Brigadier General Herbert Chingono, Inspector General for the Zimbabwe National Army, and Major General Fidelis Satuku, Director General for Policy and Personnel, Zimbabwe Defence Forces, took a huge risk when they talked to United States ambassador Charles Ray and the United States embassy defence attaché on 5 and 6 January last year.
They had no kind words for the army chief General Constantine Chiwenga. They said he was a political general who worked hard but had very little practical military experience or expertise.
He was a political commissar before 1980 and had only attended one mid-level training course, which he did not complete.
“If given a choice between a military and a political issue, he routinely defaults to the political. His goal is to be in politics when his tenure ends as defence chief, and he will be very disappointed if he fails to achieve that goal.
“He has been given to making political statements. This has caused some ZANU-PF politicians to be suspicious of him, and he was chastised by Mugabe for being too political,” a cable released by Wikileaks says.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 10HARARE7, SURVIVING IN TODAY,S ZDF — VIEWS OF TWO SERVING
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Reference ID |
Created |
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Classification |
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VZCZCXYZ0002
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHSB #0007/01 0091042
ZNY CCCCC ZZH(CCY-ADXA421A4-MSI8944-468)
R 091042Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5281
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 3235
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 3346
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1769
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 2603
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 2973
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0034
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0036
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 2506
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L HARARE 000007
SIPDIS
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT)
AF/S FOR BRIAN WALCH
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR MICHELLE GAVIN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2020
SUBJECT: SURVIVING IN TODAY,S ZDF — VIEWS OF TWO SERVING
OFFICERS
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CHARLES A. RAY FOR REASONS 1.4 B,D
——-
SUMMARY
——-
¶1. (C) The most senior ranks of the Zimbabwean military are
so entwined with ZANU-PF as to be practically
indistinguishable from the party. This is particularly
frustrating for many officers who want to concentrate on
building a professional military that can serve as a national
army and play a role in regional stability.
¶2. (C/NF) The following views are from two general officers
currently serving, who spoke privately with Ambassador and
DATT on January 5 and 6; Brigadier General Herbert Chingono
(strictly protect), Inspector General for the Zimbabwe
National Army (ZNA), and Major General Fidelis Satuku (strictly
protect), Director General for Policy and Personnel, Zimbabwe
Defense Forces (ZDF). END SUMMARY.
———————-
FACTIONS AND SANCTIONS
———————-
¶3. (C) There are no “factions” within the military, as this
implies leadership around which factions can coalesce. There
are different attitudes and opinions: full support of
ZANU-PF, recognition that the military has been politicized
and improperly used, and the fence sitters who are waiting to
see who comes out on top. Except for those who are fully in
bed with ZANU-PF, people keep their views private to avoid
being accused of treason, which can have fatal consequences.
¶4. (C) The Commander of the Defense Forces, General
Constantine Chiwenga, is a political general who works hard,
but who has very little practical military experience or
expertise. A political commissar before 1980, he has only
attended one mid-level training course, which he did not
complete. If given a choice between a military and a
political issue, he routinely defaults to the political. His
goal is to be in politics when his tenure ends as defense
chief, and he will be very disappointed if he fails to
achieve that goal. He has been given to making political
statements. This has caused some ZANU-PF politicians to be
suspicious of him, and he was chastised by Mugabe for being
too “political.”
¶5. (C) Military officers at the one- and two-star level have
felt the impact of sanctions, and would like to see them
lifted, although they understand the reason they exist.
Those who are currently undecided could be convinced to move
into the reform camp if they saw any signs of flexibility in
the sanctions regime. Military personnel valued their former
relationship with the U.S. and would like to see it resumed.
Many acknowledge that the military’s role in the violence of
2008 and previously was a misuse of the military and hope
such never happens again. The key, they believe, is
continued economic stability and a better resource flow for
the military.
