Movement for Democratic Change Members of Parliament from Matabeleland- Moses Mzila-Ncube, Thokozani Khupe and Abednico Bhebhe- together with members of civil society told United States ambassador to Zimbabwe Christopher Dell just before the 2005 parliamentary elections that the MDC was going to win in Matabeleland but added that support for the party stemmed primarily from opposition to the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front more than the appeal of any MDC platform.
They said that there was deep resentment of ZANU-PF by the Ndebele over the massacres of the 1980s and the region’s economic and political marginalisation by the government ever since.
The Ndebele were so used to oppression that no amount of intimidation would make them vote ZANU-PF.
The MPs, however, conceded that discredited hard-line Information Minister Jonathan Moyo had achieved inroads among the Ndebele by delivering tangible goods — computers, blankets, clinics — to populations that heretofore had gotten nothing from the ruling party but intimidation.
ZANU-PF had, therefore, shot itself in the foot by punishing his success and reasserting the dominance of ZANU-PF’s Ndebele heavyweights such as John Nkomo and Dumiso Dabengwa, who were loathed as sell-outs by most Ndebele.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 05HARARE229, MATABELELAND RESTIVE AS CAMPAIGNS COMMENCE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HARARE 000229
SIPDIS
AF/S FOR BNEULING
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2010
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ZI MDC ZANU PF
SUBJECT: MATABELELAND RESTIVE AS CAMPAIGNS COMMENCE
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell under Section 1.4 b/d
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: During the Ambassador’s visit to Bulawayo
February 7-8, MDC and civil society figures reviewed the
election environment in surrounding Matabeleland, a
historically marginalized region that is the principal home
to Zimbabwe’s leading minority Ndebele tribe (about 15
percent of the population). In contrast to other areas of
the country, police in the region were reported to be
stepping up efforts to restrict public assembly. However,
opposition and civil society interlocutors said they were
proceeding with public meetings with or without official
approval. Consistent with national trends, ruling party
militia and war veteran elements were maintaining low
profiles and anti-MDC violence was markedly reduced compared
to prior pre-election periods. Most predicted that, unless
the GOZ engineered a violent anti-opposition crackdown,
ZANU-PF would not win more than six or seven seats out of 21
in Bulawayo, Matabeleland North and Matabeleland South. Some
complimented the Secretary’s designation of Zimbabwe as an
outpost of tyranny and asked what its implications were for
U.S. policy. END SUMMARY.
Violence Down; Fear Remains
————————
¶2. (C) The Ambassador met on February 7 with a group of MDC
MPs from Matabeleland: Moses Mzila-Ncube, Thokozani Khupe,
and Abednico Bhebhe. On February 8 he met with a civil
society group: Peter Khumalo, a prince of the Ndebele royal
family and businessman; Nigel Johnson, Catholic priest and
Station Manager of Radio Dialogue; and George Mkhwananzi,
member of the National Constitutional Assembly — all three
officers of the USAID-funded Bulawayo Agenda. The MPs
offered an optimistic appraisal of the party,s election
prospects in Matabeleland on the heels of the party,s
official re-entry into the race the previous week. The MPs
and civil society prepresentatives agreed that
anti-opposition militia and war veteran activity in rural
districts were markedly less than earlier campaigns and
continued not to be a problem in urban areas. The MPs
reported that some war veterans and village headmen were
being discreetly supportive of the MDC despite relentless GOZ
efforts to co-opt them with perks and pledges of assistance.
¶3. (C) Mzila-Ncube described the atmosphere in his rural
South Matabeleland constituency as notably more restive over
the weekend, however, with people fearing a possible
escalation of violence consistent with past contested
elections. Local ruling party structures were conflicted:
their leaders consistently called for non-violence and
tolerance, but they feared certain election defeat if they
were not allowed to resort to intimidation as in the past.
All agreed that there remained an atmosphere of fear,
particularly in the rural areas, as most of the electorate
remained skeptical of the ruling party’s public commitment to
non-violence. Indeed, they all forecast a sudden “snap” of
violence in rural areas if ZANU-PF leaders began to think it
was in real danger of losing. However, all were confident
that Bulawayo was too public a venue and too solidly
pro-opposition to experience any significant violence.
