United States ambassador to Zimbabwe James McGhee said there was so much bad blood between the two secretaries of the Movement for Democratic Change Tendai Biti and Welshman Ncube that they presented their positions as contradictory even when both were saying the same thing.
He was commenting after the stalemate in reaching agreement over the allocation of ministries two months after the signing of the Global Political Agreement which was supposed to usher an inclusive government.
Ncube accused Biti and his co-negotiator Elton Mangoma of playing hard ball arguing that party leader Morgan Tsvangirai was ready to enter into the inclusive government.
The main contention was over four ministries: Home Affairs, Local Government, Finance and Foreign Affairs but the MDC called for the whole deal to be renegotiated after the Southern African Development Community said the two major parties should share Home Affairs.
Biti and Mangoma were backed by the party’s national council forcing Tsvangirai, who had ignored its decision not to sign the agreement, to comply.
The MDC now demanded:
- In addition to Home Affairs, an equitable distribution of all ministries;
- Division of governorships between the two parties;
- Appointments of ambassadors and permanent secretaries;
- Composition of the national security council;
- Discrepancies between the agreement of September 11 and the agreement actually signed on September 15;
- and agreement on Amendment 19 encapsulating the power-sharing agreement before formation of a government.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 08HARARE1034, STATE OF PLAY IN ZIMBABWE–NO END IN SIGHT
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Reference ID |
Created |
Released |
Classification |
Origin |
VZCZCXRO4806
OO RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHSB #1034/01 3241411
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 191411Z NOV 08 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3707
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 2436
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 2554
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1054
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1830
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 2185
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 2610
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 5038
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1702
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HARARE 001034
SIPDIS
AF/S FOR B.WALCH
DRL FOR N. WILETT
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E. LOKEN AND L. DOBBINS
STATE PASS TO NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B. PITTMAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2018
SUBJECT: STATE OF PLAY IN ZIMBABWE–NO END IN SIGHT
REF: PRETORIA 2486
Classified By: Ambassador James D. McGee for reason 1.4 (d)
——-
SUMMARY
——-
¶1. (C) ZANU-PF has been using the SADC Extraordinary Summit
Communique to argue that the MDC-T is the obstacle to
implementation of a power-sharing government. The MDC-T has
indicated it will not participate in a government until core
issues, in addition to control of the Home Affairs Ministry,
are addressed. With ZANU-PF unwilling to meet the MDC-T’s
demands, many in the MDC believe the September 15 agreement
is dead. The MDC-T will not, however, cede what it believes
is the moral high ground to ZANU-PF by withdrawing from
negotiations. It appears to be adopting a long-range
strategy of opposing ZANU-PF from within Parliament, and
waiting for the ruling party to collapse. Meanwhile,
Zimbabwe is effectively without a government to address its
growing humanitarian crisis. END SUMMARY.
——————————
Since the SADC Summit: ZANU-PF
——————————
¶2. (U) The Communique issued by SADC Secretary General
Salomao following the November 9 Summit instructed Zimbabwe’s
political parties to form an inclusive government
immediately, sharing responsibility for the Ministry of Home
Affairs. Since this instruction coincided with ZANU-PF’s
offer on the table entering the Summit, it is not surprising
that ZANU-PF has attempted to turn the SADC Communique into a
propaganda tool and to place the MDC-T on the defensive.
Noting that the MDC-T had requested the Extraordinary Summit
after the SADC Troika meeting on October 27 in Harare had
failed to result in a final agreement, ZANU-PF immediately
indicated its willingness to comply with the Communique. A
Politburo meeting on November 12 unanimously endorsed the
SADC position; ZANU-PF then invited the MDC to submit names
of proposed ministers. The (illegitimate) GOZ Minister of
Information, Sikhanyiso Ndlovu, announced that the
(illegitimate) State’s legal drafting team had drafted
Constitutional Amendment 19 and submitted it to SADC
Facilitator Mbeki for scrutiny. Ndlovu outlined remaining
steps in the formation of a new government as purely
procedural: a waiting period while Amendment 19 is under
public review, appointment of a cabinet and approval of the
Amendment by Parliament.
