ZANU-PF politburo member Dzikamai Mavhaire told United States ambassador to Zimbabwe Christopher Dell that the party was paralysed by lack of meaningful debate and President Robert Mugabe continued to manipulate leaders with prospective punishments and rewards measured by loyalty to him.
He said the only exceptions were Vice-President Joseph Msika and retired General Solomon Mujuru whom he described as the “untouchables”.
Mavhaire said Emmerson Mnangagwa would continue to be potentially significant, but only insofar as his ability to get others to tow the line, but not in his ability to stand up to Mugabe.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 05HARARE228, ZANU-PF DINOSAURS, DISSENTERS EXPOSE RULING PARTY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HARARE 000228
SIPDIS
AF/S FOR D. MOZENA, B. NEULING
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2010
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SOCI ZI ZANU PF
SUBJECT: ZANU-PF DINOSAURS, DISSENTERS EXPOSE RULING PARTY
VULNERABILITIES
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell under Section 1.4 b/d
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: During the Ambassador’s February 7-9 trip
to Bulawayo and Masvingo, ZANU-PF “Old Guard” figures
Thenjiwe Lesabe and Dumiso Dabengwa excoriated the party’s
younger generation for their unseemly disregard for
“liberation values,” in their view, the basis for ZANU-PF’s
right to rule. Highly regarded party outsiders Dzikamayi
Mavhaire and Eddison Zvobgo, Jr., lamented the party’s
deepening ossification in the wake of recent purges, but
suggested that the supplanting of hard-liners by more
moderate Old Guard figures in Mugabe’s inner circle could
open opportunities for the opposition and the West. The
dissidents predicted that intra-party bitterness could cut
into the party’s election returns and yield surprising
dividends for the opposition. END SUMMARY.
————
Dinosaurs
————
Lesabe: Liberation Credentials Underlie Party Authority
—————————————-
¶2. (C) At a February 7 meeting at her family home near
Bulawayo, ZANU-PF Women,s League Chairperson and Politburo
member Thenjiwe Lesabe denied having been involved with the
controversial Tsholotsho meetings last year and asserted that
her name had been included on the “Young Turks'” alternative
presidium ticket without permission. She blasted Information
Minister Jonathan Moyo and other Young Turks for their
unseemly disregard for the wishes of the party,s senior
leadership. Rejected by the party, Moyo was now desperately
trying to play the ethnic/tribal card — a strategy destined
to fail as it had with others in the past. (N.B. Mtabeleland
is the heartland of Zimbabwe,s largest minority, the
Ndebele, who comprise roughly fifteen percent of the
country,s population.) Lesabe said Moyo had managed to
attract support from younger elements in the party, but he
and his supporters lacked the respect for the party,s
liberation values that would be required of the party,s next
generation of leadership. Lesabe told the Ambassador that
she remained on the Politburo but, with the President,s
permission, was reducing her public profile to attend to her
ailing 90-year old husband.
¶3. (C) Lesabe declined the Ambassador,s invitation to
assess ZANU- PF,s prospects in the upcoming election. She
acknowledged a generational division in Matabeleland, with
youth attracted to the MDC while the older generation
remained loyal to the ruling party. Lesabe described the
atmospherics in the region generally as calm; there were some
“rougher elements” in the cities but rural areas were
orderly. The retired teacher maintained that Matabeleland
had not been left behind other regions in development, but
later acknowledged that the region had suffered from its
people,s reluctance to commit support to the government.
Dabengwa: Uncompromising on Young Turks, Opposition, Outside
World
——————————————— —————-
¶4. (C) Over dinner on February 7, Politburo Member Dumiso
Dabengwa elaborated on recent ferment in ZANU-PF. He
asserted that Jonathan Moyo was finished in the party. Moyo
appropriately recognized the party,s weaknesses in
Matabeleland — the legacy of massacres in the 1980s and the
region,s lagging development — but had tried to combat them
in an unseemly manner. He had been profligate in spending
and had alienated the leadership in trying to sidestep them
with his so-called “Tsholotsho Declaration.” Dabengwa said
he and others in the Old Guard overcame Moyo and his allies
through manipulation of the party,s gender parity
resolution, specifically by having provincial committees
declare the seats of certain individuals as reserved for
female candidates. As an aside, Dabengwa noted that he was
largely responsible for bringing Moyo into the ruling party
camp as a result of an encounter at a regional conference on
governance held at Robben Island in 1999.
