The Movement for Democratic Change had a hectic travel ahead of the 2005 elections which covered Southern, North and East Africa as well as Europe and the United States.
Party leader Morgan Tsvangirai and his deputy Gibson Sibanda were scheduled to travel to South Africa, Nigeria, Ghana and Senegal and were expected to receive training on media strategy from an American organisation the International Republican Institute one of whose former employees was Tsvangirai’s special advisor.
The delegation was also expected to travel to Brussels, London, Oslo and Stockholm before flying to the United States.
From the Us the delegation would swing to Ethiopia, Kenya and Tanzania before returning to Zimbabwe.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 04HARARE1842, MDC SECRETARY-GENERAL ON PARTY TRAVEL,
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 001842
SIPDIS
AF/S FOR BNEULING
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2009
SUBJECT: MDC SECRETARY-GENERAL ON PARTY TRAVEL,
CAMPAIGNING, INTER-PARTY RELATIONS
REF: (A) HARARE 1787 (B) HARARE 1562
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell under Section 1.5 b/d
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Movement for Democratic Change
Secretary-General Welshman Ncube on November 4 updated poloff
SIPDIS
on the developing itinerary of opposition party leaders,
including regional travel and a planned trip by him and Party
President Morgan Tsvangirai to the United States in
mid-November. He said the party was finalizing a slate of
candidates for possible participation in next year’s
parliamentary elections, which were still scheduled for
March. He reported positive developments suggesting a
continuing opening of campaign space for the opposition but
dismissed South African Government suggestions that the
ruling party was preparing to re-engage in inter-party talks
on constitutional change. END SUMMARY.
Opposition’s Hectic Travel Schedule
———————————–
¶2. (C) Ncube reported that Tsvangirai and party
Vice-President Gibson Sibanda were scheduled to be in South
Africa November 4, and to meet with heads of state in Nigeria
November 6, in Ghana November 8, and in Senegal on November
¶10. (Note: The delegation also is slated to receive media
strategy training from IRI while in West Africa. End note.)
They hoped to secure meetings with the presidents of
Botswana, Lesotho, and Burkina Faso during that period as
well, but scheduling details had yet to be worked out. Ncube
indicated that the party was getting the cold shoulder from
SADC troika member Lesotho, possibly because of the rapport
between Foreign Minister Mudenge and the Lesotho foreign
minister, who Ncube said had been classmates.
¶3. (C) After covering southern and western Africa, the
delegation would be joined by Ncube for visits to Brussels,
London, Oslo, and Stockholm before travelling to the United
States. During the U.S. leg, dates for which were yet to be
determined, the delegation hoped to visit the State
Department, Capitol Hill, the MDC’s Washington Office and
Zimbabwe emigre elements, among other interlocutors. The
delegation would then swing by Ethiopia (where they hoped to
engage the African Union), Kenya, and Tanzania by early
December before returning to Zimbabwe.
¶4. (C) Ncube singled out the Obasanjo meeting as
particularly important. He said Obasanjo indicated that he
wanted to remain engaged on Zimbabwe, notwithstanding past
frustrations. As the African Union Chair, he could be
particularly helpful in engineering a meaningful AU election
observation group. Moreover, Nigeria could keep Zimbabwe on
the Commonwealth’s agenda, notwithstanding Zimbabwe’s
withdrawal from the organization, and had leverage through a
bilateral relationship that was important to Zimbabwe.
Campaign Space Opening Up?
————————–
¶5. (C) Ncube reported that he and Deputy Secretary-General
Gift Chimanikire would be advancing the party’s domestic
agenda while the President was abroad. They planned to be
addressing rallies and meeting with party district and ward
structures in the Midlands in the next few days. Police were
becoming notably less obstructive with respect to party
meetings. Instead of disapproving applications on specious
grounds or never responding and then closing meetings down,
police generally were approving meeting requests around the
country, with few exceptions. When applications were
disapproved, it was usually with some apparent justification
and without prejudice to reschedule or to relocate.
(Comment: This appeared to continue a trend first reported by
Tsvangirai aide Gandhi Mudzingwa in July, ref B. End
SIPDIS
comment.) Local organizers still faced intimidation and
disruptions by local ruling party elements, but not as widely
as before or with quite the apparent level of official
impunity.
¶6. (C) The Secretary-General did not comment on prospects
for MDC participation in the March election or on the party’s
recent call to delay the election. Nonetheless, he allowed
that the party was proceeding with efforts to complete its
slate of candidates to participate in the election. The
party had identified candidates in about 85 of the 120
parliamentary constituencies. Most of the remaining
selections were in the Mashonalands (East, West and Central)
with a few left in Harare and Manicaland as well.
Bennet Case Implications
————————
¶7. (C) Ncube said the eligibility of recently incarcerated
MDC MP Roy Bennet to stand for election was murky (ref A).
The constitution conditioned an MP’s ineligibility on a
criminal sentence exceeding six months being imposed by a
court, not Parliament (which imposed Bennet’s sentence). Of
more immediate concern, though, was Bennet’s possible
expulsion from the body and the holding of a by-election
before the March national elections. An MP can be expelled
from the body if he is absent without adequate cause (an
issue that would be debatable in Bennet’s politically charged
case) for 21 consecutive days that Parliament is in session.
