President Robert Mugabe’s repeated claims that the United States, and in particular Christopher Dell, its Ambassador to Zimbabwe from July 2004 to July 2007, wanted regime change in the country have been proven right according to documents released by Wikileaks through the New York Times. “Having said my piece repeatedly over the last three years, I won’t offer a lengthy prescription for our Zimbabwe policy,” Dell wrote before his departure to another trouble spot, Afghanistan. “My views can be stated very simply as stay the course and prepare for change. Our policy is working and it’s helping to drive change here. What is required is simply the grit, determination and focus to see this through. Then, when the changes finally come we must be ready to move quickly to help consolidate the new dispensation”. Below are Dell’s dispatches in full.
Date 2007-07-13 10:04:00
Source Embassy Harare
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HARARE 000638
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR P, AF, AND AF/S FOR MOZENA AND HILL,
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B.
PITTMAN AND B. LEO; USAID FOR M. COPSON AND E. LOKEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/12/2017
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ZI
SUBJECT: The End is Nigh
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell under Section 1.4b/d
1. (C) Having said my piece repeatedly over the last three years,
I won’t offer a lengthy prescription for our Zimbabwe
policy. My views can be stated very simply as stay the
course and prepare for change. Our policy is working and it’s
helping to drive change here. What is required is simply the grit,
determination and focus to see this through. Then, when the changes
finally come we must be ready to move quickly to help consolidate
the new dispensation.
THE SITUATION
2. (C) Robert Mugabe has survived for so long because he is more
clever and more ruthless than any other politician in
Zimbabwe. To give the devil his due, he is a brilliant
tactitian and has long thrived on his ability to abruptly
change the rules of the game, radicalize the political
dynamic and force everyone else to react to his agenda.
However, he is fundamentally hampered by several factors:
his ego and belief in his own infallibility; his obsessive
focus on the past as a justification for everything in the
present and future; his deep ignorance on economic issues
(coupled with the belief that his 18 doctorates give him
the authority to suspend the laws of economics, including
supply and demand); and his essentially short-term,
tactical style.
3. (C) While his tactical skills have kept him in power for 27
years, over the last seven this has only been achieved by a
series of populist, but destructive and ultimately
self-defeating moves. In reaction to losing the 2000
referendum on the constitution, a vengeful Mugabe unleashed
his QGreen BombersQ to commit land reform and in the
process he destroyed ZimbabweQs agricultural sector, once the
bedrock of the economy. While thousands of white farmers
saw their properties seized, hundreds of thousands of black
Zimbabweans lost their livelihoods and were reduced to utter
poverty. In 2005, having been forced to steal victory by
manipulating the results of an election he lost, Mugabe
lashed out again, punishing the urban populace by launching
Operation Murambatsvina. The result was wholesale
destruction of the informal sector, on which as much as
70-80 percent of urban dwellers had depended, and the
uprooting of 700,000 Zimbabweans. The current inflationary
cycle really began with Murambatsvina, as rents and prices
grew in response to a decrease in supply.
4. (C) And now, faced with the hyperinflationary consequences
of his ruinous fiscal policies and growing reliance on the
printing press to keep his government running, Mugabe has
launched Operation Slash Prices. This has once again given
him a very temporary boost in popularity (especially among
the police, who have led the looting of retail outlets and
now seem well positioned to take a leading role in the
black market economy) at the cost of terrible damage to the
country and people. Many small grocery and shop owners,
traders, etc., will be wiped out; the shelves are
increasingly bare; hunger, fear, and tension are growing;
fuel has disappeared. When the shelves are still empty
this time next week, the popular appeal of the price roll
back will evaporate and the government simply doesnQt have
the resources to replace the entire private commercial
sector and keep Zimbabweans fed. It may attempt to do so
by printing more money, adding even more inflationary
pressure on a system already reeling from the GOZQs
quasi-fiscal lunacy combined with the price impact of
pervasive shortages. The increasingly worthless Zim dollar
is likely to collapse as a unit of trade in the near
future, depriving the GOZ of its last economic tool other
than sheer thuggery and theft of othersQ assets.
5. (C) With all this in view, IQm convinced the end is not
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far off for the Mugabe regime. Of course, my predecessors
and many other observers have all said the same thing, and
yet Mugabe is still with us. I think this time could prove
different, however, because for the first time the
president is under intensifying pressure simultaneously on
the economic, political and international fronts. In the
past, he could always play one of these off against the
other, using economic moves to counter political pressure
or playing the old colonial/race/imperialist themes to buy
himself breathing room regionally and internationally. But
he is running out of options and in the swirling gases of
the new Zimbabwean constellation that is starting to form,
the economic, political and international pressures are
concentrating on Mugabe himself. Our ZANU-PF contacts are
virtually unanimous in saying reform is desperately needed,
but won’t happen while the Old Man is there, and therefore
he must go (finding the courage to make that happen is
another matter, however, but even that may be coming closer).