Public Assembly Occurring Despite Constraints
——————————————–
¶4. (C) The three MPs asserted that police and the CIO in
Matabeleland were playing an increasingly disruptive role in
their efforts to reach the people. Khupe was scheduled to
appear in court February 10 to answer charges associated with
her arrest last month with 80 supporters for an alleged
violation of the Public Order and Security Act (POSA). Bhebhe
was late for the lunch because he had to meet with police in
connection with their “investigation” of his attendance at a
“Burial Society” meeting, also a possible POSA violation.
Still, all agreed that some junior police supported the MDC
and many more were sympathizers; senior levels, however, were
pro-ZANU-PF and thoroughly politicized and all levels were
constrained by career considerations. Mzila-Ncube emphasized
that official harassment in any event was hardly
insurmountable and cited the courage of Iraqis voting last
month as an inspirational example for Zimbabweans in enduring
and overcoming their own obstacles to democracy.
¶5. (C) Given constraints posed by police restrictions and
the party,s lack of access to the media, the MDC MPs said
their party was being creative in its efforts to connect to
the people. In addition to approved rallies at established
venues, unauthorized meetings were led from the back of
pick-up trucks, which allowed for quick dispersal if
necessary. Meetings at the homes of constituents were popular
and could accommodate as many as 50 people at a time. In
rural areas, business centers and pubs were gathering areas
that could be used for political communication on an
impromptu basis. House-to-house canvassing was important,
albeit risky, and Khupe said she was planning an ambitious
personal letter campaign. All emphasized the importance of
VOA’s “Studio 7” (an hour-long Zimbabwe-specific program),
which they said was widely heard in rural areas, and were
pleased with the Ambassador,s news that it would be expanded
to include two programs per day for the pre-election period.
¶6. (C) The civil society interolocutors said civil society
groups were also managing to meet publicly in spite of
official obstacles. Khumalo said Bulawayo Agenda organized
about one public forum per month, bringing together party and
community figures to address topical issues. Police often
denied applications for meeting authorizations, sometimes on
specious grounds. They imposed conditions to reduce
participation, such as requiring meetings be conducted during
working hours, and typically sent police representatives to
monitor each meeting. Ruling party figures were invited but
rarely showed up, presumably because they were barred by
their superiors or feared a hostile audience. In any event,
people were quite outspoken during the meetings and did not
appear to suffer retribution. Personal relationships were
important as NGOs pursued their objectives, according to Fr.
Johnson, and some NGOs, including Bulawayo Agenda, were
tentatively building relationships of growing two-way trust
with selected authorities.
Town Square Test
—————-
¶7. (C) The three Bulawayo Agenda participants agreed that
President Bush’s “town square” test could be met in some
parts of Zimbabwe but not others. In Bulawayo, the urban
masses were sufficiently numerous and unanimous in their
loathing of the government that one could speak relatively
freely. Group expressions of speech could be exercised
without retribution — but often only with official approval.
Rural areas were a different story altogether, and even in
Harare the atmosphere seemed considerably more chilled,
perhaps because there was so much traffic between
ZANU-PF-dominated Mashonaland and the city. In any event,
the well-publicized arrests of people for innocuous criticism
of the President in public areas made people think twice,
even if they were not common occurrences. Ever-restrictive
laws such as the Public Order and Security Act (POSA), the
Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA),
and the pending NGO bill similarly chilled free speech even
if they were not enforced rigidly.
Campaign Issues
—————
¶8. (C) The three MDC MPs reported that they would be pushing
GOZ failure to address basic needs – food, health, shelter,
jobs – in its campaign. ZANU-PF,s threat to individual
security based on its historical reliance on violence also
would be highlighted. Convincing people that their vote was
secret and mattered would also be an important campaign
SIPDIS
priority. The opposition also would expose land reform as a
fraud, although Mzila-Ncube conceded that the party had not
fully come to grip with how to address the diverse challenges
of land reform. People understood the ruling party,s effort
had been a complete failure but the MDC had not offered a
coherent, comprehensive alternative. The civil society group
warned that hunger was a growing problem; children on the
Hwange Road were now hand-signalling their hunger to all
passers-by and the situation was even worse in the remote
areas around Binga.
