The United States was holding higher standards for Zimbabwe than most other countries because it once held itself to higher standards and had been a model for the region.
This was said by former United States ambassador to Zimbabwe Christopher Dell in response to criticism from Justice Minister Patrick Chinamasa.
Chinamasa complained to Dell that the United States had double standards and castigated Zimbabwe for numerous transgressions it accepted in others while giving Zimbabwe insufficient credit for its successes.
He said Zimbabwe’s parliament was among the most robust in Africa with genuine debate, collaboration and compromise between the parties.
“I can pick up the phone and talk to Coltart or Welshman Ncube any time,” Chinamasa told Dell.
Dell said that Zimbabwe was being held to a high standard in part because it once held itself to a higher standard and had been a model for the region.
The international community and Zimbabweans still expected more of it and were disappointed with government policies which were responsible for the nation’s sharp decline.
“The government should not expect to redress historical injustices with additional injustices today,” Dell said.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 04HARARE2015, JUSTICE MINISTER ON ELECTIONS, BILATERAL RELATIONS
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
141032Z Dec 04
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 002015
SIPDIS
AF/S FOR B. NEULING
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE, D. TEITELBAUM
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2009
SUBJECT: JUSTICE MINISTER ON ELECTIONS, BILATERAL RELATIONS
REF: (A) HARARE 2003 (B) HARARE 2001 (C) HARARE 1913
(D) HARARE 1505 (E) 2003 HARARE 2310
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell under Section 1.5 b/d
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Minister of Justice, Legal, and
Parliamentary Affairs Patrick Chinamasa on December 10
updated the Ambassador on issues associated with the
scheduled March parliamentary elections. During the
sometimes testy exchange, the Minister did not address the
election environment’s most serious flaws, including
political violence and media access. He suggested that the
USG would not be invited to observe elections but that
“unbiased” Americans not affiliated with the USG could be
welcome. The Ambassador emphasized that Zimbabwe still did
not appear to have established conditions to permit free and
fair elections and reiterated that USG evaluation of the
election would hinge on process issues. END SUMMARY.
Parliamentary Elections
—————————–
¶2. (C) Chinamasa confirmed that parliamentary elections
would be held in March on a date still to be determined. He
expected considerable haggling in the Parliament over
nominations for the recently authorized election commission
(ref A) but asserted that the Commission would be sitting by
early January. An election directorate would mobilize
resources from various ministries to conduct the election,
while the Election Commission’s work would be in tandem with
other agencies responsible for facets of the election: the
Registrar-General, the Delimitation Commission, and the
Election Supervisory Commission.
¶3. (C) Chinamasa was frank about the likely limitations of
ad hoc election courts under pending legislation. (Note: The
Election Bill, a companion to the recently passed Election
Commission Bill, is likely to pass before the end of the
month. End note.) The election courts, which would be
composed of seconded High Court or Supreme Court judges,
would be expected to dispose of disputes in no more than six
months. Chinamasa said he agreed with opposition critics who
doubted such speedy justice would be possible, especially
when contentious fact issues implicating depositions and
conflicting testimony were involved. Nonetheless, he said
that they would be an improvement over existing courts and
procedure.
Combating Election Violence
—————————
¶4. (C) Challenged by the Ambassador on GOZ sincerity about
elections, the Justice Minister asserted that a central
challenge to election administration in Zimbabwe was not the
process, which he maintained was the source of few
substantive complaints, but the Government’s ability to
address pre-election violence. Chinamasa conceded that the
police were inadequate to the task, so the GOZ would rely
increasingly on political parties to take responsibility. To
this end, the election would provide for multi-party liaison
committees to resolve disputes at the local and national
levels. He noted that a similar institution had been tried
in 2002 but was set up too late to achieve the intended
effect. The Ambassador expressed doubt about the parties’
ability to police themselves effectively in such a polarized
environment unless the process included sanctions on parties
and candidates, such as disqualification of those associated
with violence. The Minister remained adamant that there was
little Government authorities could do.
Election Observers: USG Unlikely, Eminent Persons Possible
——————————————— ————–
¶5. (C) Responding to the Ambassador’s inquiry about election
observation, Chinamasa reported that international observers
would be admitted to the country strictly by invitation from
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Invitations would go to
neutral governments but not to governments that had shown
themselves “biased” by imposition of “sanctions” (i.e.,
including the United States). Chinamasa emphasized that the
matter was within the purview of MFA, not his Ministry, but
suggested that SADC, the AU, and the UN would be invited, and
that the door was open for unbiased private persons from
countries, including the United States, whose governments
would not be invited.