This is not some sudden awakening on the road to
Damascus, but a reflection of the pain even party insiders
increasingly feel over the economic meltdown. We also get
regular, albeit anecdotal, reports of angry and
increasingly open mutterings against Mugabe even in ZANU-PF’s
traditional rural bastions. Beginning in March, the
other SADC leaders finally recognized (in the wake of the
terrible beatings of March 11 and the international outcry
that followed Q another self-inflicted wound for Mugabe)
that Zimbabwe is a problem they need to address. Thabo
Mbeki appears committed to a successful mediation and is
reportedly increasingly irritated with MugabeQs efforts to
manipulate him or blow him off altogether. If Mugabe
judges that he still commands all he surveys by virtue of
being the elder statesman on the scene, he may be
committing yet another serious blunder. Finally, one does
well to recall that the only serious civil disturbances
here in a decade came in 1998 over bread shortages, showing
that even the famously passive Shona people have their
limits. The terror and oppression of the
intervening years have cowed people, but itQs anyoneQs guess
whether their fear or their anger will win out in the end.
WHAT WILL THE END LOOK LIKE?
6. (C) This is the big, unanswerable question. One thing
at least is certain, Mugabe will not wake up one morning a
changed man, resolved to set right all he has wrought. He
will not go quietly nor without a fight. He will cling to
power at all costs and the costs be damned, he deserves to
rule by virtue of the liberation struggle and land reform and
the people of Zimbabwe have let him down by failing to
appreciate this, thus he neednQt worry about their
well-being. The only scenario in which he might agree to
go with a modicum of good grace is one in which he
concludes that the only way to end his days a free man is
by leaving State House. I judge that he is still a long
way from this conclusion and will fight on for now.
7. (C) The optimal outcome, of course, and the only one that
doesnQt bring with it a huge risk of violence and conflict, is
a genuinely free and fair election, under international
supervision. The Mbeki mediation offers the best, albeit
very slim, hope of getting there. However, as Pretoria
grows more and more worried about the chaos to its north
and President MbekiQs patience with MugabeQs antics wears
thin, the prospects for serious South African engagement
may be growing. Thus, this effort deserves all the support
and backing we can muster. Less attractive is the idea of
a South African-brokered transitional arrangement or
government of national unity. Mbeki has always favored
stability and in his mind this means a ZANU-PF-led GNU, with
perhaps a few MDC additions. This solution is more likely
to prolong than resolve the crisis and we must guard
against letting Pretoria dictate an outcome which
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perpetuates the status quo at the expense of real change
and reform.
8. (C) The other scenarios are all less attractive: a popular
uprising would inevitably entail a bloodbath, even if it
were ultimately successful; MugabeQs sudden, unexpected
death would set off a stampede for power among ZANU-PF
heavy weights; a palace coup, whether initiated within
ZANU-PF or from the military – in which Mugabe is removed,
killed, exiled or otherwise disposed of, could well devolve
into open conflict between the contending successors. Similarly,
some form of “constitutional coup” i.e., a change at the top
engineered within the framework of ZANU-PFQs “legitimate”
structures could well prove to be merely the opening bell
in a prolonged power struggle. None of the players is
likely to go quietly into the night without giving everything
they have, including calling on
their supporters in the security services. Moreover, experience
elsewhere would suggest that whoever comes out on top
initially will struggle, and more than likely fail, to halt
the economic collapse. Thus, there is a good prospect of
not one but a series of rapid-fire Qtransitions,Q until
some new, stable dispensation is reached.
9. (C) The final, and probably worst, possibility is that Mugabe
concludes he can settle for ruling over a rump Zimbabwe,
maintaining control over Harare and the Mashona heartland,
the critical forces of the National Reserve Force and CIO
and a few key assets Q gold, diamonds, platinum and Air
Zimbabwe to fund the good times. Under this scenario the
rest of the country, in one of the comradeQs favorite
phrases, could Qgo hang,Q leaving it to the international
community to stave off the worst humanitarian consequences.
WHAT OF THE OPPOSITION?
10. (C) ZimbabweQs opposition is far from ideal and I leave
convinced that had we had different partners we could have
achieved more already. But you have to play the hand youQre dealt.
