Co-Minister of Home Affairs Giles Mutsekwa vowed to assert his authority over police commissioner Augustine Chihuri whom he said controlled the police while the minister had traditionally taken a back seat.
Mutsekwa told United States embassy officials that he worked quite well with his Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front counterpart Kembo Mohadi, a former Zimbabwe African People’s Union cadre.
He said Mohadi was not a zealot and could be motivated to support reform.
Mutsekwa and Mohadi now attended meetings of the Joint Operations Command which reportedly set the tone for reform and the way forward for the country.
Chihuri also sat on the JOC and reported directly to President Robert Mugabe rather than to the Minister of Home Affairs.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 09HARARE226, THE NEW GOZ: A ONE-MONTH ASSESSMENT
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|
Reference ID |
Created |
Classification |
Origin |
VZCZCXRO0579
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHSB #0226/01 0751319
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 161319Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4226
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 2700
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 2819
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1281
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 2087
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 2443
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 2867
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 5306
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1989
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 08 HARARE 000226
SIPDIS
AF/S FOR B.WALCH
DRL FOR N. WILETT
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR J. HARMON AND L. DOBBINS
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR MICHELLE GAVIN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID PHUM ASEC ZI
SUBJECT: THE NEW GOZ: A ONE-MONTH ASSESSMENT
REF: A. HARARE 183
¶B. HARARE 168
¶C. HARARE 162
¶D. HARARE 96
¶E. HARARE 149
Classified By: Ambassador James D. McGee for reason 1.4 (b) and (d)
——-
SUMMARY
——-
¶1. (C) The newly formed Government of Zimbabwe is not a
government of national unity with shared values and goals.
It is principally a forced marriage of two opposing parties
that seek to strengthen themselves while weakening the other
as they look toward elections in two years.
¶2. (C) The MDC believes that fundamental political and
economic reform is possible only if it can win the next
election and control both the executive and legislative
branches. To build support, it is pursuing democratic
reforms including an end to political detentions,
depoliticization of the security forces, an impartial
judiciary, and freedom of the media. Perhaps most
fundamental, after 10 years of economic collapse, is the
ability to deliver social services and to begin to
resuscitate the economy. ZANU-PF, which has depended on
patronage and intimidation to maintain itself in power, has
no program on which to build support. Its success in the
next elections depends on the failure of the MDC. We can
therefore expect ZANU-PF to undermine the MDC’s efforts in
the new government to weaken it as a party. There are also
some ZANU-PF hardliners, who were opposed to the party
forming a coalition with the MDC; they seek to sabotage the
agreement and provoke the MDC into abandoning government.
¶3. C) For our part, the ultimate goal in Zimbabwe is an
accountable government with democratic institutions that
serves the interests of its people. A crucial step is free
and fair internationally-supervised elections that result in
the election of a party or parties that can begin to meet
this goal. At this point, the MDC is the only established
party with an excellent chance to beat ZANU-PF in a fair
election. As such, it is in our interest to support the
party and reformist ministries in the government that it
shares; failure of the government before elections could
result in a severe weakening of the MDC and a resurgence of
ZANU-PF. This would set Zimbabwe back years. Our challenge
is to continue to insist on fundamental reforms consistent
with The Hague principles, and at the same time provide
critical assistance to the government that will allow the MDC
(and any other democratic parties) to position itself for the
next election. Key to this is enabling the government to
provide basic social services to the Zimbabwean people, and
this requires that civil servants receive sufficient salaries
to motivate them to come to work. Given the transitional
power-sharing arrangement and ZANU-PF’s self-interest, it is
unlikely that the nature and extent of reforms with reference
to the Hague principles will be all that we would like. END
SUMMARY.
————————-
Progress in the Last Year
QProgress in the Last Year
————————
¶4. (SBU) In assessing progress to date, it is instructive to
note the events of the last year. In March 2008, most
observers, uncertain of the depth of MDC support in the
country and cognizant of ZANU-PF’s ability to fraudulently
control the election, gave the MDC little or no chance of
HARARE 00000226 002 OF 008
winning the presidency and gaining control of Parliament.
