The United States embassy in Harare said one of the lessons that had to be learnt from the 2005 elections, which the Movement for Democratic Change had said it would win, was that no one should underestimate President Robert Mugabe, his wiliness and his willingness to go to any length to hold on to power.
It said Mugabe would not willingly abandon his long-term game plan, including constitutional reform to consolidate his grip and the ideal of a one-party state.
“As long as he is on the scene, any ZANU-PF inspired reform will be on Mugabe’s terms and will be anti-democratic,” the embassy said.
There were also lessons for the MDC, civil society, the region and the US government.
For the MDC, the key finding was that while it almost certainly “won” the election campaign, it lost the vote due to its poor organisation especially on election day.
For civil society and other democratic forces, there was a need to better coordinate among themselves and with the MDC, especially in exploiting wedge issues sooner and more aggressively.
Regionally, the key lesson was that the South African government and President Thabo Mbeki could not be relied on to play a neutral role and put real pressure on Mugabe.
For the US, the key finding was that it needed to provide sufficient and sustained resources to the democratic forces in Zimbabwe to achieve meaningful change.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 05HARARE580, LESSONS LEARNED FROM ZIMBABWE,S 2005 PARLIAMENTARY
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
|
Reference ID |
Created |
Released |
Classification |
Origin |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
141147Z Apr 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HARARE 000580
SIPDIS
AF FOR DAS T. WOODS
AF/S FOR B. NEULING
OVP FOR NULAND
NSC FOR DNSA ABRAMS, SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2010
SUBJECT: LESSONS LEARNED FROM ZIMBABWE,S 2005 PARLIAMENTARY
ELECTIONS
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell under Section 1.4 b/d
——-
Summary
——-
¶1. (C) The lessons to be learned from Zimbabwe,s tainted
March 31 parliamentary elections fall into four categories,
lessons for: (a) the opposition; (b) civil society; (c)
regional outreach; and, (d) the US government. Some of these
lessons are not new but build on or refine lessons from
previous elections. For the MDC, or whatever democratic
alternative might replace it, our key finding is that while
it almost certainly &won8 the election campaign, it lost
the vote due to its poor organization, especially on election
day. It must do more in the future to counteract ZANU-PF,s
control of government resources and traditional chiefs and
the ruling party’s ability to steal elections. In
particular, it needs to be prepared to issue a timely
parallel vote count.
¶2. (C) For civil society and other democratic forces, there
is a need to better coordinate among themselves and with the
MDC, especially in exploiting wedge issues sooner and more
aggressively. Regionally, the key lesson is that the SAG and
President Mbeki cannot be relied on to play a neutral role
and put real pressure on President Mugabe ) we must look
elsewhere in Africa for regional leadership and should do
more to involve regional NGOs as a counterweight to official
views on Zimbabwe. For the USG, the key finding is that we
need to provide sufficient and sustained resources to the
democratic forces in Zimbabwe to achieve meaningful change.
End Summary.
————————–
Lessons for the Opposition
————————–
¶3. (C) With technical assistance from NDI, IRI, and others
the MDC ran a strong campaign that raised genuine issues of
concern for Zimbabweans suffering from the country,s severe
economic decline and repressive political environment. From
the Mission,s observations around the country, the MDC,s
campaign resonated with the population at large. The MDC
also pushed hard, and with some modest success, on the issue
of election reform, eliminating some of the earlier, cruder
forms of vote rigging. In the words of one American
consultant, the GOZ has reached the end point in its ability
to steal elections, and there are no further new tricks out
there.
¶3. (C) Nonetheless, although the party made important
progress in key areas since the 2000 and 2002 election, it is
clear that the MDC was still too disorganized and failed with
regard to several critical elements. The party did not
sufficiently press the issue of voter registration, letting
their conditional suspension from participation in the
elections prevent them from ensuring that their supporters
were registered, while the ruling ZANU-PF was furiously
registering its supporters in surgical voter drives (and
ensuring that potential MDC supporters such as the young and
urban voters would have difficulties). More importantly,
despite brave talk, the party also failed abysmally to put
out a parallel vote count. Even now, two weeks after the
election, they have been unable to pull together and release
the data from their polling agents. The timely dissemination
of a parallel count could have done much to undermine the
credibility of the election with African observers and could
have stoked public outrage at another fraudulent election.
