Labour Minister and close Mugabe confidante Nicholas Goche refused a Mugabe exit package that was offered by United States ambassador to Zimbabwe James McGhee, 19 days before the 2008 elections.
According to a cable released by Wikileaks, McGhee made the offer on 10 March 2008 and spoke in “direct language”.
He said the United States was willing to assist President Robert Mugabe…”now”…to achieve a dignified departure.
“If Mugabe lost the election, he would be exposed to prosecution for his past misdeeds. He could talk to the US, make plans to leave, and protect himself,” the cable said.
Goche said the situation was under control. Mugabe was going to win the election and there would be no run off. Any changes in the ZANU-PF leadership would be at the December 2009 party congress.
Goche said there had always been cracks in ZANU-PF but the party continued to be viable.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 08HARARE197, AMBASSADOR PRESSES MUGABE EXIT WITH MUGABE
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Reference ID |
Created |
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Classification |
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VZCZCXRO2751
RR RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHSB #0197/01 0721409
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 121409Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2575
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 1806
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 1931
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0510
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1208
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 1565
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 1987
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 4418
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1058
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000197
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
AF/S FOR S. HILL,
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E. LOKEN AND L. DOBBINS
STATE PASS TO NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B. PITTMAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2018
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR PRESSES MUGABE EXIT WITH MUGABE
CONFIDANTE
REF: HARARE 85
Classified By: Ambassador James D. McGee for reason 1.4 (b) and (d)
——-
SUMMARY
——-
¶1. (C) The Ambassador on March 10 told Nicholas Goche, a
Mugabe confidante who is Minister of Public Service, Labor
and Social Welfare, that Zimbabwe was in a transition, and
that the U.S. was willing to help Mugabe achieve a smooth
exit from office. A supremely confident Goche pushed back,
stating that Mugabe would win the upcoming election without a
runoff. The time to talk to the U.S. would be after the
election. Goche said there would be a change in leadership
— but at the ZANU-PF conference in December 2009. Goche
dismissed the Ambassador’s suggestion that change was
necessary to deal with a reeling economy. Zimbabwe’s mineral
wealth would allow it to repay its international debts and
reengage with international financial institutions, and an
increase in farm productivity would support an
inflation-busting program. On election observation, Goche
said he had pushed for independent international observers,
but the Foreign Ministry had decided not to allow them. END
SUMMARY.
———————
ZIMBABWE’S TRANSITION
———————
¶2. (C) Speaking in direct language, the Ambassador averred
that Zimbabwe was in a transition that would result in
Mugabe’s exit from office. Noting that the U.S. had a firm
policy on Zimbabwe, he stated that we would be willing to
assist Mugabe — now — to achieve a dignified departure. If
Mugabe lost the election, he would be exposed to prosecution
for his past misdeeds. He could talk to the U.S., make plans
to leave, and protect himself.
¶3. (C) Goche declined to follow-up on the Ambassador’s
offer. He agreed that Zimbabwe was in a transition, but
argued that a ZANU-PF change in leadership would occur at the
ZANU-PF Congress in December 2009. Mugabe would not lose the
election and there would be no runoff. His support was as
strong as ever, particularly in the rural areas. Goche
continued that elections were ward-based where ZANU-PF
structures were strong. As for cracks in ZANU-PF, Goche said
this had always been the case, but the party continued to be
viable.
¶4. (C) Goche was dismissive of Simba Makoni. Makoni had
never run for office before, he did not have his own
constituency, and any votes he received would be at the
expense of the MDC’s Morgan Tsvangirai. This was good for
ZANU-PF. He added that Dumiso Dabengwa’s defection to Makoni
was insignificant. Dabengwa had run for parliament in 2005
and pulled few votes; he had little support in Matabeleland.
Goche concluded the discussion of the elections by saying
that the situation was “under control.”
—————
U.S. PRINCIPLES
—————
¶5. (C) The Ambassador stressed that reengagement would be
based on Zimbabwe’s compliance with our principles, including
free and fair elections, return to the rule of law, and
observation of human rights. Goche interrupted the
Ambassador — rule of law and human rights were just a
euphemism for returning land to the whites. Zimbabwe wanted
HARARE 00000197 002 OF 002
to be treated like other countries, and not worse. Why, he
asked rhetorically, was the U.S. treating Zimbabwe this way
when Zimbabwe had cooperated with the U.S. in such countries
as Liberia, Somalia and Angola.
¶6. (C) When the Ambassador noted the importance of economic
reform, Goche responded that Zimbabwe had large mineral
resources, particularly diamonds and platinum. These
resources would be used to pay off international and
bilateral debts. He maintained that Zimbabwe was in the
process of increasing agricultural productivity; increased
productivity would allow Zimbabwe to tackle its inflation
problem.
——————————
A NOTE ON ELECTION OBSERVATION
——————————
¶7. (C) Referring to his previous conversation (Ref) with
Goche in which Goche said he would push Mugabe for
independent election observers, the Ambassador told Goche he
was disappointed this had not materialized. Goche replied
that he also was disappointed. He had made the case but the
Minister of Foreign Affairs had nixed the idea.
——-
COMMENT
——-
¶8. (C) Goche’s supreme confidence that Mugabe will win the
election may be due to two factors: 1) confidence in
ZANU-PF’s ability to rig the elections and the results; and
2) the absence of additional ZANU-PF defections to Makoni.
During the meeting, Goche cryptically mentioned that we would
understand Mugabe’s strength when we learned who had visited
with the president earlier in the day. An intermediary later
told us that Goche, prior to the meeting with the Ambassador,
had met with Mugabe. Mugabe told Goche that earlier he had
met with Solomon Mujuru who had pledged his loyalty.
¶9. (C) Makoni would definitely be helped by additional
high-level endorsements. It is a measure of Mugabe’s
residual strength and the fear he inspires that important
officials who are rumored to support Makoni have not come
out. A number of sources have told us that despite Mujuru’s
pledge to Mugabe, Mujuru continues to support Makoni and will
make this support public a few days before the election.
Dumiso Dabengwa confirmed to the Ambassador (Septel) that
Mujuru remains solidly behind Makoni.
¶10. (C) We continue to believe, along with independent
Zimbabwean analysts, that Mugabe would not win a free and
fair election. We are skeptical, however, that he can be
defeated in a rigged election. The wild card is the
familiarity of the Makoni people with the rigging process and
the fact that many ZANU-PF electoral officials may be Makoni
supporters. The Makoni organization’s efforts to reduce
rigging, combined with the hoped for vigilance of the
Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN) and MDC and Makoni
polling agents at polling stations, should make Mugabe’s task
more difficult.
MCGEE
(47 VIEWS)
