The United States embassy said Emmerson Mnangagwa, who had been sidelined at the 2004 Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front congress, and his supporters had not yet conceded defeat and could use Operation Murambatsvina and the continuing economic failures to discredit the ZANU-PF leadership.
The embassy seemed disillusioned by infighting within the Movement for Democratic Change saying that if the party survived the internal dissension and its failure to show leadership during the operation it could also use these failures to discredit ZANU-PF.
“The current leadership of ZANU-PF, Mugabe, the Mujurus, and Didymus Mutasa to name the key players, appear to have decided that they cannot reverse economic decline without adopting policies that would threaten their hold on power,” the embassy said.
“Continued economic decline will make an unpopular regime still more unpopular. It will also affect the regime’s ability to control its own party through the use of patronage. In this context, Murambatsvina makes perfect sense as a warning to the whole of Zimbabwe that the regime will do whatever it needs to in order to stay in power.”
Full cable:
Viewing cable 05HARARE1004, ZIMBABWEQS WINTER OF DISCONTENT
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
221157Z Jul 05
ACTION AF-00
INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AID-00 AMAD-00 USNW-00 CIAE-00 INL-00
DS-00 EAP-00 EUR-00 VC-00 H-00 TEDE-00 INR-00
IO-00 LAB-01 VCE-00 NRC-00 NSAE-00 OES-00 OIC-00
OMB-00 NIMA-00 PA-00 MCC-00 GIWI-00 FMPC-00 SP-00
SSO-00 SS-00 EPAE-00 SCRS-00 DSCC-00 PRM-00 DRL-00
G-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 SWCI-00 /001W
——————199E46 221247Z /38
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8633
INFO SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ABUJA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L HARARE 001004
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR U/S BURNS, AF A/S NEWMAN/DAS WOODS; OVP FOR
NULAND; NSC FOR ABRAMS, COURVILLE; AID FOR PIERSON, COPSON
DEPARTMENT PASS EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ZI ZANU PF
SUBJECT: ZIMBABWEQS WINTER OF DISCONTENT
Classified By: Classified by CDA Eric Schultz, reasons 1.4 (b) (d)
——–
Overview
——–
¶1. (C) The winter of Murambatsvina (Operation Restore
Order) seems to have changed everything in Zimbabwe and
nothing. Robert Mugabe is still president and likely to
remain so for as long as he wants Q which could be until
the day he dies. ZANU-PF is still firmly in control. The
economy is still deteriorating. The people are still
passive and essentially leaderless in the face of
government repression as the MDC focuses inward. But the
GOZ, under new day-to-day management, has dropped all
pretense and revealed itself as a brutal Q and callous Q
dictatorship. Since taking the reins of the government
MugabeQs would-be heirs, the Mujurus, have shown themselves
to be not only mean-spirited and corrupt but, from a ZANU
perspective, much worse – incompetent. With the steepening
decline of the economy has come the steady erosion of the
regimeQs extensive patronage system that once bought off
losers and kept party members loyal. In its absence
repression, a la Murambatsvina, looms large as the regimeQs
alternative means of control.
¶2. (C) The turn to repression has cost the regime support
internationally, regionally, and domestically. The
Europeans have stiffened their resolve and even the region
may finally have had enough if recent signals from South
Africa are to be believed. ZANU itself is riven with
dissension, exacerbated by the succession struggle and the
decline of patronage, waiting only for MugabeQs passing or
incapacitation to burst forth. For its part, the MDC bides
its time, convinced that the regime will implode and that
it will pick up the pieces. The countryQs future remains
unpredictable but one thing seems clear after this winter,
the restoration of democracy and prosperity in Zimbabwe
will be more difficult, especially as what remains of the
educated populace, black, white, or Indian, appears
increasingly ready to throw in the towel and emigrate. The
remainder of the population, psychologically scarred but
unable to leave, is hunkering down and trying to survive
what could be a very bad next few years.
—————————-
MurambatsvinaQs Winter Chill
—————————-
¶3. (C) ZimbabweQs normally mild winter has been cloudy and
cold this year. The nights have been especially bitter.
The weather mirrors the national mood as Zimbabweans come
to terms with the countryQs bleak reality following
Operation QMurambatsvinaQ or Restore Order as it has been
translated into English. In its first two months, the
operation has left hundreds of thousands of Zimbabweans, by
some estimates more than a million, homeless and
destitute. Many of these people, who were the poorest of
the poor, are now sleeping in the open, enduring
temperatures near freezing. The operation has also
destroyed most of the countryQs informal economy, which may
have amounted to as much as 40 percent of GDP, and was
critical to the strategies of many Zimbabweans, rich and
poor alike, for coping with economic decline.
