As the story unfolded, Butterworth called me in Cambodia and spoke with me about the incident. Her article distanced the paper from the op-ed and said that withdrawing it was the right thing to do. I thought it was fair.
“With some hesitation I accept that this type of ghostwriting can be justified,” she wrote, “particularly when political instability means that it is otherwise difficult for political leaders to publish opinions in major newspapers under their own names.”
Other publications were not so evenhanded, particularly those in the explosive context of Zimbabwe. One said I was caught out “writing cobblers and passing them off as genuine Tsvangirai pieces”.
My name was claimed to be a pseudonym for an MI6 or CIA operative—and even became a byword for Western meddling in Zimbabwe’s affairs and a case study in how Tsvangirai was unfit to lead the country. “How many Roses will be giving them (the MDC-T) direction in times of national crisis?” queried one commentator.
I became concerned about just how far Zimbabwe’s black-ops arm would reach. I knew it was ubiquitous inside the country, but, Cambodia? It’s a long way, but I felt unsafe in a country that has its own issues with strong-arm rule and government goon squads.
In the end, it appears Mukonoweshuro was not privy to important negotiations between the MDC-T and ZANU-PF at exactly the time The Guardian article was published.
Shortly before the June op-ed, Tsvangirai had holed himself up in the Dutch embassy in Harare, seeking temporary refuge and claiming he and his supporters’ lives were in grave danger. Tsvangirai was more or less incommunicado during this time. It appears communication between him and Mukonoweshuro was not as functional as it had previously been, perhaps understandably. So, it may have slipped through.
But I have another theory. I believe at that time, Tsvangirai and Mugabe had just begun talking behind the scenes about the National Unity Government concept. Mugabe, no doubt feeling the heat from the international community (possibly due to my work with Tsvangirai and Mukonoweshuro) and also from within his own political compound, was shifting ground on his hardline, no-negotiation approach (although there were rumors that he had always been willing to talk). Tsvangirai, for his part, recognized an opening in the wall and busily worked to squeeze through and make it big enough for his vision of a democratic Zimbabwe.
The National Unity Government went into effect in September 2008. An attempt to head off opposition anger at the recent elections, the new government left Mugabe in position as a very hands-on president, but he conceded the prime minister position to Tsvangirai, and two deputy positions to other opposition leaders.
The agreement was met coolly among some in the international community who felt that Mugabe had pulled the wool over everyone’s eyes. I wrote another op-ed for Coltart that was published in The Washington Post on Christmas Eve 2008, supporting the new government. “Yes, the proposed transitional government has warts and blemishes, but this is not a beauty contest. It is time to move forward. This is the only viable, non-violent option.”
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