ZANU-PF Politics
—————–
¶6. (C) Chinamasa was generally cagey in responding to the
Ambassador’s inquiries about the implications of the recently
concluded ZANU-PF Party Congress. He asserted that upcoming
primaries for the party would be more vibrant than ever, more
so even than the likely final elections. As the party’s
Secretary for Legal Affairs, he had been tasked with crafting
SIPDIS
rules for primaries, which he joked were becoming a “cottage
industry.” The most significant issues for primaries were
not so much factional as grassroots effectiveness, with
contenders nursing constituencies in an effort to unseat
incumbents. Casting the ZANU-PF incumbents in his area of
Manicaland as effective, he reported that he did not plan to
run for a seat and would not hazard a guess as to his likely
role in the Government next year. He predicted that the
Presidium (the President, two Vice-Presidents, and Party
Chairman) would soon work out a new Politburo.
Bilateral Relations
———————-
¶7. (C) The Justice Minister inquired about “the state of
bilateral relations,” to which the Ambassador replied,
“limited.” Noting the importance of the upcoming elections
to bilateral relations, the Ambassador said conditions for a
free and fair election had yet to be met. He stressed that
our judgment of the elections would be objective, based on
our own criteria, and would assess actual conditions on the
ground against those. Referring to suggestions by the
official media and the President (ref D) that the Ambassador
might be sent home if he were not sufficiently “objective”
(i.e., if he were critical of the GOZ and ZANU-PF), the
Ambassador underscored that the USG’s positions would not be
shaped by threats. The USG was scrutinizing the Zimbabean
situation carefully for concrete developments that might
justify improved relations but to date had seen mostly
expressions of intentions and little real change that might
warrant improvement.
¶8. (C) Chinamasa then launched into a familiar but
aggressive rehearsal of GOZ complaints of American double
standards and general historical injustices. He charged that
the USG castigated Zimbabwe for numerous transgressions it
accepted in others, while giving Zimbabwe insufficient credit
for its achievements. He asserted that Zimbabwe’s parliament
was among the most robust in Africa, with genuine debate,
collaboration and compromise between the parties. “I can
pick up the phone and talk to (MDC Shadow Minister of
Justice) Coltart or (MDC Secretary-General and head of the
Parliamentary Legal Committee) Welshman Ncube any time.”
(Comment: But not MDC MP Roy Bennet, who is serving a year’s
hard labor in prison for pushing Chinamasa down on the floor
of the Parliament. End comment.) Zimbabwe lacked a perfect
democracy but its youth — this next election would mark the
first time in the country’s history that there had been two
consecutive multi-party elections — should be factored into
any evaluation of its elections.
¶9. The Ambassador replied that Zimbabwe was being held to a
high standard in part because it once held itself to a higher
standard and had been a model for the region. The
international community and Zimbabweans still expected more
of it and were disappointed with GOZ policies, which were
responsible for the nation’s sharp decline. The GOZ should
not expect to redress historical injustices with additional
injustices today.
¶10. (C) Shifting to a warmer tone again, Chinamasa asserted
that with growing political stability, Zimbabwe would
progress toward a more rational and efficient system of
secure land tenure. Referring to a book by economist
Hernando de Soto given to him by the Embassy last year (ref
E), Chinamasa urged that the USG “not forget its yesterdays,”
i.e. the fact that it took a long time in establishing the
legal infrastructure to unleash its domestic capital
potential. Zimbabwe could learn from American examples, and
he curiously singled out New Jersey corporations law to
illustrate the importance of fostering a favorable investment
climate. In the meantime, however, Zimbabwe had done
relatively well in overcoming colonial legacies on land so
far, and was a model for other governments in the region,
such as South Africa and Namibia, which the GOZ was advising.
Comment
——-
¶11. (C) Chinamasa’s sometimes gregariously friendly tone and
his inquiry about bilateral relations bespeak growing GOZ
interest in better bilateral relations (ref C). As with
other senior GOZ officials, however, his frothy edge in
addressing purported historical injustices and Western double
standards testifies to deep-seated ruling party insecurities
over its misgovernance and brittle hold on power. Indeed,
little he said suggests that the GOZ is willing to redress
fundamental imbalances in the election environment or to
undertake any other measures before the elections to justify
improved relations.
¶12. (C) Chinamasa has been rumored in the popular press to
be on the way out over his apparent alignment with
Parliamentary Speaker Emmerson Mnangagwa and possible
collaboration on the “Tsholotsho Declaration” (ref B). Like
fellow hard-liner Jonathan Moyo, Chinamasa is a hard-working
cabinet minister without a strong grassroots constituency who
has gotten where he is by making himself valuable to the
President. Unlike Moyo, however, he may have continuing
value to Mugabe both as a sop to his Karanga patron,
Mnangagwa, and as one of the few adept legal minds near the
party’s apex. A political pragmatist and reasonably
effective bureaucratic operator, he lacks the number of
in-party enemies Moyo has made. Moreover, his unswervingly
hard-line political posture and latent inclination to more
liberal economic policies comport with the attitudes of some
elements within in the ruling party’s younger generation.
DELL
(16 VIEWS)
