Former army commander Solomon Mujuru heavy-handedly invited Movement for Democratic Change leader Morgan Tsvangirai in September 2005 to cooperate with him “post –Mugabe” and be “taken care of” or else, according to Tsvangirai’s advisor Eddie Cross.
When Tsvangirai refused the offer, a more reconciliatory Mujuru met Tsvangirai two weeks later and asked him what it would take to win his cooperation.
Tsvangirai reportedly responded that it would take a negotiated constitution, a transitional government, and free and fair, internationally monitored national elections.
Cross said Mujuru never responded to Tsvangirai’s proposal but instead approached Welshman Ncube with the same initial deal to which Ncube agreed.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 05HARARE1608, TSVANGIRAI “SUSPENDED”, PREPARING FOR PARTY
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
281517Z Nov 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 001608
SIPDIS
AF/S FOR B. NEULING
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE
AFR/SA FOR E. LOKEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2010
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ASEC ZI MDC
SUBJECT: TSVANGIRAI “SUSPENDED”, PREPARING FOR PARTY
CONGRESS
REF: (A) HARARE 1603 (B) HARARE 1578 AND PREVIOUS
Classified By: Charge d’Affaires, a.i., Eric T. Schultz under Section 1
.4 b/d
——-
Summary
——-
¶1. (C) Following the &non-event8 Senate elections on
November 26 (septel), opposition MDC President Morgan
Tsvangirai received a letter from party Vice President Gibson
SIPDIS
Sibanda, a leader of the pro-election faction, purporting to
suspend Tsvangirai from the party. At a meeting with the
Charge in the party’s Harvest House headquarters November 28,
Tsvangirai said following his call for a boycott, the low
SIPDIS
turnout had vindicated his leadership. That said, the letter
indicated that his opponents in the party were determined to
fight on even if it meant the party,s destruction.
¶2. (C) Tsvangirai nonetheless expressed confidence that he
would successfully deflect the suspension effort and would
have his leadership reconfirmed at the Party Congress
scheduled in February. Tsvangirai said mass action against
the regime would have to wait until after the Congress had
resolved the intra-party disputes. A Tsvangirai aide
separately alleged Tsvangirai,s MDC opponents had struck a
deal with the ruling party’s Mujuru clique after Tsvangirai
spurned Mujuru’s overtures, an allegation given weight by MDC
MP David Coltart,s claim that faction leader Welshman Ncube
had received favors from the GOZ, including a stolen farm.
End Summary.
————————-
“Suspended” but In Charge
————————-
¶3. (C) Firmly in charge at party headquarters, Tsvangirai
confirmed receipt of the Sibanda letter. Tsvangirai said the
suspension was invalid arguing that only a National Congress
could remove elected party officers from office. Moreover,
they could be sanctioned, but only by the National Council,
which had not addressed the issue. The Disciplinary
Committee, which Sibanda chaired, could only recommend
suspension following a hearing, and no such due process had
been afforded. Tsvangirai said he had called for a meeting
of the National Council on December 3, which he said would
put the issue to rest.
¶4. (C) Tsvangirai said, however, that he feared the letter
was a sign that his opponents within the party were not
interested in reconciliation but instead, having lost badly
in the debate over the Senate elections, were intent on
&burning down the house.8 He nonetheless expressed hope
that with the election behind them, some of the pro-election
leaders would rejoin the fold and reunify. As for the Senate
candidates elected under the MDC name, Tsvangirai reiterated
that the party had tagged them as “independent” and therefore
no longer members of the party. However, he saw no reason to
contest their election or to force them to resign their seats
to remain in the MDC. Their status within the party was
“open to further discussion.”
———————————-
Focus on Internal Party Activities
———————————-
¶5. (C) Tsvangirai emphasized that as a result of the
continuing divisions within the party it would be very
absorbed with its internal issues until the Party Congress in
February. This was unfortunate. He would have liked to
build on the momentum from the successful boycott by
confronting the regime. The party would continue to be
supportive of actions – mostly at the local level – by
partners in civil society. However, MDC sponsored mass
action would have to wait until the distraction of the Ncube
faction could be put to rest, which could only be at the
Party Congress, when all of the leadership, himself included,
would be subject to an election.