¶4. (C) The lessons for the MDC to learn are that it needs to:
(a) substantially improve the party,s communications
directorate which, while much improved during the campaign,
fell into disarray during the immediate post-election period;
(b) improve its understanding of the entire electoral
process, and put systems in place well in advance to conduct
parallel vote tabulation; (c) be more targeted and strategic
in reaching out to other key democratic forces in Zimbabwe
and the region; (d) review and strengthen party structures to
improve its grassroots outreach; (e) find ways to counteract
the GOZ,s influence with traditional leaders; and (f) convey
leadership, both domestically and internationally, in the
face of ZANU-PF,s constant assaults and in spite of
significant set backs. Several of these needs had been
identified after past elections and while there has been
improvement, more is needed.
¶5. (C) The MDC may very well splinter, change leaders, or
morph into another party in the aftermath of this election.
However, there will surely be a democratic alternative to
ZANU-PF, and that party will need to find a way forward that
will rally disaffected Zimbabweans, put pressure on the GOZ,
and prepare the ground for local elections in 2006 and the
presidential election in 2008.
———————————–
Lessons for Other Democratic Forces
———————————–
¶6. (C) In important respects, the other democratic forces in
Zimbabwe have emerged from the 2005 election at least as
battered as the MDC. Organized labor, which was effectively
absent during the campaign, is under assault from the
government and its allies on one side, and on the other side
from the more progressive elements of the labor movement who
want a more confrontational approach towards government.
Likewise, the church effectively remains divided and
fragmented, without any clear consensus about the country,s
predicament, despite the pivotal role religion plays in
Zimbabwean society, nor effective mechanisms for coordinating
among themselves. Finally, and most importantly, while civil
society remains generally united internally and also allied
with the MDC in their analysis and goals, NGOs are deeply
frustrated with the party for its lack of outreach to them
during the campaign and for its decision not to pursue any
form of civil disobedience following the announcement of the
election results.
¶7. (C) Civil society,s alienation and frustration with the
MDC is most acute with the more activist and visible members
of civil society ) such as the National Constitutional
Assembly (NCA) and Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WoZA). It is
primarily an argument over tactics, but is also driven by
individual agendas. Much of civil society, but especially
the more activist elements, feel that the MDC has tried to
&control8 their activities too much. There is some truth
in this charge and the MDC needs to learn to manage this
relationship with more tact, allowing civil society NGOs more
room for independent action.
¶8. (C) While not fatal, this visible split among the
democratic forces is debilitating. The democratic opposition
spends a distressing amount of time criticizing one another
over tactics rather than working together on a common agenda.
The lesson for civil society, ZCTU, and progressive elements
in the churches to draw from the election is that they must
support whichever democratic political party is leading the
fight and give it their unstinting backing, even while
accepting that there will be diversity among their objectives
and methods. The civil society NGOs also need to do what the
MDC did late in the past election campaign and focus their
message on the bread and butter concerns of average
Zimbabweans rather than more esoteric issues.
¶9. (C) One particular NGO bears special mention, the Zimbabwe
Election Support Network (ZESN). ZESN has played an
important role in the election aftermath. As a non-partisan
domestic observer group, its commentary on the election has
carried added weight. In particular, its calls for the
Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) to answer questions and
release data have resonated publicly. Nonetheless, the
election also revealed that ZESN still lacks the capacity to
challenge electoral authorities effectively and ensure a free
and fair election. Like the MDC, ZESN was too disorganized
to pull together and publicize parallel counts in the
immediate aftermath of the election. The lesson for ZESN to
learn is that monitoring elections is a full-time business.
It cannot be effectively ginned up a month or two before an
election and expected to get the job done.
———————————-
Lessons Regarding Regional Support
———————————-
¶10. (C) The regional focus for the democratic opposition and
us has been on South Africa, and largely on the South African
Government (SAG). This focus has had some limited successes.
A broad range of forces, spanning the political spectrum
from the Democratic Alliance to COSATU and the South African
Communist Party, now recognize and say publicly that
democracy is being thwarted in Zimbabwe. South African media
is also supportive of Zimbabwe,s democratic forces and we
had great success convincing the South African Council of
Churches (SACC) to play a constructive role and speak out
with regard to the election. However, SAG and the ANC have
not generally played constructive roles. Although they did
pressure ZANU-PF to reduce election violence, their focus was
always on ensuring that the election was &blessable8 rather
than truly free and fair. As one wag quipped, the SAG
statement on the election was written so long ago it could
have been drafted in Afrikaans.
