Movement for Democratic Change leader Morgan Tsvangirai told United States ambassador to Zimbabwe James McGee less than two months before the 2008 elections that the party was broke. It needed US$10 million to run its country-wide campaign.
Party spokesman Nelson Chamisa said the party was divided. Tsvangirai’s advisors were advocating for a boycott while parliamentarians who had the support base wanted to participate.
Former ZANU-PF stalwarts Ibbo Mandaza and Jonathan Moyo were looking at ways of forming a third way.
ZANU-PF negotiators Patrick Chinamasa and Nicholas Goche were digging in their heels.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 08HARARE16, 2008 ELECTIONS: STATE OF PLAY
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Reference ID |
Created |
Released |
Classification |
Origin |
VZCZCXRO9658
RR RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHSB # 0016/01 0111019
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 111019Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2364
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 1712
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 1838
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0438
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1115
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 1472
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 1894
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 4322
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0965
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 HARARE 000016
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
AF/S FOR S. HILL,
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E. LOKEN AND L. DOBBINS
STATE PASS TO NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B. PITTMAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2013
SUBJECT: 2008 ELECTIONS: STATE OF PLAY
Classified By: Pol/Econ Chief Glenn Warren. Reason: 1.4 (d)
——-
Summary
——-
¶1. (C) SADC talks are deadlocked over ZANU-PF’s insistence
on a March election date and refusal to implement a new
constitution before elections. With internal divisions, an
uneven electoral playing field, and inadequate time to
prepare for elections, the MDC is faced with a Hobson’s
choice: participate in elections which most party officials
believe it will lose, in the process (at least partly)
legitimizing a Mugabe victory; or boycott the elections which
will result in a Mubabe victory, the absence of an MDC
presence in Parliament, and perhaps the end of the MDC as a
viable party.
¶2. (C) ZANU-PF is rife with divisions, and discussions
continue regarding formation of a ZANU-PF splinter group to
be led by ZANU-PF businessman and Politburo member Simba
Makoni, or creation of a popular front, to be led by Makoni,
that would combine elements of ZANU-PF (primarily the Mujuru
faction) and the MDC. (An alternative scenario involves
opposition from a splinter group within the party, but this
appears unrealistic.) A coalition could present formidable
opposition to Mugabe, but it is unclear that Makoni is
willing to participate, that the Mujuru faction will break
with ZANU-PF, and that an accommodation could be reached with
the MDC, and in particular with Morgan Tsvangirai. Absent
such a united opposition, it is almost certain Mugabe will be
reelected, and the focus will shift to a Mugabe-orchrestated
succession. End Summary
————–
SADC Stalemate
————–
¶3. (C) According to MDC negotiators Tendai Biti and Welshman
Ncube, the SADC talks are deadlocked over ZANU-PF’s
insistence that elections occur in March and that
implementation of an agreed-upon draft constitution take
place after the elections. Biti and Ncube were to have
traveled to South Africa this week to meet with their ZANU-PF
counterparts and President Thabo Mbeki in a last ditch effort
to salvage the talks, but, according to Biti, ZANU-PF is
“playing games” and opted out of the trip. Biti told us an
effort would be made to reschedule.
¶4. (C) Ncube stated that ZANU-PF negotiators Chinimasa and
Goche had appeared willing to compromise on the issues of the
constitution and election date, but had subsequently hardened
in their position. He speculated that Mugabe had insisted on
hewing to the March election date because he believed the MDC
was now weak and additional time might result in a stronger
MDC and/or opposition coalition including disaffected ZANU-PF
members. A new constitution would present the opportunity
for (from Mugabe’s point of view) undesirable electoral
reforms.
¶5. (C) Ncube said that Mbeki and SADC had promised a level
electoral playing field. To attain this it was crucial that
elections be postponed to at least June and that the draft
constitution, transferring voter registration from the
current partisan registrar and providing for an independent
media commission, be implemented. He averred that the MDC
would ask Mbeki to request the intervention of the SADC Organ
on Defense, Politics, and Security to break the deadlock and,
if unsuccessful, to seek a SADC summit.