¶3. (U) While official statements emanating from ZANU-PF
leaders are positive about the current state of the political
dialog, the state-controlled press has maintained a drumbeat
of criticism of the MDC-T and Morgan Tsvangirai. These
unofficial ZANU voices treat any MDC expression of
dissatisfaction with the outcome of the Summit as evidence of
dissension in the party and signs of western manipulation of
MDC-T leaders. On November 18, The Herald’s banner headline
read “Divisions rock MDC-T…as hawks seek Tsvangirai’s
ouster.” Tsvangirai’s trip to France has provided fodder for
this effort.
—————————-
Since the SADC Summit: MDC-T
—————————-
¶4. (U) The MDC-T, for its part, received no satisfaction on
the matters it had raised at the summit from the SADC
Communique. The MDC-T publicly condemned the SADC ruling as
having failed to address what it considered core issues: 1)
HARARE 00001034 002.3 OF 004
in addition to Home Affairs, an equitable distribution of all
ministries; 2) division of governorships between the two
parties; 3) appointments of ambassadors and permanent
secretaries; 4) composition of the national security council;
5) discrepancies between the agreement of September 11 and
the agreement actually signed on September 15; and 6)
agreement on Amendment 19 encapsulating the power-sharing
agreement before formation of a government.
¶5. (U) On November 14, the MDC-T National Council met to
formally consider the party’s position. The Council adopted
a Resolution which condemned the SADC Communique and referred
to the necessity of resolving all the outstanding issues.
However, the resolution did not explicitly state that
resolution of these issues was a precondition for
participation in government. Confusingly, it also said: “the
MDC shall participate in a new government once Constitutional
Amendment No. 19 has been passed and effected into law.” The
government media seized upon the MDC-T statement to say that
the MDC-T would enter into government as soon as Amendment 19
was drafted and passed. On November 17, the MDC-T issued a
press release to clarify its position and stated that
resolution of all core issues was a prerequisite to MDC-T
participation in a government.
¶6. (C) MDC-T secretary-general Tendai Biti, both privately
in conversations with us and in a diplomatic briefing on
November 17, stated that he believed the September 15
agreement was for all intents and purposes dead. Biti said
that the National Council’s resolution was designed to be
conciliatory while at the same time staking out a hard
position. He explained the reference to joining government
once Amendment 19 was adopted by pointing out that agreement
on Amendment 19 would require agreement on the other issues
in dispute and on other matters left vague in the Agreement,
such as the interpretation of the President’s obligation to
“consult” with the Prime Minister. This would be
extraordinarily difficult. The MDC-T would not withdraw from
the SADC process in order to avoid ceding the moral high
ground to ZANU-PF. It intended to press its case with the AU
and ultimately the UN. MDC-T president Morgan Tsvangirai has
been traveling since the SADC Summit to consult with African
leaders. Biti claimed that both Jacob Zuma and South African
President Motlanthe had apologized to Tsvangirai for the SADC
Summit Communique, and that both had agreed that Home Affairs
alone was not the only issue. Biti admitted, however, that
he did not believe either the AU or UN would actively take up
the MDC-T’s cause. Biti believed that the economic
situation, splits within ZANU-PF, MDC solidarity, and
international opposition to the ruling party and support for
the MDC would ultimately result in change. Other than
raising the possibility of street demonstrations, which he
conceded would be difficult to organize and sustain, and
opposition to the GOZ in Parliament, Biti offered no concrete
roadmap for MDC-T action.
