many years of struggle and
sacrifice he had spent in trying to bring about democratic
change to Zimbabwe. They shared his concern about the
humanitarian situation and indicated France would remain
engaged, stressing the importance of being able to have
access to those in need of humanitarian assistance. The
French also encouraged Tsvangirai to increase his base of
support among Africans, especially Zimbabwe’s neighbors,
since it was clear that Africans as a whole wanted to be
involved in helping Zimbabwe resolve its crisis.
¶10. (C) Boisgelen offered several personal observations.
She said the meetings had gone well and were positives for
both sides. It was good for Tsvangirai to meet directly with
his French supporters and to get to know them. There was
high demand on the French side to meet with him, and this was
accomplished by the sessions at the National Assembly and
Senate, where a broad swathe of elected officials were able
to confer with him. On the down side, Boisgelen said that
the MFA officials with whom he lunched were surprised that he
did not make more of the occasion (“we were in the palm of
his hand, and he should have sensed this”) by making a more
forceful and engaging presentation. On the other hand,
Boisgelen said that he may have been worn out by his travels
and the earlier meetings and saw lunch as a more low-key
affair. She noted that he made a strong comeback at the
press conference with Kouchner, where “he came alive once he
was facing an audience and had a microphone before him.”
STAPLETON
(26 VIEWS)