¶6. (C) Comment. The MDC entered into the SADC negotiations
because it thought it had no alternative. SADC mandated the
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GOZ to participate and the MDC thought it had an opportunity
to negotiate–for the first time–directly with ZANU-PF on
crucial issues such as a new constitution, repressive
legislation, electoral reform, and an improved political
environment. As part of the process, and in anticipation of
ZANU-PF concessions, the MDC supported Amendment 18 which
enlarges the size of Parliament and provides for presidential
succession; both of these provisions benefit ZANU-PF and
Mugabe. In return, ZANU-PF agreed to minor changes to AIPPA,
POSA, the electoral law, and the Broadcasting Act.
Significantly, political violence and intimidation have
continued. Unless SADC succeeds in a breakthrough on the
outstanding issues, the SADC talks will be seen to have
advantaged Mugabe and his party while failing in almost every
way to achieve the objective of a level playing field. End
Comment.
—————————————-
State of the MDC and Election Challenges
—————————————-
¶7. (C) The MDC has been split since October 2005. While
Tsvangirai is well known and remains a popular figure in many
SIPDIS
areas of the country, the party’s failure to reunite or form
an electoral coalition, combined with its failure until
recently to actively campaign, have resulted in decreased
support and apathy among potential voters. To be fair,
government repression, exemplified by the events of March 11
and the subsequent trashing of MDC offices, has made
organization and election preparation difficult. Yet until
recently, the MDC had no policy positions and proposals to
tell Zimbabweans how an MDC government would be different.
The Tsvangirai faction’s dissolution of its Women’s Assembly
in October, resulting in the sidelining of its head, Lucia
Matibenga, resulted in divisions within the faction that have
not yet healed. And with the apparent breakdown of the SADC
talks, many party members and officials are critical of
Tsvangirai and his advisors for entering into the talks.
SIPDIS
¶8. (C) Both factions have told us they intend–at long
last–to form an electoral coalition which would field one
candidate for president, and one candidate for parliamentary
and local council seats. In fact, presidents Tsvangirai and
Arthur Mutambara and secretary generals Welshman Ncube and
Tendai Biti met together this week, and further discussions
are scheduled by party standing committees next week in South
Africa. Ncube made the point to us, however, that with the
increase in the size of Parliament, the MDC would now have to
select candidates to run for 210 seats in the House of
Assembly (up from 120) and for 60 Senate seats (up from 50).
Additionally, there are several thousand seats in local
councils. Ncube believed the selection of candidates, given
a March election date, would be a difficult, if not
impossible, task.
¶9. (C) Finances continue to be a problem. In a diplomatic
briefing several weeks ago, the MDC stated it would need
US$10 million to run a country-wide campaigning. Money has
not been forthcoming. Tsvangirai told the Ambassador last
week that the MDC is broke. While the MDC has begun to hold
some rallies, additional resources are necessary to campaign,
particularly in Mashonaland which has always been the base of
ZANU-PF support.
¶10. (C) The new electoral act provides for independent
examination of the voters’ roll, which the Zimbabwe Electoral
Support Network (ZESN) believes contains numerous
inaccuracies. We’re not aware of anybody as of yet
undertaking a comprehensive examination which would obviously
take some time. (Note: ZESN has plans to do a partial audit
with USAID support. End Note.) Voter registration, which
the new draft constitution transfers to the Zimbabwe
HARARE 00000016 003 OF 005
Electoral Commission (ZEC), remains in the hands of the
partisan and corrupt Registrar. Ncube told us that this will
result in the disenfranchisement of numerous voters,
especially among the young. Additionally, the current ZEC,
widely thought to be biased in favor of the GOZ, is
conducting delimitation to draw up new constituencies in
light of the increase in the size of Parliament. The
delimitation exercise, not yet completed and made public, is
expected to combine a number of urban constituencies with
newly-created rural constituencies to dilute constituencies
now held by the MDC.