Under the current parliamentary schedule (assuming he could
not get a court order freeing him earlier), that would occur
in mid-December for Bennet. That would still probably leave
inadequate time to conduct a by-election before March. In
quiet inter-party negotiations, ZANU-PF had proposed to
release Bennet from jail in return for his expulsion from
Parliament and a declaration of his seat’s vacancy. Ncube
indicated that the Parliament didn’t have the authority to
expel him under current law, but that Bennet and the MDC
would likely accept his suspension for the remainder of the
current term in return for his release. Ncube said that the
ZANU-PF offer underscored its interest in trying to get a 2/3
majority before the parliamentary election so it could amend
the constitution to its liking without MDC support. (Note:
If ZANU-PF is able to capture Bennet’s seat, it would still
be one seat short of a 2/3 majority. End note.) Ncube was
not optimistic about Bennet’s chances for release under a
high court petition scheduled to be heard on November 9.
ZANU-PF Temporizing on Talks
—————————-
¶8. (C) According to Ncube, ZANU-PF was still dragging its
feet on long-standing discussions about a package of
constitutional amendments. Since the MDC publicly announced
in July its conditional suspension of participation in
elections, the ruling party had backed off from the package
tentatively agreed between Ncube and Minister for Justice,
Parliamentary and Legal Affairs Patrich Chinamasa. Ncube
said that Chinamasa told him that Mugabe himself had scotched
further ZANU-PF efforts on the matter. According to
Chinamasa, Mugabe had said that the MDC was “taking them for
a ride” and would end up reneging on any agreed amendments or
demanding more at the last minute.
¶9. (C) Ncube maintained that the MDC remained interested in
rekindling talks but had little faith in the ruling party’s
sincerity. The opposition privately had made it clear to
ZANU-PF counterparts that the constitutional talks were not
linked to the issue of election participation; they would
vote for the agreed constitutional changes even before making
a decision to participate in the election. Ncube said that
Tsvangirai had conveyed that message to Mugabe in a letter.
SIPDIS
¶10. (C) Ncube said that SAG interlocutors told the MDC that
Mugabe had undertaken to Mbeki on the margins of the UNGA in
September that inter-party talks on the constitution would be
revived soon. SAG sources later said that the politburo was
scheduled to meet on November 3, when Mugabe would bless the
recommencement of talks. However, Chinamasa has been unable
to confirm any of this to Ncube. When they last spoke
earlier in the week, Chinamasa told Ncube to talk to Minister
for Security Nicholas Goche, who has since been unavailable.
Ncube concluded that these developments were consistent with
the ruling party’s long-term strategy of using “talks on
talks” to string out the SAG and the MDC, appearing to be
willing to talk without ever talking meaningfully.
Comment
——-
¶11. (C) The ruling party’s overarching priority remains to
win the March elections and win big – big enough to amend the
constitution on its own. Nonetheless, the party is stepping
up efforts to market its election internationally, at least
to the region and its developing world “friends.” The MFA
convened diplomats from Non-Aligned Movement embassies on
November 1 to brief them on election-related developments.
At the briefing, Foreign Minister Mudenge rejected MDC
demands that the election be delayed and casitigated the EU
for planning to condemn Zimbabwe with an UNGA resolution
“based on stale reports from three years ago,” a move he
alleged indicated that they had prejudged the election. He
maintained that Zimbabwe had the region’s strongest
opposition party and was ahead of most of SADC in
implementing SADC’s electoral principles – proof of the
Government’s commitment to multiparty democracy. The
reportedly meek response from the audience and muted reaction
from regional counterparts will fortify ruling party
confidence in its strategy.
¶12. (C) The GOZ can be expected to make additional marginal
(but not decisive) improvements in the electoral environment,
as the gradual opening of campaign space indicates. The
electoral bill’s modest reforms received their second reading
in the Parliament and elicited little outcry in a recent
sparesly attended public hearing conducted on the bill by the
parliamentary committee; they will likely pass in the coming
weeks, in time to be implemented for the March election. The
GOZ reportedly is working on election-related media access
rules, but ministers have proclaimed publicly that they will
apply only to parties contending in elections – an implicit
(and mostly disingenuous) enticement for the MDC to
participate. The MDC will be challenged to take advantage of
these openings to rekindle hope and energy among an
electorate that appears increasingly resigned to a ruling
party victory.
¶13. (C) The MDC leadership hopes that its ambitious travel
agenda will burnish its image at home and abroad, will
generate more regional pressure on the GOZ, and will
stimulate party fund-raising efforts, particularly with the
growing Zimbabwean diaspora. The strategy is not without
costs, however. The party will be without much of its
leadership at home for a lengthy and potentially important
period in the run-up to elections, potentially handicapping
its ability to exploit the small openings being afforded it
as the ruling party dresses up its election administration.
Moreover, the public posturing with Western governments is a
double-edged sword — it may bolster flagging morale among
party faithful but it plays into the hands of the GOZ
propagandists, who exaggerate the party’s western orientation
in playing to unaligned domestic and regional audiences.
Finally, few things raise the hackles of travel sanctioned
ruling party officials more than high profile opposition
globe-trotting. Tsvangirai’s publicized meetings abroad
could provoke a backlash, including an effort to go after
Tsvangirai’s passport again in connection with purported
SIPDIS
treason charges. We do not discount the possibility that a
backlash could touch us as well; a ZANU-PF official once
indicated privately to us that reports he had received from
the ANC that the USG was funding MDC travel, if true, could
adversely affect bilateral relations.
DELL
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