¶6. (C) Tsvangirai anticipated that many of his opponents in
the leadership would not be reelected and for that reason
might try to hold a rival Congress, possibly with a view to
pursuing legal action to claim the MDC mantle. Tsvangirai
added that provincial congresses would start the weekend of
December 10 and would elect local leadership as well as
consider reforms to the party,s structures and constitution.
Tsvangirai expressed confidence that all of the provincial
congresses would support him, with the possible exception of
Matabeleland South.
¶7. (C) Responding to the Charge’s expression of concern
about growing reports of intra-party violence, Tsvangirai
said he “didn’t know where such reports were coming from.”
Then he recounted several incidents of violence against his
supporters and asked why nobody seemed to want to discuss
those. In any event, he had earlier expelled certain youths
over their violent actions and acknowledged the importance of
not giving the ruling party fodder with which to discredit
the MDC for violent tactics. He said he was confident that
the provincial congresses would not turn violent.
———————
Engaging with ZANU-PF
———————
¶8. (C) Responding to the Charge’s inquiries about any
discussions he may have had with elements of the ruling
party, Tsvangirai said he had engaged with ruling party
elements with a view to exploiting fissures. He said he met
with unspecified individuals “from time to time” and found
the parliament a particularly useful venue in which the MDC
could reach out to the “many doubters” on the other side. He
observed that “suppression” at the top of ZANU-PF remained
strong, but that fissures became more evident farther down,
especially in the hopelessness over the country’s economic
situation, and that he would remain open to such discussions.
¶9. (C) In a separate meeting with poloff on November 26,
Tsvangirai adviser Eddie Cross provided background on some of
SIPDIS
some of these meetings. According to Cross, Tsvangirai had
met in September with ZANU-PF kingpin Solomon Mujuru at
Mujuru’s instigation. Mujuru had heavy-handedly invited
Tsvangirai to cooperate with him &post-Mugabe8 and be
SIPDIS
“taken care of” or else. After Tsvangirai had refused, a
more conciliatory Mujuru had gotten the two together two
weeks later and asked what it would take to win Tsvangirai,s
cooperation. Tsvangirai had responded that it would take a
negotiated constitution, a transitional government, and free
and fair, internationally monitored national elections.
¶10. (C) Cross said Mujuru never responded to Tsvangirai’s
proposal but instead, supported by South African President
Thabo Mbeki, approached Welshman Ncube with the same initial
deal, to which Ncube had agreed. Ncube’s desperate attempts
to oust Tsvangirai over the past two months represented his
part of the bargain with Mujuru. Adding substance to this
charge, MDC MP David Coltart confided to poloff in another
meeting on November 26 that Ncube had recently taken
possession of a farm seized as part of the GOZ,s fast-track
land reform. Coltart said the owner of the farm in question
was a client of his. He added that Ncube had also purchased
Z$1 billion (US$10,000) in cattle, and had received his
Mercedes – a parliamentary perk – ahead of others who had
still not received a car from the last parliament.
——-
Comment
——-
¶11. (C) The suspension effort appears to represent the
uncoordinated will of the increasingly isolated leadership of
the Ncube faction. Indeed, Coltart – the party’s Secretary
for Legal Affairs and a member of the Disciplinary Committee
– confirmed to poloff the Disciplinary Committee’s
limitations and said he was unaware of any suspension actions
underway. Ncube faction member Moses Mzila-Ndlovu told
poloff the same day that plans were afoot to commence
suspension proceedings the following week but seemed unaware
that a letter had gone forward. Tsvangirai is likely to
easily beat back this effort at the December 3 meeting.
¶12. (C) However, much more dangerous to the party than the
ill-advised suspension effort is the opposing faction’s
apparent willingness to draw Tsvangirai and the party as a
whole into protracted procedural battles that will distract
the party from its imperative to reconnect with the public
and do battle with the regime. The Ncube faction,s actions
would certainly seem to lend credence to the allegations that
they have sold the party out (Embassy efforts to communicate
with Ncube and key allies over the past two weeks have been
fruitless, and Ncube failed to appear at a scheduled meeting
with poloff in Bulawayo on election day). However, perhaps
the greatest risk to the MDC at this juncture is the threat
that the intra-party wrangling may spill over into the courts
where the GOZ would be able to manipulate outcomes that would
further hamstring the opposition.
SCHULTZ
(27 VIEWS)
