Movement for Democratic Change legislator David Coltart said the breakup of the MDC was fuelling strains in the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front because with the threat from the MDC reduced there was less reason for ZANU-PF insiders to bury their differences.
Coltart said the MDC was, in fact, not the real threat to ZANU-PF. The real threat was not even the ruling party’s internal divisions. It was their mismanagement of the economy, which was sapping both the regime’s strength and what was left of its popularity.
United States ambassador to Zimbabwe Christopher Dell agreed with Coltart saying that the economy appeared to be spinning out of control and the International Monetary Fund had come to the same conclusion.
Coltart said despite the economic problems, ZANU-PF’s inner core was continuing to get rich but the party’s second tier was feeling the effects of skyrocketing inflation and dwindling economic opportunities.
He said a government appointed accountant for parliament, a well-connected official, had confided to him that he could no longer afford school fees and could not make other ends meet.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 06HARARE159, MDC MP COLTART: GOZ WEAKENING
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
|
Reference ID |
Created |
Released |
Classification |
Origin |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000159
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
AF/S FOR B. NEULING
SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2015
SUBJECT: MDC MP COLTART: GOZ WEAKENING
REF: REFTEL: HARARE 095
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher Dell for reasons 1.5 b/d
——-
Summary
——-
¶1. (C) In a meeting on February 8 with the Ambassador, MDC
MP for Bulawayo South David Coltart said the GOZ was
beginning to show signs of crumbling under the strain of
economic deterioration. The inner circle of the regime was
getting rich but patronage was no longer reaching second tier
members, including ZANU-PF MPs. Moreover, lack of funds was
hollowing out the regime,s main prop, the security forces.
Coltart said now was the time for the U.S. and other donors
to increase resources and put more pressure on the regime, a
message he intended to deliver in a private visit to
Washington the first week of March. Coltart said he was
disappointed with both MDC factions and planned to remain
&neutral8 while helping arbitrate an amicable divorce. He
conceded that both factions could emerge as viable opposition
political parties. End Summary.
————————-
Coltart: Regime Crumbling
————————-
¶2. (C) Coltart told the Ambassador that the MDC break up was
fueling strains within ZANU-PF as well. With the threat of
the MDC reduced, there was less reason for ZANU-PF insiders
to bury their differences. In any event, the MDC was not the
real threat to ZANU-PF. The real threat was not even the
ruling party,s internal divisions. It was their
mismanagement of the economy, which was sapping both the
regime,s strength and what was left of its popularity. The
Ambassador strongly agreed, noting that the economy appeared
to be spinning out of control, and said the IMF team had come
to much the same conclusion.
¶3. (C) Coltart said despite the economy,s problems, the
regime,s inner core was continuing to get rich. However,
the party,s second tier was feeling the effects of
skyrocketing inflation and dwindling economic opportunities.
MP salaries,, for instance, were only Z$15 million (less
than US$100 at parallel market exchange rate) and ZANU-PF
members in particular were becoming increasingly upset. The
GOZ-appointed accountant for parliament, a well-connected
official, had confided to Coltart the day before that he
could no longer afford school fees and could not make other
ends meet.
¶4. (C) The Ambassador said our impression was that the inner
core appeared increasingly preoccupied with stealing as much
as possible; the sort of fin-de-regime behavior that seemed
to indicate that even they believed the end was near and
there was no point sustaining pro-government institutions for
the future. Coltart agreed, noting that even the security
forces, the major prop of the regime, were being hollowed out
due to lack of funds. Their salaries were largely below the
poverty line, they had very limited operating budgets, and
there were persistent, credible reports that the military
could not feed its troops. He concluded that on the surface
the regime might appear strong but in fact it was very
fragile.
———————————————
Press for More Resources and Washington Visit
———————————————
¶5. (C) Coltart said that given the regime,s weakness, now
was the time to increase the pressure. To that end, he
informed the Ambassador that he planned to conduct a personal
visit to Washington during the first week of March to make
the case for a greater USG financial commitment. Coltart
said he hoped his senior religious contacts in the U.S. could
secure a meeting with President Bush, but conceded that
chances were slim. Through other private connections,
however, he expected to secure meetings on Capital Hill with,
among others, Senators Frist, McCain, and Feingold. He said
he did not need Embassy or Department assistance but would of
course be happy to meet with Department officials.
¶6. (C) With respect to existing funds, Coltart questioned
the decision to shift resources from the MDC-aligned Legal
Defense Fund (LDF, formerly funded by USAID’s Office of
Transition Initiatives) to the independent civic organization
Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR). Coltart said ZLHR
did great work but lacked the nation-wide network that LDF
had built over the years. The Ambassador responded that in
the current climate it was in the MDC,s own interest that it
not have financial ties to the U.S. and other foreign donors.
He also suggested that the two groups could work together in
the future to capitalize on each other,s strengths, and in
the process set a positive example for Zimbabwe,s fractious
civil society.
————————
MDC Intra-Party Struggle
————————
¶7. (C) Coltart said his disappointment with both factions
had led him to adopt a neutral stance. Moreover, though he
planned to remain in parliament, he was considering a
sabbatical of sorts from party politics. He said the party
would have been stronger if it had held together. He was now
focused on mediating an amicable divorce, which hinged on the
party name, assets, and the fate of MDC MPs (Reftel). Both
sides would keep the assets they currently controlled and
Coltart said both would likely agree not to challenge the
seats of opposing faction MPs. The ownership of the MDC name
and logo was the main sticking point. Coltart had pressed
Ncube and Sibanda to concede on this issue and to look
instead to the long-term building of a new political base.
If there was no amicable divorce, both factions were likely
to spend years in courts controlled by ZANU-PF.
¶8. (C) The Ambassador responded that both parts of the MDC
might emerge from the split stronger. In particular, the
Tsvangirai faction might be energized without the more
SIPDIS
cautious Ncube faction. Coltart conceded that both factions
had the capability to emerge as viable parties. Each had
strengths and weaknesses. Tsvangirai enjoyed grassroots
support but his incompetent and untrustworthy “kitchen
cabinet8 was a major liability, especially when it came to
planning mass action. The Ncube faction lacked popular
support but had more political talent on its side, including
more than half of the MDC MPs. They would have several years
to build a base of support provided they could find an
appropriate ethnic Shona to lead them.
¶9. (C) Coltart said the outcome of the two congresses would
determine his ultimate allegiance. If Tsvangirai dumped his
kitchen cabinet, Coltart said he might side with this
faction. Roy Bennett and Tendai Biti, both Tsvangirai
supporters, were strong figures that had promised to rid
their faction of the kitchen cabinet. If they were
successful, it might lay the foundation for reconciliation
and would certainly make their faction a more effective
party. If the kitchen cabinet remained, Coltart said he
would likely join the Ncube faction, provided Gift
Chimanikire did not emerge as the faction,s leader. Coltart
said he favored Midlands MP Blessing Chebundo, who he said
would be aggressive in confronting the Mugabe regime. (N.B.
The same day Chebundo was named chief parliamentary whip for
the Ncube faction.)
——-
Comment
——-
¶10. (C) Coltart,s views of the regime,s increasing
fragility echo those of many other local analysts. In
particular, his inside look at the unhappiness of ZANU-PF MPs
and other parliamentary figures further confirms that the
regimes patronage resources are both drying up and being
hoarded by those at the very top. While Coltart may have a
vested interest which colors his views, his analysis of
accelerating regime decay – fueled by the ongoing economic
meltdown and ZANU-PF internal seucession maneuvering – is
consistent with the growing evidence of a regime under ever
increasing strains.
DELL
(28 VIEWS)
