Movement for Democratic Change leader Morgan Tsvangirai was upbeat about 2004 asserting that the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front would be more attentive to international opinion as it fought for economic survival rather than concentrate on attaining a two-thirds majority in parliament.
But the United States embassy remained sceptical. It said that the insecurity, lack of meaningful debate, and combustible rhetoric associated with the ZANU-PF national conference and commonwealth fall-out suggested a hardened ruling party posture.
Tsvangirai said the appointment of Gideon Gono as central bank governor and his desire to re-engage with the Bretton Woods institutions was likely to entail enhancing the credibility of both the government’s economic policy and the political situation.
On the controversial land issue, Tsvangirai said his party would carry out a rationalisation exercise grounded on consistent plot sizes, one farm per family, productive capacity and would weed out many but not all of the current beneficiaries of land reform.
Beneficiaries with alternative viable occupations, such as civil servants and military personnel, would likely be given a choice between land and position.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 04HARARE47, OPPOSITION LEADER UPBEAT ON 2004
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
|
Reference ID |
Created |
Released |
Classification |
Origin |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000047
SIPDIS
AF/S FOR S. DELISI, L. AROIAN, M. RAYNOR
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR J. FRAZER, D. TEITELBAUM
LONDON FOR C. GURNEY
PARIS FOR C. NEARY
NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2009
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ECON ZI MDC
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION LEADER UPBEAT ON 2004
REF: (A) 03 HARARE 2455 (B) 03 HARARE 2443 (C) 03
HARARE 2412
Classified By: Political Officer Win Dayton under Section 1.5(b)(d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: With qualified optimism, MDC President
Morgan Tsvangirai offered an assessment of Zimbabwe’s
political landscape to Ambassador Sullivan during lunch on
January 7 at the Residence. Tsvangirai identified
mobilization of membership, coordination with civil society,
and improving the election environment as tactical party
priorities in the coming year. He was non-committal about
mass action and held out the possibility that the MDC would
not participate in elections if election atmospherics and
mechanics did not improve. While still skeptical of South
African President Mbeki’s motives, Tsvangirai surmised that
Mbeki had pressed Mugabe meaningfully during his December
visit and predicted that the GOZ would be more susceptible to
foreign pressure in coming months. END SUMMARY.
Party Mobilization, Election Preparations
—————————————–
¶2. (C) Accompanied by MDC Secretary for Presidential Affairs
Gandi Mudzingwa, Tsvangirai expressed appreciation for
Secretary Powell’s response to his letter last month. He
SIPDIS
said he was pleased with the results of last month’s MDC
national conference (ref A), which fostered grassroots
momentum among middle class and rural constituencies.
Further mobilization of those constituencies would absorb
substantial party energy in coming months, in part with a
view to mass action. Tsvangirai did not say when mass action
might commence but indicated that it would require close
coordination with civil society groups.
¶3. (C) Tsvangirai indicated that the party’s preoccupation
with training, building, and reinforcing party structures and
motivating the membership would be geared in large party to
election preparations. He expected that parliamentary
elections would be conducted within six to 18 months,
depending on when ZANU-PF perceived it had the strongest
advantage. The intimidating environment and GOZ control of
election administration continued to offer the ruling party a
prohibitive advantage. The MDC would consider boycotting
elections altogether if the situation did not improve,
although he conceded that the party risked sliding into
irrelevance if it walked away. In that vein, MDC
participation in elections would depend largely on
international posture toward the election environment and the
ruling party.
Change in Ruling Party Posture?
——————————-
¶4. (C) Tsvangirai asserted that ZANU-PF may be more
attentive to international opinion in coming months. For
example, the ruling party may be reluctant to manipulate
elections to yield itself the two thirds parliamentary
majority it would like in order to engineer controversial
constitutional changes. He noted that the GOZ had signalled
interest in re-engaging with the Bretton Woods institutions,
which would likely entail enhancing the credibility of both
economic policy and the political situation. Indeed, the
country’s dire economic straits — of late manifested in the
precarious financial sector — left the ruling party little
choice but to work on its international credibility in
economic and political spheres. New Reserve Bank Chairman
Gideon Gono’s rise to prominence gave the regime a confident
voice for re-engagement. Tsvangirai concluded that the
ruling party would not sacrifice these longer term interests
for the short-term expedience of getting a two thirds
majority.
¶5. (C) According to Tsvangirai, Mbeki’s visit (ref B) helped
to drive home to Mugabe the imperative of political progress.
