South Africa and Botswana were so pissed off with lack of progress in finding a solution to the Zimbabwean problem that Botswana wanted “to take the gloves off” with President Robert Mugabe at the next Southern African Development Community summit, a cable released by Wikileaks says.
According to the cable this was told to former journalist Sydney Masamvu by South Africa’s Director General of the Department of Foreign Affairs Ayanda Ntsaluba in August 2007.
Ntsaluba said South Africa had a “no nonsense” attitude towards the crisis in Zimbabwe because of the increasing number of Zimbabweans that were flocking into the country. Botswana was even more frustrated.
Despite the lack of progress South African President Thabo Mbeki was going to tell his colleagues at the SADC meeting in Lusaka that he was making progress so that he could keep pressure on the negotiating partners in Zimbabwe at the table.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 07PRETORIA2818, MBEKI TO PUT POSITIVE SPIN ON ZIMBABWE MEDIATION
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|
Reference ID |
Created |
Released |
Classification |
Origin |
VZCZCXRO8347
RR RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHSA #2818/01 2250515
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 130515Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1163
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0535
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1262
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0492
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1136
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0087
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 2112
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 1014
RUEHDU/AMCONSUL DURBAN 9062
RUEHTN/AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN 4688
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRETORIA 002818
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF/S S. HILL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/09/2017
SUBJECT: MBEKI TO PUT POSITIVE SPIN ON ZIMBABWE MEDIATION
AT SADC SUMMIT
REF: A. PRETORIA 2210
¶B. TRENKLE-HILL EMAIL OF 6/19/2007
¶C. PRETORIA 2414
¶D. GABORONE 1031
¶E. PRETORIA 2646
¶F. PRETORIA 1447
PRETORIA 00002818 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Donald Teitelbaum. Reasons 1.4(
b) and (d).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Despite limited progress on the core
political issues, President Mbeki will likely paint an upbeat
picture for SADC Heads of State on his Zimbabwe political
facilitation at the upcoming summit in Lusaka. Mbeki
believes the positive spin will help keep the GOZ negotiators
at the table and open the door to GOZ political concessions
as the economic situation in Zimbabwe deteriorates. Mbeki
will point to the latest round of secret talks which took
place in South Africa August 4-6. While the two sides agreed
to pursue reforms through the pending Constitutional
Amendment 18, they did not reach consensus on core issues
such as repealing repressive laws and reforming the electoral
system. We continue to be skeptical about the prospects of
the Mbeki facilitation in Zimbabwe, but note that the SAG is
under increasing domestic pressure to deal with the
situation. END NOTE.
————————————-
Two Rounds of Talks; Limited Progress
————————————-
¶2. (C) Negotiators from the Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ) and
opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) met in South
Africa August 4-6, according to IDASA political analyst
Sydney Masamvu and MDC Treasurer Roy Bennett (protect both).
(NOTE: Despite the tensions between the two MDC camps,
Secretaries General Tendai Biti and Welshman Ncube both
SIPDIS
participated in the talks. END NOTE.) Masamvu received
seperate read-outs on the talks from Department of Foreign
Affairs Director General Ayanda Ntsaluba and MDC leader
Morgan Tsvangirai. In a significant concession to the GOZ,
South Africa and the MDC agreed to work with the GOZ-proposed
Constitutional Amendment 18, instead of insisting on a new
constitution. The South Africans and MDC believe they can
achieve their goals by “front loading” Amendment 18 with the
necessary political reforms to level the playing field before
the March 2008 elections, and will deal with the broader
constitutional reforms at a later date.
¶3. (C) According to Masamvu, the two sides did not reach
agreement on five “sticking points”:
— the status of the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and
Access to Information and Privacy Act (AIEPA) (MDC wants both
repealed),
— diaspora vote (the MDC wants diaspora to be able to vote),
— proportional representation (the MDC wants a PR system;
the GOZ wants single-member constituencies),
— legalization of the death penalty (the GOZ wants the death
penalty; the MDC doesn’t), and
— demarcation of parliamentary districts.
In Masamvu’s opinion, these are the key issues that must be
resolved before Zimbabwe can hold free and fair elections.
