President Robert Mugabe was prepared to step down after his defeat in the 2008 elections but he was persuaded to stay on by senior members of the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front who wanted to protect their own futures.
According to the United States embassy, Zimbabwe was being run by the Joint Operation Command comprised of the heads of the military services, police, and prisons, as well as Emmerson Mnangagwa, and Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Governor Gideon Gono.
The dominant players were Defence Forces Chief Constantine Chiwenga, Police Commissioner Augustine Chihuri, and Mnangagwa.
Air Marshal Perrence Shiri was responsible for military operations and security in the northern part of Zimbabwe.
Army Commander Philip Sibanda was in charge of the southern part of the country.
Two committees were formed to steer Zimbabwe toward the election.
The first was a campaign and logistics committee whose members were Justice Minister Patrick Chinamasa, deputy Youth Minister Saviour Kasukuwere, Labour Minister Nicholas Goche, a representative of the Central Intelligence Organisation and the military triumvirate of Chiwenga, Sibanda and Chihuri.
The second committee on information and publicity was chaired by Chinamasa and included Policy Implementation Minister Webster Shamu, former diplomat Chris Mutsvangwa and deputy Information Minister Bright Matonga.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 08HARARE453, HARARE STATE OF PLAY–UPDATE
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Reference ID |
Created |
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VZCZCXRO0817
OO RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHSB #0453/01 1431154
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 221154Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2922
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 1982
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 2103
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0652
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1380
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 1738
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 2159
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 4590
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1243
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 HARARE 000453
SIPDIS
AF/S FOR S. HILL
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E. LOKEN AND L. DOBBINS
STATE PASS TO NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B. PITTMAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2018
SUBJECT: HARARE STATE OF PLAY–UPDATE
REF: HARARE 367
Classified By: Ambassador James D. McGee for reason 1.4 (d)
——-
SUMMARY
——-
¶1. (C) Stung by its defeat in the March 29 elections and
uncertain about the future, ruling party ZANU-PF has evolved
a strategy which it believes will allow it to maintain power.
The essential elements are a campaign of terror in rural
areas to weaken and intimidate the opposition, targeted
attacks on and arrests of opposition Movement for Democratic
Change (MDC) officials, an information campaign to bolster
ZANU-PF and deny the opposition access to media, restrictions
on international election observers and intimidation of local
observers, and a vote-rigging apparatus that will stand in
stark contrast to the electoral structures of March 29.
ZANU-PF’s intent to win at all costs has been abetted by the
weakness of the MDC. MDC president Tsvangirai has been
absent from Zimbabwe since shortly after the March 29
elections and there has been a vacuum of leadership to
challenge ZANU-PF violence and oppression. The MDC, although
under resourced, still believes it can win a victory in June
but it faces an uphill battle. If the MDC somehow manages to
win, ZANU-PF, including the military, will probably try to
cut a deal and allow the MDC to assume the reigns of
government. If Mugabe wins, a succession battle will begin.
Both parties will face pressures from within that will change
their present complexions. END SUMMARY.
———————–
ZANU-PF DECISION MAKING
———————–
¶2. (C) By most accounts, President Robert Mugabe was
prepared to step down after his defeat in the March 29
elections became clear. He was persuaded not to do so by a
number of high-ranking ZANU-PF officials concerned for their
own futures. As reported Reftel, these individuals, in
consultation with Mugabe, considered several options
including a declaration of victory and if necessary a state
of emergency, a negotiation with the MDC, and lastly, a
runoff election. The latter was ultimately adopted, and the
reign of violence began shortly thereafter. ZANU-PF has
adopted a win at all costs strategy.
¶3. (C) We understand that Zimbabwe is being run by the Joint
Operation Command (JOC) comprised of the heads of the
military services, police, and prisons, as well as Emmerson
Mnangagwa, and Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Governor Gideon Gono.
Of this group, the dominant players appear to be Defense
Forces Chief Constantine Chiwenga, Police Commissioner
Augustine Chihuri, and Mnangagwa. The JOC made the decision
to hold a runoff election, and set in motion the on-going
violence as retribution for voting against Mugabe and
ZANU-PF, to intimidate ZANU-PF opponents into voting for
ZANU-PF in a runoff election or to not vote, and to disperse
MDC supporters from their voting wards through fear.