The fact that the combined MDC did win a majority in
Parliament and that Morgan Tsvangirai outpolled Robert
Mugabe–and probably won an outright majority of the
votes–was evidence of widespread distrust of ZANU-PF and
corresponding support of the MDC.
¶5. (SBU) When the new Parliament met for the first time late
last year, Lovemore Moyo of MDC-T was elected Speaker. For
the first time since Independence in 1980, therefore, the
opposition had a working majority in Parliament and held the
Speakership position. Tsvangirai’s inauguration as prime
minister on February 11 and the swearing-in of MDC ministers
shortly thereafter was the first time a Zimbabwean opposition
had occupied positions, let alone significant positions, in
the executive branch. All this was difficult to imagine a
year ago.
—————————————
The MDC Decision to Enter Government…
—————————————
¶6. (C) Tsvangirai’s decisions to sign the Inter-Party
Agreement (IPA) on September 15 and to be inaugurated on
February 11 were made against the wishes of many in his
party, including Tendai Biti. Some (such as Biti) opposed
any agreement, hoping that the dire economic situation would
result in the collapse of ZANU-PF. Others opposed an
agreement until outstanding issues such as the release of
detainees had been resolved. Ultimately, Tsvangirai decided
to enter government for two reasons: 1) with a desperate
humanitarian situation and dire economic situation, he
thought he could best help the Zimbabwean people from inside
the government; and 2) with ZANU-PF weakened by its failure
to turn around the economic crisis and its internecine
struggle for succession to Mugabe, Tsvangirai believed that
as a leader in government with MDC heads of significant
ministries he could exploit this weakness to further
debilitate ZANU-PF.
¶7. (C) Although Tsvangirai and the MDC had an ambitious
agenda of political and economic reform, they realized they
were not entering into a government of national unity where
parties, despite differences of philosophy, have common
goals. Rather they correctly understood the government to be
a temporary marriage of convenience that would last only a
couple of years until elections. Thus, while the MDC intends
to pursue its democratic agenda and attempt to achieve a
measure of economic stability, its main goals are its
political viability and the building of support so that it
can contest and win elections under a new constitution in two
years’ time. As Tsvangirai recently told the Ambassador,
however bad things get, he is in this government for the
duration.
———————-
…and that of ZANU-PF
———————-
¶8. (C) ZANU-PF realized it had no ability to revive the
economy on its own. While for years, Zimbabwe’s economic
plight was of little concern to high-level ZANU-PF insiders
Qplight was of little concern to high-level ZANU-PF insiders
who benefited from the largesse of Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe
(RBZ) Governor Gideon Gono, the worthlessness of the Zimbabwe
dollar has gradually eliminated Gono’s ability to generate
forex to support his friends and their businesses. The
Mujuru faction, which controls a large proportion of
Zimbabwe’s economy, unsuccessfully tried to oust Mugabe at
the ZANU-PF conference in December 2007, and was particularly
supportive of a deal with the MDC. Mugabe himself ultimately
made the decision to form a government with the MDC because
HARARE 00000226 003 OF 008
he thought it was necessary economically; he also thought he
could control the government both as president and by
presiding over the Joint Operations Command (JOC) which,
while theoretically operational, has been involved in
Zimbabwe’s important policy decisions in the last couple of
years.
¶9. (C) Tsvangirai’s inauguration of February 11 occurred
despite unresolved outstanding issues. Principal of these
was the continued detention of over 30 MDC members and
sympathizers. ZANU-PF’s failure to release these
individuals, despite commitments to SADC that it would do so,
was due to actions by ZANU-PF hawks who opposed any agreement
since they saw a government that included the MDC as a threat
to their power. The hawks include the security chiefs,
Defense Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa, Justice Minister Patrick
Chinamasa, Attorney General Johannes Tomana, and Didymus
Mutasa who is believed to be the mastermind behind ZANU-PF’s
farm invasion policy. Having failed to prevent the formation
of a government, they can be expected to subvert its
functioning as they seek to maintain their power and restrain
that of the MDC.
