Movement for Democratic Change leader Morgan Tsvangirai said Roy Bennett, who had just been elected chairman of Manicaland, had admirable energy but needed to take a more strategic vision.
He was discussing the pending MDC congress, soon after the split, with United States ambassador to Zimbabwe Christopher Dell.
Tsvangirai expressed concern about the “zealousness” of some people within the leadership and noted that the “aggressives” and the “more compliant” would have to reach some accommodation in the run-up to the congress.
He said the party was conducting “direction courses” for the new provincial leadership to teach what his “paradigm shift” meant – “disobedience within the law; not business as usual.”
Full cable:
Viewing cable 06HARARE49, TSVANGIRAI ON MDC CONGRESS(ES), ACTION PLAN,
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Reference ID |
Created |
Released |
Classification |
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VZCZCXRO3476
PP RUEHMR
DE RUEHSB #0049/01 0171504
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171504Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9459
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 1032
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0867
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 1048
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0308
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 0671
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 1103
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 3427
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0865
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 1496
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1247
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//DHO-7//
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK//DOOC/ECMO/CC/DAO/DOB/DOI//
RUEPGBA/CDR USEUCOM INTEL VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ23-CH/ECJ5M//
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000049
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
AF/S FOR B. NEULING
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE
AFR/SA FOR E. LOKEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2010
SUBJECT: TSVANGIRAI ON MDC CONGRESS(ES), ACTION PLAN,
FACTIONAL POLITICS
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher Dell under Section 1.4 b/d
——-
Summary
——-
¶1. (C) Opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai told the
Ambassador on January 13 that he was pleased with progress on
his party’s provincial congresses and ongoing reconstitution
of the party leadership. He reported on preparations for the
March 18-19 MDC national congress, which included meetings
with key civil society players in late February. Tsvangirai
held out little hope for reconciliation with MDC Secretary
General Welshman Ncube and castigated the SAG for its
purported alignment with and/or support of his rival faction.
The opposition leader said he hoped to visit Washington
after the party congress had articulated a national plan of
action, and closed with a plea for outside support of the
party’s capacity to implement the plan. End Summary.
————————————-
Provincial Congresses Proceeding Well
————————————-
¶2. (C) During a call on the Ambassador at the Residence,
Tsvangirai said he was impressed with the new leadership
SIPDIS
emerging from MDC provincial congresses around the country.
All provincial congresses had been concluded, save Bulawayo
and Matabeleland South, which he said would be “trickier”
than the others given sensitivities about the party’s overall
ethnic balance. (N.B. Tsvangirai’s office subsequently
circulated reports on the Bulawayo and Matabeleland South
congresses and their election of new provincial leaderships
January 14-15.) Tsvangirai noted that the party’s women’s
wing had been especially instrumental in “defending unity”
(i.e., rallying behind his faction) and making the congresses
productive.
——————————-
Preparing for National Congress
——————————-
¶3. (C) Asked by the Ambassador to characterize the party’s
character following recent events, Tsvangirai said we would
have to see what leadership and plan of action emerged from
the national party congress, which he noted had been
postponed from late February to March 18-19. He expressed
concern about the “zealousness” of some within the leadership
at this juncture, and noted that the “aggressives” and the
“the more compliant” would have to reach some accommodation
in the run-up to the congress. Roy Bennett, for example, had
admirable energy as Manicaland’s new chairman but needed to
take a more “strategic” vision.
¶4. (C) In this vein, the party was conducting “direction
courses” for the new provincial leaderships to teach what
Tsvangirai’s “paradigm shift” meant, i.e., “disobedience
SIPDIS
within the law; not business as usual.” These meetings were
proving useful opportunities to shape expectations of the
membership and the leadership and to gauge specific concerns
and practical limitations for action. To further inform a
new action plan at the March national congress, the party
would also conduct stakeholders meetings with the Zimbabwe
Confederation of Trade Unions, the National Constitutional
Assembly, churches, and others from civil society in late
February.