¶4. (C) Air Marshal Perence Shiri (in charge of the notorious
North Korean-trained Fifth Brigade which carried out
Gukurahundi in the early 1980s) is responsible for military
operations and security in the northern part of Zimbabwe.
Army Commander Philip Sibanda is in charge of the southern
part of the country. The vast majority of the violence has
occurred in the North. This is because many rural areas in
the North traditionally supportive of ZANU-PF changed their
allegiances in the March 29 elections and it is important for
ZANU-PF that this not recur in the runoff election.
HARARE 00000453 002 OF 005
¶5. (C) Two committees have been formed to steer Zimbabwe
toward the election. The first is a campaign and logistics
committee. Members include Patrick Chinamasa (justice
minister), Saviour Kasukwere (deputy youth minister),
Nicholas Goche (labor minister), a representative of the
Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) and the military
triumvirate of Chiwenga, Sibanda, and Chihuri. This
committee is responsible for voter mobilization, food
distribution, transportation, and fuel supply. The second
committee on information and publicity, chaired by Chinamasa,
is responsible for controlling ZANU-PF’s message in the state
media and assuring that the MDC does not have the same access
to the media that it had before the March 29 elections.
Members in addition to Chinamasa include Webster Shamu
(policy implementation minister), Chris Mutsvangwa (former
ambassador to China), and Bright Matonga (deputy information
minister).
¶6. (C) Within the ZANU-PF officials running the country,
there are undoubtedly factions, but they are held together
for now by the common goal of winning the election. Gono,
for example, favored a government of national unity rather
than a runoff election. He is not liked by most other
ZANU-PF officials. Nevertheless, he is indispensable to
keeping the financial ship afloat. The military is not
believed to be close to Mnangagwa, Goche, and Chinamasa, but
for now they are working together, with Mnangagwa assuming a
virtual presidency role as a member of the JOC. Mugabe does
not sit with the JOC but is briefed on a regular basis.
While he is not making day to day decisions, policy decisions
cannot be made without his assent, and we believe he knows
the broad outlines of what is occurring in the country, if
not the details.
¶7. (C) Solomon Mujuru is sitting out ZANU-PF politics for
the time being. He initially made an effort to sideline
Mugabe at the ZANU-PF Congress in December. After failing he
covertly backed Simba Makoni’s presidential candidacy and
considered publicly coming out for Makoni. When Makoni
faltered, Mujuru decided to remain behind the scenes.
Paradoxically, Mujuru’s star ascended and Mnangagwa was
sidelined after Mnangagwa’s failed attempt at the
vice-presidency (and higher) in the 2005 Tsholotsho incident;
Mnangagwa has regained power and it is Mujuru who is biding
his time. One of Zimbabwe’s most significant businessmen,
Mujuru has told allies that the economy is dead and that the
country is bereft of political leadership. For the time
being, however, he is unwilling to act despite a substantial
political following in Mashonaland East and continuing
support in the military.
————————-
ZANU-PF Election Strategy
————————-
¶8. (C) ZANU-PF’s campaign of violence has mostly taken place
in the traditional party strongholds of Mashonaland,
Manicaland, and Masvingo. The MDC polled strongly in
Manicaland and made strong incursions into Masvingo in the
March 29 elections. ZANU-PF’s intent is to punish those who
voted for the MDC, intimidate MDC supporters into either not
voting or voting for ZANU-PF in the runoff election, and to
disperse MDC supporters from their voting areas so that they
are unable to vote. Additionally, and perhaps less noticed
because of the large number of victims, ZANU-PF has targeted
MDC officials who are not well known but who are critical to
organizing and getting out the vote. ZANU-PF has killed
some, beaten others, and arrested still more. On May 20, for
example, authorities arrested Ian Kay, a prominent MDC
organizer who was elected to the House of Assembly on March
29, taking over a seat that had been held by ZANU-PF. On May
21, the body of Tonderai Ndira, an MDC activist and member of
HARARE 00000453 003 OF 005
the Combined Harare Resident Association, was identified in
the Harare morgue. He was abducted on May 14.