¶5. (C) Dabengwa dismissed suggestions that alienation of the
“Young Turks” would cost the ruling party, and added that
they would be welcome back into the fold if they admitted
their mistakes, as some already had. For its part, the
opposition had no record on which to run, according to
Dabengwa. He chastised the opposition parliamentary
delegation from Matabeleland for not taking up his offer to
collaborate on the Zambezi River Project in which he had
played a prominent role. Nonetheless, he complimented some
of the opposition as conscientious and emphasized the
importance of a vibrant opposition to Zimbabwe,s future —
including a possible ZANU-PF opposition some day.
¶6. (C) Dabengwa confirmed ZANU-PF plans to change the
constitution after the parliamentary elections, with the
collaboration of the opposition if necessary. The new
arrangement would create a Senate and a new office of Prime
Minister. Far from fueling a divisive fight like that
precipitated by the recent presidium election, the new rash
of positions would enable the ruling party to better balance
competing factions.
¶7. (C) Dabengwa rehearsed familiar criticism of US
“sanctions policy” and perceived double standards, and blamed
the ruling party,s chaotic approach to land reform on
purported US and British reneging on promises to support land
reform compensation. The Ambassador clarified US policy and
corrected Dabengwa’s historical mischaracterizations.
Dabengwa bristled at the Ambassador,s challenging of GOZ
policies and concluded that Zimbabwe would “find its way”
regardless of what outsiders thought. Echoing others in the
ruling party, Dabengwa was contradictory on US sanctions,
suggesting at once that they were causing Zimbabweans to
suffer but not hurting him personally.
————-
Dissenters
————-
Mavhaire: President in Charge of Dysfunctional Party
——————————————-
¶8. (C) ZANU-PF elder statesman and former Politburo member
Dzekimayi Mavhaire told the Ambssador over dinner on February
8 that the ruling party was paralyzed by a lack of meaningful
debate. The Tsholotsho debacle and the manipulation of
primaries reinforced President Mugabe,s unquestioned grip on
the party. Ironically, though, Mugabe,s triumph on those
fronts could cost the party in parliamentary elections – many
disaffected party leaders and supporters would likely stay
home on election day. The party,s repression prevented
ZANU-PF from competing effectively with the opposition — the
ruling party had little idea what the opposition stood for
much less how it was doing with the electorate. Moreover,
ZANU-PF continued to kill the economy by stifling the private
sector and encouraging public dependency on the ruling party.
In sum, ZANU-PF was digging itself into a hole.
¶9. (C) Mavhaire, who was suspended from the party leadership
when he called for Mugabe’s resignation in 1999, predicted
that the election would produce some surprises. The ruling
party was devoting a lot of resources to reclaiming the one
Masvingo seat it lost in 2000; it could take it back. On the
other hand, the rural masses “were not as sleepy as one might
think:” and even though the financially crippled opposition
had no record on which to run, resentment of the poverty
wrought by ruling party policies was growing. Disaffection
among the ZANU-PF troops over recent purges was an additional
factor. The MDC could therefore make inroads into some of
the ruling party’s traditional rural strongholds.
¶10. (C) Mavhaire dismissed the potential significance of
high profile Masvingo factional divisions — the President
would continue to manipulate their leaders with prospective
punishments and rewards measured by loyalty to him. Mavhaire
described Vice President Msika and retired General Solomon
Mujuru as the system,s only “untouchables.” Fallen heir
apparent Emmerson Mnangagwa would continue to be potentially
significant, but only insofar as his ability to get others to
tow the line, not in his ability to stand up to the
President. Should a post-election constitutional amendment
create a Prime Minister,s position, Mavhaire predicted that
the cowed party would not suffer the kind of competitive
ferment it experienced in the run-up to last year,s
presidium contest — the President would simply name his
choice and that would be that.
Zvobgo: Don’t Give Up on Zimbabwe
————————————
¶11. (C) Eddison Zvobgo, Jr., son of the late Masvingo
political giant, forcefully echoed Mavhaire in forecasting
potential trouble for the ruling party in the coming
elections. The party would suffer for its “disastrous”
primaries and the abuse of gender diversity objectives.