¶11. (C) The lesson to be learned from this election, which
the MDC has already internalised, is that the SAG and the ANC
cannot be relied on to be non-partisan and to pressure Mugabe
and his government and party to play by the rules ) even
SADC,s own rules. Thabo Mbeki will remain a potentially
pivotal player, however, and a targeted effort at the office
of the President and senior ANC leadership is still needed ,
including especially through key players from South African
civil society. At the same time, we will also need to look
elsewhere for regional leadership and build on the more
progressive positions taken by Botswana, Ghana, Nigeria and
Mauritius and Southern African civil society groups with
respect to the election.
¶12. (C) None of these countries and organizations alone
carries the same weight that South Africa has, nor do they
have the same degree of economic influence. Nonetheless,
collectively, they can begin to chip away at Mugabe,s status
within Africa and can put pressure on South Africa to be more
neutral in the run-up to 2008. Similarly, we hope that our
Embassies in the SADC region will be urged to spend less time
on fruitless demarches to host governments and more time
discussing Zimbabwe,s crisis with civil society groups. A
mechanism needs to be established, either with the RCSA in
Botswana or thru bilateral missions, to channel resources to
NGOs willing to get involved on the Zimbabwe question.
—————————–
Lessons for the US Government
—————————–
¶13. (C) The overwhelming lesson we should learn from these
elections is that democracy programs require more resources,
allocated consistently over a sustained period. Our ability
to mobilize resources in a timely manner, and at a scale to
have a measurable impact, was severely hampered by budget
cuts in FY04. Zimbabwe is now looking at nationwide local
government elections in 2006 and a Presidential Election in
¶2008. This is the appropriate time to review the policy
environment to determine funding needs for democratic support
during the FY05 through FY08 period. Continued cuts, or even
a levelling off of resources, followed by a large increase in
FY08 just prior to the Presidential elections, would be
counterproductive as it would reduce the effectiveness of the
democratic forces in the short to medium term. The Mugabe
regime remains extremely brittle and we believe that funding
in the range of approximately $13 million per annum for three
years will have a dramatic effect on the political landscape.
¶14. (C) Another lesson we should take away from this election
is that we need to take a more active role in fostering
coordination among the democratic forces, using our leverage
as the key donor. The &middle ground8 in Zimbabwe remains
extremely thin and if elements of the church or organized
labor again choose to sit on the fence, additional USG
support to them should be curtailed. Instead, support should
flow to enlightened, committed, non-violent, but activist,
civil society groups, key regional partners, the more
progressive elements in organized religion and labor. Above
all, the MDC still requires large amounts of technical advice
and support in devising effective strategies to counter the
regime,s authoritarian tendencies. In effect, support needs
to be focused and concentrated on institutions and
organizations that are committed to democratic change of
which the MDC remains the strongest for the moment.
¶15. (C) In relation to our partners, the USG needs to trust
but verify. We discussed preparations about election
observation with both the MDC and ZESN and were painted a
much rosier picture of their capabilities than their actual
preparatory work justified. In the future, we should prompt
local partners more rigorously to investigate key issues
thoroughly and have sufficient technical expertise available.
For this election we essentially provided one part-time
advisor. He did an excellent job, but one person could not
do it all. We also need to press them harder to seriously
consider contingency plans and be prepared for any
eventuality. For instance, when we discussed with the MDC
what their response would be to an election defeat, they
vaguely deflected our inquiries and were unable to indicate
that they had devoted any sort of meaningful planning to this
scenario.
¶16. (C) Finally, there are two seemingly paradoxical lessons
to be remembered, if not (re) learned about Robert Mugabe and
ZANU-PF. The first is don,t underestimate him, his wiliness
and his willingness to go to any length to hold on to power.
Moreover, he will not willingly abandon his long-term game
plan, including constitutional reform to consolidate his grip
and, we believe, the ideal of a one-party state. As long as
he is on the scene, any ZANU-PF inspired &reform8 will be
on Mugabe,s terms and will be anti-democratic. But at the
same time, these elections showed just how narrow his base of
support is. ZANU-PF, supposedly a mass-based movement,
relies on a shrinking base of voters, repression by the
security forces and others — including a whole series of
measures, documented elsewhere, to ensure low-voter turnout
by non-ZANU-PF voters ) and control of the state machinery
to engineer the outcome it wants. Just as with authoritarian
regimes elsewhere, this is a formula that makes Mugabe and
Mugabe-ism vulnerable to a broad-based democratic movement.
It will not be an easy or brief struggle, but it is certain
that with sufficient effort and support it can be done.
Dell
(71 VIEWS)