————————-
ZANU-PF Obstructionism…
————————-
¶10. (C) ZANU-PF has made clear by its actions and words that
it will to a large extent obstruct the implementation of the
IPA. The issue of detainees has become emblematic and
illustrative both for MDC supporters and donors of the
difficulties of working with the government. Tsvangirai
signed the IPA on September 15 despite averring he would not
do so until detainees had been released. He later said he
would not join the government until detainees were released.
Once again, he relented. In both instances, Mugabe gave him
assurances the issue would be quickly resolved. Welshman
Ncube, who in February was chair of the Joint Monitoring and
Implementation Committee (JOMIC, comprised of representatives
of ZANU-PF and the two MDC factions), told us that after the
formation of the government in February, JOMIC met and
resolved that all detainees should be released. JOMIC then
met with Mugabe, Tsvangirai, and MDC-M leaderArthur
Mutambara for three hours. Mugabe initially insisted that
the justice system be allowed to run its course; to do
otherwise would be to interfere with the courts. Mugabe
eventually reversed himself and agreed to their release. He
promised to speak to Justice Minister Chinamasa and convinced
Tsvangirai and Mutambara their presence was unnecessary.
According to Ncube, it took a week for Mugabe to meet with
Chinamasa, who at first resisted Mugabe before agreeing to
speak to Attorney General Tomana. Chinamasa then stalled
another week before speaking to Tomana. Tomana agreed to not
oppose bail for most detainees, but his office argued for
onerous conditions.
¶11. (SBU) While many detainees have been released, including
Jestina Mukoko and Roy Bennett, there are still several that
QJestina Mukoko and Roy Bennett, there are still several that
remain in custody. And in a sign that old habits die hard,
in the past couple of weeks police have arrested WOZA
demonstrators (who were attempting to deliver a petition to
the Ministry of Education) and student protesters.
¶12. (SBU) According to the IPA, high-level appointments were
to be made after the formation of the government.
Nevertheless, Mugabe appointed Gono to a new five-year term
as governor and appointed Tomana as attorney general.
Despite SADC’s suggestion that these appointments be
revisited in consultation with the MDC, Mugabe has stood
firm. In a similar vein, Mugabe ignored the IPA and
Amendment 19 which call for consensus in making high-level
HARARE 00000226 004 OF 008
appointments such as permanent secretaries and ambassadors
and, after the government was formed, made a round of
appointments of permanent secretaries. (NOTE: After
Tsvangirai complained, Mugabe said he would review the
appointments with Tsvangirai, but this has not yet occurred.
END NOTE.) Additionally, Mugabe has not yet implemented an
agreement, as urged by SADC, to apportion the country’s 10
governors with the MDC.
¶13. (SBU) Mugabe at his recent birthday bash, in light of a
recent spate of invasions of white-owned farms, supported the
eviction of all remaining white farmers. With ZANU-PF
ministers in charge of the ministries of agriculture and
lands, and with the minister of justice and attorney general
encouraging magistrates to rule against white farmers in
cases involving farm invasions, it appears ZANU-PF will carry
out Mugabe’s intentions. The MDC, which has called for an
audit of farms to ensure that all are being utilized
productively, has been powerless so far to stop this
destructive policy.
———————————–
…and Other Challenges for the MDC
———————————–
¶14. (C) In the IPA, ZANU-PF agreed the MDC should run the
Ministry of Finance knowing that if there was no economic
reversal the MDC would get the blame. Tsvangirai in turn
named Biti to head the ministry. Although Biti is a lawyer
and not an economist, he is an indefatigable political
in-fighter and Tsvangirai is counting on him to jump start
Zimbabwe’s economy. His first task is to pay civil servants,
including military and teachers, who Tsvangirai promised
after his inauguration would be paid in forex from March 1.