———————————-
Welshman Ncube: A Contrarian View
———————————-
¶7. (C) Ncube told us on November 18 that MDC-M viewed
negotiations as a tripartite process. MDC-M would not enter
into government unless all three parties–ZANU-PF, MDC-T and
MDC-M–were in agreement to form a government. He opined
that the September 15 agreement was probably dead, and a
dance was now occurring between ZANU-PF and MDC-T to lay
blame for its failure on the other. Specifically, he said
that MDC-T negotiators Biti and Elton Mangoma did not want an
agreement; while ZANU-PF and Mugabe wanted an agreement, they
would not make the concessions demanded by MDC-T.
HARARE 00001034 003 OF 004
¶8. (C) Ncube said the GOZ-prepared draft of Amendment 19 was
now with SADC mediator Thabo Mbeki, and that Mbeki was
seeking to facilitate a discussion on it. Biti and Mangoma,
however, were avoiding Mbeki. The next step would await
Tsvangirai’s return to South Africa later this week.
¶9. (C) Tsvangirai had told South African president Motlanthe
and ANC president Jacob Zuma, Ncube claimed, that he would
enter the government if an agreement on Amendment 19 was
reached. Ncube acknowledged this was not the position of
Biti, Mangoma, and other hardliners in MDC-T who were
insisting on total control of the Home Affairs Ministry and
other concessions. (COMMENT: Bad blood between Biti and
Ncube is such that even when both are saying the same thing,
they present their positions as contradictory. This may be
the case with their characterization of MDC-T’s position on
Amendment 19. END COMMENT.)
¶10. (C) Ncube said he favored a government of national
unity, even if ZANU-PF did not meet some of MDC-T’s
conditions. He described Mugabe and ZANU-PF as fascistic and
said that the entry of the MDC into government would not make
that party more democratic. The goal of MDC participation in
a power-sharing government would be to restrain ZANU-PF from
its excesses, e.g., violence, to begin the process of
economic recovery, and to prevent ZANU-PF from subverting the
next election. He also thought that MDC participation in
government would weaken ZANU-PF since MDC members would
occupy a number of positions now held by ZANU-PF, causing
disaffection among ruling party officials who no longer had
positions.
——-
COMMENT
——-
¶11. (C) The next step will be discussions among the parties
on Amendment 19. From Biti’s point of view, the drafting of
the Amendment would logically be tasked to the negotiators
jointly, and the text would include details of most of the
issues still in dispute, such as composition of the National
Security Council, discrepancies between the September 11 and
15 texts, and the actual authorities of the Prime Minister.
If this is indeed the position of the MDC as a whole, the
text prepared by GOZ legal drafters will almost certainly be
rejected out of hand by the MDC. If, however, divisions
remain within the MDC-T, they could manifest themselves in
discussion of the Amendment.
¶12. (C) Tsvangirai during the past several months has
expressed a desire to get into government and work for change
from within as long as his powers as Prime Minister were
assured. Biti and others have taken a more hard-line
approach, often privately criticizing Tsvangirai for not
being tough enough. We believe that the hardliners are in
control for the moment, and that Tsvangirai will hold out for
a satisfactory resolution of key MDC-T issues, either in
Amendment 19 or otherwise. The hardliners fundamentally do
not believe an agreement with ZANU-PF can work. Their
insistence on preconditions which they believe ZANU-PF will
not agree to is a way of undermining the possibility of an
agreement.
¶13. (C) For its part, ZANU-PF believes it is in the driver’s
seat after the SADC Communique. Seeking to avoid offending
SADC, it is likely to either leave ministerial positions
unfilled, fill only 15 of the 31 positions allocated to it
under the September 15 agreement, or name ministers for the
MDC slots as “caretakers.” Meanwhile, it will push for
discussion of Amendment 19 and seek to demonstrate that it is
complying with the SADC Communique.
HARARE 00001034 004 OF 004
¶14. (C) At this point, we see no agreement between the
parties in sight. Each side is seeking to position itself to
blame the other side when and if negotiations completely
break down. But while the parties remain at a standoff,
there is no government in Zimbabwe capable of addressing the
increasingly desperate humanitarian situation. END COMMENT.
McGee
(156 VIEWS)