¶6. (C) Those military personnel who are older with more
experience tend to view difficulties in life more
realistically than the younger generation. Life teaches us
Qrealistically than the younger generation. Life teaches us
to expect a certain amount of difficulty and conflict. The
situation in Zimbabwe with the current coalition government
is no different. To think that there would be little or no
conflict in such a government is naive. That said, both
sides in the current lash-up must work out their differences;
they owe it to the people who elected them. In this regard,
the media is often unhelpful. Reports that emphasize extreme
points of view should be read with suspicion and skepticism.
Relations within government are hardly ever smooth, and
conversely, reports that predict the demise of one side or
another are often meant only to enflame, not inform. For
example, we have experienced a situation when two opposing
politicians go into a private meeting and interact civilly,
getting along relatively well. Then, at the end of the
meeting, as soon as a microphone is put in front of them, all hell
breaks loose.
————————
A VIEW FROM THE TRENCHES
————————
¶7. (C) Ambassador and DATT met privately on January 5 with
Brigadier General Herbert Chingono, Inspector General for the
ZNA, and on January 6 with Major General Fidelis Satuku,
Director General for Policy and Personnel, ZDF. These two
serving military officers took a grave personal risk meeting
with us, and their identities should be strictly protected.
In the current environment, they risk being charged with
treason for an unsanctioned meeting with U.S. officials, and
that could have fatal consequences. Chingono, an artillery
officer, was the last ZNA officer to train under the IMET
program, graduating from NDU in 1999, while Satuku received
training in England. Both participated in the fight for
independence as teenagers and received commissions for that
participation. Unlike some of the senior military who came
out of the struggle, however, they sought to develop
professional military credentials.
¶8. (C) Chingono said that the most senior ranks of the ZDF
are so entwined with the ZANU-PF party as to be practically
indistinguishable. This is particularly frustrating for
those officers who would like to focus on developing a
professional military force that can be an effective national
army, and can at the same time play a constructive role in
the southern African region. This situation has been
exacerbated since the ZDF came under the leadership of
General Constantine Chiwenga, a man with little practical
military experience (he was a political commissar before
1980), who has clear political ambitions. Chingono said that
once Chiwenga called a meeting of senior officers that
started at 10:00 in the morning and went on until 9:30 pm,
which discussed economics and politics, but not once did a
military issue come up. He said that near the end of the
meeting, as he consulted his notes, he turned to a colleague
next to him and asked, “Why have we not discussed how to
teach soldiers to shoot straight, how to better feed and
clothe them?” This was, he said, a purely rhetorical
question, as, given a choice between a military and a
political issue, Chiwenga will always chose the political
because he doesn’t know enough about the military to be
comfortable discussing it. Satuku, who works directly for
Chiwenga at the Defense Ministry, said that he is
hardworking, coming to his office at 7:30 am and staying
until 10:00 at night, but he spends his time on political
issues.
————————————–
A GENERAL WHO WANTS TO BE A POLITICIAN
————————————–
Q————————————–
¶9. (C) Both officers stressed Chiwenga’s political ambitions
repeatedly. Chingono said, “He will be very disappointed if
he does not get a political position when his tenure as
defense chief ends.” His politics, however, could very well
be his undoing. His frequent political statements have upset
and worried some ZANU-PF politicians, and about five months
ago Mugabe reportedly called him and chastised him for it.
(COMMENT: This comes as no big surprise. People who do not
hesitate to use the military to enforce and buttress their
hold on power have to be concerned that a member of that very
same military might one day use it against them. What is
surprising is that Mugabe himself took a hand in the matter.
This seems to counter rumors we’ve heard that he is under the
control of the military. END COMMENT.)
