Former Finance Minister Simba Makoni told United States ambassador to Zimbabwe Christopher Dell that the government was not the beginning and end of Zimbabwe so the United States should seek engagement with other potentially influential figures.
He said President Robert Mugabe was religious despite his Marxist leanings and listened to clerics such as Zimbabwe’s senior Jesuit Father Fidelis Mukonori and Anglican Bishop Norbert Kunonga.
Mugabe also respected and liked to engage with self-made businesspersons such as John Chiweshe, chairman of the Tobacco Merchants Association, and safari mogul Mike Chidziwa.
Makoni said he remained on good terms with Mugabe and could see him whenever he asked.
They continued to have frank exchanges and Makoni asserted that Mugabe continued to enjoy intellectual debate.
He dispelled popular notions that Mugabe had dismissed him for his economic proposals; rather, Makoni had resigned when he realised that his proposals would never be adopted.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 05HARARE547, ZANU-PF POLITBURO MEMBER DISMISSIVE OF PARTY,S
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000547
SIPDIS
AF/S FOR B. NEULING
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2010
TAGS: PGOV PREL EFIN PHUM ZI ZANU PF
SUBJECT: ZANU-PF POLITBURO MEMBER DISMISSIVE OF PARTY,S
POTENTIAL TO LEAD REFORM
REF: HARARE 128
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell under Section 1.4 b/d
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a candid exchange with the Ambassador on
April 6, politburo member and former Finance Minister Simba
Makoni asked about U.S. reaction to the elections. The
Ambassador explained USG objections, sharing with Makoni a
copy of the Embassy press release. Makoni said the U.S.
analysis of election irregularities was the most detailed he
had seen. Still, he predicted it would have little effect,
since ZANU-PF had known the U.S. would never endorse a
ZANU-PF victory. Noting the degree of self-delusion that
exists within the party, Makoni predicted that a more
confident ZANU-PF would emerge from the elections. However,
it was not likely to alter its political or economic policies
significantly. In that regard, Makoni asserted that Mugabe
was not impervious to reason but that most of the government
and senior ranks of the party, and especially the &young
Turks,8 lacked the political courage needed to argue with
Mugabe in favor of needed reforms. Makoni confirmed that
some in the leadership were interested in rapprochement with
the West but not on terms other than their own. Makoni
closed with a pitch for USG support of his candidacy for the
ADB presidency. END SUMMARY
————
The Election
————
¶2. (C) Makoni asked the Ambassador how the USG regarded
Zimbabwe’s parliamentary elections. Recounting a litany of
flaws in the election’s conduct and the Zimbabwe Election
Commission’s (ZEC) failure to address discrepancies, the
Ambassador characterized the election results as not
credible. The Ambassador shared the Embassy’s publicly
released assessment on the elections. Makoni said it was the
most detailed critique he had seen and raised issues about
which he and others in the leadership were unaware. However,
he said most in the party would discount the U.S. statement,
since they believed the U.S. had made up its mind in advance
to reject a ZANU-PF victory.
¶3. (C) In defense of the elections, Makoni offered a
detailed description about how the presence of party polling
agents throughout the process, including at tabulation
centers, was to have prevented rigging and observed that the
MDC leadership’s claims of “massive fraud” had yet to be
backed up by any details. He added that their claims were
also undermined by the MDC,s (alleged) initial embrace of
the results when early returns from Harare and Bulawayo
showed them sweeping the two urban centers. That said,
Makoni acknowledged that ZEC should have an institutional
interest in clearing up doubts about the election by
releasing the numbers.
——————————————— ————
A Dysfunctional Ruling Party That Can,t/Won,t Lead Reform
——————————————— ————
¶4. (C) While Makoni defended the election results, he did
concede that popular support for the ruling party was
shallow. He cited a study he had done for the party in the
mid-90s that showed ZANU-PF getting a larger share of the
vote but in a declining electorate. That situation had only
worsened and ZANU-PF was now a “mass-based” party that
depended on a committed minority to hold on to power. Every
day was now &campaign day8 for ZANU-PF as the party had to
work to maintain support in the face of continuing economic
difficulties. The problem was that many in ZANU-PF were
convinced by their own rhetoric and believed they had the
people with them and therefore no need to change. This was
not true, especially with regard to economic policies, where
the populace at large was clamoring for change.
¶5. (C) Makoni said there was an expectation in some quarters
that the ruling party, more confident of its standing in the
wake of its electoral showing, might move forward with more
constructive economic and political policy agendas. However,
he thought political expediency would undermine any push for
reform. On the economy for instance, his area of expertise,
the leadership would probably assess that the right economic
policies would involve unacceptable political costs. Even
with a decisive election victory, the party would be loath to
embrace painful economic medicine. He added that in any
event, economic liberalization had not been a ZANU-PF
priority since at least 2000.
