The Movement for Democratic Change disengaged from the government in 2009 out of frustration with the Zimbabwe African National-Patriotic Front’s intransigence but it had no Plan B, according to the United States embassy officials.
Hardliners within ZANU-PF, Patrick Chinamasa, Jonathan Moyo, Didymus Mutasa, and the service chiefs appeared to be aware of this and were working for a collapse of the government
“Withdrawal from the government, which is its only leverage, is not an option as it is opposed by most MDC supporters, and would leave government control completely with ZANU-PF,” a cable released by Wikileaks says.
“For the moment, all the MDC can do is appeal to SADC and argue that a collapse of the government will have negative consequences on SADC and regional countries. Like Tsvangirai, we’re sceptical that SADC will act effectively,” it said.
President Robert Mugabe also dug in his heels. He insisted that his party would not allow him to appoint MDC governors and resolve other outstanding issues as long as sanctions were imposed, pirate radio stations continued to broadcast, U.S. congressional hearings provided platforms to supporters of regime change, and Western resources were used to support the MDC and civil society.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 09HARARE853, TSVANGIRAI BRIEFS CHARGE ON STATE OF PLAY
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
|
Reference ID |
Created |
Released |
Classification |
Origin |
VZCZCXRO1963
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHSB #0853/01 3010542
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 280542Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5062
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 3115
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 3227
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1654
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 2488
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 2857
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 3275
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 5723
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 2407
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000853
SIPDIS
AF/S FOR B.WALCH
DRL FOR N. WILETT
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR J. HARMON AND L. DOBBINS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/17/2019
SUBJECT: TSVANGIRAI BRIEFS CHARGE ON STATE OF PLAY
REF: A) HARARE 843 B) HARARE 832 C) HARARE 826
Classified By: CDA Donald Petterson for reason 1.4 (d)
——-
SUMMARY
——-
¶1. (C) A somewhat dejected Morgan Tsvangirai told the Charge
on October 27 that a three-hour meeting with President Robert
Mugabe the previous day to discuss implementation of the
Global Political Agreement (GPA) and an end to the MDC’s
disengagement had ended in deadlock. Commenting on his
recent diplomatic visits to four Southern African countries,
Tsvangirai said he told leaders that the biggest threat to
the success of the Inclusive Government (IG) was the
securocrats and that the GPA should be implemented. The
leaders of those counties want the GPA to succeed, according
to Tsvangirai, but he expressed doubts about the efficacy of
SADC, and said the MDC would ultimately press for elections
if there was no progress on the GPA. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) The Charge met with Tsvangirai at Tsvangirai’s
residence on October 27. In contrast to his upbeat
determination when he briefed diplomats last week on the
MDC’s, Tsvangirai appeared tired and somewhat dejected. He
said he had just briefed the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade
Unionists and civil society representatives on the political
impasse, and would brief diplomats tomorrow.
————————-
Seeking Support from SADC
————————-
¶3. (C) Tsvangirai first briefed on his recent trip to
Southern Africa. He said he had told the leaders of the four
countries he visited–South Africa, Mozambique, DRC, and
Angola–that the MDC had not pulled out of government, but
that disengagement from ZANU-PF was a first step. SADC as
guarantor of the GPA had to work for its implementation. If
they could not rescue the GPA, the MDC’s only recourse would
be elections.
¶4. (C) Tsvangirai said he had also emphasized to the SADC
leaders that, in his opinion, the biggest threat to the
success of the government was the securocrats whose
continuing sponsorship of rule of law and human rights
violations was calculated to highlight the absence of
normalcy in Zimbabwe. He said there was an urgent need to
rein them in; otherwise the constitutional process and
efforts to achieve democracy would be imperiled, and Zimbabwe
could end up like Madagascar.
¶5. (C) All the SADC leaders with whom he met, according to
Tsvangirai, accepted that the GPA must be implemented. A
failure of the GPA, which was the result of a major SADC
initiative, would be a reflection on SADC. And, Tsvangirai
noted, nobody in SADC wanted the specter of new Zimbabwe
elections, particularly with the 2010 World Cup on the
horizon.