US$100 voucher payments redeemable in forex began in
February and produced excitement and expectation as for the
first time in recent memory many civil servants were able to
patronize shops and grocery stores (Ref A). A number of
civil servants, however, particularly in rural areas have
been unable to redeem their vouchers. And Biti is scrambling
to raise forex for the next round of salaries.
¶15. (C) Biti told us that there are 236,000 civil servants
on the payroll; 60,000 of these are military and police and
over 130,000 are teachers. (NOTE: It is unknown how many of
these are “ghost” employees. END NOTE.) Biti estimated
revenues in February at US$15 million; visiting IMF mission
estimated monthly revenues at US$30 million. He and other
MDC officials have characterized the government as “broke” in
terms of its ability to meet recurrent obligations and to pay
civil servants, including health workers, teachers, military,
and police. Support for the government in general and the
MDC in particular, depends on the government’s ability to at
least minimally compensate civil servants and provide
services while beginning to attend to Zimbabwe’s crumbling
infrastructure.
¶16. (C) NOTE: Biti agreed with us that as he seeks
Q16. (C) NOTE: Biti agreed with us that as he seeks
assistance the MDC faces a problem of perceptions as
potential benefactors are concerned about a bloated cabinet
driving around the country in new Mercedes. He blamed the
increase in cabinet ministries from the number specified in
the IPA and Amendment 19 (Ref C) on a unilateral agreement
made by Tsvangirai with Mugabe and Mutambara without
consultation with other MDC officials. As for his Mercedes,
he said he would gladly give it up. END NOTE.
¶17. (C) A number of MDC ministers have told us of
encountering dilapidated infrastructure and absence of human
and technical capacity in their ministries. Many qualified
civil servants have left government to pursue opportunities
HARARE 00000226 005 OF 008
outside of government or in other countries. The ministers
themselves for the most part have not run large
organizations. As Deputy Prime Minister Khupe told the
Ambassador on March 2 (Ref B), there are only a handful of
people in each ministry that know what they are doing.
¶18. (SBU) Minister of Education David Coltart has provided
the press with a graphic illustration of infrastructure
problems. When he arrived at his ministry for the first
time, he said he encountered women with water buckets on
their heads preparing to deliver water to his office 18
floors above. There had been no water in the building for
six months. Coltart told us that he, as is the case with
most ministers, has no email or data collection capacity. In
fact, as the Ambassador makes courtesy calls on the new
minister, the absence of computers for ministers and their
staffs is notable.
——————–
On the Brighter Side
——————–
¶19. (C) For the last month, Tsvangirai has asserted his
authority in cabinet meetings and begun to receive respect
from ZANU-PF ministers, and MDC ministers have begun to
establish control over ministries they head. Tsvangirai,
often accompanied by Mutambara who has been supportive, has
also pursued individual issues with Mugabe. As evidenced by
his February 25 press conference (Ref E), Tsvangirai has not
been reticent to publicly raise outstanding issues.
¶20. (C) While the military remains in firm ZANU-PF control
with the service chiefs in place and Emmerson Mnangagwa as
Minister of Defense, the MDC through Giles Mutsekwa (who
recently returned from a Voluntary Visitor Program) now
shares control of the Home Affairs ministry. Mutsekwa’s
ZANU-PF counterpart is Kembo Mohadi. Mutsekwa recently told
the Ambassador he was working well with Mohadi. Mohadi is
ex-ZAPU and was imprisoned by Mugabe in the 1980s; according
to Mutsekwa he is not a zealot and can be motivated to
support reform. Mutsekwa, along with Mohadi, is now
attending meetings of the Joint Operations Command (JOC) and
will be part of the National Security Council when it
supplants the JOC. The National Security Act was passed by
Parliament and signed by Mugabe. While ZANU-PF officials
hold a majority of positions on the NSC, the legislation
stipulates that all decisions must be made by consensus.
