Movement for Democratic Change secretary general Tendai Biti was sceptical about the Global Political Agreement that his party signed with the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front on 15 September 2008 because anything Mugabe touched was poisoned.
Biti was briefing the United States ambassador to Zimbabwe, James McGhee, on his views on the agreement, two days after its signing.
He said MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai had been tricked into signing an agreement that gave more power to the smaller faction of the MDC led by Arthur Mutambara and surrendered powers of the Council of Ministers which the negotiators had drafted.
Biti said that MDC negotiators let ZANU get its way on symbolic issues like sanctions and external interference, but made sure they held their ground on important issues of substance, like the process for the drafting of a new constitution.
On land, Biti argued that yielding to ZANU-preferred language on the characterisation of Zimbabwean history was of little importance compared to the significant measures the parties agreed to going forward: that land would be distributed to all Zimbabweans regardless of race, that a land audit would be conducted, and that land holders would enjoy security of tenure.
He said that provisions requiring the President to act “in consultation with the Prime Minister” meant that the Prime Minister effectively had a veto, since consultation, in the Westminster system, required consent.
Biti expressed bitterness about the South African mediation and the role of Mutambara faction secretary general Welshman Ncube. He said that MDC-T lost substantial ground at the last negotiating session on 11 September.
On September 10, according to Biti, the text gave real power to the Council of Ministers, granting it a substantive role in government. Mutambara and Tsvangirai initialled a draft, but President Robert Mugabe deferred a decision.
Early 11 September, ZANU-PF backtracked, insisting on a minor role for the COM. Mbeki convened the principals to work out the issue. Biti said Morgan Tsvangirai “gave in” and agreed to a COM with no real powers.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 08HARARE840, BITI PESSIMISTIC, BUT NOT WITHOUT HOPE
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Reference ID |
Created |
Released |
Classification |
Origin |
VZCZCXRO4811
OO RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHSB #0840/01 2611335
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 171335Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3447
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 2299
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 2418
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0933
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1695
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 2051
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 2472
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 4904
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1567
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000840
SIPDIS
AF/S FOR G. GARLAND
DRL FOR N. WILETT
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E. LOKEN AND L. DOBBINS
STATE PASS TO NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B. PITTMAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2018
SUBJECT: BITI PESSIMISTIC, BUT NOT WITHOUT HOPE
REF: A. HARARE 747
¶B. HARARE 828
¶C. HARARE 837
Classified By: Ambassador James D. McGee for reason 1.4 (d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: During a September 17 meeting with
Ambassador, MDC Secretary General Tendai Biti said that the
Zimbabwean power sharing agreement is a reasonably good
document on paper, but will only succeed in creating a better
future if ZANU-PF exhibits good will. He is pessimistic on
this front, pointing to ZANU intransigence on the
distribution of cabinet positions. Biti said that the South
African facilitation essentially tricked Tsvangirai into
making concessions that provide the Mutambara faction
enhanced representation. Biti has not decided whether to
participate in the new government or look after his family’s
interests by pursuing a career outside Zimbabwe. If Biti
leaves, he will leave a hole that MDC-T will find difficult
to fill. END SUMMARY.
———————————
IT MIGHT LOOK OK ON PAPER, BUT…
———————————
¶2. (C) MDC Secretary General Tendai Biti called on the
Ambassador on September 17. Biti, who was one on the key
negotiators of Zimbabwe’s power-sharing agreement (Ref A),
characterized the document as not bad on paper, but suspect
in practice. He compared it favorably with the agreement
outlining the division of powers in Kenya, with the 1979
agreement that led to Zimbabwe’s independence, and with the
1992 agreement between Mandela and De Klerk that ended the
South African apartheid regime’s monopoly on power. Biti
said that MDC negotiators let ZANU get its way on symbolic
issues like sanctions and external interference, but made
sure they held their ground on important issues of substance,
like the process for the drafting of a new constitution. On
land, for example, Biti argued that yielding to
ZANU-preferred language on the characterization of Zimbabwean
history was of little importance compared to the significant
measures the parties agreed to going forward: that land will
be distributed to all Zimbabweans regardless of race, that a
land audit will be conducted, and that land holders will
enjoy security of tenure, meaning they will receive some form
of transferable title. He said that provisions requiring the
President to act “in consultation with the Prime Minister”
mean that the Prime Minister effectively holds a veto, since
consultation, in the Westminster system, requires consent.
