Central bank governor Gideon Gono told United States ambassador to Zimbabwe James McGhee in August 2008 that the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front and President Robert Mugabe were so weak that he intended to start his own party.
Mugabe had just won the presidential elections run-off and his party was negotiating a settlement with both factions of the Movement for Democratic Change.
McGhee was sceptical that Gono would start an alternative party, but said since he was soclose to Mugabe his appraisal of Mugabe and ZANU-PF was a strong indication that all was not well within the party.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 08HARARE747, THE ZIMBABWE CRISIS: NEXT STEPS
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Reference ID |
Created |
Released |
Classification |
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VZCZCXRO0539
OO RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHSB #0747/01 2411058
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 281058Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3343
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 2233
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 2353
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0883
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1630
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 1986
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 2407
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 4839
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1502
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000747
SIPDIS
AF/S FOR G. GARLAND
DRL FOR N. WILETT
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E. LOKEN AND L. DOBBINS
STATE PASS TO NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B. PITTMAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2018
SUBJECT: THE ZIMBABWE CRISIS: NEXT STEPS
REF: A) HARARE 741 B) HARARE 730
Classified By: Ambassador James D. McGee for reason 1.4 (d)
——-
Summary
——-
¶1. (C) Tendai Biti, MDC Tsvangirai (MDC-T)
secretary-general, believes that the MDC-T’s gameplan on
negotiations and the way forward includes renewed
international outreach beyond SADC. Biti said the MDC-T’s
success in naming a speaker of the Assembly confounded Mbeki
and ZANU-PF plans. MDC Mutambara (MDC-M) members consider
MDC-M president Arthur Mutambara a serious liability. Cracks
in ZANU-PF are growing and the USG can help strengthen the
prospects for change by encouraging Tsvangirai to reach out
to expand his base while increasing pressure on ZANU-PF
insiders with expanded snctions.
—————————————-
Biti on Negotiations and the Way Forward
—————————————-
¶2. (C) Biti told polecon chief on August 27 that heads of
state and government at the August 16-17 SADC Summit had
supported Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe and MDC
Mutambara (MDC-T) president Arthur Mutambara in efforts to
pressure MDC-T president Morgan Tsvangirai to sign the
power-sharing agreement prepared by Thabo Mbeki, the SADC
mediator, the previous week in Harare. The most important
part of the agreement (Septel) outlines the role of the prime
minister. Tsvangirai rejected the agreement during
negotiations in Harare on August 9 and 10, and he did so
again at the Summit because he believed Mugabe would retain
excessive executive power.
¶3. (C) Frustrated with MDC-T and Tsvangirai, Biti said Mbeki
helped draft the Communique of the Heads of State and
Government which called for the Zimbabwean parliament to be
convened, even though this was in contravention of the July
21 MOU between ZANU-PF and the MDC. Mbeki’s expectation,
according to Biti, was that a ZANU-PF–MDC-M coalition would
win the important position of House of Assembly speaker,
thereby refuting MDC-T claims that it had a majority in the
House, and that Tsvangirai therefore deserved to be head of
government.
¶4. (C) Biti told us he believed that SADC and Mbeki were
floored by Monday’s vote to elect MDC-T’s Lovemore Moyo House
speaker. He believed that SADC now understood the MDC’s
strength and Mugabe’s weakness. Nevertheless, Biti believed
Mbeki remained ineffective and the MDC needed to pursue a
strategy outside of SADC.
¶5. (C) Biti related that Tsvangirai met with the South
African ambassador to Zimbabwe on August 27. Tsvangirai made
the case that Mbeki was ineffective. He also complained
about the continued lack of humanitarian access (Septel), the
arrests of MDC-T MPs, and argued that Mugabe in making
senatorial and gubernatorial appointments had violated the
July 21 MOU.
¶6. (C) MDC-T, according to Biti would next launch a
diplomatic offensive aimed at securing UN-AU facilitation for
ZANU-PF–MDC negotiations. Based on ZANU-PF’s failure (in
MDC-T’s view) to negotiate in good faith, the refusal of
humanitarian access, and continuing arrests and violence,
MDC-T would lobby for another UN resolution condemning
ZANU-PF and imposing sanctions.