¶21. (C) The Ministry of Home Affairs oversees the police and
is supposed to oversee the Commissioner of Police. Mutsekwa
acknowledged that in practice the Commissioner, Augustine
Chihuri, has historically controlled Zimbabwe’s police force
while the Home Affairs minister has taken a back seat.
Mutsekwa vowed to assert this authority over Chihuri.
Additionally, Home Affairs oversees the Registrar General who
is responsible for voter registration. Partial control of
Home Affairs will give the MDC, at least in theory, the
opportunity to regularize voter registration and voting.
Qopportunity to regularize voter registration and voting.
¶22. (C) In the face of a worthless currency and economic
meltdown, RBZ Governor Gono was forced to begin liberalizing
the economy in his Feb 2, 2009 Monetary Policy Statement (Ref
D). He introduced hard currencies as legal means of tender;
he removed exchange controls and price controls, including on
gold; and he announced the end of off-budget spending.
Significantly for the recovery of the agricultural sector,
Acting Finance Minister Chinamasa had announced the removal
of the Grain Marketing Board,s monopoly in his budget
statement the previous week. The GOZ,s acceptance of the de
facto dollarization of the economy brought hyperinflation to
an abrupt stop.
HARARE 00000226 006 OF 008
¶23. (C) Chipping Gono,s powers away further, Biti, as
Minister of Finance, challenged in Cabinet Gono,s
continuation as RBZ governor and forcefully argued he should
step down. While Gono remains, Biti is attempting to
marginalize him. He has ordered the removal of arbitrary
fees imposed by Gono on businesses operating in foreign
currency; he has reopened the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE),
removed levies on share transactions, and restored
fungibility of dual-listed shares. Biti put a quick end to
the use of RBZ-printed vouchers for paying civil servants a
monthly U.S. dollar allowance (Ref A), and he is attempting
to restore the Ministry of Finance’s control over mineral
revenues. Furthermore, we understand the new government’s
emergency recovery program includes removal of the onerous
7.5 percent foreign exchange surrender requirement on
exporters that had been payable to the RBZ, thereby drying up
one more revenue stream for Gono.
¶24. (C) While competence and staffing is lacking in many
ministries, the visiting IMF chief told donors that his
interlocutors in the Ministry of Finance were “competent
people” and that his initial first impression of staff at the
Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA) was favorable. He also
thought there was good capacity in the balance of payments
and debt management departments of the RBZ. T
¶25. (C) There has been an expansion of political space. The
MDC has held a series of rallies around the country (events
for which, prior to the establishment of the transitional
government, the MDC had struggled and often failed to obtain
permission to undertake). A number of MDC activists, who
were in exile or hiding, have returned to Zimbabwe to work
with the MDC. (COMMENT: The salutary return from the
diaspora has been blemished by the detention of Roy Bennett
who returned from South Africa. END COMMENT.)
¶26. (C) Eric Matinenga, one of Zimbabwe’s leading lawyers,
heads the new Ministry of Constitutional and Parliamentary
Affairs. His primary responsibility is the drafting of a new
constitution. Matinenga told us that he has begun planning,
in accordance with Schedule 10 to Amendment 19, for the
establishment of a Parliamentary select committee, an
all-stakeholders’ conference, and public consultation.
Schedule 10 calls for the drafting of the constitution and a
referendum with 18 months. Both ZANU-PF and the MDC have
indicated they support a new constitution within the
prescribed period with elections in approximately two years.
Matinenga did note that there is opposition on the part of
ZANU-PF and Mugabe to consulting with civil society; they
would prefer to rely on the Kariba draft constitution
negotiated in 2007 between ZANU-PF and the MDC when the SADC
process was beginning. To bridge the gap with civil society,
Matinenga has received the commitment of widely-respected
lawyer Arnold Tsunga, formerly head of Zimbabwe Lawyers for
Qlawyer Arnold Tsunga, formerly head of Zimbabwe Lawyers for
Human Rights and now with the International Commission of
Jurists in Geneva, to work with him.