¶4. (C) Beyond the economic and social damage it has caused,
it is also apparent that the operation has taken a
psychological toll, in part because of its indiscriminate
nature. For instance, it not only targeted MDC strongholds
but ZANU-PF neighborhoods as well and in addition to
African traders, the traditionally pro-ZANU-PF Indian
community was hit hard. Most Zimbabweans seem angry about
what has happened but feel powerless to do anything about
it. Long-time observers of the country cannot recall a
time when people were less hopeful about the countryQs
future. Inevitably, that means that many, especially the
educated, are looking to leave. In the past few weeks, we
have had an upsurge of long-term American residents of
Zimbabwe seeking to renew American passports. In the words
of one seventy-year old it is time to Qgive up.Q Many
Embassy officers have reported similar discussions with
friends and contacts in the countryQs educated black middle
class as well as among its small white and Indian ethnic
minorities.
—————–
Economic Meltdown
—————–
¶5. (C) It is not only Murambatsvina that is driving
Zimbabweans to despair. The country is facing economic
turmoil on a scale not seen even in 2002, the last major
crisis. The country is desperately short of food, fuel,
and the foreign exchange needed to buy them. With no
access to balance of payments support, the country is
caught in a vicious circle of declining exports leading to
less foreign exchange leading to further declines in
exports. Exporters have access to less and less of the
foreign currency they generate which they need to pay for
the imports needed to finish their products. Instead, the
foreign currency coming into the country must pay for
massive food and fuel imports Q with a certain amount also
being siphoned off to feed official corruption.
¶6. (C) Food insecurity is arguably the most serious
shortage facing the country, especially in rural areas.
The shortfall has never been worse. The governmentQs fast
track land reform and this yearQs drought combined to
produce a record low maize harvest. The country needs to
import 1.2 million metric tons of maize, fully 75 percent
of its needs. The IMF team that visited last month
concluded that Zimbabwe probably had enough foreign
currency to pay for food imports but that this would
inevitably cause shortages elsewhere. Over the past two
months, the GOZ has increased the pace of food imports, to
nearly 100,000 MTs a month, but in the process has proven
the IMFQs point as a massive fuel shortage has erupted.
¶7. (C) For the urban population, it is the fuel situation
that has come to symbolize the countryQs accelerating
decline. The country is all but bereft of fuel. The price
on the black market is up to Z$70,000 a litre, which works
out to roughly U.S. $10 a gallon, and even at that price is
almost impossible to find. Economic activity is grinding
to a halt as a result of the fuel shortages. The only
people who can routinely get fuel are those who work for
companies or organizations, like the Embassy, that import
their own. Or who work for the government. But even that
source is apparently drying up. The police and
intelligence officers are said to have had their allotments
cut in half, and even mid-ranking ZANU-PF officials and
their families are feeling the pinch.
———————–
A Stronger Police State
———————–
¶8. (C) To the average Zimbabwean, white or black, rich or
poor, the governmentQs obsession with Murambatsvina while
the economy is melting down seemed inexplicable. The
consensus view among most of our regular contacts following
the March parliamentary elections, especially in the
business sector, was that a more secure ZANU-PF, its
two-thirds majority restored, would adopt more moderate and
sensible economic and social policies and would seek to
regain the good graces of the international community.
Instead, the opposite has happened. The new Cabinet,
largely dominated by the Mujuru clan, victors in the
internal ZANU-PF power struggle at last yearQs party
congress, has turned to repression as its primary means of
retaining power.
¶9. (C) There has been much speculation about the regimeQs
true motives and about the role of President Mugabe in
authorizing the operation. But of one thing we can be
sure, the party leadershipQs intent was to increase their
hold over the country, politically, economically, and
socially. The overriding objective for the MujuruQs is to
ensure that the Vice President, Joyce Mujuru, succeeds
Mugabe, by whatever means necessary. As to Mugabe, the
most telling comment was one the UN Special Envoy, Anna
Tibaijuka, offered at dinner with the visiting staffdel the
night of July 25. She recounted how in her youth then
President Nyerere had launched a similar operation in
Tanzania only to stop it three days later when he saw it
getting out of control. As Tibaijuka somberly noted,
Mugabe made no effort to stop the operation, even after it
was clear that it was causing massive human suffering.
Whether he couldnQt or whether he didnQt care she left to
her listeners to decide.
¶10. (C) The ruling clique probably believes the operation
to have been a success. The raw demonstration of the
regimeQs authority has gone largely unchallenged within
Zimbabwe either by the opposition or by the people
themselves. Much is made of the cultural passivity of the
Shona people and perhaps that is part of the reason why the
operation has largely gone unchallenged. But a more
telling factor is simply fear. The regime retains a
monopoly on the use of force and Zimbabweans of all stripes
know it will not hesitate to deploy the police, or even the
military if need be.