Mbeki would have had to impress on Mugabe the length to
which he had gone for Mugabe and the extent to which Mbeki’s
own credibility was on the line domestically, regionally, and
internationally. Tsvangirai trusted that Mbeki had elicited
from Mugabe a commitment to dialogue, and hoped that Mugabe’s
exit was “part and parcel” of the commitment. Tsvangirai
added that the CHOGM affair further underscored South
Africa’s importance to Zimbabwe, and Mugabe would have to
deliver something. Nonetheless, ZANU-PF still appeared to be
playing for time a month, a week, a day at a time — a
situation that effectively diluted the impact of outside
pressure.
¶6. (C) Tsvangirai confirmed that there was no progress since
Mbeki’s visit toward recommencement of interparty talks.
Mbeki’s assignment to the parties was to work out a program
for talks, which would require more work by MDC negotiating
team and additional engagement between party Secretary
General Welshman Ncube and Minister of Justice Patrick
Chinamasa. He concluded that substantive progress would be
impossible while Mugabe was out of the country. (NOTE: The
GOZ reports that Mugabe is “on leave” until the end of
January. He reportedly plans to be in Asia much of that
time, beginning with Indonesia and Malaysia. South African
Ambassador Ndou advised Ambassador (septel) that SAG expected
progress toward talks to continue regardless of Mugabe’s
absence. END NOTE.)
Land Reform
———–
¶7. (C) Commenting on the MDC land reform policy articulated
at the national conference, Tsvangirai asserted that it was
an approach that should benefit and appeal to the masses,
including the poor. He confirmed that there was no going
back to Zimbabwe’s status quo ante. Imparting value to the
land, including the communal areas, was a central priority.
Considerable attention would be required to establish a model
for allocation of titles. A rationalization exercise —
grounded on consistent plot sizes, one farm per family,
productive capacity — would weed out many but not all of the
current beneficiaries of GOZ land reform. Beneficiaries with
alternative viable occupations, such as civil servants and
military personnel, would likely be given a choice between
land and position. The new system would significantly alter
traditional patronage relationships and means of social
control in rural areas. A transparent, widely consultative
process would be key in assuring the program’s success.
Tsvangirai conceded that the party would have difficulty
SIPDIS
overcoming official obstacles in publicizing the program to
rural areas, and would have to rely on the party’s growing
personally based networks.
Harare Hassles
————–
¶8. (C) Tsvangirai confirmed newspaper reports that the
investigative report into alleged corruption and
mismanagement by Harare’s City Council and Mayor Mudzuri (ref
C) was complete but had yet to be released. He predicted
that the report would be relatively objective and would
identify legitimate shortcomings that would fall short of
justifying dismissal. At the same time, Mudzuri’s
uncooperative interaction with the investigating commission
would likely reflect poorly on him in the report. The
Council suffered from inexperience and susceptibility to
corruption but seemed to be gaining competence with the
passage of time, in part because of MDC efforts to organize
and discipline wayward members. He noted that Christopher
Mushonga was one of the more experienced councillors but
suffered flaws such as unseemly patronage arrangements.
¶9. (C) According to Tsvangirai, municipal administration put
ZANU-PF in a quandary. Local Government Minister Chombo was
working hard to hamstring MDC-controlled municipalities,
especially Harare, but dismissing the Harare Mayor and
Council outright would undercut efforts to burnish the
government’s image internationally. In the end, he expected
the process to serve as a “verbal warning” to Harare’s MDC
administration. If personnel were dismissed, new elections
would yield a new or rejuvenated MDC-dominated council in any
event. Tsvangirai underscored the value of USAID assistance
that would help MDC municipal administration and urged that
we explore opportunities in this area.
Regional Outreach
—————–
¶9. (C) Tsvangirai expressed satisfaction with continuing MDC
efforts to engage regional leaders and parties. The party
planned following up soon with Nigeria, Senegal, and Kenya,
and was interested in tapping Ghanaian experiences in
election organization. Tsvangirai acknowledged with the
appreciation the “courage” of Botswana’s supportive efforts.
Comment
——-
¶10. (C) Tsvangirai was surprisingly upbeat in his new year’s
tour d’horizon. We remain skeptical. The insecurity, lack
of meaningful debate, and combustible rhetoric associated
with the ZANU-PF national conference and CHOGM fall-out
suggest a hardened ruling party posture, notwithstanding
Gono’s refreshing voice and Mbeki’s efforts. Early litmus
tests of GOZ sincerity likely will include progress in the
Ncube-Chinamasa engagement, disposition of the Harare
Council/Mayor controversy, Tsvangirai’s treason trial (due to
recommence January 19), and adjudication of the MDC’s
election petition (also likely to resume this month).
SULLIVAN
(43 VIEWS)