¶4. (C) The August 4-6 meeting was only the second time the
GOZ negotiators met formally with the South African
Government (SAG) team, led by SAG Minister for Provincial and
Local Government Sydney Mufamadi, since the March 31 SADC
Extraordinary Summit tasked Mbeki to facilitate political
dialogue between the MDC and GOZ (although we understand the
GOZ and MDC negotiators have met privately in Harare).
During the first round of talks, on June 17-18, the two sides
PRETORIA 00002818 002.2 OF 003
agreed on an agenda (refs A and B). ZANU-PF negotiators
failed to show up for planned talks in mid-July, a snub that
received wide press coverage and led to a SAG statement
denying that “Mugabe has spurned the SADC-led facilitation
process” (ref C).
————————————–
Mbeki to Put Best Face on Facilitation
————————————–
¶5. (C) Despite the limited concrete movement on core
political issues, Masamvu believes that President Mbeki will
tell his colleagues at the upcoming SADC Summit in Lusaka
that he is making progress in his facilitation effort. He
will point to agreement on procedural issues, as well as
improvements on the ground, like the lifting of the ban on
MDC rallies and the release of most opposition leaders from
jail. According to Masamvu, Mbeki believes that he must keep
the GOZ negotiators at the table and that an overly negative
report will undermine SADC’s influence with Mugabe. Over
time, the economic implosion in Zimbabwe will, the SAG hopes,
force the GOZ to make political concessions. Although
everyone is focused on the Mbeki political readout, Masamvu
believes the report of the SADC Secretariat on the economic
situation in Zimbabwe (ref D) could be even more significant
in terms of pressuring Mugabe.
¶6. (C) DFA’s Ntsaluba assured Masamvu that the SAG has a
“no-nonsense” attitude toward the crisis in Zimbabwe. The
increasing number of Zimbabweans crossing the border affects
South Africa directly (ref E). Ntsaluba told Masamvu the
Government of Botswana is even more frustrated than South
Africa and “wants to take the gloves off” with Mugabe at the
SADC Summit, in large part because of the impact of the
Zimbabwean refugee/migration crisis on Botswana’s economy.
——————
Mbeki Spent Force?
——————
¶7. (C) Institute for Security Studies (ISS) analyst Chris
Maroleng told PolOff August 7 that he believes Mbeki’s
facilitation in Zimbabwe is a “spent force.” Mbeki is
increasingly focused on his own domestic political survival
in advance of the December 2007 ANC elections. Mugabe is
simply “waiting Mbeki out,” Maroleng claimed. Maroleng also
suggested that no faction in ZANU-PF is strong enough to take
on Mugabe, although this could change in the coming months as
the economic situation deteriorates. Maroleng and Masamvu
agreed that the lack of any effective internal pressure from
the MDC on Mugabe through mass protests or other action also
empowers Mugabe and undermines the possibility of change
within ZANU-PF.
——-
Comment
——-
¶8. (C) We agree that President Mbeki is likely to put a
positive spin on his Zimbabwe political facilitation efforts
at the upcoming Lusaka SADC Summit. Mbeki will point to the
two rounds of talks and agreement on procedural and other
peripheral issues, and gloss over the lack of consensus on
the core political issues. As reported in Ref F, we continue
to be skeptical about the prospects of the Mbeki
facilitation. Mugabe has consistently outplayed Mbeki, and
appears to be doing it again. The SAG is unwilling to use
its economic leverage by cutting off electricity or fuel
exports. Threats of SADC condemning the March 2008 elections
ring hollow, especially since Mugabe still has allies in the
regional organization.
¶9. (C) For the first time, Mbeki faces serious domestic
pressure to deal with the Zimbabwean crisis as thousands of
Zimbabweans stream across the border every day. The
deteriorating economic situation in Zimbabwe and deepening
tensions within the ruling ZANU-PF party also present
PRETORIA 00002818 003.2 OF 003
opportunities for SAG diplomacy. However, new motivation and
opportunities may not be enough to force progress between the
two parties.
Bost
(21 VIEWS)