¶3. (C) However, Biti was skeptical about the sincerity of
President Mugabe (“anything Mugabe touches is poisoned”) and
ZANU-PF–which will be essential for successful
implementation. He said current difficulties over the
distribution of Ministerial portfolios suggest that ZANU-PF
is not really ready to share power; ZANU wants all the
strategic ministries except Home Affairs, including the
Ministries of Finance and Foreign Affairs, which MDC-T
expected to hold. In contrast to what he described as the
euphoric, celebratory mood of his MDC colleagues, Biti said
he considered the chances of success to be less than 50
percent. Biti questioned MDC fitness to govern as well as
ZANU-PF commitment to sharing power.
——————————————-
TSVANGIRAI TRICKED IN END STAGE NEGOTIATION
——————————————-
¶4. (C) Biti expressed bitterness about the South African
mediation and the role of Mutambara faction Secretary General
Welshman Ncube. Although Biti was not fundamentally
HARARE 00000840 002 OF 003
dissatisfied with the text of the agreement, he said that
MDC-T lost substantial ground at the last negotiating session
on September 11. On September 10, according to Biti, the
text gave real power to the Council of Ministers (COM),
granting it a substantive (though somewhat duplicative) role
in government. Mutambara and Tsvangirai initialed a draft,
but Mugabe deferred a decision. Early September 11, ZANU-PF
backtracked, insisting on a minor role for the COM. Mbeki
convened the principals to work out the issue. Biti said
Morgan Tsvangirai “gave in” and agreed to a COM with no real
powers.
¶5. (C) Biti was disappointed by Tsvangirai’s capitulation,
but angry about what happened next. He said that he would
have expected that, at that point, the negotiators would have
assembled to put together a final text embodying the
principals’ agreement on the distribution of executive
powers. Instead, however, the South Africans kept the
principals together while they assembled a text. The text
was then signed by all three principals on the evening of
September 11, presenting their parties with a fait accompli.
The problem was that the text altered other agreed
provisions, in each case favoring the Mutambara faction and
disadvantaging the MDC-T. Biti attributed this to conniving
between Ncube and Mbeki advisor Gumbi.
¶6. (C) Although it was not the only measure, the most blatant
example Biti described involved Article 20.1.7, which allows
Mugabe to appoint eight senators, MDC-T to appoint three, and
MDC-M to appoint three. According to Biti, the agreement
between the negotiators on September 11 was to allow ZANU-PF
to maintain the five senatorial appointments it had already
made, but to balance these by giving MDC-T four appointed
senators and MDC-M two. Biti understood that Principals had
not negotiated to change this provision–Tsvangirai signed on
September 11 in the mistaken belief that, except for the role
of the COM, the text he was signing was the document his team
had negotiated.
——————
A PERSONAL DILEMMA
——————
¶7. (C) Asked what role he expected to play in a new
government, Biti said that he was torn. His lack of
confidence in the agreement (and his wife’s strong appeals)
led him to consider remaining out of the new government
altogether. He thought this would leave him untainted for
future efforts to effect change, but he knew that his
decision to withdraw would be used to weaken whatever chance
existed for successful implementation. He also considered
that he would need to leave Zimbabwe, and perhaps Africa, if
he chose to sit out the “inclusive government.”
¶8. (C) On the other hand, Biti said he believed that, even if
the new government was not entirely successful, it offered
opportunities to advance the democratic agenda in Zimbabwe.
He described the provisions for the drafting of a new
constitution as the best part of the agreement, and said he
thought he might be able to deliver tangible progress if he
served as the Minister of Justice. Biti also thought he had
a good grasp on what would be required to turn around the
economy, and suggested he would also consider an appointment
as Minister of Finance. Ambassador told Biti we hoped he
would stay and work from within government to try to bring a
better future to Zimbabwe.
——————–
WHAT CAN THE USG DO?
——————–
¶9. (C) Ambassador asked Biti what the USG could do to improve
HARARE 00000840 003 OF 003
the chances that the agreement will usher in real change in
Zimbabwe. Biti agreed with Tsvangirai that quick deployment
of humanitarian assistance will be critical both to address
severe food insecurity and to build credibility for
Tsvangirai. He was skeptical about widespread distribution of
inputs, noting that without correcting market distortions,
input distribution alone will not reverse declining food
production. He urged USG capacity building for new MDC MPs
as well as for the Speaker and his team.
——-
COMMENT
——-
¶10. (C) Biti’s pessimistic assessment of the good faith of
Mugabe and ZANU-PF corresponds with our own. His relatively
positive assessment of the substance of the agreement is
encouraging, though hardly surprising given that he was one
of its authors. We hope he will sacrifice personal
considerations and agree to serve in the new government. If
he loses Biti, Tsvangirai faces off against Mugabe with an
even weaker team on his bench.
MCGEE
(33 VIEWS)