With that in mind, the current leadership has little executive
experience and will require massive hand holding and assistance
should they ever come to power.
11. (C) Morgan Tsvangarai is a brave, committed man and, by and
large, a democrat. He is also the only player on the scene
right now with real star quality and the ability to rally
the masses. But Tsvangarai is also a flawed figure, not
readily open to advice, indecisive and with questionable
judgment in selecting those around him. He is the indispensable
element for opposition success, but possibly an albatross around
t heir necks once in power. In short, he is a kind of Lech Walesa
character: Zimbabwe needs him, but should not rely on his executive
abilities to lead the country’s recovery. Arthur Mutambara is young
and ambitious, attracted to radical, anti-western rhetoric and
smart as a whip. But, in many respects heQs a light-weight
who has spent too much time reading U.S. campaign messaging
manuals and too little thinking about the real issues. Welshman
Ncube has proven to be a deeply divisive
and destructive player in the opposition ranks and the
sooner he is pushed off the stage, the better. But he is
useful to many, including the regime and South Africa, so
is probably a cross to be borne for some time yet. The
prospects for healing the rift within the MDC seem dim,
which is a totally unnecessary self-inflicted wound on
their part this time. With few exceptions Q Tendayi Biti,
Nelson Chamisa Q the talent is thin below the top ranks.
The great saving grace of the opposition is likely to be
found in the diaspora. Most of ZimbabweQs best
professionals, entrepreneurs, businessmen and women, etc.,
have fled the country. They are the oppositionQs natural
allies and it is encouraging to see signs, particularly in
South Africa and the UK, that these people are talking,
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sharing ideas, developing plans and thinking together about
future recovery.
12. (C) Unfortunately, among the MDCQs flaws is its inability to
work more effectively with the rest of civil society. The
blame for this can be shared on both sides (many civil
society groups, like the NCA, are single-issue focused and
take the overall dynamic in unhelpful directions; others,
like WOZA, insist on going it alone as a matter of
principle), but ultimately it falls to the MDC as the
largest and the only true political party, to show the
way. Once again, however, these are natural allies and
they have more reason to work together than fight against each
other.
STAYING THE COURSE, PREPARING FOR CHANGE
13. (C) If I am right and change is in the offing, we need to
step up our preparations. The work done over the last year on
transition planning has been extremely useful, both for
stimulating a fresh look at our own assumptions and plans
and for forging a common approach among the traditional
donor community. But the process has lagged since the
meetings in March in London and should be re-energized. It is
encouraging in this respect that USAID Washington has
engaged the Mission here in discussing how we would use
additional resources in response to a genuinely
reform-minded government . I hope this will continue and
the good work done so far will survive the usual
bloodletting of the budget process.
14. (C) The official media has had a field day recently whooping
that “Dell leaves Zimbabwe a failed man”. That’s not quite
how it looks from here. I believe that the firm
U.S. stance, the willingness to speak out and stand up,
have contributed to the accelerating pace of change.
Mugabe and his henchman are like bullies everywhere: if
they can intimidate you they will. But ther’re not used to
someone standing up to them and fighting back. It catches them
off guard and that’s when they make mistakes. The howls of protest
over critical statements from Washington or negative coverage
on CNN are the clearest proof of how this hurts them. Ditto
the squeals over Qillegal sanctions.Q In addition, the regime
has become so used to calling the shots and dictating the
pace that the merest stumble panics them. Many local
observers have noted that Mugabe is panicked and
desperate about hyperinflation at the moment, and hence heQs
making mistakes. Possibly fatal mistakes. We need to
keep the pressure on in order to keep Mugabe off his game
and on his back foot, relying on his own shortcomings to do
him in. Equally important is an active U.S. leadership
role in the international community. The UK is ham-strung
by its colonial past and domestic politics, thus, letting them
set the pace alone merely limits our effectiveness. The EU is
divided between the hard north and its soft southern
underbelly. The Africans are only now beginning to find
their voice. Rock solid partners like Australia donQt
pack enough punch to step out front and the UN is a
non-player. Thus it falls to the U.S., once again, to take
the lead, to say and do the hard things and to set the agenda.
Hundreds, maybe thousands, of ordinary Zimbabweans of all
kinds have told me that our clear, forthright stance has
given them hope and the courage to hang on. By this regimeQs
standards, acting in the interests of the people may indeed be
considered a failure. But I believe that the opposite is true,
and that we can be justifiably proud that in Zimbabwe we have
helped advance the PresidentQs freedom Agenda. The people of
this country know it and recognize it and that is the true
touchstone of our success here.
DELL
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