The leader of the pro-senate faction of the Movement for Democratic Change Arthur Mutambara lamented that despite on-going negotiations, little progress had been made by the two factions.
He could not understand why but he believed that the Morgan Tsvangirai faction was afraid of legitimising him.
Mutambara said it was true that he had presidential ambitions but his time would come. He therefore expected Tsvangirai to be the MDC candidate in 2008 and he had no objection to working under Tsvangirai and he had publicly stated so.
He therefore questioned why Tsvangirai and his faction continued to see him as a threat especially since Tsvangirai and his people knew that he had problems with his secretary-general Welshman Ncube.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 07HARARE92, MDC FACTION LEADER ARTHUR MUTAMBARA: MDC UNITY
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|
Reference ID |
Created |
Released |
Classification |
Origin |
VZCZCXRO8011
RR RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHSB #0092/01 0361414
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 051414Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1101
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 1459
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 1315
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 1463
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0158
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0724
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 1089
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 1517
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 3913
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1286
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 1942
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUFGNOA/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1680
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000092
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
AF/S FOR S.HILL
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E.LOKEN
STATE PASS TO NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B.PITTMAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2016
SUBJECT: MDC FACTION LEADER ARTHUR MUTAMBARA: MDC UNITY
NECESSARY
REF: HARARE 00079
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher Dell under Section 1.4 b/d
——-
Summary
——-
¶1. (C) MDC pro-Senate faction leader Arthur Mutambara told
the Ambassador February 1 that cooperation between both MDC
factions was necessary to defeat Mugabe. Noting that MDC
anti-faction leader Morgan Tsvangirai had expressed similar
sentiments in an earlier meeting (Ref), the Ambassador urged
the two leaders to meet Mutambara also told the Ambassador
he believed elections would take place in 2008 and that
Mugabe would be the ZANU-PF standard bearer. End Summary.
————————-
MDC Cooperation Necessary
————————-
¶2. (C) Mutambara told the Ambassador that the two MDC
factions had no alternative to working together. Mugabe had
in the past defeated a united MDC. A factionalized MDC would
be even more easily defeated in a national election.
Cooperation could be especially fruitful now, added
Mutambara, given the chaotic situation in the country and the
disarray within ZANU-PF. If the two factions could not work
together, the people should reject the MDC.
¶3. (C) Mutambara said that cooperation did not necessarily
mean reunification or one MDC president. Rather, it meant
working together. For example, if there was a protest march
or a demonstration, both factions could participate together.
This would inspire confidence among the opposition as a
whole.
¶4. (C) The Ambassador queried Mutambara about the
effectiveness of civil society’s umbrella Save Zimbabwe
Campaign. Mutambara replied it was a good platform but
should not be an excuse for MDC non-cooperation since the MDC
factions were the two major opposition players.
———————
On Cooperation So Far
———————
¶5. (C) Mutambara lamented that despite on-going
negotiations, little progress had been made by the MDC
factions toward cooperation since the split in October, 2005.
Tsvangirai’s faction had, for instance, refused to agree to
a joint press conference to publicly present the Code of
Conduct the factions had agreed to. Tsvangirai had also
spoken publicly as the sole representative of the MDC on
behalf of the Save Zimbabwe Campaign without acknowledging
Mutambara and his faction.
¶6. (C) Mutambara said he believed Tsvangirai and his faction
were afraid of legitimizing him. It was true that he had
presidential ambitions but his time would come*he expected
Tsvangirai to be the MDC candidate in 2008–and he had no
SIPDIS
objection to working under Tsvangirai for the time being,
something that he had stated publicly. For that reason, he
questioned why Tsvangirai and his faction continued to see
him as a threat. Moreover, Tsvangirai and his people knew
that Mutambara had problems with pro-Senate faction
secretary-general Welshman Ncube. Attacking him, Mutambara
SIPDIS
HARARE 00000092 002 OF 003
argued, only served to weaken him and his ability to control
his faction.
———————————–
The Ambassador Urges Reconciliation
———————————–
¶7. (C) The Ambassador responded that the single most
important gesture the MDC could take at this point was a
public show of greater cooperation between the two factions.
It would send a powerful signal of the MDC,s seriousness of
purpose to the government, ZANU-PF, civil society, the people
of Zimbabwe, and the international community. The Ambassador
told Mutambara that in a meeting a few days earlier (Ref),
Tsvangirai had also acknowledged the need for greater
SIPDIS
cooperation. The Ambassador argued that this common ground
provided a foundation for reconciliation. Mutambara
responded positively, suggesting that he and Tsvangirai
needed to meet face-to-face to resolve differences.
————-
2008 vs. 2010
————-
¶8. (C) Mutambara said he believed Solomon Mujuru,s
opposition to a 2010 election had effectively scuttled the
idea and that a presidential election would take place in
¶2008. He thought Mugabe would be ZANU-PF,s candidate;
assuming Mugabe decided to contest the election, nobody in
the party would challenge him. Mutambara cautioned that if
the opposition was not prepared for a 2008 election, ZANU-PF
could win even a relatively fair election.
———————————–
On Gono,s Monetary Policy Statement
———————————–
¶9. (C) Mutambara said that in his recent statement, Reserve
Bank of Zimbabwe (RZB) Governor Gideon Gono had accepted that
RZB policies had failed, that ZANU &chefs8 had benefited
from these policies, and that ultimately fixing the economy
is a political problem. However, Gono needed to go further,
and discuss quasi-fiscal policy, issues of governance, and
RZB incompetence and corruption. The idea of a “social
contract” was a good one but would not happen under this
government given its corruption and lack of political will.
——-
Comment
——-
¶10. (C) MDC active cooperation, if not reunification, is the
most immediate means by which the party can energize the
democratic opposition to challenge the government and the
ruling party at a time when both are weakened by internal
dissension over the presidential succession and the
country,s economic collapse. Like Tsvangirai, we believe
Mutambara is genuine in his desire for greater cooperation.
¶12. (C) That said, it is elements within Mutambara’s
faction, notably Welshman Ncube, that remain the greatest
obstacle. It is not clear at this juncture how much of his
faction Mutambara could bring with him were he and Tsvangirai
to agree on a way forward. In that regard, Tsvangirai’s
behavior toward Mutambara could be key; the greater respect
he shows Mutambabra, the stronger Mutambara’s position would
become within his faction (and the weaker Ncube,s). A
HARARE 00000092 003 OF 003
face-to-face meeting, as Mutambara suggested, could be a good
start.
DELL
9
(21 VIEWS)