¶6. (C) Tsvangirai said he was continuing to reach out to
SADC. He had talked yesterday by phone to Swaziland’s King
Mswati, and had just sent an MDC delegation to Zambia to meet
with President Banda. Yet he was skeptical about SADC’s
ability to pressure ZANU-PF.
————————————
Meeting with Mugabe Ends in Deadlock
QMeeting with Mugabe Ends in Deadlock
————————————
¶7. (C) A three-hour meeting of the principals–Mugabe,
HARARE 00000853 002 OF 003
Tsvangirai, and Arthur Mutambara–ended last night in
deadlock, according to Tsvangirai. Mugabe, who was
“defiant,” claimed his party would not allow him to appoint
MDC governors and resolve other outstanding issues as long as
sanctions were imposed, pirate radio stations continued to
broadcast, U.S. congressional hearings provided platforms to
supporters of regime change, and Western resources were used
to support the MDC and civil society. When Tsvangirai
brought up the issues of rule of law, media hate speech, and
national healing, Mugabe had excuses as to why nothing was
being done.
¶8. (C) Referring to Tsvangirai’s comment at a diplomatic
briefing last week that a spirit of cooperation existed
between him and Mugabe (Ref B), the Charge asked Tsvangirai
if he still believed he could work with him. Tsvangirai
responded affirmatively, but admitted that ZANU-PF
institutions could not work without Mugabe. He told the
Charge he had confronted Mugabe and asserted that Mugabe was
more concerned about remaining in power than the well fare of
the Zimbabwean people.
———-
Next Steps
———-
¶9. (C) Tsvangirai confirmed that the foreign ministers of
the SADC Troika–Mozambique, Swaziland, and Angola–would
arrive in Harare on October 29 to mediate. He did not expect
progress and expected the matter would be referred to the
Troika heads of state. If they were unsuccessful in bringing
the parties together, the MDC would seek a SADC summit of all
heads of state.
¶10. (C) Tsvangirai noted that the MDC had canvassed its rank
and file and there was overwhelming sentiment that the MDC
not withdraw from the government. (COMMENT: Despite
continuing human rights violations and absence of rule of
law, Zimbabwe is significantly more peaceful that a year ago,
and there is greater access to food. People are afraid new
elections could bring a recurrence of violence. END
COMMENT.) But the MDC leadership would not budge on its
demand for resolution of outstanding issues; if this did not
occur, the MDC would take “appropriate actions.”
¶11. (C) Tsvangirai acknowledged that although the MDC had
not withdrawn from government, certain governmental actions
would have to await reengagement. This included announcement
of the formation of the Media Commission.
——————-
A Note on Sanctions
——————-
¶11. (C) Tsvangirai explained he distinguished between
targeted sanctions against individuals and “non-personal”
sanctions, such as those against banks. He was against
lifting of the former, but would not object to lifting of the
latter. He would not, however, publicly advocate the lifting
of any sanctions, nor would he privately advocate the lifting
of non-personal sanctions as a bargaining chip in discussions
with Mugabe.
——-
COMMENT
——-
¶12. (C) Last week, there appeared to be a path for MDC
reengagement (Ref A), but Mugabe and ZANU-PF have dug in
their heels. In particular, hardliners such as Patrick
Qtheir heels. In particular, hardliners such as Patrick
Chinamasa, Jonathan Moyo, Didymus Mutasa, and the service
chiefs appear to be working for a collapse of the government
HARARE 00000853 003 OF 003
and an MDC withdrawal. Mugabe, who has the power to break
the stalemate with the MDC, is at least for now siding with
them.
¶13. (C) The MDC, which in disengaging acted out of
frustration with ZANU-PF’s intransigence, has no Plan B.
Withdrawal from the government, which is its only leverage,
is not an option as it is opposed by most MDC supporters, and
would leave government control completely with ZANU-PF. For
the moment, all the MDC can do is appeal to SADC and argue
that a collapse of the government will have negative
consequences on SADC and regional countries. Like
Tsvangirai, we’re skeptical that SADC will act effectively.
END COMMENT.
PETTERSON
(28 VIEWS)