————————————-
Getting on with an “Amicable Divorce”
HARARE 00000049 002 OF 003
————————————-
¶5. (C) In response to the Ambassador’s inquiry about
inter-factional relations, Tsvangirai said that Welshman
Ncube’s personal intransigence underpinned the other
faction’s apparent opposition to reconciliation. Tsvangirai
noted that there were a group of MPs who were pushing for a
unified congress, largely out of concern for the fate of
their seats. Tsvangirai had encouraged the MPs’s efforts,
but noted that the other side’s demands, such as protected
positions and augmented power to the Secretary-General
position, made a unified congress unlikely. Hand-picking
protected leadership slots would be counter-prodcutive,
Tsvangirai concluded; what was needed was the regeneration of
SIPDIS
a democratic force in sufficient number to challenge Mugabe
and ZANU-PF. In the meantime, each faction was preparing its
own congress. (N.B. The Ncube faction’s congress is
scheduled for February 21-22.) Accordingly, Tsvangirai was
ready to “get on with an amicable divorce” and move on.
——————————–
Ethnicity and the South Africans
——————————–
¶6. (C) Tsvangirai expressed bafflement over the Ncube
faction’s motives and goals. Noting that ethnicity pervades
all African politics, he observed that the ethnic dimension
might give Ncube and Sibanda a seat at the table with
ZANU-PF, but it assured the them a losing hand in the long
run. He said the South Africans played a “heavy role” in
events and may have supported a Ncube-ZANU-PF deal, but
Zimbabweans never would. Noting the Ncube faction’s
closeness with the SAG (many of their leaders reportedly were
in South Africa that day), he said that the SAG was
inadvertantly discrediting itself among Zimbabweans with its
partisanship. He reported that he had been trying
unsuccessfully to secure an appointment with the South
African Ambassador to express his concerns.
—————-
Washington Trip?
—————-
¶7. (C) Tsvangirai noted that he had discussed with party
principals and NDI the advisability of a visit by MDC leaders
to western capitals, including Washington. Tsvangirai said
he had concluded that such travel would best be deferred
until after the party congress, when divisions would
hopefully be behind the party and a new plan of action could
be showcased. In the meantime, the party would dispatch a
low level delegation to engage the Zimbabwean diaspora
overseas, including in the United States. The group would
not meet with governments but would sell the party to the
diaspora, seeking to tap its ideas and resources.
¶8. (C) In closing, the opposition leader reiterated interest
in outside assistance in further preparing the party’s
leadership and membership for the coming paradigm shift. He
said he had discussed the matter with NDI.
———————————
Biti: Divorce Papers in the Works
———————————
¶9. (C) The Belgian Ambassador on January 17 told the
Ambassador that Tsvangirai-aligned MDC Secretary for Economic
Affairs Tendai Biti recently showed him a draft document the
two factions were negotiating to govern the terms of their
separation. Among the terms of separation were that
HARARE 00000049 003 OF 003
Tsvangirai’s faction would retain the MDC name; each faction
SIPDIS
would largely retain possession of assets already within its
possession inside Zimbabwe; the factions would split the
party’s overseas assets evenly; each faction would continue
to be associated with the Zimbabwe Institute, the party’s
principal vehicle in South Africa; and MPs would be free to
affiliate themselves with either party without interference
from the other.
——-
Comment
——-
¶10. (C) The focus of inter-factional relations has largely
shifted from conflicting smear campaigns and reconciliation
efforts to preparation for a future apart. Assuming the
Ncube faction doesn’t begin to negotiate a purported
“solution” to the the GOZ’s legitimacy crisis, we don’t
discount the prospect of these two groups eventually
collaborating against the ruling party. For now, however,
each is going through a necessarily introspective process of
consolidating its support and defining itself. We continue
to view the Tsvangirai camp as in ascendance, certainly among
the grassroots and civil society. This may yet provoke
periodic distracting media attacks and legal actions by an
insecure Ncube faction, and the battle over party assets may
yet prove to be further disruptive.
¶11. (C) In any event, rejuvenation of meaningful democratic
pressure on the Mugabe regime in 2006 will likely hinge
largely on Tsvangirai’s ability to marshal a credible action
plan that can capture the public imagination. We have heard
Tsvangirai talk a good game before and then fail to follow
SIPDIS
through. More importantly, the people of Zimbabwe have heard
it too, and are increasingly disillusioned by the lack of
action. Tsvangirai could still revive his fortunes but this
will require a major ramping up of efforts.
DELL
(18 VIEWS)
