21 However, contrary to what is claimed by the Commission, the fact that the fourth applicant has failed to prove that its name was included on the lists at issue has no bearing on the admissibility of the present claim for damages, in so far as such a claim is made by that applicant. Indeed, the question whether the inclusion of the name of Breco International or the names of the first three applicants on the lists at issue caused the fourth applicant to suffer harm for which redress must be made in accordance with the rules set out in paragraph 17 above has no bearing on the admissibility of the action, but is linked to whether that applicant suffered actual harm and whether there is a causal link between the alleged unlawful conduct vitiating the inclusion of the first three applicants on the lists at issue and that harm.
22 As a consequence, while it is true that the applicants’ argument is not correct, in so far as they claim that the name of the fourth applicant was included on the lists in question, the fact nevertheless remains that the action is admissible as regards the fourth applicant.
23 As regards the claim that the Council, and the Commission acted unlawfully, it should be noted, first of all, that even though in the introduction to the application the applicants refer both to common positions and decisions adopted on the basis of provisions of the EU Treaty relating to common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and imposing restrictive measures on them, and to regulations adopted on the basis of EC and FEU Treaty provisions, in their complaints alleging unlawful conduct they refer only to those regulations. Accordingly, it must be concluded that the action seeks to establish the non-contractual liability of the European Union on the sole basis of the regulations in question, not on the basis of the common positions and decisions adopted under the CFSP.
24 In order to satisfy the condition for the European Union to incur non-contractual liability for the unlawfulness of the conduct of the institutions that is objected to, it is necessary to establish a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals. That is by definition the case where the fundamental right to property is at stake (judgment of 23 November 2011 in Sison v Council, T‑341/07, EU:T:2011:687, paragraphs 33 and 75).
25 In the present case, the applicants contend that, insofar as Regulations No 77/2009, No 173/2010 and No 174/2011 concern them, those regulations (i) lack any proper legal basis, (ii) are vitiated by errors of law and of fact, (iii) are vitiated by breaches of essential procedural requirements and (iv), in view of the unlawful conduct referred to above, constitute a breach of the right to property.
26 It should be observed, as a preliminary point, that, with regard to the requirement that the legal rule alleged to have been infringed must be intended to confer rights on individuals, the purpose of restrictive measures is to limit the exercise of certain rights by certain targeted persons, primarily their right to property. However, in the light of the objectives which a system of restrictive measures such as the system in question seeks to attain, the limitation on the right to property satisfies the criteria laid down in Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) (judgment of 27 February 2014 in Ezz and Others v Council, T‑256/11, EU:T:2014:93, paragraphs 195 to 205). Moreover, the applicants do not claim that that system infringes their right to property as such. It should, however, be recalled that the right to restrict the right to property must be exercised in accordance with the procedural and substantive rules laid down for that purpose. If those rules are not adhered to, the court will find that there has been an unjustified restriction on the right to property in a given case (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 September 2008 in Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461, paragraphs 352, 353 and 368 to 370). In consequence, insofar as the pleas raised in support of the action seek to establish that the regulations which froze the assets of the first three applicants are vitiated by unlawful application of the procedural and substantive rules governing the power to restrict their right to property, they are based on rules conferring rights on individuals.
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