Bringing women into the leadership was a laudable goal, but
it had been disingenuously pursued for cynical political
advantage. Zvobgo added that the ascendant Old Guard would
be less effective than the recently purged Young Turks at
delivering the vote. He said that the MDC had meaningful
chances not only to hold Masvingo,s urban seat, but to claim
two to three new rural ones as well. The opposition would
remain strong in urban areas nationally as well as throughout
Matabeleland. He thought the MDC could win as many as 62
seats, and probably at least 55 if the ruling party did not
engineer too violent a crackdown. However, if the leadership
recognized its vulnerability, it would unleash violence at
the local level, although the SADC microscope might serve to
contain the scale to some extent.
¶12. (C) For his part, Zvobgo said his disappointment over
being excluded from the parliamentary race would not drive
him from politics. He said he and other younger elements in
the business community had long eschewed politics, preferring
to wait until the system changed more to their liking. In
the past year, however, he and others had decided to be more
proactive, and despite recent failures, they would bide their
time until the opportunity came to make a more forceful
contribution to change in Zimbabwe. Zvobgo would not
facilitate the ruling party in its national campaign but
would maintain his party credentials by campaigning for
fellow Young Turk Walter Mzembi in his father,s old
constituency and by contributing to regional development. He
recently founded the Masvingo Press Club and was working on
ways to bring investment and revenue to the area, such as the
re-opening of Masvingo airport to commercial traffic and a
road toll concept (N.B. Masvingo is on the main trucking
route from South Africa).
¶13. (C) Looking ahead to post-election Zimbabwe, Zvobgo said
that if the MDC won at least 50 seats, ZANU-PF would have to
adopt a more engaging posture in order to effect its priority
of constitutional change. In any event, hard-liners Jonathan
Moyo and Patrick Chinamasa would be sidelined and
atmospherics would likely soften after the election.
¶14. (C) Zvobgo emphasized that the United States was in a
position to make important contributions to Zimbabwe,s
political development but expressed concern that we may be
giving up on Zimbabwe. The ascendancy of “moderates” at the
expense of hardliners in recent purges presented us with an
opportunity. Old Guard moderates like Nkomo, Shamuyarira,
Gono, and even retired General Solomon Mujuru were in a
position to influence Mugabe positively, but needed to be
able to show him that a more moderate approach at home and
abroad could bring advantages: “The ice needs to melt before
they can get their heads above water.” The international
community could exert positive influence on key issues, like
the NGO bill, with proper care. Shrill denunciations and
public demands only provoked more rigid resistance and
fortified a sterile anti-imperialist posture. As an aside,
Zvobgo asserted that we should not count on South Africa for
any decisive influence — Mugabe had correctly assessed that
there were no conditions under which Mbeki would be willing
to stand up to him or exert any meaningful pressure on the
GOZ.
Comment
———–
¶15. (C) The contrasting accounts offered by dinosaurs Lesabe
and Dabengwa and dissenters Mavhaire and Zvobgo underscore
the ruling party’s most glaring vulnerability: its increasing
brittleness and internal divisions. Representative of many
in the ascendant Old Guard, Lesabe and Dabengwa seemed
thoroughly out of touch with the bread and butter priorities
central to the lives of most Zimbabweans — food security,
education, health care, employment. Their denial of ethnic
tensions in historically marginalized Matabeleland is at odds
with the accounts we heard from opposition members and civil
society in the region (to be reported septel). The sole
basis of their claimed legitimacy to lead — devotion to the
liberation struggle — is increasingly irrelevant to most of
the electorate, half of which was “born free” after
liberation.
¶16. (C) The alienation of figures sidelined by Tsholotsho
and the primaries — including a majority of provincial
chairmen, many of the party’s most dynamic backbenchers, and
a number of prominent businesspersons — could dent the
party’s considerable systemic advantages going into the
elections. Certainly, the absence of these figures from the
party’s inner circles will likely leave the party more
moribund in outlook and less nimble in responding to changing
events. That said, the sacking of influential hard-line
Young Turks might also lead to more moderate domestic and
foreign policies, especially economic, and may give us an
opening to increase our influence with and leverage over the
regime. Interestingly, none of our disaffected interlocutors
or their alienated colleagues appear even to consider the
possibility of “defecting” to the opposition. They
apparently calculate that ZANU-PF remains the vehicle
best-suited to address their personal priorities for now,
even as they bide their time for a change in leadership they
desire but are unwilling to fight for.
DELL
(40 VIEWS)