¶9. (C) Last Friday at a ZANU-PF Central Committee meeting, a
number of Central Committee members questioned ZANU-PF’s poor
showing in the March elections and challenged Mugabe’s
intention to hold a runoff. Some suggested a government of
national unity (GNU) would be the best option to bring
stability to the country. Mugabe insisted that a runoff
would take place. He acknowledged the party’s poor showing
in March and publicly criticized ZANU-PF for complacency and
lack of organization in the run-up to the March 29 election.
He made it clear that the party had to do a better job of
organization for the June 27 election. (NOTE: The idea of a
GNU is still being floated, and MDC president Tsvangirai told
the Ambassador during a meeting in South Africa that Mugabe
had sent feelers about Tsvangirai joining a GNU with an
agreement that Tsvangirai would assume the presidency after a
six month transition. Tsvangirai rightly distrusts Mugabe
and has given no indication at this time of a willingness to
negotiate. END NOTE.) Mugabe plans to kick off the
campaign this weekend with a rally in Harare and with rallies
throughout Zimbabwe. The theme of the campaign will be
ZANU-PF-guaranteed sovereignty and independence versus an
MDC-sponsored return to colonialism if that party should win.
¶10. (C) ZANU-PF is concerned that despite its reign of
violence and its attempt to weaken the MDC, it could still
lose a relatively free and fair election. It will therefore
place its rigging apparatus in full gear. One factor that
contributed to the MDC win in March was impartial polling
station supervisors. Many of these were teachers, and it is
not an accident that teachers have been frequent targets in
the ongoing violence. We can expect the Zimbabwe Electoral
Commission (ZEC) to use different supervisors in this round
to prevent qualified voters from voting, to allow the
introduction of stuffed ballot boxes, and to manipulate the
counting. ZANU-PF will also make it difficult for rural
voters, displaced by violence, to return to their rural homes
to vote. We have also heard that residents of certain areas
are being required to obtain and present passes to travel to
other areas.
———————————–
A Weakened MDC, But Still Confident
———————————–
¶11. (C) Tsvangirai failed to mobilize MDC support in the
long interim between the election and the announcement of
results and apathy among regime opponents became noticeable.
Violence and Tsvangirai’s long absence from Zimbabwe created
a feeling among many that change was unlikely and that
ZANU-PF would continue to manipulate events. Tsvangirai’s
recent history of having failed to respond to Murambatsvina’s
mass human dislocations in 2005 and to the government’s
brutal crackdown on March 11, 2007, combined with his current
jet setting between African capitals while his supporters are
being killed and beaten has resulted in a crisis of
leadership. Zimbabwean civil society, members of his own
party, and the press have taken him to task privately and
publicly for remaining outside the country. (NOTE:
Tsvangirai, after a number of false starts, insisted to the
Ambassador this week that he will return to Zimbabwe this
weekend. In the past, he has based his failure to return on
alleged threats against his life; he told the Ambassador he
does not believe there are credible threats against his life,
but wanted to ensure his MDC-organized security was ready
before he returned. END NOTE.)
¶12. (C) Tsvangirai can repair the damage, but it is
important he return soon. He has plans to travel by bus
around the country in the weeks before the election. This
HARARE 00000453 004 OF 005
will be important in assuring people he understands what they
have gone through and demonstrating his willingness and
ability to lead. Also, it will be important for the MDC to
establish a united front. Tsvangirai and the Mutambara
faction of the MDC have agreed that the Mutambara faction
will back him in the runoff election, but until now he and
his supporters have been dismissive of Simba Makoni, noting
he only received seven percent of the vote. Yet Makoni’s
votes would be important in a runoff election and there would
be significant symbolic effect in having Makoni support
Tsvangirai. We have continued to impress upon Tsvangirai the
importance of a public alliance with Makoni, and Tsvangirai
told the Ambassador he would meet with Makoni upon his return
to Zimbabwe.
¶13. (C) Tsvangirai demonstrated his ability to attract votes
in the last election in traditional ZANU-PF areas. But this
will be a different election. ZANU-PF opened up democratic
space before the March 29 elections and allowed a credible
voting process; it believed it would win and could take
credit for a free and fair election. We expect that the GOZ
will restrict MDC rallies and meetings, and will restrict the
MDC’s access to the media. As noted in para. 10, it is
likely the ZEC will employ biased polling station supervisors
and will stuff ballot boxes and attempt to manipulate the
counting process.