¶27. (C) Matinenga’s other priorities will be the repeal and
amendment of repressive/restrictive legislation including the
Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA),
the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and the Public
Broadcasting Act. Additionally, he is waiting for Parliament
to establish the Standing Rules and Order Committee to
provide for an independent Media Commission to provide for
the independent exercise of journalism, and to make
appointments to the Electoral Commission and Anti-Corruption
Commission.
¶28. (U) Trevor Ncube, who publishes the weekly newspapers
Zimbabwe Independent and The Standard, has announced plans to
HARARE 00000226 007 OF 008
begin publishing a daily newspaper. In the absence of a
functioning Media Commission, Ncube said he had received
tentative approval from Minister of Information Webster Shamu
to publish.
¶29. (SBU) Minister of Education David Coltart managed to
reach an agreement with teachers’ unions for striking
teachers to return to schools. Almost all urban schools and
some rural schools have resumed classes. Teachers expect
salaries, however, and failure to provide them could result
in a renewed strike and the exodus of more teachers to other
countries in the region.
¶30. (SBU) The new Joint Monitoring and Implementation
Committee (JOMIC) responsible for resolving inter-party
conflicts that threaten the new government has been an active
participant in the political process; most notably it reached
a consensus that political detainees should be freed and has
played a role in pressuring Mugabe and ZANU-PF to do this.
——-
COMMENT
——-
¶31. (C) A new paradigm now exists in Zimbabwe. In refining
our policy, we believe our analysis should be informed as
follows: 1) This is not a government of national unity with
shared values and goals, but a transitional government in
which the primary goal of both parties is to win the next
elections; 2) While there was much debate as to whether the
MDC should join the government, the MDC has in fact done so.
The collapse of this government would be chaotic with
unforeseen consequences; 3) It is in the U.S. interest for
the government to succeed. Our goal of an accountable
government with democratic institutions that serves the will
of the people is in all likelihood possible only after new
elections under a new constitution. For better or worse, a
successful MDC, which can manage to achieve some reforms, is
the best vehicle to navigate toward new elections; 4) We
should continue to apply pressure for conformance with the
Hague principles. But we should be realistic that our
principles and benchmarks will not be met as completely or
quickly as we would like. Biti and other MDC officials have
acknowledged to us that progress toward political reform will
be incremental and fitful; while they seek political and
economic reform, their eyes are on the next election.
¶32. (C) The Zimbabwean political landscape in the last year
has dramatically changed. The MDC has important positions in
the government, the MDC is popular throughout Zimbabwe, and
there are reasons to think that it can enhance its influence
and its ability to achieve reforms within the government.
The complete dollarization of the economy in the last weeks
put an abrupt end to hyperinflation, and economic
stabilization has begun. Added to this is the fact that
ZANU-PF is a tired, old, divided party that is bereft of
ideas. With diminishing ability to dispatch patronage, it
will decrease in strength.
¶33. (C) We believe therefore that the government should be
Q33. (C) We believe therefore that the government should be
given the opportunity to survive. Tsvangirai, Biti, and
others constantly remind us now, however, of the desperate
economic situation they have inherited. The government’s
ability to provide services, such as health and education, is
crucial to its survival. It is also vital to the MDC in
maintaining and building support. There is a sense of
momentum in Zimbabwe at present. We should take advantage of
this window of opportunity. We should work with other donors
to provide aid that will at least indirectly enable the GOZ
to pay minimal civil servant salaries in the short term, and
at the same time begin to rebuild infrastructure, while the
HARARE 00000226 008 OF 008
economy stabilizes and revenue streams improve. In doing so,
our hallmarks should be flexibility and rapid response. END
COMMENT.
MCGEE
(85 VIEWS)