——————————————
NO MILITARY FACTIONS, JUST DIFFERENT VIEWS
——————————————
¶10. (C) In response to a question about factions within the
military, Chingono said that he would take issue with the
view because factions implies that there is leadership around
which they can coalesce. What there are, he said, are
different attitudes and opinions. There are those who fully
support ZANU-PF, have no compunction about engaging in
violence when the party orders it, and who are intensely
political. Others recognize that the military has been used
improperly, and in some instances, illegally, and would like
to get back to the business of developing a professional
military. They worry about morale, discipline, and training
of the troops. Still others are fence sitters — they could
be professional military or thugs — waiting to see who comes
out on top, and will cast their lot with the winning side
just to survive. With the exception of those who are loyal
ZANU-PF tools, no one dares publicly air their views. The
consequences of such rashness could be fatal. (COMMENT: The
Pomona Barracks weapons theft, when several soldiers,
including at least one officer who fought in the liberation
war, were tortured and several died, demonstrates how the
hardliners treat those on the “out.” END COMMENT.) Chingono
said that on the issue of sanctions, the key people on the
list probably don’t really care, as they have other avenues
of funding. Hurt by them, though, are other officers who are
not on the list. He spoke of one brigadier general who was
in Kenya for training who was unable to get his salary
remitted through the banking system because of sanctions.
While they would like to see them lifted, they are realistic
enough to know this won’t happen in the short term. The
fence sitters, however, could be swayed by some flexibility
in sanctions relating to state-owned enterprises, as this
would show that there is hope.
————————–
WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD?
————————–
¶11. (C) Regarding predictions on the future of Zimbabwe,
both officers expressed cautious optimism. Military
personnel who are older and more experienced take a pragmatic
view of difficulties compared to the younger generation.
Life, they said, teaches us to expect a certain amount of
difficulty and conflict, and the situation with the current
coalition government is no different. Anyone who thinks
there would be little or no conflict in such an arrangement
is very naive. Having said that, it is essential that both
sides in the coalition government work out their differences
because they owe it to the people who elected them. The
people of Zimbabwe want to be able to live their lives in
peace; they want a house, a car, and education for their
children. Many, perhaps even most, in the military want to
be able to pursue their profession in an honorable manner.
Qbe able to pursue their profession in an honorable manner.
When the government, or the press, report that everything is
rosy, they said, it is time to be suspicious, because it
means they are concealing something. The events of 2008 when
the military was used to violate the human rights of those
who opposed ZANU-PF are, Chingono said, hopefully an anomaly
that will never happen again. When asked why officers who
want to be professional didn’t oppose such employment, he
said, “In a professional military, you can be court-martialed
for failing to carry out an order.” (COMMENT: This raises
questions of culpability for following an illegal order,
similar to the arguments advanced at the Nuremberg Tribunal
after WWII, but one can also see the motivation for this,
given the potentially fatal consequences here in Zimbabwe.
END COMMENT.)
¶12. (C) Chingono said that if the West insists on
prosecution of all personnel involved in the 2008 violence
and the killings in Matabeleland, this is likely to ensure
that those in power will do everything to retain that power.
The Ambassador pointed out that these are issues that the
people of Zimbabwe have to decide, but that there should at
least be some forum established to allow healing. Regarding
any military involvement in violent land seizures, however,
this is a politically-motivated criminal act, perpetrators
can be identified, and the legal system should take
appropriate action.
¶13. (C) Both Chingono and Satuku said they would like to see
re-engagement with the U.S. military because they and many of
their colleagues are impressed with the flexibility and
resilience of American military personnel. They also think
that the generation of military officers that will follow
them could benefit from exposure to American military
professionalism. When asked about ethnic conflict in the
military, the treatment of non-liberation officers, and
morale, their response was that: (a) when people face
hardships together, external differences tend to be
minimized; (b) there is at the junior- and mid-levels no
difference in treatment, and most units below battalion are
commanded by officers who entered the military after 1980;
and (c) while morale now is acceptable, if they’re unable to
keep the military productively occupied, there are likely to
be problems in the future. Satuku said that, if there were
no discipline problems with young soldiers (provided they
don’t interfere with mission accomplishment) he would be
worried, because it is not possible to have a grouping of
young men in such an environment and not have at least a few
problems. Professional officers, though, can deal with these
issues. The key to keeping the military in good order, both
officers said, is continued economic stability and growth
which will allow the military to have an adequate flow of
resources.
¶14. (C) COMMENT: These views are from only two people, and
can’t be extrapolated to represent a general consensus of the
military. But, they are instructive, and tend to validate
other information we hear about what goes on inside the ZDF.
END COMMENT.
RAY
(285 VIEWS)
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