¶11. (C) The MDC has told us that the level of political
violence instigated by ZANU-PF has lessened, although
political intimidation continues. The MDC and civil society
have not tested the political environment by attempting to
hold rallies in ZANU-PF areas. To get a sense of
pre-election political space, or lack thereof, monitors will
be necessary well in advance of the election. The GOZ has
taken the position that monitors must be invited by the MFA,
and Mugabe has stated that only “friendly” monitors will be
invited. The draft SADC agreement contains a provision for
international monitors, but assuming there is no overall
agreement, this provision will not come into play. At this
point, it appears there will be regional monitors for the
election itself, but no monitors for the crucial period
beginning now and including the immediate run-up to the
election.
——————————————— —
To Contest or Not to Contest–A Hobson’s Choice
——————————————— —
¶12. (C) Given the state of the MDC, the electoral
environment, and, importantly, the short period to March
elections, most MDC officials with whom we have spoken do not
believe the MDC can win the presidential election.
Discussion is taking place as to whether to boycott the
election.
¶13. (C) Ncube told us that the executive council of his
faction has voted to participate in the election. Supporters
of this position, according to Ncube, believe that a boycott
could result in a dying-off of the party and a void that
would be filled by others. Parliamentarians would lose their
offices and attendant perquisites, including remuneration,
vehicles, and fuel. Ncube said he himself supports a
boycott. With little chance to win, participation would
serve primarily to legitimize a Mugabe victory.
¶14. (C) Officials in the Tsvangirai faction told us that a
decision has not yet been taken. Spokesman Nelson Chamisa
told us that many of Tsvangirai’s advisors are leaning toward
a boycott, but that parliamentarians in the faction, who
represent an important base, are in favor of participation.
¶15. (C) Comment. The MDC at this moment has two bad
choices. Participation runs the risk of legitimizing Mugabe;
a boycott would result in a one-party state and a diminution
of relevance of the MDC.
16 (C) Comment Continued. We strongly suspect the MDC will
ultimately decide to participate in elections. Threat of a
boycott is intended to exert pressure on SADC to wring
concessions from ZANU-PF on an election date. In the event
of an actual boycott, it would be more difficult to allege an
unfair election than if the MDC campaigned and could point to
specific examples of ZANU-PF conduct resulting in an unlevel
electoral playing field. Mugabe would claim that ZANU-PF
participated in negotiations in good faith, that his party
compromised on such issues as AIPPA and POSA, and that the
MDC had declined to participate because it realized it could
HARARE 00000016 004 OF 005
not win. As noted, a boycott would also allow Mugabe to
realize his long-sought goal of a one-party state while at
the same time the MDC diminished in importance. MDC
participation runs the risk of legitimizing a ZANU-PF win,
but parliamentarians would keep their jobs and the MDC would
maintain a platform in Parliament. End Comment.
———–
A Third Way
———–
¶17. (C) Ibbo Mandaza (a longtime ZANU-PF member who is a
former minister and a former adviser to Mugabe) and Jonathan
Moyo (a former ZANU-PF member, who is also a former minister
and former adviser to Mugabe) are both involved in efforts to
recruit Simba Makoni to establish a “third way” movement.
¶18. (C) Mandaza told us two weeks ago that his plan was to
have Makoni head a splinter ZANU-PF faction to challenge
Mugabe. He hoped to win provincial party support, primarily
from the Mujuru faction with which he and Makoni are
affiliated, to demonstrate to Mugabe that there was
substantial opposition to him within the party and convince
him to stand down for the elections. Failing that, he would
hope to have the splinter group contest the election against
ZANU-PF, perhaps as part of a broader coalition. Mandaza,
who has been one of the only ZANU-PF members in Zimbabwe
openly critical of Mugabe, told us he wants to get rid of
Mugabe but keep ZANU-PF and its structures in tact.