“Opposition Will Win Matabeleland”
—————————————
¶9. (C) The MPs and civil society representatives were
confident that recent ZANU-PF turmoil would boost opposition
prospects in the election. The MPs lamented the removal of
more constructive ruling party elements from the ZANU-PF
parliamentary slate but asserted that many of the discarded
MPs were actively working against their successor candidates.
At a minimum, their supporters would be less inclined to
vote even if they would not go as far as supporting the
opposition. Any who ran as an independent (as Jonathan Moyo
is rumored to be considering) would divide the ZANU-PF vote,
further enhancing opposition prospects. Civil society
figures agreed that support for the MDC in Matabeleland still
stemmed primarily from opposition to ZANU-PF more than the
appeal of any MDC platform. All agreed that the opposition
would lose no more than six or seven seats of 14 in
Matabeleland North and Matabeleland South and would sweep
Bulawayo’s seven seats.
Ethnic/Tribal Resentments Festering
————————–
¶10. (C) The MPs and civil society leaders asserted that the
contrast between heightened police disruption in Matabeleland
with documented trends of greater openness in Shona-dominated
areas reflected the ruling party’s deep-seated fear of
Ndebele rebelliousness. Some emphasized the continuing deep
resentment felt by the Ndebele at large over the massacres of
the 1980s and the region’s economic and political
marginalization by the GOZ ever since. They maintained that
the Ndebele were so used to oppression that no amount of
intimidation would make many vote ZANU-PF. Still, they
conceded that discredited hard-line Information Minister
Jonathan Moyo had achieved inroads among the Ndebele by
delivering tangible goods — computers, blankets, clinics —
to populations that heretofore had gotten nothing from the
ruling party but intimidation. ZANU-PF had shot itself in
the foot by punishing his success and reasserting the
dominance of ZANU-PF’s Ndebele heavyweights such as John
Nkomo and Dumiso Dabengwa, who were loathed as sell-outs by
most Ndebele, according to our interlocutors.
¶11. (C) Mkhwananzi asked the Ambassador why the USG was not
more sensitive to and supportive of Ndebele resistance
against the Shona-dominated GOZ. He argued that ethnic
resentments presented the USG with an opportunity that it
should exploit in trying to press for change in Zimbabwe.
Drawing on the lessons of history, the Ambassador explained
that the USG saw no advantage to fanning ethnic divisions in
Zimbabwe or elsewhere. The key to resolving the plight of
the Ndebele and many other suffering Zimbabweans lay in good
governance and establishment of a government that reflected
the will of all of its people. Mkhwananzi nonetheless later
pressed the issue again, asserting that no Shona-dominated
government, regardless of party, would ever treat the Ndebele
fairly.
Appreciation for USG Engagement
—————————————–
¶12. (C) The MPs and civil society leaders expressed strong
appreciation for the Secretary,s public characterization of
Zimbabwe as an outpost of tyranny and stressed its importance
as an emotional boost to a despondent populace that was
beginning to re-energize. Several asked what the statement
would mean in terms of future USG commitment of resources.
The Ambassador stressed the depth of USG commitment to
liberty as exemplified by the Secretary’s and President
Bush’s recent public statements and the USG’s ongoing work
with democratic forces in Zimbabwe.
Comment
———
¶13. (C) Matabeleland may be where ZANU-PF suffers most for
its Tsholotsho and primaries debacles — whatever local
loyalty Moyo may have bought with his aggressive sales job
appears to have been for naught. Ndebele resentment of the
ruling party is much more apparent from within Matabeleland
than it is from Harare. While the MDC does not appear to be
actively exploiting that ethnic tension, it no doubt will
continue to benefit from it. We also got the sense that the
local MDC MPs are more in touch than many in either party’s
national leadership with the bread and butter issues —
hunger, education, health, jobs — that are central to the
suffering of their constituents. Deeply resentful of the
government, the alienated electorate may produce a surprise
result March 31. However, overt opposition momentum may lead
the ruling party to resort to violence, which could also
prove a key factor in this part of Zimbabwe.
DELL
(34 VIEWS)
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