¶6. (C) Makoni said further constraining ZANU-PF,s ability
to lead reform was the deference to Mugabe by all in
positions of potential influence. It was true that Mugabe,s
worldview remained suspicious of markets and the West. That
said, in Makoni,s experience, Mugabe was not impervious to
persuasion and could chart a more constructive course if
enough trusted advisers weighed in. Unfortunately, no one in
Mugabe,s inner circle was willing to risk his displeasure
and tell him the hard truths. The Ambassador noted not
without reason, for instance, Mugabe’s suppression of
internal debate on the margins of the December Party Congress
and Makoni’s own dismissal as Finance Minister when he
advocated reforms. Makoni conceded the point.
¶7. (C) Makoni said that impetus for change, if any, within
the party was most likely to come from some in the ascendant
“Old Guard.” The “Young Turks” and “technocrats” lacked the
courage of their convictions and had proven incapable of
asserting themselves effectively. He recounted his own
experience in falling from grace as Finance Minister several
years ago. Many in the politburo agreed with his
market-oriented prescriptions but left him isolated during
politburo meetings. He concluded that these individuals bore
greater responsibility for Zimbabwe’s economic disaster than
even Mugabe himself because they knew better but were too
timid to act.
——————-
Bilateral Relations
——————-
¶8. (C) The Ambassador asked if the country’s desperate need
for re-engagement with international financial institutions
and the West would be a powerful enough incentive to take
concrete measures that are a precondition to any conceivable
rapprochement with the United States and other like-minded
governments. Makoni conceded that, notwithstanding the GOZ’s
“look East” rhetoric, there was nowhere for Zimbabwe to turn
but to the West for economic recovery. However, by any
measure the economy had collapsed years ago and with the rise
of informal markets, was not as bad off (as compared to
2002-03) as it might appear. The GOZ was more likely to
remain in its familiar anti-imperialist posture and just
“muddle through” before it would pursue concrete political or
economic reforms in any “charm offensive.” That said, he
urged the Ambassador to wait for the dust to settle on the
election and then discuss bilateral relations with selected
GOZ and ruling party officials. Makoni suggested reaching
out to Party Chairman John Nkomo, Secretary for
Administration Didymus Mutasa, and Defense Minister Sydney
Sekeramayi. Vice-President Joyce Mujuru would be constrained
for now by the newness of her position but was “open-minded”
and might be a constructive interlocutor down the road.
¶9. (C) Makoni emphasized that the government was not the
“beginning and end” of Zimbabwe, and also urged strong USG
engagement with other potentially influential figures. Civil
society and the churches remained important. Mugabe was
religious despite his Marxist leanings, and listened to
clerics such as Zimbabwe’s senior Jesuit, Father Fidelis, and
Anglican Bishop Kunonga. Mugabe also respected and liked to
engage with self-made businesspersons such as John Chiweshe
(Chairman of the Tobacco Merchants Association) and safari
mogul Mike Chidziwa. As for himself, Makoni said he remained
on good terms with Mugabe and could see him whenever he
asked. They continued to have frank exchanges and Makoni
asserted the Mugabe continued to enjoy intellectual debate.
He dispelled popular notions that Mugabe had dismissed him
for his economic proposals; rather, Makoni had resigned when
he realized that his proposals would never be adopted.
————————
Pitch for ADB Presidency
————————
¶10. (C) Makoni closed with a request for American support of
his candidacy for the presidency of the African Development
Bank (ADB) and laid out his (admittedly strong) personal
qualifications for the job. The Ambassador undertook to
relay the request to Washington but noted that Makoni’s
nationality might pose complications given the state of
bilateral relations. Makoni emphasized that ADB candidates
competed as individuals on the strength of their own merits
and not as government representatives. In his case, SADC
members had collaborated to get behind one candidate from
their region; he earned their endorsement in a competitive
process, which spoke to the strength of his credentials and
the breadth of his appeal. He recognized that at least one
candidate was using his “wrong address” against him, shopping
the idea that Makoni was subject to travel sanctions even
though he is not on U.S. or EU sanctions lists. He urged
that the USG weigh these factors and give his candidacy full
consideration.
——-
Comment
——-
¶11. (C) In a Mass Public Opinion Institute poll a year ago,
Makoni was the only putative successor to Mugabe aside from
MDC President Morgan Tsvangirai who garnered significant
support from all provinces. That Makoni, one of Zimbabwe’s
most impressive senior technocrats, has essentially given up
on Zimbabwe’s politics to seek the ADB job, speaks volumes
about the lack of oxygen inside the ruling party leadership.
We agree with his assessment that post-election ZANU-PF will
be no more dynamic or capable of constructive policy shifts
than pre-election ZANU-PF was. Indeed, his views tend to
confirm our own analysis that ZANU-PF will be incapable of
reforming itself, much less Zimbabwe, as long as it is an
institution made in the image of Robert Mugabe and bent
solely to his personal political ends. As noted in reftel,
we think that endorsement of his ADB candidacy could send the
wrong signal to the GOZ, notwithstanding Mr. Makoni’s
individual merits. Moreover, despite his wishes, we think
Makoni can do more good if he stays in Zimbabwe rather than
in effect joining the millions of other bright Zimbabweans
who have fled their country.
Dell
(21 VIEWS)