¶19. (C) Moyo, who has been in contact with Mugabe, related
to us that his idea was a broad-based coalition, comprised of
break-off elements of ZANU-PF (presumably the Mujuru faction)
and the MDC. Makoni would lead this coalition. Moyo is
trying to cast a wider net than Mandaza; he has strategized
with Nkosana Moyo (no relation), a well-respected former
international trade minister who is now a London businessman.
Jonathan Moyo, who is the only independent member of
Parliament, has talked with numerous ZANU-PF and MDC
parliamentarians.
¶20. (C) Consideration of a “third way” is not a secret. The
Financial Gazette carried a front-page article on Jan 3. On
Saturday, George Charamba, Mugabe’s spokesperson who writes
under the name of Nathaniel Manheru, belittled Mandaza and
his plans to challenge Mugabe in his regular column. As a
result, according to Moyo, a number of potential supporters
of a third way are getting cold feet. However, on January
11, the Independent reported that Mandaza and Makoni will
publicly roll out their plan and and announce formation of
the splinter ZANU-PF party next week. Moyo told us that he,
Mandaza, Nkosana Moyo, and possibly Makon planned to meet in
South African January 12.
¶21. (C) Comment: There are several keys to a “third way”
challenge. First is the participation of Makoni. Makoni, is
a member of the ZANU-PF politburo, is well-respected
throughout Zimbabwe, is considered relatively clean, and has
good ties with the international community. Affiliated with
the Mujuru faction, he has criticized ZANU-PF from within and
non-publicly. But he has until now declined to exercise a
leadership role to oppose Mugabe. Mandaza claimed to us that
within the last several weeks, Makoni has said he would
consider leading opposition to Mugabe; at the moment he is
“consulting” and considering his options.
¶22. (C) Comment continued: The second key is the support of
the Mujuru faction. Makoni has no constituency of his own
and he probably could not be effective, particularly in an
intraparty struggle, without the Mujuru faction. For their
part, the Mujurus failed in December to stop Mugabe from
obtaining the ZANU-PF nomination, and it is unclear they
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would be willing to challenge Mugabe openly in a battle they
might not win, in the process exposing themselves to an
assault by Mugabe on their huge business interests. The
Mujurus are corrupt and Mugabe, who reportedly has dossiers
on the faction and its interests, could make things difficult
for them should they publicly oppose him.
¶23. (C) Comment continued: With Mugabe’s control of
security and intelligence elements of ZANU-PF and with a
substantial following in ZANU-PF outside of the Mujuru
faction, it is unlikely an internal challenge, as envisaged
by Mandaza can succeed. More realistic is a broadbased
coalition with the Mujuru faction and Makoni joining with the
MDC. The third key, then, in addition to willingness on the
part of the Mujuru faction and Makoni, is an accommodation
with the MDC. MDC officials with whom we have spoken are
skeptical of the plan. They doubt Makoni has the courage to
assert a leadership role and that the Mujurus would leave the
party. And they’re not sure a modus vivendi could be worked
out between Makoni and Tsvangirai. Tsvangirai told the
Ambassador he would not step aside for Makoni. End Comment.
———————–
Comment–The Road Ahead
———————–
¶24. (C) A broadbased coalition, unlikely to be formed (but
still a possibility), is the best hope to defeat Mugabe.
Given the MDC’s weaknesses, an early election date, and an
unlevel playing field, the MDC by itself is unlikely to
prevail in an election. Reflective of this, Biti and Ncube
both told us they expect this year to be worse than last.
¶25. (C) Mugabe’s reelection in March is likely. He may then
try to create a government of national unity by inviting some
MDC members into his cabinet. The betting is that he will
try to stay in office until at least early 2009 when the
ZANU-PF Congress will either reelect him as first secretary
or elect a new leader. At this point, the best hope may be
for the unexpected. Mugabe is old and reportedly has cancer.
And as the economy worsens, infrastructure deteriorates, and
hardship increases, opposition may coalesce in ways that are
not now apparent.
MCGEE
(39 VIEWS)