¶11. (C) On the surface the regime appears to be more in
control of the country than ever before. However, that
control has never been as naked before either and the
regimeQs power base has essentially narrowed to the police,
the security services, and the military. Even the party
has become less reliable as economic decline has reduced
the reach of the once extensive patronage system that kept
party members loyal. The GOZ now rules almost entirely by
intimidation and repression; for all intents and purposes
it has become a police state.
——————-
But a Weaker Regime
——————-
¶12. (C) Murambatsvina and the economic meltdown may have
accelerated ZimbabweQs transition to a police state, but we
would argue that it has not made the regimeQs long-term
hold on the country, and especially that of the MujuruQs,
more secure. In that regard, Murambatsvina may well prove
to have been a critical mistake, one that has given the
opponents of the current leadership of the regime, both
within and without ZANU-PF, useful ammunition.
¶13. (C) The UN Special Envoy and her team came to the
conclusion that neither enforced QruralizationQ or the
destruction of the informal economy would last long. We
agree. Growing food insecurity in rural areas and the
better prospects for making a living in the city will
likely ensure that many people return and rebuild in urban
and peri-urban areas. Many have never left at all. There
is every likelihood that by the time the next national
elections are held, whether in 2008 as scheduled or 2010 as
rumored, current demographic patterns will have been
reestablished and the MDC or some other opposition party
will once more win the urban vote.
¶14. (C) More importantly, we would argue that Murambatsvina
has had a number of unintended effects that have clearly
weakened the regime for the long run and that will fuel
attacks by its opponents within ZANU-PF and in the
opposition. It has significantly increased ZimbabweQs
international isolation. Following the elections it was
clear that France, Italy and other European countries were
preparing to press for the EU to normalize relations with
the GOZ. That effort is now suspended indefinitely, much
to the relief of our British colleagues. This development
also has obvious implications for the IMF vote on expulsion
in August, the danger of which the regime seems to have
finally woken to.
¶15. (C) The operation has also begun to tear at African
solidarity with Zimbabwe. It is much harder for the GOZ to
spin to Africans a crackdown on poor blacks than it was the
seizure of white farms. The Special EnvoyQs visit and her
apparently negative report (due to be released July 22),
along with last weekQs condemnation of the GOZ by the South
African Council of Churches (SACC) have apparently put
intense pressure on South African President Mbeki and other
African leaders to finally take action on Zimbabwe.
¶16. (C) Finally, Murambatsvina has also further alienated
ZANU-PF, ostensibly a peopleQs liberation party, from the
people it is supposed to have liberated. The current
ruling clique, the Mujurus and their allies, may not care
all that much, indeed every sign is that they have evolved
into a kleptocracy primarily motivated by a desire to stay
in power. However, it does seem to matter to many others
within the party and has added to increasing internal
dissension, already fueled by the succession struggleQs
move to a new phase at last yearQs party congress.
¶17. (C) Emmerson Mnangagwa and his supporters have yet to
concede defeat and will no doubt use Murambatsvina and the
continuing economic failures to discredit the current
leadership, either from within the party or as the core of
a Qthird forceQ in Zimbabwean politics. The MDC, assuming
it survives its own internal dissension and its failure to
show leadership or even solidarity with the victims of
Murambatsvina, will also be able to use these failures to
good effect in discrediting ZANU-PF as a whole in future
elections.
————————-
Conclusion: Make Them Pay
————————-
¶18. (C) The current leadership of ZANU-PF, Mugabe, the
Mujurus, and Didymus Mutasa to name the key players, appear
to have decided that they cannot reverse economic decline
without adopting policies that would threaten their hold on
power. Continued economic decline will make an unpopular
regime still more unpopular. It will also affect the
regimeQs ability to control its own party through the use
of patronage. In this context, Murambatsvina makes perfect
sense as a warning to the whole of Zimbabwe that the regime
will do whatever it needs to in order to stay in power.
Increased repression, however, will only deepen the countryQ
s misery and further undermine the regimeQs legitimacy,
domestically, regionally, and internationally.
¶19. (C) The regime made a bold move with Murambatsvina but
it is one that already appears to be backfiring on them, as
evidenced by the apparent pressure the South Africa
Government is bringing to bear. We need ensure that the
GOZ remains faced with its current unpalatable choice Q
between policy changes that will undermine its hold on
power or further repression that will undermine the
regional support it needs to survive.
SCHULTZ
NOTE: NOT PASSED TO ABOVE ADDRESSEE(S)
NNNN
(38 VIEWS)