¶14. (C) To counter ZANU-PF, the MDC will have to test
authorities by attempting to move around the country and hold
rallies. To the extent the MDC is thwarted, this will be a
visible demonstration to SADC and the international community
of ZANU-PF’s tactics. Most importantly, the MDC will need
polling agents at the over 9,000 polling stations throughout
the country. ZANU-PF has attacked the Zimbabwe Electoral
Support Network (ZESN) as a tool of the National Democratic
Institute (NDI), and it is unclear how freely ZESN will be
able to operate. MDC polling agents, therefore, become even
more critical. The MDC failed to field agents at all polling
stations for the March 29 elections; organizational problems
caused by Tsvangirai’s absence from Zimbabwe, and ZANU-PF
targeted violence against MDC organizers call into question
the MDC’s capacity to man polling stations throughout
Zimbabwe for the run off election.
¶15. (C) MDC finances are important but problematic. During
his sojourn in South Africa, Tsvangirai has used the
resources of Tokyo Sexwale to visit SADC capitals and lobby
on behalf of the MDC. Inside Zimbabwe, the MDC has been cash
strapped. Tsvangirai told the Ambassador Senegal had
provided the MDC with USD 2 million, but the MDC has received
scant support from elsewhere. ZANU-PF is printing and
spending large amounts of money to mobilize voters, to
distribute food, and to otherwise campaign. MDC organizers
are concerned that without funding they will be unable to
counter Mugabe and his party. In particular, they have told
us they lack vehicles and fuel to reach the rural areas, and
funds to hold meetings and rallies in these areas. They also
need funds to send displaced supporters now living in urban
areas to their rural homes to vote.
¶16. (C) Despite the handicaps, MDC officials are optimistic
that there are enough Zimbabweans, fed up with Mugabe’s
mishandling of the economy and the violence, who want change.
The MDC’s challenge is to convince voters, particularly in
the rural areas, that their votes will count so that they
will be willing to risk possible repercussions, e.g., more
violence.
——————-
A Note on Observers
——————-
HARARE 00000453 005 OF 005
¶17. (C) Although Tsvangirai insisted publicly on
international observers as a condition of his participation
in the runoff election, the GOZ has indicated it will allow
only those observers who were accredited for the March 29
election. SADC sent an observation mission for the March 29
elections and at its April 13 Extraordinary Summit in Lusaka
urged the GOZ “to ensure that the runoff elections are held
in a secure environment.” It offered to send an observer
mission for a runoff election.
¶18. (C) Observers are important in attempting to minimize
rigging and we should support SADC to send as many observers
as possible. We note, however, that in the last election the
120 SADC observers confined themselves mostly to Harare and
other urban areas. They did not reach the remote rural areas
most susceptible to vote-rigging. Observers are important;
reliable MDC polling agents are more important.
—————————
Looking Beyond the Election
—————————
¶19. (C) The MDC surprised many analysts and observers by
winning both the presidential and parliamentary elections in
March. It faces more serious obstacles in this round, and
the odds are against an MDC win. If Tsvangirai wins, meaning
he can demonstrate publicly that he has received more votes
than Mugabe, there is a decent chance ZANU-PF will accept his
victory with senior officials, including Mugabe, trying to
cut deals to protect themselves. The military, cognizant
that SADC would not accept a military coup, would likely
follow suit.
¶20. (C) If, as likely, the ZEC announces Mugabe has won, the
relative cohesion that has characterized both parties in
their electoral quests will likely dissolve. ZANU-PF will
likely try to form a GNU by co-opting MDC parliamentarians
and the MDC will look for new leadership after another
failure by Tsvangirai to win the presidency. Fissures with
ZANU-PF will widen as Mnangagwa, the Mujuru faction, Gono,
and others reopen the succession battle and try to ease
Mugabe from office. While Mugabe’s aim may be to turn over
power at the ZANU-PF Congress in December 2009, continued and
growing dissatisfaction with him from within ZANU-PF, much of
it a result of a crashing economy, may well force him out
before then.
McGee
(107 VIEWS)
