46 Moreover, given that the decision to maintain the name of the first three applicants and Breco International on the list of persons referred to in Article 6 of Regulation No 314/2004 put into effect by Regulation No 173/2010 and No 174/2011 is based on the same grounds as those underlying their original inclusion, the statement of reasons for those regulations must be considered to be of the requisite legal standard in that regard.
47 In so far as the applicants contend that the reasons in question do not chime with the truth of the facts, it is sufficient to observe that that argument concerns the substantive legality of the acts in question (judgment of 15 November 2012 in Council v Bamba, C‑417/11 P, EU:C:2012:718, paragraph 60) and will therefore be examined in connection with the complaint alleging errors in the assessment of the facts in paragraphs 65 to 94 below.
The alleged infringement of the right to be heard
48 In view of the surprise effect necessary for a measure freezing funds (see paragraph 45 above), the right to be heard, which must be observed in cases involving restrictive measures, does not require, according to established case-law, either the European Union authorities to communicate to the person or entity concerned the grounds for the inclusion of his or its name on the list imposing restrictive measures before the name of the person or entity is entered in the list for the first time (see judgment of 4 February 2014 in Syrian Lebanese Commercial Bank v Council, T‑174/12 and T‑80/13, EU:T:2014:52, paragraph 137 and the case-law cited) or the Council to hear that person or entity of its own motion (judgment of 14 October 2009 in Bank Melli Iran v Council, T‑390/08, EU:T:2009:401, paragraph 93 and 98).
49 On the other hand, where the Council initially froze assets for a fixed period, it must, in principle, give the persons concerned an opportunity to be heard before extending the application of such a measure. In order for them to be effective, acts extending the application of such a measure are not necessarily required to have a surprise effect (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 March 2014 in Al Assad v Council, T‑202/12, EU:T:2014:113, paragraph 70).
50 While it is true that where, as in the present case (see paragraphs 43 to 46 above), sufficiently precise information enabling the person concerned to state his point of view effectively on the evidence adduced against him by the institutions concerned has been communicated, observance of the rights of the defence does not mean that the institutions are obliged spontaneously to grant access to the documents in their file, the fact nonetheless remains that, on the request of the party concerned, the institutions are required to provide access to all non-confidential official documents concerning the measure at issue (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 October 2009 in Bank Melli Iran v Council, T‑390/08, EU:T:2009:401, paragraph 97).
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