¶7. (C) Biti said that in the immediate future no
HARARE 00000747 002 OF 003
ZANU-PF–MDC talks were planned. He and other MDC officials
would travel to Lusaka for the Mwanawasa funeral on September
3 and hoped to engage SADC leaders. Biti did not dismiss the
idea of future Mbeki-mediated negotiations, but he was clear
in his opinion that they would go nowhere as long as Mugabe
insisted on remaining as head of government. (Note:
Subsequent to our conversation with Biti, we learned that
Mbeki decided to convene ZANU-PF and MDC working-level
negotiators in Pretoria today. The MDC is deciding whether
to participate. Tsvangirai will fly to South Africa
tomorrow; it is not clear whether he will participate in any
discussions. End note.)
————————
Mutambara on the Way Out
————————
¶8. (C) We talked separately about Arthur Mutambara this week
with MDC-M secretary-general Welshman Ncube, MP Abednico
Bhehbe, and former MP Trudy Stevenson. All were outraged at
Mutambara’s recent antics in cozying up to Mugabe on Heroes
Day and publicly blasting Tsvangirai and the West in
interviews. They believed that Mutambara should be replaced
as MDC-M president, but thought this was difficult while
negotiations were ongoing. Stevenson in particular commented
that Mutambara seemed a little mentally “off.” She also
thought he had done irreparable harm to MDC-M which was not
strong to begin with.
¶9. (C) Comment: MDC-M is a weak cousin of Tsvangirai’s
formation. Its 10 MPs, however, hold the balance of power in
the House of Assembly. Although 8 of them supported Lovemore
Moyo, the Tsvangirai candidate, for House speaker, and
presumably now believe themselves more closely aligned with
Tsvangirai than with MDC-M, they cannot formally switch to
MDC-T. To do so would result in expulsion from MDC-M, loss
of their parliamentary seats, and by-elections to replace
them. End Comment.
——————–
Ambassador’s Comment
——————–
¶10. (C) Despite concerns that he would cave in during
negotiations and make concessions leaving Mugabe with
significant executive power, Tsvangirai has stood his ground
against Mugabe, Mutambara, and SADC. His steadfastness
combined with the MDC-T’s important victory in the House
speaker contest, has left the MDC stronger than before
negotiations began. At the same time, Mugabe and ZANU-PF
have been weakened by the loss of the speakership, by
Mugabe’s humiliation at the convening of Parliament, and by
expanding fissures within ZANU-PF. Four ZANU-PF MPs, who we
believe are affiliated with the Solomon Mujuru camp, voted
for the MDC-T speaker candidate. Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe
governor Gideon Gono told me earlier this week that he
believes ZANU-PF and Mugabe are so weak that he intended to
start his own party. While we are skeptical that Gono will
start an alternative party, he is among Mugabe’s few
confidantes, and his appraisal of Mugabe and ZANU-PF is a
strong indication that all is not well within the party.
Finally, we continue to receive reports of disaffection
within the military and police.
¶11. (C) What can we do to support Tsvangirai and pressure
ZANU-PF? While our tools are limited, I believe our focus in
Harare should be to encourage Tsvangirai to reach out to a
broad spectrum of Zimbabwean society. His weakness, I
believe, has been to focus on his own party and especially on
its leadership to the exclusion of others who are just as
interested in political and economic change. He has largely
HARARE 00000747 003 OF 003
neglected civil society, the trade union movement (from which
he came), and other political actors, such as MDC-M and Simba
Makoni, in mounting an opposition to Mugabe. For months, I
and my Embassy colleagues have stressed to Tsvangirai and the
MDC the importance of a broad-based opposition. We will
place renewed emphasis on this. The Mugabe regime must know
that it faces increasing opposition from throughout Zimbabwe.
I believe the AF bureau should reach out to Tsvangirai’s
advisor in Washington to pass the same message. He needs to
hear this from as many trusted voices as possible.
¶12. (C) The other important focus should be sanctions. We
have heard that the latest rollout of sanctions directed
against businesses and parastatals has caused significant
heartache both among those directly affected, and among those
who fear being the next targets. Additional sanctions now or
in the immediate future would send a clear signal to Mugabe,
ZANU-PF insiders, and SADC that the status quo is
unacceptable and that the results of the March 27 election
must be respected. End Ambassador’s Comment.
MCGEE
(19 VIEWS)
